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in the after noon of September 26, 2014, dozens of students from the 
teacher- training college of Ayotzinapa in Mexico’s coastal state of Guerrero 
set out to commandeer several buses to use as transportation to Mexico City. 
As they had in years past, they would attend the annual commemoration of 
the 1968 massacre in which the army killed hundreds of students demonstrat-
ing in Tlatelolco’s plaza. Frowned on by the authorities and begrudgingly 
tolerated by bus companies as the cost of  doing business, such bus takeovers 
by students of the country’s seventeen rural normales  were common practice. 
 These boarding schools, created in the 1920s for the sons and  daughters of 
campesinos, have long enjoyed a reputation for po liti cal militancy. This lat-
est action appeared as another exploit in this tradition. However,  later that 
night, as the Ayotzinapa students tried to depart the city of Iguala with the 
five buses they had garnered, they found themselves encircled by a massive 
armed operation. Local police blocked their exit while uniformed agents and 
plainclothes gunmen shot at them. The army dispatch at the nearby mili-
tary base that had, in concert with federal and state police, been tracking 
the students since they left their school  earlier that after noon, did nothing. 
By morning, three Ayotzinapa students lay dead, one with his face torn off. 
INTRODUCTION
Ayotzinapa and the  
Legacy of Revolution
2 Introduction
Forty- three other students had dis appeared, last seen being dragged off in 
the presence of federal and state authorities.1
Gruesome as it was, this event was hardly remarkable in a country whose 
war on drugs— officially declared in 2006— had, by then, left over 100,000 
 people dead and 25,000 more dis appeared.2 Indeed, federal officials quickly 
dismissed the attack as a local cartel conflict: if students from Ayotzinapa 
had been victims, they must have had some connection to illicit activity. 
 After all, the normalistas’ penchant for disruption was widely known. Re-
markably, however, this official narrative did not quell public ire, nor did the 
victims’ families accept it. Over the following months, thousands took to 
the streets demanding justice and the return of the forty- three dis appeared 
Ayotzinapa students. Why this event and not the thousands of other deaths 
and disappearances sparked the unpre ce dented protests has much to do with 
the identity of the forty- three dis appeared, the immediate actions of their 
peers, and the history of the schools where they studied.3
Founded in 1926, the rural normal of Ayotzinapa was one of thirty- five 
teacher- training schools the Mexican government built in the two de cades 
following the 1910–20 revolution. This civil war ended the thirty- five- year 
dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) and brought to power a nationalist 
government whose ensuing proj ect deployed teachers as agents of state con-
solidation. The institutions that would train  these educators acquired many 
of their defining characteristics during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas 
(1934–40), whose numerous progressive reforms included socialist edu-
cation. Although socialist education was short- lived as official policy and 
never clearly defined by its state architects, at rural normales its meaning was 
 simple and enduring: justice. Education for the poor, a student voice in in-
stitutional practices, and class consciousness constituted defining ele ments 
of normalista culture, reproduced in subsequent de cades thanks to student 
collective action.
 These dynamics  were at play that fateful September night. Commandeer-
ing buses from private companies was not just a means to acquire transpor-
tation but also a lesson in protest, one the student association passed on to 
each incoming class. The Tlatelolco commemoration that the Ayotzinapa 
students planned to attend, moreover, offered a history lesson, an impor tant 
one for rural normalistas whose besieged schools had for de cades produced 
numerous campesino and  labor activists, some killed or jailed by the state 
(figure I.1). Tlatelolco’s anniversary provided a venue to dramatize the myriad 
ways the government had betrayed the 1917 Constitution and the revolu-
tionary princi ples on which the modern Mexican state was founded.
figure I.1 Mural at the rural normal of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, that depicts the 1970s 
guerrilla leader Lucio Cabañas and the images of the Missing 43. The legend reads, 
“We are an army of dreamers.” Photo graph by author.
4 Introduction
The betrayal was de cades in the making. President Enrique Peña Nieto 
(2012–18), whose administration marked the return of the Institutional Rev-
olutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, pri), which had 
ruled the country from 1929 to 2000, epitomized many of its sins. It was 
corrupt, authoritarian, and technocratic, and its long relationship to drug 
trafficking had spun out of control, a dynamic reflected in the dizzying num-
bers of  people killed and dis appeared in the preceding de cade.4 In this con-
text, the vio lence against Ayotzinapa’s students was the proverbial straw that 
broke the camel’s back. Their condition as students, the sheer scale of the 
attack against them, and the state’s involvement in it elicited the specter of 
Tlatelolco, the site of a massacre that still haunts the pri. Building on their 
long tradition of protest, rural normalistas mobilized immediately, sparking 
a level of outcry the state could not contain.
 There are few weapons the poor can wield against the power ful, but in 
 those the rural normalistas are well versed. In addition to compelling bus 
 drivers to take them to demonstrations, they have frequently blocked roads, 
taken over tollbooths to let  drivers pass for  free, commandeered and distrib-
uted merchandise from cargo trucks, and sequestered transport vehicles in 
their schoolyards. And they have long or ga nized school strikes and walkouts. 
Students undertook most of  these actions merely to force the authorities to 
allocate the necessary bud gets for the schools’ subsistence— funds they are 
entitled to but often receive only  after a fight. While normalista per sis tence 
and loud protest have ensured their schools’ survival, they also produced a 
black legend. For de cades, the government and the press have labeled  these 
institutions centers of agitation and guerrilla seedbeds; the authorities have 
threatened to turn them into pig farms or schools for tourist technicians and 
have characterized  those who study and teach  there as agitators, subversives, 
and, more recently, pseudostudents or hooligans. Indeed, in the public de-
bates that raged as the families of Ayotzinapa’s Missing 43 searched for their 
sons, official narratives sought to blame the victims. What, other than trou-
ble, could students expect with their disruptive be hav ior and blatant disre-
gard for private property?
To the narrative that criminalized the victims, protesters counterposed 
the crimes of the state. “Fue el estado” (“It was the state”) became the mas-
sive rallying cry.  Here the Tlatelolco massacre, the anniversary of which the 
Ayotzinapa normalistas sought to honor, intensified the rage. Still an open 
wound, Tlatelolco resonated across social sectors, partly  because its victims 
 were students.5 Just as significant was the rural normalistas’ tradition of pro-
test. Within moments of the September 26 attack, with a fellow classmate’s 
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blood- soaked body still on the ground, students called a press conference 
and safeguarded the crime scene. Before most could even describe the events 
as they tran spired that night, normalistas had activated their school net-
works across the country, publicized this latest aggression against them, and 
reminded the nation of their schools’ history. That history is the subject of 
this book.
A RADICAL TRADITION
Since their founding, rural normales have been hosts to national sagas. 
Emerging from the state’s revolutionary proj ect, they trained teachers who 
 were intended to shape a modern patriotic citizenry by organ izing civic fes-
tivals, promoting hygiene and health campaigns, and replacing superstition 
with science. But the popu lar longings driving the Mexican Revolution also 
permeated  these institutions and by the 1930s became constituting ele ments 
of their institutional logic. Land reform, education for the poor, and commu-
nity leadership stood as guiding princi ples of the teachers they trained. Over 
the coming de cades, the tensions between state consolidation and revolu-
tionary justice produced a telling contradiction. The very schools meant to 
shape a loyal citizenry became hotbeds of po liti cal radicalism, and their gradu-
ates appeared consistently linked to militant protests, including guerrilla 
strug gles. How and why did the rural normales stray from the state’s original 
design?
The answer lies in four interrelated pro cesses. First, while rural normales 
 were founded for the purposes of state consolidation, they  were grounded in 
the notion of agrarian justice. Built on expropriated haciendas,  these schools 
 were enshrined with an air of poetic justice. In the palatial estates that pre-
viously exploited their parents, adolescents of campesino origin— one of the 
requirements to study at  these institutions— would now gain an education.6 
State officials linked education to rural development, adopting pedagogical 
princi ples that connected the classroom to the community, cooperativism 
to individual discipline, and learning to laboring.  These qualities, insisted 
Mexico’s early twentieth- century educational architects, would reinforce a 
“rural spirit,” one that harnessed campesinos’ commitment to the land but 
directed it to modern, efficient ends.7 This framework sparked a uniquely 
student- campesino consciousness that came to challenge a modern national 
proj ect increasingly devoid of justice.
Second, the state’s prescribed mission comingled with a transformation 
in students’ own identity. At rural normales, the  children of campesinos 
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became professionals, male and female students shed gender norms and ab-
sorbed diff er ent ones, and ethnic identities expanded or narrowed as nor-
malistas navigated the contradictions of mestizaje, the dominant ideology 
that Mexico constituted a harmonious mixture of Spanish and indigenous 
heritage. Field trips exposed students to diff er ent parts of the country, and 
dorm life alongside two hundred to five hundred other youth gave them a 
degree of autonomy they did not have at home. Such exposure and social 
fluidity denaturalized hierarchy and created both the possibility and expec-
tation of change.
Third, rural normales hosted broad contradictions that made strug gle a 
fact of daily life. The imposing architecture of the ex- haciendas that  housed 
 these schools contrasted with the spartan nature of daily life. Boarding-
houses rarely had enough beds for all of the students; the newly arrived slept 
on cardboard. Food was meager,  running  water and electricity infrequent. 
To secure their basic needs, students continuously petitioned the govern-
ment, leading them to mobilize for resources as much as they studied for 
classes. By underfunding and abandoning rural normales, the state assured 
that the individual upward mobility the schools promised could be secured 
only through collective strug gle.
Fi nally,  these contradictions extended beyond normalistas’ time as stu-
dents. Upon their graduation, the Ministry of Public Education (Secretaría 
de Educación Pública, sep) dispatched the young teachers to communities 
whose  children they would teach, whose living conditions they would im-
prove, and whose inhabitants they would or ga nize and uplift. It was a daunt-
ing task, one made virtually impossible  after 1940 as the state took less interest 
in the countryside, except as it might serve the cities. In lieu of the funding, 
infrastructure, and resources— including a dignified teaching salary— that 
might buttress rural education, the sep appealed to teachers’ missionary 
duty. They  were of campesino origin  after all; sacrifice must not be foreign 
to them.
Rural teachers navigated this contradiction in myriad ways. As did the 
rest of the population, most migrated to urban centers, where they pur-
sued professional advancement and could teach in more manageable con-
ditions. Plenty became regional caciques (po liti cal bosses), charros (official 
 unionists), or corrupt politicians.8 Some pursued justice relentlessly, willing 
to lose life and limb in the pro cess. In the minority,  these militant teachers 
and students exerted an outsized role, and their legacy is most associated 
with the rural normales. This association is partly based on rural normalistas’ 
constant protest to garner resources for their schools’ survival. But it is also 
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a mea sure of how  these schools served as an uncomfortable reminder of the 
countryside’s abandonment.
Unintended Lessons of Revolution details the culture of student militancy 
that was forged and reproduced in Mexico’s rural normales. Rural normalis-
tas occupied an intermediary position between city and countryside, and 
their lived experience, tactics of strug gle, and notions of justice drew on the 
campesino, student, and  labor worlds. The ideology they fashioned high-
lights key continuities between the old left (whose relationship to the Com-
munist Party looked to the Soviet Union as a model, saw workers as the 
principal revolutionary protagonists, and privileged structure over agency) 
and the new left (which was more inspired by anti- imperialist strug gles, espe-
cially Cuba; saw students and campesinos as essential agents of change; and 
believed the conditions for revolution should be made rather than awaited). 
At rural normales the relationship between the two became manifest not 
 because of the content or style of classroom lessons— which  were in many 
ways quite traditional— but  because of the nature of students’ collective liv-
ing experience in institutions conceived of within the framework of revo-
lutionary justice. As an ethos more than a pedagogy, Mexico’s brief 1930s 
experiment with socialist education proved transcendent. So, too, the Mexi-
can Federation of Socialist Campesino Students (Federación de Estudiantes 
Campesinos Socialistas de México, fecsm) formed in 1935 to advocate for 
the rights of students at rural normales. In the tradition of the old left, the 
federation was hierarchical, sought discipline from its members, imposed 
mandatory meetings and activities, and had a vanguardist strategy. Within 
rural normales it became a primary vehicle to challenge the state, transmit 
historical knowledge, and offer analytical tools that denaturalized poverty. It 
challenged the power ful to reckon with the vision of the oppressed.
That challenge propelled a radical po liti cal culture at rural normales, schools 
that, like other progressive institutions from Latin Amer i ca’s old left, became 
venues “where the abstractions of liberty and equality could be embodied as 
felt experiences, where individual rights and collective social justice would 
be viscerally understood and mutually dependent,” what Greg Grandin char-
acterized as insurgent politics.9 That from the start rural normales  were ma-
terially precarious, besieged by the right and dependent for their survival on 
students petitioning the state, punctured liberal individualist notions that 
education was an in de pen dent, self- sufficient endeavor. Insurgent politics 
also tied schooling to action, giving students a sense that conditions in the 
world could be changed. This pro cess spurred po liti cal consciousness, not 
 because students learned a critical pedagogy that they then applied as teachers, 
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but  because they came to understand their very schools as historically consti-
tuted through social relationships of power.10
The question of consciousness, an awareness of one’s material real ity that 
spurs action, is a central theme in this story. Scholars of  labor, agrarian, stu-
dent, and guerrilla movements have long noted the multifaceted, contingent, 
and contradictory nature of critical consciousness and its manifestations.11 
Consciousness is not, as E. P. Thompson famously put it, tied to the ups and 
downs of an economic curve but is an accumulation of lived experiences.12 It 
is also not a static or binary characteristic that subjects  either do or do not 
possess. Consciousness is a pro cess with multiple origins and expressions, al-
ways dependent on the particularities of time and place.13 Fi nally, conscious-
ness is a constantly evolving pro cess, one honed or transformed in the act of 
strug gle, one that itself generates new possibilities.14 This is why the tactics, 
rhe toric, and demands of par tic u lar movements change over time and why 
radical revolutionary language coexists with seemingly innocuous strategies 
of “reaching the  people.”15 In their rhe toric, historical actors often borrow 
from the only available po liti cal discourse, even if it originates with elites.16 
Other times the language of strug gle comes from utopian ideals spurred by 
insurrections of the dispossessed,  whether failed or successful.17 What ever 
its manifestations, context is key to understanding the puzzle of collective 
action.18
For the indigenous and campesino students of this study, that context was 
the network of rural normales, schools that came to harbor shared politicized 
cultural norms. This institutional world determined much of their praxis, a 
condition that goes a long way in explaining why,  after graduation, individ-
ual teachers’ paths diverged so widely and why, for many, upward mobility 
came to supersede collective action. But even within the schools, the polit-
icized environment did not mean all students  were militant actors. Indeed, 
as is historically the case, relentless activists are the minority and achieve 
change only when their message resonates with a larger group and when 
that larger group is willing to act. At rural normales the self- consciously po-
liti cal student leadership or ga nized through the fecsm achieved collective 
action not  because it promised liberation but  because it secured the basic 
material needs for their institutions’ survival and reproduction. To be sure, 
the fecsm did articulate radical princi ples—in its calls for socialism, for 
example— and or ga nized militant actions such as land takeovers alongside 
campesinos that posited a fundamental restructuring of society and culti-
vated alliances to achieve it. But for most normalistas  those lessons served as a 
framework to justify and secure their own rights: adequate living conditions 
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in their boarding schools, competent teachers and sufficient learning sup-
plies, pedagogical and recreational infrastructure, and a dignified job upon 
graduation. To achieve this, the fecsm constantly called for strikes. Since 
its representative body drew from rural normales across the country,  these 
strikes extended nationally and forced the upper echelons of the sep to the 
negotiating  table.
The politicized culture that became such an enduring feature of rural 
normales is a mea sure of how far the schools’ constituting logic— which fore-
grounded the countryside— contrasted with the state’s actions that privileged 
cities. Unable and unwilling to resolve this contradiction, the government 
propagated a narrative that stigmatized  these schools and their students like 
no  others, even as many rural normal gradu ates went on to serve as cogs in 
the ruling party’s governing apparatus. In the 1940s the authorities revived 
reactionary 1930s tropes demonizing teachers’ role as community leaders; 
the press added red- scare tales of Bolshevik takeovers in the 1950s and of 
Cuban subversion in the 1960s; and the sep topped it off by insisting that 
unqualified teachers bore responsibility for the nation’s educational short-
comings, especially the dismal situation in the countryside.
The logic established a clear continuity between the portrayal of ungrate-
ful campesino youth who, at rural normales, continued to challenge the state 
rather than appreciate the opportunity and resources to study and teachers who 
would not succumb to sep appeals for self- sacrifice and insisted on higher 
pay, better working conditions, and more benefits. Teachers’ very strug gle for 
 union democracy, which,  under the leadership and with the participation of 
rural normal gradu ates, saw especially strong episodes in the mid-1950s and 
again in the late 1970s, provided an additional layer with which to demonize 
them in the public eye.19 On the one hand, the National Union of Education 
Workers (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, snte)— the 
power ful official teachers’  union, whose historic allegiance to the state 
produced (often dubious)  labor concessions meant to control its base and 
harness support for the pri— offered proof of teachers’ collective corrup-
tion. On the other, when teachers challenged snte cronyism by mounting 
strug gles for in de pen dent  unions, they  were stigmatized for putting their 
 labor interests above  children’s educational needs.
But stigmatizing rural normales and blaming teachers for Mexico’s low 
education levels obscure the extent to which the school system itself reflected 
structural in equality, which  after 1940 became increasingly acute and 
was driven by three policy strategies that marked most of the twentieth 
 century. First, in contrast to President Cárdenas, who in the 1930s treated 
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rural education as part and parcel of community development, which in-
cluded land distribution, support for the ejido (communal landholdings), 
and the establishment of cooperatives, subsequent administrations addressed 
schooling in isolation.  After 1940 the sep continued to build school houses 
throughout the country, often at an accelerated pace. The sep also trained an 
increasing number of teachers to populate the new classrooms. But a village 
teacher could do  little against the broader forces of hunger, lack of infra-
structure, and families who could not send their  children to school  because 
their immediate economic survival depended on the entire  house hold’s 
 labor. The staggeringly low rates of elementary school completion are a tes-
tament to  these larger dynamics.20 Teacher absenteeism was another. Sent 
to remote communities, educators found themselves in a situation that was 
tantamount to exile. Rural living conditions did not correspond to the up-
ward mobility their education had promised. Their paychecks alone might 
take a year to arrive. Their salary level, moreover, was set on a lower scale 
than that of urban teachers. With this situation, sep appeals to missionary 
duty and self- sacrifice rang hollow. Teachers consistently sought transfers to 
urban areas where they would have better pay and working conditions and 
could seek additional schooling to qualify for positions in secondary schools 
or as principals, sep bureaucrats, or regional inspectors.
A second dynamic, the state’s policy  toward the countryside, aggravated 
this pro cess since it stymied the efforts of  those teachers willing to brave dif-
ficult conditions. Absent  after 1940 was any type of deliberate or sustained 
strategy to develop social infrastructure in the countryside. Indeed, at  every 
turn the state undermined campesinos’ basic ability to subsist off the land. 
Not only did agrarian re distribution slow  after Cárdenas, but presidents 
Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–46) and Miguel Alemán (1946–52) eased 
laws designed to prevent land concentration by expanding expropriation 
limits for export- crop cultivation. Through subsidized inputs for production 
and infrastructure proj ects, the state helped agribusiness establish its dom-
inance in the countryside, much of it geared to serve the US market.21 The 
1941 Rockefeller- sponsored Green Revolution also focused its aid efforts 
on large- scale farms. Campesinos could in no way compete with a mecha-
nized industry whose high- yielding seeds depended on sustained irrigation 
and high levels of fertilizers and chemical pesticides, the costs of which both 
the public and private sector sponsored.22 The 1942–64 US- Mexico Bracero 
Program, which sent hundreds of laborers north, and the 1965 Border In-
dustrialization Program, which led to the proliferation of northern assembly 
plants, offered jobs to rural mi grants that usually paid more than the income 
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they might derive from their own land cultivation. But such opportunities 
did nothing for rural development’s social infrastructure. On the contrary, 
to the extent that such opportunities helped laborers provide a better  future 
for their  children, that  future lay with an education in the cities. By the 1960s 
Mexico went from being a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban 
nation, a trend that continued throughout the  century. Material support 
for rural teachers and their school houses as venues to promote community 
development had by then long been abandoned— but not the rhe toric. The 
sep continued to invoke teachers’ sense of missionary duty by which they 
 were to endure rural poverty and isolation for the greater good of the na-
tion. Such appeals may have had some resonance had they been part of a de-
liberate national effort in which shared sacrifice produced a more equitable 
collective well- being. But the state made  these appeals at a time of unbridled 
prosperity, whose fruits accentuated in equality and  were based on a transfer 
of wealth from the countryside to the city.23
Fi nally, Mexico’s education spending itself operated  under a palliative 
rather than transformative logic. The state expanded educational opportu-
nities without implementing the structural reform consistently demanded 
by campesino,  labor, student, and indigenous movements. Public education 
compensated for the lack of other benefits— health care, social security, ade-
quate housing, stable employment, a living wage— ones the country’s majorities 
would never enjoy.24 Over the latter part of the twentieth  century, education 
spending ebbed and flowed depending on the presidential administration, 
but even when it increased, that rise did not improve its quality nor offer 
more equitable access.25 Nor did it always correspond to significant inter-
generational social mobility.26 Intertwined with this dynamic was the nature 
of the pri, whose power and orga nizational logic came from a corporatist 
structure that relied on  union networks affiliated to the state. The official 
teachers’  union, the snte, constituted Mexico’s (and Latin Amer i ca’s) largest 
 union. Aside from teachers, it included schools’ technical, manual, and cler-
ical personnel; nonmanagement and some lower- level sep administrative 
workers; and academic and nonacademic employees of institutes, research 
centers, and museums.27 Its infamously corrupt leadership— whose general 
secretaries comfortably navigated the halls of power, often using the snte 
as a springboard into po liti cal office— supported the pri in exchange for 
concessions to their membership.28  Those concessions  were again palliative, 
translating into increased opportunities for individual upward mobility 
rather than collective material improvements, much less  union democracy. 
When adjusted for inflation, for example, teachers’ pay did not achieve its 
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1921 levels  until the early 1960s; during the crucial years of educational ex-
pansion, this allowed the state to hire three teachers for the price of one.29 
In lieu of raises and other benefits demanded by dissident teachers in the 
1950s, the sep offered opportunities for professional development that cor-
responded to individual merit- based pay. The snte’s involvement in aca-
demic  matters—so censured by technocrats as interfering with educational 
efficiency— acted in tandem with this dynamic. The snte assured, guided, 
and directed opportunities for upward mobility to control its base.30  These 
opportunities, moreover, came in the cities, partly  because that was where 
the accrediting institutions  were located but, more impor tant,  because that 
was where the higher- paying jobs lay.31
It is within  these three structural dynamics— school construction devoid 
of rural development, support for agribusiness at the cost of the campesino 
economy, and the corporatist logic of education spending— that we must 
understand rural normales and their consistently politicized student body. 
Mexico’s urbanizing po liti cal economy marked rural normales as relics of 
a past proj ect even as they provided crucial opportunities for students to 
navigate the contradictions of national development. For this opportunity 
students had to fight: they had to fight to secure material resources, to ensure 
rural normales remained schools for the poor, and to prevent the reduction 
of spots for incoming students. Far from static, their frameworks of strug-
gle changed with each passing de cade and acquired new dimensions, ones 
rooted in the Mexican Revolution and the structural changes carried out 
 under Cárdenas, spurred by subsequent  battles to preserve the popu lar ele-
ments of the 1917 Constitution, given new impetus by the anti- imperialist 
and socialist ideals of the 1960s, and engaged with the guerrilla strug gles of 
the 1970s.
OLD DIVIDES, NEW QUESTIONS
Mexico’s education system of the 1920s and 1930s enjoys a robust tradition 
of study.32 For subsequent de cades, however, historians have turned their 
attention to student protest rather than to educational policy or schools 
as institutions.33 The relationship between the two remains largely unex-
amined, a lacuna this work seeks to fill. How rural normales become re-
positories of po liti cal militancy, how this ethos was reproduced, and how 
it survived amid sea- change transformations constitute this book’s guiding 
questions. To answer them, I center the experience of the indigenous and 
campesino students who participated in school mobilizations, engaged in 
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popu lar strug gle, and perpetuated po liti cal traditions. Their experience, in 
turn, I contextualize within the broader forces that conditioned their vision 
and actions. My story begins with the revolutionary state consolidation 
in the 1920s–1930s, continues through the 1940–68 Mexican miracle, and 
takes us through the guerrilla groups of the 1970s— three periods historians 
tend to treat separately. Focusing on the countryside or Mexico City and al-
ternatively treating campesinos, students, workers, or the  middle class, recent 
histories have uncovered the multifaceted protest and state repression that 
accompanied the betrayal of the revolution’s social reforms.34 Seeking to ex-
pand  these geographic, temporal, and social divides, I take a longue durée ap-
proach that is national in scope and that examines subjects whose changing 
identity— from campesino, to student, to teacher— defies neat categoriza-
tions. In this way, Unintended Lessons of Revolution addresses key questions 
raised, but still unanswered, by this recent lit er a ture.
First, while the recent scholarship on popu lar unrest has revealed the 
1940–68 pax priísta (peace of the pri) to be a myth, uncertain still are the 
effects of  those strug gles. Put another way, what is the relationship between 
the protest that we now know marked the Mexican miracle and the institutions 
meant to fulfill the revolution’s social reforms?35 To answer this question, 
this study considers Mexico’s revolutionary twentieth  century as a distinct 
historical period.36 In a rather bold fashion, historians Greg Grandin and 
Gilbert Joseph have posited a long Cold War time frame that extends, in 
Joseph’s words, “back to the Mexican Revolution, the twentieth- century’s 
first  great social revolution,” and by some mea sures “has not yet ended.”37 This 
new Cold War historiography understands Latin American politicization 
not as resulting from US- Soviet rivalry but as emerging from local historical 
dynamics in conversation with global events. The 1910 revolution inaugu-
rated Latin Amer i ca’s transition from nineteenth- century authoritarian 
liberalism to revolutionary nationalism as popu lar strug gles throughout 
the region challenged landed oligarchs, their exclusionary institutions, and 
the racial hierarchies that structured social domination.38 No institution 
better represents nationalism’s inclusionary vision than Mexico’s rural nor-
males, the boarding schools that trained agents of state consolidation while 
bringing education to the  children of the historically subjugated campesino 
and indigenous population. This ostensibly inclusionary vision  housed se-
rious contradictions, namely, the assimilationist framework of mestizaje on 
which it was based. How indigenous students navigated a system that de-
manded they shed their languages, traditions, and worldview and the alterna-
tive educational proposals that indigenous communities would themselves 
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make by  century’s end reveals the dynamic nature of the educational pro cess 
and the differing visions originating from above and from below.
Second, a history of rural normales provides a unique opportunity to 
hone in on the question of po liti cal consciousness and examine its expansive 
nature amid a group whose identity drew from the agrarian, student, and 
 labor worlds. Utterly unique in their evolution, student practices, and insti-
tutional mores, rural normales display the fate of leftist foundational princi-
ples in a changing national landscape. First conceived as a means to produce 
campesino teachers and soon expanded within the logic of socialist educa-
tion, rural normales endured reactionary backlash, survived despite state ne-
glect,  housed teachers and students- turned- guerrillas, and persisted in their 
Marxist- Leninist rhe toric even as many on the left abandoned such language 
in the 1990s. Their origins in a particularly radical period of revolutionary 
state consolidation, their almost mythical status in the official revolution-
ary narrative, and the role of the fecsm within and across  these schools 
made social justice both an effective and a compelling framework by which 
to elicit the state’s material support. Ideology and praxis, the collective and 
the individual, material interests and radical ideals constituted ever- evolving 
dialectics. While rural normales hosted an array of student types— from mil-
itant, to reformist, to indifferent, to conservative— all had to contend with a 
politicized institutional universe overseen and enforced by the student asso-
ciation. For  those who chose activism, the road to politicization began with 
a rather modest venture: demands for better food, dormitories, and peda-
gogical resources. For many that is where it ended. But for many  others the 
notion that campesinos  were entitled to an education coalesced with longer 
memories of  family exploitation, concurrent agrarian strug gles, student mo-
bilizations, teachers’ movements, and anti- imperialist notions that produced 
a militant consciousness that the state battled to contain.
Fi nally, Unintended Lessons of Revolution broadens the framework of 
transnational comparisons for both radical actors and institutions within au-
thoritarian systems. If previous notions of the pax priísta prompted views of 
Mexican exceptionalism, recent debates alternately characterize the seventy- 
one- year pri rule as a dictadura (dictatorship) or a dictablanda (soft dicta-
torship). The former stresses the state’s coercion, its physical and symbolic 
vio lence, and an evolving repressive apparatus.39 The latter, in contrast, em-
phasizes a loose po liti cal control, a “cultivated but thin hegemony,” and an 
uneven ability to co- opt and points to the pri’s irregular pro cess of state 
domination, in which repression was  limited, controlled, and hidden.40 My 
own view is that this debate sets up a false dichotomy for a regime that was 
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both staunchly repressive and remarkably flexible.41 While rendering Mex-
ico’s authoritarianism soft risks minimizing state repression as proponents 
of the dictadura view maintain, overemphasizing its likeness to other Latin 
American dictatorships risks diminishing the fundamental significance of 
the 1910 revolution as a social upheaval. The extent to which the pri was 
more restrained in its repression owes much to the popu lar revolution that 
 earlier in the  century broke the church- oligarchy- army triumvirate that in 
the southern cone structured state terror.42 More useful for making trans-
national comparisons is understanding the Cold War as counterrevolution, 
a pro cess that was hard and soft, in which anticommunism served both to 
attenuate old- left notions of democracy that linked po liti cal and economic 
rights and to marshal elite power with broader conservative traditions such 
as status anxiety, racism, and fear of loosening social mores.43 In this context, 
rural normalistas harnessed the princi ples inherent in the twentieth  century’s 
first  great social revolution to defend their schools, a pro cess that led them to 
question capitalism’s socioeconomic structures. The po liti cal consciousness 
they acquired in the course of their strug gle became increasingly articulated 
through larger ideological and subjective frameworks tied to national and 
international  battles in Latin Amer i ca’s  century of revolution.
In this sense, contrary to interpretations of the pri as a successful po-
liti cal center that oversaw a society largely devoid of Cold War politiciza-
tion, Unintended Lessons of Revolutions shows how that po liti cal center was 
itself historically constituted through vio lence and co- optation.44 Time 
and again, elites harnessed Cold War narratives about the containment of 
communists, foreign agitators, and  those intent on tarnishing the nation’s 
image to  battle popu lar sectors fighting for their constitutional rights. It was 
a counterrevolutionary pro cess that sought to break the link between po liti-
cal and economic rights propelled by the radical ele ments of Mexico’s 1910 
insurrection. While the pri’s tried- and- true strategy of co- optation was by 
definition a less violent method of suppressing dissent, its success depended 
on the ever- looming threat of vio lence— the vio lence of the stick or the vio-
lence of poverty.
In this context of re sis tance, repression, and co- optation, what does it 
mean, then, to tell the history of rural normales from the perspective of radi-
cal actors? Why not focus on their conservative, quiescent, officialist, or cor-
rupt gradu ates,  those who helped shape the dominant po liti cal and economic 
system rather than  those who challenged it? Or, indeed, why not devote equal 
time to both? The latter position is attractive especially to  those who conceive 
of historical writing as a quest to find balance between all perspectives, an 
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endeavor in which the historian is a  free agent “floating above, taking notes 
with equanimity.”45 This question of objectivity has itself been the subject 
of historical examination revealing the extent to which its proponents have 
been dominant groups at the center and its challengers  those at the mar-
gins of the status quo.46 Without subscribing to the trappings of historical 
relativism, it is imperative to interrogate the power of dominant narratives 
and the extent to which they act to silence the past, to use Michel- Rolph 
Trouillot’s haunting analy sis of power and the production of history.47 One 
way of silencing the past is to erase the radical possibilities presented by the 
strug gles of the dispossessed. Another is to attenuate  those possibilities by 
placing them on equal footing with endeavors that aligned with the status 
quo. Fi nally,  there is the temptation to evaluate radical actors by  whether 
or not their movement succeeded, a mea sure that, as Robin Kelley puts it, 
would render virtually all of them failures “ because the basic power relations 
they sought to change remain pretty much intact.” Rather than regarding 
this as a fatalistic assessment, however, Kelley reminds us that precisely  these 
alternative visions drive new generations of strug gle.48
For  these reasons, I have chosen to privilege normalista radical voices— 
the ways they contended with and created their institutional world; the de-
bates, strategies, and contradictions they encountered; their interactions and 
confrontations with  those who occupied the seats of power; and the inspi-
ration they drew from local, national, and international strug gles. Within 
the cap i tal ist forces that structured the po liti cal economy of education,  these 
dynamics  shaped their history. The unrest of campesino students created an 
institutional culture that slowed down the erosion of revolutionary rights, 
awakened an expansive form of consciousness, and continues to reveal the 
counterrevolutionary pro cess that resulted in neoliberalism’s imposition. 
Their perspective, their strug gle, brings into sharp relief the power relations 
that created the past and produced the pre sent, puncturing the dominant 
narrative that sees teachers primarily as a reflection of an officialist leadership.
SOURCES AND STRUCTURE
The story that follows draws on seven diff er ent source bodies, including 
intelligence documents that  were declassified in 2002.49 Within this col-
lection, reports on rural normales are extensive—in some instances pro-
duced daily— and focus primarily on student po liti cal activity. Their content 
provides essential chronology, numbers, and information on government 
views of and strategy  toward  these schools. My other source bodies include 
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press reports, US State Department rec ords, sep documents, local school 
archives, published memoirs, and over fifty oral histories that I conducted. 
Documents from the sep are extensive and provide additional material for 
context, policy, and state vision. While the sep’s National Archive (Archivo 
Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública) collections are vast, few go 
beyond the early 1940s, especially for normales.50 To fill this void, I traveled 
to rural normales throughout the country, working at the handful of schools 
that had available archives. Varying in quantity, organ ization, and accessibil-
ity,  these collections  housed an array of national directives, curricula, insti-
tutional correspondence, student files, meeting reports, and petitions that 
help fill the post-1940s void in the sep’s National Archive. Despite my time 
at individual schools and the fact that some rural normales— Salaices and 
Saucillo in the north, Ayotzinapa and Amilcingo in the coastal and central 
south, and Tamazulapan or Mactumactzá in the indigenous south—at times 
occupy prominent places in this account, the history told  here is a national 
one that privileges the rural normal system, its student networks, and federal 
policy over microhistories of individual schools.51
 These archival sources help contextualize and cross- reference the oral 
histories on which this book is also based, gathered beginning in 2006 and 
for over a de cade thereafter from normalistas across the country;  those in-
terviewed for this work span from generations who studied in the 1930s to 
 those graduating as recently as 2019. Working with oral histories requires, 
as Alessandro Portelli wrote, operating at diff er ent levels: reconstructing 
the past, analyzing how events are narrated, and “connecting what we know 
about the facts with what we know about the narratives.”52 While written 
documentation also necessitates context and attention to narrative struc-
ture, oral history has an added complexity since it is mediated by memory. 
“Less about events and more about their meaning,” oral testimonies are thus 
intrinsically diff er ent from written documents and therefore specifically 
useful.53 Recounted de cades  later, normalista accounts are often contradic-
tory, partial, and usually romanticized. If turned into analytical categories, 
however,  these apparent limitations can help decipher the meaning students 
attached to par tic u lar experiences. Concerned as this work is with po liti cal 
consciousness— itself expansive, contradictory, and contingent— student re-
flections provide an essential way to understand individuals’ relationship to 
the student body, institutional norms, changing frameworks of social justice, 
and national education policy.
Po liti cal participation tends to play an outsized role in student accounts 
about life at the normales. This narrative quality reflects an objective real ity: 
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the obligatory encounter with the fecsm, the socialist student organ ization 
whose hold on dorm life meant students confronted a politicized world 
from the moment they arrived at the normal. Coming at a turbulent mo-
ment in a youngster’s life— living away from home for the first time, learning 
to live as part of a collective, and preparing to make the most of this opportu-
nity to study— the experience was gripping for many.  Others took it simply 
as another component of their education— the par tic u lar variant of dorm 
culture— and thus recount fecsm assemblies, school strikes, and student 
marches in the most matter- of- fact manner. For still  others, such practices, 
ideological formation, and public speaking and organ izing skills became a 
tool kit and source of knowledge deployed years  later  either in the classroom, 
in dissident po liti cal groups, or even in official government circles.54
A telling insight into the politicized world comes from a normalista op-
posed to it. A 1987 gradu ate of the rural normal of Panotla in Tlaxcala, and 
that school’s director when I interviewed her in 2012, Victoria Ramírez re-
counted her own experience as a student:
The most difficult part was not so much the separation from my 
 family— which was hard. The most difficult  thing was when I saw that 
 there was a student committee and that  there was  going to be a strike, and 
we  were  going to commandeer buses, and the school director and teach-
ers  were worth peanuts. . . .  I came from a strong, authoritarian home, in 
which the  father and  mother had to be obeyed, and from a [ju nior high] 
school where  there  were rules, where  there was a principal and a teacher 
who you had to obey. Seeing what for me was total student impunity just 
 didn’t make sense.
Narrating  these events twenty- five years  later while she herself was barred 
from campus as students shuttered the school during a strike, Ramírez stated 
that then, as now, students had to participate in such mobilizations. The fierce 
debates about actions and strategies that  others recall as part of the collective 
decision- making pro cess are absent from her account. And yet when I asked 
what her parents thought of her participation, her narrative converged with 
 those from across the po liti cal spectrum: “It was that sense of justice. Even 
when [my parents] told me I was in danger, and they warned the [student] 
committee that if anything happened to me they  were the ones responsible, 
my parents never withdrew me. Well,  there was one moment when my  father 
said, ‘Come home, leave.’ But where to?! I had to stay. It was a challenge to 
myself. And it was also that sense of justice. In that, the normalistas are right. 
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Which is the same  thing that parents say  today, ‘The government  won’t give 
[resources], it lets students starve.’ . . .  That was my parents.” Half guarding 
her, half supporting normalista petitions, Ramírez’s parents accompanied 
her on marches, at mobilizations in Mexico City, and at conventions at other 
normales.55 While she was disdainful of collective action— students should 
come together according to individual preferences, Ramírez emphasized— 
her account underscores a key dynamic at the center of this study: how the 
precarity of rural normales as institutions, and the lack of other educational 
options in the countryside, made student mobilizations  there a necessity.
The story that follows is largely chronological. Chapter 1 sets the stage by 
exploring Mexico’s early twentieth- century educational architects, their new 
pedagogical approaches in the wake of the revolution, and their place in 
a wider transnational context of state formation. It likewise provides a pan-
oramic picture of rural normales, their changing structure and unique place 
within Mexico’s larger teacher- training system. Chapter 2 delves into the rural 
normales’ early history in the 1920s and their consolidation  under radical 
Cardenista princi ples in the 1930s. It shows how socialist education had a last-
ing effect on an institutional culture whose mores the fecsm preserved and 
reproduced, setting the stage for the schools’ long- lasting politicized culture.
Chapter 3 begins in 1940 as post- Cardenista regimes steered state policy 
to the right. In this context, the number of rural normales was reduced by 
almost half, and new educational reforms ended socialist pedagogy and co-
education, decreased the schools’ autonomy, and replaced previous appeals 
to social justice with appeals to national unity. Significantly, the Cold War 
would give the right new tools with which to demonize activist teachers, a 
context that established rural normales as bulwarks of the revolution.
By the late 1950s, two de cades of state neglect of campesinos had produced 
an increasingly urbanizing nation, concentrating teachers in the cities while 
the greatest need for them lay in the countryside. Chapter 4 telescopes out-
ward and, through the lens of education, assesses the diff er ent sectors vying to 
define the course of the revolution. Loath to address educational needs through 
structural reform as rural normalistas demanded, the state doubled down on its 
appeal to teachers’ missionary duty and self- sacrifice. Normalistas and teachers 
fought back, prompting the state to paint them as dangerous subversives. At 
the same time, the government’s own effort to expand primary education 
emboldened old foes— namely, the Catholic Church and power ful business 
groups— which harnessed the panic over the 1959 Cuban Revolution in an 
effort to roll back previous limits on private and religious education.
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During the 1960s new repertoires of strug gle emerged in rural normales. 
This de cade, which crystallized the association between  these institutions 
and the radical protest of their students, is the focus of chapters 5 and 6. Key 
to this dynamic  were the joint teacher- student- campesino land takeovers 
in northern Mexico, which soon gave way to a regional guerrilla group in 
the northern state of Chihuahua. Chapter  5 examines the nature of rural 
normalistas’ participation in this state’s agrarian strug gle to highlight how 
student protest characterized Mexico’s periphery before the widely recog-
nized 1968 movement in the capital. It shows how the rural background of 
normalistas marked them in unique ways as they drew on two po liti cally rich 
categories, that of the campesino with its deep roots in the Mexican Revolu-
tion and that of the student, which during the 1960s acquired such charged 
meaning. Chapter  6 follows this dynamic at the national level through the 
fecsm- led strikes. By analyzing the nature of normalista demands and the ex-
perience of  those who participated in the strug gle, I show how their unrest 
manifested ele ments of old- and new- left politics.
Chapter  7 explores the state’s effort to contain rural normalista organ-
izing with par tic u lar attention to the 1969 sep reform that reduced the coun-
try’s rural normales from twenty- nine to fifteen, disbanded the fecsm, and 
implemented unpre ce dented harsh disciplinary mea sures at the remaining 
schools. Given this severe blow to student power, chapter 8 traces normalista 
efforts to recover and reconstitute the fecsm. It shows how student organ-
izing became more militant but also more fractured. President Luis Echever-
ría’s (1970–76) demo cratic opening provided a space for normalistas to regroup. 
In this context, normalistas— together with campesino activists— achieved the 
creation of a new rural normal in the state of Morelos. But the 1970s also saw 
the proliferation of guerrilla groups, to whom the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre 
signaled the impossibility of working within the system. Many rural nor-
malistas collaborated with or joined  these armed movements, a dynamic that 
cemented their radical reputation. By the de cade’s end, state surveillance, in-
filtration, and demonization of rural normales marked the system.
The epilogue recounts the sep’s decentralization pro cess, which, coupled 
with the economic crisis of the 1980s, paved the way for the increasing neo-
liberal restructuring of education. It addresses the latest changes to the rural 
normal system and other educational reforms of the subsequent three de cades, 
closing with a discussion of some of the recent episodes of normalista protest 
and repression.
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three years before the Missing 43 became a worldwide symbol of 
Mexico’s state and narco- violence, police killed two Ayotzinapa students 
who, along with their peers, had blocked the Mexico City– Acapulco high-
way in December 2011. The normalistas  were protesting the Guerrero gov-
ernor’s stonewalling of their yearly negotiation over school resources. The 
killings shook but did not deter Ayotzinapa students, who closed their 
school in protest and or ga nized subsequent mobilizations. Among the ban-
ners the normalistas prepared, one depicted their peers’ deaths as part of a 
larger history of campesino massacres. The image they drew up included sev-
eral blood- soaked corpses; in addition to the two normalistas, bodies rep-
resented the 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre, in which police killed seventeen 
campesinos en route to a demonstration, and the 1998 El Charco massacre, 
in which soldiers killed eleven indigenous Mixtecs participating in a com-
munity assembly. The banner shows yet another body outline, this one with a 
question mark, an open interrogation about the next instance of state terror.
Even as this sign illustrated how much Ayotzinapa students understood 
themselves as a persecuted group, they likely never  imagined the nature 
and scale of the attack that came in Iguala on the night of September 26 and 
elicited such far- reaching national and international condemnation. Some 
of the survivors of both attacks stated that, had the police been prosecuted 
for the 2011 killings, the 2014 ones might not have happened, or at least not 
so brazenly. That assertion may be difficult to maintain, but, along with the 
student banner, it reflects normalistas’ keen understanding of the long rela-
tionship among protest, state vio lence, and impunity. Ayotzinapa laid that 
dynamic bare for the world to see. The mobilizations it inspired, in turn, 
added another lesson in re sis tance to institutions that, for a  century, have 
made justice for campesinos a constituting ele ment of their existence.
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diego rivera’s 1924 mural La maestra rural (The Rural Teacher), 
which adorns one of the first floor walls of Mexico’s Ministry of Public 
Education (sep), lays out what would become an iconic image of the rural 
schoolteacher: against a backdrop of campesinos tilling the land, sitting on 
the ground as part of a  human circle, a teacher leads a makeshift classroom 
(figure 1.1). Her pupils, indigenous men and  women,  children, and elders, 
reveal the community dimension of rural education. Alongside this open- air 
classroom, a member of the rural defense league, mounted on a  horse,  rifle in 
hand, dutifully protects two of the poor’s most prized revolutionary achieve-
ments: land and access to education.
Mexico’s 1910 revolution was at heart an agrarian strug gle. While the 
Constitutionalists— the northern- led bourgeois faction— triumphed over 
the popu lar forces led by Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa, the decade- 
long mass uprising made clear the need for broad social reforms. Thanks to 
the Zapatistas and Villistas, who fought not only to oust dictator Porfirio 
Díaz but to overturn the exploitative structures that undergirded his rule, 
progressive articles regarding  labor, land, and subsoil protections permeated 
the 1917 Constitution, along with the right to  free, secular elementary educa-
tion. As the new government consolidated its rule during the 1920s, workers 
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figure 1.1 Mural by Diego Rivera entitled La maestra rural, located on one of the 
first- floor patio walls of the sep. Photo graph by author.
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and campesinos continued to press for reform; in many parts of the country, 
this coalesced into radical proj ects spearheaded by or in conjunction with 
local socialist organ izations.1
In the 1920s the sep’s policies and programs identified the teacher with 
social reform, as the agent who would guide grassroots demands. In the 
coming years, the sep came to  house an array of progressive thinkers. Rang-
ing from humanists, to Marxists, to idealists,  these pedagogues— several of 
them former teachers— believed in the redemptive power of education. While 
many operated  under a paternalist framework, they understood schools as 
part of a broader proj ect of economic justice demanded by the poor. Primary 
schoolteachers had already played a part in both the re sis tance to the Díaz 
dictatorship and the revolutionary leadership. Otilio Montaño, the author 
of the Plan of Ayala, the po liti cal program of Zapata’s campesino army, best 
exemplifies the dynamic by which teachers could become vocal advocates of 
the poor.2 Perhaps more than any other social group, teachers pushed for and 
 were receptive to princi ples of social justice. Belonging to the lower rungs of 
the professional class, they  were poorly paid and  little recognized. Unlike 
other intellectual groups, James Cockcroft points out, “teachers lack the 
‘social distance’ that separates  middle class professionals from workers [and 
can awaken] the re spect and trust of their less lettered brethren.”3 When the 
sep  later made it a specific policy to recruit the sons and  daughters of cam-
pesinos to become rural teachers, it established an institutional connection 
between the countryside’s educators and the poor.
For much of the revolutionary intelligent sia, education functioned as 
part of a modernizing proj ect to transform a mostly poor, apparently back-
ward, and unsettlingly diverse population—85   percent of whom lived in 
the countryside— into modern citizens. The sep would be a key institution 
in this monumental undertaking, and José Vasconcelos, its first minister 
(1921–24), conceived of education as a way to regenerate the nation’s soul.4 
Teachers  were central to this proj ect, he believed, for only they possessed 
the spiritual authority and self- sacrifice necessary to wade through a social 
morass characterized, on the one hand, by the rich, the  bearers of culture 
whose own privilege precluded a social conscience, and, on the other hand, 
by the poor, whose ignorance para lyzed them.5 For Vasconcelos, devotion 
rather than academic preparation made a  great educator, and he expressed 
a general disdain for intellectuals indifferent to social ills.6 He envisioned 
teachers who simply “gathered the poor and without more incentive than a 
 will to enlighten . . .  instructed without reserve, no  matter how  limited their 
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own knowledge.”7  These types of teachers indeed emerged, as often in fact as 
in fiction, but always in lore.
By articulating social justice as an organ izing princi ple, the state provided 
the space for  those motivated by ethics, idealism, and social responsibility to 
influence the nationalist proj ect. This pro cess was especially apparent among 
Mexico’s muralists, whom the sep commissioned to paint the walls of gov-
ernment buildings.  There, artists like Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, 
and David Alfaro Siqueiros depicted a conception of Mexican history and 
society and a vision of the  future in which the masses  were central protagonists. 
They exalted Mexico’s pre- Columbian civilization and depicted a real ity whose 
essence was indigenous and campesino. Rivera especially celebrated bucolic 
scenes, traditional work instruments, and local handicrafts or festivities, in 
images that became iconic symbols of Mexican culture. While the muralists 
promoted  these signifiers of Mexico’s past, they painted a modern socialist 
 future in which workers secured their liberation from cap i tal ist exploitation. 
In the Marxist vision held by many artists, science eliminated superstition 
and triumphed over the Catholic Church’s religious hold. Princi ples of social 
justice, to be overseen by the very agencies whose walls  these scenes adorned, 
constituted an impor tant organ izing motif that “mimicked and [was] mimicked 
by” emerging official versions of history.8
La maestra rural is one of the first paintings in Mexico’s art history to 
depict  women in a progressive light. Shown on the front line of the  battle 
to create a new society, the model who posed for Rivera’s mural was herself a 
young indigenous  woman intent on joining the literacy brigades created in 
the wake of the revolution.9 The centrality of the female teacher in this iconic 
image is more than a depiction of a job traditionally accessible to  women. It 
is an example of revolutionary citizenship, the pro cess by which historically 
marginalized groups insisted “on material revolutionary benefits, recogni-
tion as po liti cal, ‘public’ actors, and official appreciation of their centrality 
to the new regime’s revolutionary proj ect.”10 This pro cess upended social 
hierarchies, for despite the revolutionary intelligent sia’s attempts to demar-
cate the bound aries of a now more inclusive national proj ect, popu lar sectors 
 were anxious to see the ten- year revolutionary war bear fruit and pushed 
further to define the nature of such proj ects and the course they would 
take. In this context, rural teachers constituted the intermediary figures 
between state directives and popu lar longings. Their class background and 
state mandate made them receptive to community needs and contributed to 
their role as organic intellectuals who could provide the bureaucratic know- 
how and social leadership to make the revolution’s reforms a real ity. And while 
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community leadership roles of the type teachers  were supposed to inhabit 
 were gendered male, early educational architects insisted that rural normales 
be coeducational, thus paving the way for  women to also occupy such posi-
tions. As one gradu ate put it, “Rural normales broke many taboos. Before 
that, a  woman’s job was to get married and have kids. . . .  Now you had young 
girls moving away from their families to attend school, working in the fields, 
 doing carpentry and blacksmithing, then being sent to a community where 
the teacher was every thing.”11
The Mexican revolutionary school instilled long- term lessons in social 
and po liti cal participation, opening up previously unthinkable spaces for 
the poor that challenged ethnic and gender bound aries. This chapter begins by 
tracing the early pedagogical approaches that laid the foundation for Mexico’s 
twentieth- century education proj ect. For the first two de cades  after the rev-
olution, that proj ect focused on the countryside and was intimately tied to 
the pro cess of state consolidation. Taking an agrarian approach that posited 
campesinos as the subjects of transformation, rural normales tended to sub-
sume indigenous identity  under the broader category of the rural poor. This 
chapter teases out  those assumptions and shows the racialized nature of revo-
lutionary nationalism in a transnational context. As the  century wore on and 
the revolutionary regime changed course, rural normales lost their central 
role in the educational proj ect but preserved a unique identity. To show their 
place in the con temporary teacher- training landscape, the chapter then turns 
to their evolving curriculum and oppositional character concluding with a 
brief account of their students as self- conscious participants in Mexico’s 
 national drama.
NEW PEDAGOGICAL APPROACHES
The Mexican Revolution spawned a dramatic effort to extend public ed-
ucation throughout the country. “We must follow the methods of the 
 great venerable Spanish educators, like Las Casas, Vasco de Quiroga and 
Motolinía, who adapted the Indian to Eu ro pean civilization,” declared Vas-
concelos in 1922.12 The meta phor was not coincidental (though somewhat 
ironic given the revolutionary government’s anticlericalism) and illustrates 
the ambitious transformation sep officials envisioned. The appropriation of 
a religious structure itself constituted a syncretic exercise to promote grad-
ual change.13 In the years to come, El Maestro Rural, the sep’s publication, 
disseminated a missionary identity among teachers to foster enthusiasm for 
life in poor rural communities. The magazine created an archetype both 
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of the campesino, a peon in need of redemption, and of the teacher as the 
immanent savior. “Victims of their own rhe toric and of the state’s strategic 
decision to utilize the symbolic and operational structure of Chris tian ity,” 
wrote Guillermo Palacios in his analy sis of the publication, “rural teachers 
frequently conceived of themselves as heroic  bearers of messages of salvation 
who undauntedly confronted the classic dangers of fantastical adventures.”14 
On- the- ground realities in local communities may have tempered such fer-
vor, but in their efforts to adapt, teachers both translated official dicta into 
practical action and served as barometers for the sep to evaluate its own 
policy.15
The vast cultural and educational proj ect of the 1920s stimulated discus-
sion of new pedagogical theories. Especially prominent in the early part of 
the de cade was action pedagogy, John Dewey’s philosophy that students 
learn best by  doing. Pop u lar ized and adapted to the Mexican context by 
Moisés Sáenz, undersecretary of education from 1924 to 1933 and a student 
of Dewey’s at Columbia University, action pedagogy provided an impor tant 
vehicle for other educational philosophies that crystallized in the 1930s and 
had lasting legacies thereafter.  Adopted as official policy in 1923, action 
pedagogy seemed especially suited to the countryside, where the natu ral 
environment would be the canvas on which students could paint a new 
real ity.16 Emphasizing that instruction should not be overly academic, ac-
tion pedagogy stood as an explicit critique of nineteenth- century education, 
with its vertical imposition of discipline and Eu ro pean aesthetic. Instead, 
new norms valued student freedom and interaction with the surrounding 
environment, which could offer practical knowledge and address the needs 
of the community. As figures like Sáenz linked education and rural develop-
ment, action pedagogy connected the classroom to the community, collec-
tive interests to individual discipline, and learning to laboring. The goal, he 
stated, was to create a rural spirit, “to have  children love the earth, to prefer 
the countryside to the city, to have them profit from the land so they  will 
feel inextricably tied to it.”17 By infusing agricultural work with new value 
and attaching to it theoretical and practical significance, action pedagogy 
strengthened the idea of the teacher as a community leader.  Earlier, Dewey 
himself had observed about Mexico, “ there is no educational movement in 
the world which exhibits more of the spirit of intimate  union of school activ-
ities with  those of the community.”18
Pedagogical approaches acquired a more materialist basis in the 1930s 
with figures like Rafael Ramírez, head of the mobile instructor training in-
stitutes known as cultural missions, from 1927 to 1935, and Narciso Bassols, 
 Normales, Education, and National Proj ects 29
minister of education from 1931 to 1934. Ramírez emphasized technical sup-
port that would improve campesino agricultural production, which, in turn, 
was to be or ga nized through collectivist or cooperative princi ples. Rather 
than being spiritual guides, teachers  were to have practical knowledge, be 
agitators, and mobilize communities to unleash their productive capacity. 
Rural education would in its essence be agricultural and pursue as its highest 
princi ples “a social regime in which  there are neither poor nor rich, where 
all workers enjoy life’s advantages.”19 Bassols, a committed Marxist, likewise 
emphasized wealth re distribution and departed sharply from Vasconcelos’s 
cultural approach. The Spanish conquest, he maintained, had inaugurated 
an educational tradition based on exploitation, damaging the rich spiritual 
tradition of indigenous culture.  After in de pen dence the po liti cal system’s 
emphasis on the individual had further undermined the “customs, culture, 
and needs” of rural communities, laying the basis for the violent contrasts 
between cities and the countryside. “It is not pos si ble to seriously resolve any 
of our nation’s impor tant questions without taking into consideration the 
economic and cultural state of our campesinos,” declared Bassols. Indeed, 
through the revolution, he continued, “the countryside had imposed its ed-
ucational longings.”20
Both Ramírez and Bassols applied an assimilationist approach when it 
came to the indigenous population, with Ramírez emphasizing Spanish- 
language instruction and Bassols espousing classical princi ples of mestizaje 
by which education was to preserve the indigenous virtues and values while 
drawing on the technical resources of Western civilization. While the sep’s 
implementation of socialist education in 1934 accentuated some of  these 
positivist notions, the progressive nature of President Lázaro Cárdenas’s re-
gime created a space for  those who advocated indigenous and multilingual 
education. In the latter part of the de cade,  there  were a series of regional con-
gresses where self- identified indigenous community leaders addressed pub-
lic forums.21 Approaches based on cultural pluralism, whereby indigenous 
 people taught or  were taught in their own language and preserved po liti cal 
and social forms of organ ization, made some headway in the context of pre-
dominantly assimilationist practices.22 Mexico displayed international lead-
ership on this question when it hosted the First Indigenous Inter- American 
Congress in Pátzcuaro, Michoacán, in April 1940.  There, 250 delegates from 
nineteen countries met to discuss joint approaches to improve the lives of in-
digenous  people while maintaining cultural particularities. Sáenz, one of the 
conference’s principal organizers, advocated for a policy based on social and 
po liti cal activism that pushed for full participation by indigenous  people in 
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national transformations.23 The Mexican Communist Party, too, critiqued 
the policy of formal mestizaje, arguing for bilingual education and re spect 
for indigenous social and cultural forms of organ ization. Turning the assim-
ilationist logic on its head, one of the party’s recommendations was to better 
educate mestizos so “they know the capabilities of indigenous  people and 
understand the urgent need to establish close alliances with them in order to 
protect Mexico and its Revolution.”24 While this view was in the minority 
at the conference— and in Mexico was soon superseded by the apo liti cal 
and scientific approach advocated by anthropologists like Manuel Gamio—
it provided a basis for progressive approaches that would take root in  later 
de cades.
NORMALES AND NATION BUILDING
In Mexico, as in other countries, education is intimately tied to the pro cess 
of national formation. During the early nineteenth  century, as most Latin 
American nations gained their in de pen dence, governing groups debated 
how to forge a sense of unity among the disparate  peoples inhabiting the 
newly drawn national bound aries. Of Eu ro pean inspiration, the dominant 
liberal ideology cast the challenge as one in which modern, civilizing elites 
would bring order, pro gress, and modernity to the unruly, backward, 
and culturally inferior populations—be they indigenous, Afro- descendant, 
mixed- race, or rough- and- tumble frontier populations. Several national 
constitutions made primary education— seen as the tool to achieve this— 
obligatory, the responsibility of municipalities, to be financed through local 
taxes. However, the lack of resources and infrastructure, along with po liti cal 
instability, and the general poverty of the mass population meant that such 
legislation was rarely translated into practice. For most of the nineteenth 
 century, education remained a decentralized patchwork of institutions in 
private or religious hands and was accessible mostly to urban elites. The im-
pulse to centralize education gathered momentum in the latter part of the 
nineteenth  century as governments strengthened civil over religious institu-
tions and used tax revenues generated by export booms to finance schools. 
Positivist legacies and governments that  were in the hands of white elites 
gave way to the twentieth- century estado docente, an educating state that 
had a remarkably similar structure throughout Latin Amer i ca. Ministries of 
public instruction presided over a hierarchical system of primary education 
whose affiliated leadership was named directly by the executive.  These bod-
ies, in turn, ran public schools, created their curriculum and even set rules for 
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private schools. The establishment of normal schools constituted a key part 
of this pro cess as they provided state control over the se lection and training 
of teachers. Vast centralized bureaucracies, teaching’s status as a state profes-
sion, and the lack of local say over teachers have been long- standing legacies 
of this structure.25
Twentieth- century nation- building proj ects continued to be predicated 
on the ideal of a homogeneous population. Increasingly, however, this 
framework celebrated native cultures, racial mixture, and the unique essence 
of individual Latin American nations. As such, education policy was one of 
assimilation, projected onto rural areas as means of incorporating diverse 
populations into national development, teaching indigenous  people the 
dominant language, and replacing long- standing traditions with modern 
ways. But the desired ethnic uniformity was never achieved. Not only was 
the state’s reach uneven, but community re sis tance and cultural pride ensured 
the preservation of indigenous languages and traditions across generations. 
Not  until the 1970s, as unesco (the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organ ization) critiqued national bureaucratic policies 
that stifled local initiatives along with the vocal push of indigenous  people, 
did communities begin to have a voice in the education proj ects that affected 
them.26
Throughout the twentieth  century, Mexico’s rural normales operated 
 under an assimilationist framework. They  were for campesinos, who, it was 
assumed,  were mestizo if they spoke Spanish.27 While rural normales early 
on made efforts to recruit indigenous students, the schools’ constituting 
logic continued to be tied to justice for the campesino class, a characteris-
tic consolidated  under President Cárdenas in the 1930s.28 But even before 
Cárdenas’s more radical policies, the popu lar vindications inherent in Mex-
ico’s 1910 revolution drove early educational architects to identify teachers 
with social justice. As agents of social and po liti cal literacy, their role could 
no longer be  limited to the classroom. Aside from the focus on the coun-
tryside, a key innovation of the revolution’s school— referred to as la casa 
del pueblo (the  people’s house)— was its attention to the entire community. 
Adult literacy, hygiene, land reform, and civic cele brations  were as much the 
teacher’s responsibility as instructing  children in the basics of reading, writ-
ing, and arithmetic. Influenced by the architects of the Soviet Union’s educa-
tion reform, Vasconcelos  adopted similar strategies of cultural dissemination 
in Mexico, which included sponsoring the publication of lit er a ture at low 
prices, creating libraries and systematizing literacy campaigns, and organ izing 
popu lar festivals, puppetry, and open- air theater. While Vasconcelos, unlike 
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his Soviet counterpart, Anatoly Lunacharsky, did not prioritize the politics 
of class strug gle, many of  those involved in the cultural missions— mobile in-
struction brigades composed of teachers, workshop instructors, agricultural 
experts, and song, theater, and art promoters— traveled to the Soviet Union 
and  were inspired by the possibilities of socialism, a message theater troupes 
reproduced throughout the countryside. Radical pedagogy, didactic revo-
lutionary plays, and instructions on how to or ga nize community members 
to claim their land and  labor rights also reached the countryside’s teach-
ers through the pages of the sep’s bimonthly publication El Maestro Rural, 
whose articles  were often penned by teachers from normales.29 At some rural 
normales, teachers developed reading materials whose content explained basic 
Marxist princi ples like surplus value, class strug gle, and exploitation, even be-
fore the state’s adoption of socialist education in 1934.30
The cultural missions and the rural normales constituted the backbone 
of the state’s education proj ect during the 1920s and 1930s. Marxist analy-
sis and a socialist vision would acquire long- lasting legacies partly  because 
they became intertwined with commonsense notions of justice promoted 
by revolutionary state discourse. Article 3 of the 1917 Constitution, for ex-
ample, established the population’s right to a  free, secular primary education 
and decreed that the state was responsible for providing it. Radical ele ments 
coexisted alongside civic lessons aimed at replacing local allegiances with a 
national identity. The education pro cess thus constituted an effort to expand 
and centralize state power while incorporating historically neglected popu-
lations, a strategy that did not always draw a clear distinction between indig-
enous and campesino populations. To the extent that it did, it was usually 
language that constituted the strongest marker of who the sep considered 
indigenous.
Still, early approaches conceived of education in terms of cultural rather 
than racial hierarchies, which provided some overlap in how sep officials 
approached indigenous and campesino education. Rejecting the social Dar-
winism of many of their Western counter parts, revolutionary educators 
attributed campesino and indigenous penury to oppression rather than 
racial inferiority.31 As such,  these populations could be redeemed through 
incorporation, a pro cess that, unlike in the United States and Canada, was 
meant to cultivate rather than sever ethnic affiliations and targeted entire 
communities instead of focusing on individuals.32 A critic of segregated edu-
cation as practiced in the United States, Vasconcelos declared that in Mexico 
the indigenous population would not be pushed aside into reservations but 
had to be incorporated into the national proj ect.33 Rural normal gradu ates 
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would be the agents of this incorporation, and their importance is reflected 
in the growth of  these institutions, which from the early 1920s to 1940 de-
veloped from makeshift, ambulatory missions into formal, coeducational 
boarding schools, often  housed in expropriated haciendas. At their height in 
1936, rural normales, then known as regional campesino schools, numbered 
thirty- five.34
Mexico’s educational undertaking did not go unnoticed. In the United 
States, social reformers, including  those who would contribute foundational 
theories to the civil rights movement, drew inspiration from Mexico’s 
integrationist approach. Many lauded the central government’s strong 
 interventionist impulse in light of the United States’ failures to use fed-
eral institutions to dismantle southern segregation.35 In Latin Amer i ca, 
countries with high proportions of indigenous  peoples  were especially in-
terested in Mexico’s rural normales. In the early 1940s, as Peru prepared to 
establish its own teacher- training centers, it sent representatives to Mexico, 
“a country with unmistakable similarities to Peru and where rural normales 
have been functioning for more than twenty years.”36 Likewise, in the 1930s, 
as Bolivia transitioned from a liberal to a military- socialist government 
seeking to expand school coverage to indigenous communities, it, too, sent 
representatives to Mexico. Prominent Mexican pedagogues like Sáenz them-
selves visited Bolivia, showing special interest in Warisata, the ayllu (kin- and 
territorial- based community) school founded in 1931 with an Aymara com-
munalist curriculum taught by indigenous teachers.37 Other international 
connections dated a de cade  earlier. For example, Minister Vasconcelos in-
vited the Chilean poet— later Nobel laureate— Gabriela Mistral to partic-
ipate in the cultural missions. Mistral lauded Mexico’s focus on indigenous 
education and hailed pedagogical practices that included farming, work-
shops, and small industry, an approach, she observed, that imbued youth 
at normales with the ability to bridge intellectual and artisan knowledge, 
which was, for her, “the most far- reaching  human quality.”38
Work still needs to be done on the transnational networks of  these diff er-
ent educational proj ects.39 But in de pen dent of specific connections, across 
Latin Amer i ca, not to mention regions with dramatically diff er ent histories, 
such as the US South or China,  there are discernible parallels in peripheral- 
area normal schools designed  under the logic of national consolidation.40 
The students in Chile’s rural normales also hailed from lower socioeconomic 
groups for whom a university education was inaccessible both for financial 
reasons and  because of the years of prerequisite schooling.41 Where  these 
institutions drew from historically subjugated populations, as did African 
34 Chapter One
American normal schools during Reconstruction, they not only provided 
a means of social mobility but created a cadre of educator- activists who 
would go on to become community leaders and challenge racist educational 
norms.42 Moreover, boarding- school life and pedagogical training that com-
bined academics, agriculture, and small industry, along with the moderniz-
ing or redemptive task assigned to gradu ates, often imbued teachers with a 
par tic u lar esprit de corps and a sense of collective mission. In some cases, 
this quality translated to po liti cal radicalism  after graduation; in Chile the 
country’s seventeen rural normales  were known for their politicized student 
body and  were promptly closed by Augusto Pinochet  after his 1973 military 
coup.43
This context renders the story of Mexico’s rural normales both unique 
and broadly representative of larger social pro cesses. Their main particu-
larity lies in how rural normales articulated the princi ples of the Mexican 
Revolution— evident in the primacy of the campesino identity to which 
rural normalistas laid claim, the enduring discourse of teachers as agents of 
community change, and the socialist signifiers preserved from the radical 
1930s. In more generalizable terms, rural normales showcase the relationship 
between education and po liti cal consciousness, the varying mechanisms 
through which marginalized populations lay claim to their rights, and the 
way legacies of strug gle grow roots and endure over time.
THE EVOLVING TEACHER- TRAINING SYSTEM
The significance of Mexico’s rural normales lay not only in the revolutionary 
ideals they  housed but also in their design as institutions by which the fed-
eral government extended its charge over education. During much of the 
nineteenth  century, the Lancaster Society had run teacher- training institutes 
in Mexico, and it was not  until 1887 that the country saw its first federally 
controlled normal, the Teachers’ Normal School.44 In 1907, on the eve of the 
revolution, Mexico had twenty- six normales, most controlled by the states 
rather than the federal government; both their locations and their gradu ates 
 were concentrated in the state capitals and Mexico City.45 As the federal gov-
ernment built school houses throughout the countryside during the 1920s 
and 1930s, it began recruiting and forming a teaching body with diff er ent 
characteristics from the Porfirian- era normal gradu ates. The new teachers 
had  little formal education, and their authority came more from their ability 
to provide community leadership and act as links to federal land,  union, or 
credit agencies. Rural normales themselves began as makeshift institutions 
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whose study plans in the 1920s consisted of two years of coursework focusing 
on three broad areas: core academic subjects such as language, math, social 
studies, and art; basic pedagogical techniques; and farming, workshops, and 
small industries, with home economics classes for  women. During the 1930s 
the study plan was expanded to allow for a greater diversity of subjects and 
categories, while the new socialist curriculum added courses like Economy 
and History of the Working Class, Socialist Orientation and Worker and 
Campesino Legislation, Institutions and Social Prob lems, and Technical In-
vestigation for Communal Improvement.46 Aside from formalizing teacher 
training, rural normales  were to integrate adjacent communities into their 
programmatic activities and conduct social, geographic, and economic 
studies of the regions where they  were established. Their name change to 
regional campesino schools during this period partly reflects that goal. Their 
personnel, along with that of the cultural missions, had a central role in co-
ordinating education policy across the country, while socialist education was 
itself a decisive centralizing impulse since it articulated a unified ideological 
message with a pedagogy of social and economic transformation.47 The more 
radical educational princi ples went hand in hand with Cárdenas’s progressive 
social legislation, itself structured  under a strong executive and state party.
The central role of rural normales underwent a major shift during the 
1940s as radical Cardenista policies waned, the centrality of agricultural train-
ing diminished, and socialist education and coeducation  were overturned. The 
guiding philosophy became national unity, a framework meant to downplay 
class strug gle and teachers’ leadership roles and to establish academics rather 
than community development as the principal focus. Urban normales, pre-
sumably of better academic quality, became the model around which to pro-
mote curricular uniformity. The years of normal study  were expanded to six, 
with the first three equivalent to secundaria (ju nior high school) and the 
latter three providing professional teacher training. Since most elementary 
schools in the countryside did not go up to sixth grade, two complementary 
years  were added to rural normales, where students could complete fifth and 
sixth grade. Socialist subjects pertaining to po liti cal economy, working- class 
history, and agrarian legislation  were eliminated and replaced by subjects 
such as pedology, psy chol ogy of learning, instruction techniques, psycho-
metrics of pedagogy, and science and sociology of education.48 The unifor-
mity of the urban and rural curriculum did not mean agricultural training 
at rural normales was eliminated; instead, it was given a status equivalent to 
workshops at urban normales. Although this change was initially celebrated by 
students and teachers at rural normales  because it elevated the institutions’ 
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academic status, a per sis tent lack of funding would perpetually associate 
rural normales with an inferior academic reputation.
The sep’s efforts to centralize education continued through the 1940s as 
the state expanded its construction of other normales and pushed for the 
consolidation of a national teachers’  union. Urban rather than rural normales 
now became the flagship institutions. The National Teachers School, estab-
lished in 1925, was expanded and in 1945  housed in a  grand new building. 
The sep also founded the Higher Normal School of Mexico in 1942 to train 
teachers for normales or postelementary education and, in 1947, the National 
Preschool Teachers School.49 Additionally, in 1944 the sep created the Fed-
eral Institute for Teacher Training, meant to formalize the education of the 
staggeringly high numbers of teachers who taught without a formal degree 
(the majority in the countryside).50 In a related pro cess, 1943 saw the founda-
tion of the National Union of Education Workers (snte), whose vast struc-
ture absorbed previous regional, administrative, and professional education 
 unions that had been ideologically diverse. The snte’s growth went hand in 
hand with the expansion of the central government’s control over education 
since not only did the new schools it built and the new teachers it hired add 
to the snte’s membership, but the  union increasingly fought for the incor-
poration of municipal and state teachers into the federal ranks. This pro cess 
entailed standardizing teacher- training programs, rank and promotion re-
quirements, and the elementary school curriculum itself. The po liti cal impli-
cations would be enormous, for, like other  unions  under the umbrella of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (pri), the snte’s leadership acted more in 
accordance with party leadership than with the interests of its rank and file. 
At the same time, as the  union grew to be the country’s largest, it developed 
enormous power, which it wielded through a say in curricular, professional, 
and teaching- degree requirements. In the curricular changes discussed in the 
following, the snte always had a seat at the  table.
By 1954, when the sep held a national conference to assess the country’s 
normal education, officials spoke of a system in chaos.  There  were seven 
diff er ent types of normales (for preschool, elementary, secondary, special-
ized, and physical education, as well as  music, in addition to the accredit-
ing Federal Institute of Teacher Training), and the sep had not managed 
to implement a coordinating logic among them; the relationship among 
federal, state, and private control over teacher- training institutions was un-
clear; course plans  were unwieldy, and teaching methods in effec tive; and the 
number of normalistas who did not complete the degree was staggeringly 
high— about 70  percent at most normales—an indication that students used 
 Normales, Education, and National Proj ects 37
 these institutions not to become teachers but to have some sort of schooling, 
especially in the countryside, where ju nior high schools  were sparse. Offi-
cials acknowledged the  mistake of having unified the urban and rural normal 
curriculum since the mea sure facilitated transfers to the National Teachers 
School in Mexico City, whose attrition rate was only 30  percent. A commis-
sion charged with revamping the curriculum recommended that the ju nior 
high school years be separated from the normal training and that the latter’s 
curriculum be reduced and simplified, with the first year devoted to general 
education requirements and the latter two years emphasizing pedagogical 
techniques and hands-on teacher training. Electives would be reduced and 
designed for the needs of the region in which the schools  were located; in-
struction was to be less rote and instead based on research and discussion.51
Over the following de cades, Mexico’s teacher- training system grew in-
creasingly complex as additional types of normales  were created, entrance 
and schooling requirements changed, years of study expanded, and the char-
acter of the teaching degree transformed. In 1964  there  were 166 normales 
that trained elementary schoolteachers, of which 38  were federal (includ-
ing the 29 rural normales), 41 state- run, and 87 private.52 In 1969 the sep 
implemented some of the changes proposed at its 1954 normal education 
congress. For example, the secundaria and normal tracks  were separated, 
and an additional year was added to the professional training. A new type 
of teacher- training institution, known as the regional normal, was created 
for the urban periphery. Specifically designed without the boarding- school 
structure,  these normales  were to replace the rural ones, whose numbers  were 
reduced from twenty- nine to fifteen in 1969. Curricular changes  were once 
again implemented in the early 1970s. The new course load sought to both 
improve core knowledge in the areas of math, science, social studies, art, 
and lit er a ture and link that knowledge base to instructional techniques in 
each subject. With this change, courses in general education subjects such as 
math, science, philosophy, and history  were increased, and pedagogy courses 
decreased. In 1973 a teacher- training degree was given the rank of bachiller-
ato (roughly equivalent to a high school) diploma, making teachers eligible 
to apply to universities, a change meant to expand the intellectual and pro-
fessional possibilities of  those who had gone to a normal out of economic 
necessity rather than a desire to teach.53
 Today, a degree from a normal school has the status of licenciatura, 
roughly equivalent to a college degree. This reform came in 1984 when new 
entrance requirements made a high school education mandatory, a change 
that was at once meant to increase normalistas’ core knowledge base, allow 
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students to better develop their research and teaching skill, and elevate nor-
males to the realm of higher education. It also had the effect of reducing the 
number of teachers since the few years needed to obtain a degree had been 
a key appeal of the teaching profession. Just as significant was the 1980s eco-
nomic crisis, which seriously depressed teachers’ salaries.54 Conflicts that had 
been brewing since the late 1970s came to a head by the end of the 1980s and 
included disputes between government officials and the snte’s leadership, 
as well as between the  union leadership and its base. Citing the unwieldy 
nature of the sep as a state bureaucracy and the need to reform an ossified 
educational structure and imbue it with a truly federalist structure in which 
local governments had a say, then president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–
94) implemented the 1992 National Agreement to Modernize Elementary 
and Normal Education, with which it handed to state governments some 
functions and responsibilities previously in the hands of the sep.55 The fed-
eral government would still determine the curriculum, but the states would 
now administer bud gets, oversee schools, and be in charge of personnel. The 
centralizing impulse that began in the 1920s, it seemed, had come full circle.
 “AS LONG AS  THERE IS POVERTY . . .”
Rural normales are among the few institutions of higher education that con-
tinue to operate  under a boarding- school structure, a characteristic that, in 
recent de cades, makes them especially distinctive.  Those admitted are enti-
tled to  free room and board, a modest stipend, and some basic supplies such 
as shoes and uniforms. While a handful of rural normales are now coeduca-
tional, most are still divided by gender. The school grounds include teacher 
housing, agricultural lands, and farm animals that students attend with varying 
degrees of curricular formality. Most rural normales are located outside major 
urban areas, although given the swelling nature of cities and the expanding 
road infrastructure during the past few de cades, the schools are accessible 
through public transportation. Upon graduation, the young teachers are ex-
pected to work in the countryside or in marginal communities, where,  until 
President Enrique Peña Nieto’s 2013 education reform, the sep guaranteed 
them a job.
As institutions, rural normales hold a special place in the national nar-
rative. A  whole mystique surrounds their early gradu ates, often referred to 
as “education missionaries” or “apostles of agrarian revolution.”56 While not 
all of the countryside’s educators  were trained at rural normales, the selfless 
teacher who braved difficult, often dangerous conditions in remote territories 
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to bring educational enlightenment became the archetype of the rural 
normal gradu ate. The central role President Cárdenas gave rural teachers in 
his 1930s progressive agenda cemented their association with social justice. 
In addition, during Cárdenas’s presidency the rural normales  were desig-
nated explic itly for the sons and  daughters of campesinos, the poor who had 
historically been denied an education. Over subsequent de cades the cate-
gory of campesino grew more expansive, and the changing demographics 
marked by the increasing urbanization made the urban poor eligible to study 
 there.57 Whereas for most of the twentieth  century a campesino identity was 
the most prominent signifier of rural normalistas, students from rural nor-
males in the southern parts of Mexico also increasingly identify as indige-
nous. Moreover, since 2000 the sep has granted formal recognition to three 
indigenous normales in Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Michoacán.58 The latter’s 
student association joined the Mexican Federation of Socialist Campesino 
Students (fecsm) and thus participates in nationwide rural normalista 
mobilizations.59
Significantly, rural normales’ lore of po liti cal militancy persists and  today 
is most dramatically evident in the numerous murals that adorn their school 
walls. Large images of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and Che 
Guevara— sometimes located prominently in amphitheaters or cafeterias— 
are common (figure 1.2), as is the hammer and sickle, the communist symbol 
representing proletarian and peasant unity. Some schools also celebrate rural 
teachers- turned- guerrillas as well as the indigenous Zapatista insurgents 
from the southern state of Chiapas. A power fist with the fecsm acronym 
is ubiquitous, and murals depicting the ravages of capitalism or celebrating 
popu lar strug gles mark the exterior of classroom walls, dorms, and fences. 
Such radical themes have a didactic quality and hearken back to the artistic 
production of the 1920s and 1930s that condemned cap i tal ist exploitation, 
celebrated popu lar strug gle, and presented education as a means of breaking 
the system’s oppressive shackles.60 In this way, the murals at rural normales 
stand as part of a larger tradition of Mexican public art that figures promi-
nently on government buildings and flagship educational institutions such 
as the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the National Polytech-
nic Institute, the National Preparatory School, and the National Teachers 
School. Unlike the murals at  these institutions— commissioned by the state 
and undertaken by famous artists— those at rural normales are crafted by 
grassroots collectives in conjunction with normalistas. They are rustic and 
ever changing and pointedly condemn the current power structure (fig-
ure 1.3). As in other contested territories (such as the autonomous Zapatista 
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communities in Chiapas),  there is a self- conscious declaration of a distinct 
identity, an  imagined community of sorts in which past and pre sent collide.61 
 Today the schools have murals demanding justice for Ayotzinapa’s Missing 
43 and consistently showcase the names and seals of the seventeen remaining 
rural normales.
If  today’s murals tell a po liti cal story, normalistas’ published memoirs give 
a sense of their gradu ates’ esprit de corps, celebrate rural normales as institu-
tions of singular importance, and, through an air of youthful nostalgia, reflect 
on the  grand and the mundane. Self- published,  limited in circulation, and 
compiled by and about male normalistas,  these works are at once an exercise 
in reminiscing and an intervention in the historical rec ord of a proj ect they 
consider in peril.62 Such works tend to highlight rural normalistas’ com-
mitment to teach in remote communities, celebrate the demo cratic quality 
of the schools as evidenced by student participation in institutional life, de-
tail early interaction with surrounding communities, discuss the fecsm as a 
figure 1.2 Mural at the rural normal of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, depicting Vladimir 
Lenin, Friedrich Engels, and Karl Marx on the left and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Lucio 
Cabañas, and Genaro Vázquez on the right. Photo graph by author.
 Normales, Education, and National Proj ects 41
fixture of institutional life, and condemn the 1969 closure of half of their 
schools, with many remarking that it was the state’s retaliation for the 1968 
student movement. As with oral histories, certain memory frames mediate 
their accounts, and personal redemptive narratives are interwoven with offi-
cial historical tropes. The notably gendered production of  these publications, 
for example, is consistent with the extent to which the rural teacher, as a com-
munity leader, was conceived as male even while the teaching profession had 
historically been largely female.63 The very act of compiling and publishing 
such works reflects a deliberate effort to account for one’s role in a transcen-
dent national undertaking, a quality less evident in  women teachers, whose 
leadership has been  either historically sidelined or conceived of as comple-
mentary, or whose  labor is considered an extension of their caregiving roles. 
 There is likewise a generational divide in normalistas’ narratives. While older 
gradu ates celebrate their own actions and deeds as students, they do not 
figure 1.3 Mural at the rural normal of Amilcingo, Morelos. The caption reads 
“We all have blood, the poor in our veins and the rich on their hands.” Photo graph by 
author.
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always approve of current normalistas’ mobilizations. Instead, many pre sent 
the view that past generations  were both more committed to the countryside 
and less reckless in their po liti cal acts. The former characterization speaks 
to an internalization of the missionary narrative, contradicted by the fact 
that while their teaching  careers began in the countryside, most migrated to 
the cities. The latter assertion provides a glimpse into how, for so many, the 
activism they participated in as students did not continue  after graduation.
Still, the overwhelming consensus for normalistas across generations 
and the po liti cal spectrum is the invaluable nature of rural normales as life- 
changing institutions for the poor, a quality expressed more in material than 
in professional terms. The painstaking detail with which older generations 
remember the type of food they consumed, the mattress—or cardboard—on 
which they slept, or the uniform and shoes they  were given contrasts with 
the vagueness of their accounts about the classes they took, the pedagogical 
materials they worked with, or the types of teachers they had. Spartan in 
 every way,  these conditions nonetheless contrasted with the crushing pov-
erty of the campesino life from which they came. At least in the boarding 
schools, most relate, they had scheduled meals, a bed to themselves, and a 
change of clothes. Younger generations— those who have studied since the 
1970s— tend to speak less about such immediate material needs and more in 
terms of their general lack of life options. “If it  wasn’t for the normal, I would 
have had to migrate to the United States,” state many.64 Current students put 
it more ominously: “It was the normal or working for a drug cartel.”65
It is no won der that normalistas continue to fiercely defend their institu-
tions. Even in the dramatically diff er ent context of a predominantly urban 
nation in the twenty- first  century, they evoke the schools’ historic legacy. 
Their rationale is  simple: “As long as  there is poverty, rural normales have a 
reason to exist.” So reads the legend inscribed at the bottom of a crude repro-
duction of Rivera’s La maestra rural in the normal of Amilcingo, Morelos.
the artist josé hernández delgadillo, who attended the short- 
lived (1938–43) rural normal of Soltepec, Tlaxcala, said of his experience 
 there, “I met many  children of campesinos who influenced me a lot, in-
cluding their ‘uncouth habits’ like  going around without shoes, clean but 
neglected. . . .  When I returned home during the normal’s vacation, my parents 
 were alarmed,  because I was barefoot and my clothes  were unkempt. Perhaps 
they had heard that  those normales  were communist— it’s true,  there was that 
influence. The chapel of that old hacienda of Soltepec, now converted into an 
auditorium, preserved all the characteristics of a  little, feudal Eu ro pean  castle. 
It was completely decorated with frescos, figurative paintings . . .  with ham-
mers and sickles, red flags everywhere.” Delgadillo, the son of a middle- class 
rural  family, first went to Soltepec on the recommendation of his elemen-
tary school principal, a rural normal gradu ate and a communist. Troubled by 
his “normalista demeanor,” Delgadillo’s parents did not let him return. His 
murals, which would adorn the walls of numerous educational institutions, 
however, would contain many of the same motifs he first observed at the 
rural normal, leading one art critic to refer to him as Mexico’s artist- agitator.1
Delgadillo’s description of Soltepec, its seigneurial architecture now 
decked out with the symbols and colors of a proletarian revolution and 
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inhabited by campesinos with not- yet- so- reformed ways, provides a telling 
glimpse into the early life of rural normales, the institutions that would form 
a new cadre of teachers. This chapter hones in on their early period to ex-
amine how their original goals and princi ples laid a lasting foundation to 
nurture po liti cal radicalism. Specifically, in the context of revolutionary con-
solidation, the progressive tendencies within state policy during the 1930s— 
especially socialist education— and the active participation of students in all 
aspects of institutional life fostered an environment in which radical social 
actors emerged and  later flourished. Politicized by an institution that, on the 
one hand, cultivated hope for redistributive justice and, on the other, acti-
vated reactionary vio lence against  those pushing for such transformation, 
rural teachers became crucial agents of social change. The agrarian nature 
of Mexico’s revolution, moreover, marked education policy with a distinctly 
rural, holistic community framework; this framework’s abandonment be-
ginning in the 1940s set the stage for the profound inequalities that charac-
terized the rest of the  century. Just as enduring, however, was the legacy of 
the 1920s and 1930s revolutionary proj ect and the teachers trained within 
it. That proj ect and the experience of this first generation of rural teachers 
are essential to understanding the re sis tance that marked the countryside in 
de cades to come.
TRAINING RURAL TEACHERS
In the early 1920s, the countryside’s technical and social development was the 
affair of three institutions: the cultural missions, the rural normal schools, 
and the central agricultural schools. Originally composed of volunteers, 
the cultural missions relied on individuals who believed in the power of 
education to create a new society.2 They  were José Vasconcelos’s modern 
apostles, whom he charged with transforming the countryside. Staffed by 
teachers trained in art, reading, writing, arithmetic, physical education, and 
agriculture, the cultural missions visited diff er ent communities, imparting 
two- month courses to local instructors. The teams often brought with them 
pedagogical materials and medical supplies, as well as agricultural and wood-
working tools to augment local schools’ meager supplies.3 Between 1923 and 
1930, the number of cultural missions increased from six to fourteen, and their 
initial focus on teacher training expanded to include work with the entire 
community. With modest personnel and equipment, they nonetheless had 
ambitious goals. They sought to establish the basic infrastructure for rural 
education and to generate an enthusiasm for social change among the local 
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population. By emphasizing the significance of campesino po liti cal partici-
pation and valuing indigenous culture, the cultural missions helped shape an 
impor tant cadre of local radical leadership.4 Their direct exposure to rural 
communities, in turn, convinced them of the need for structural reform, a 
vision that contrasted with that of  those confined to the urban world.5
If the cultural missions represented the initiation of a federal academic 
program, the central agricultural schools linked that program to small- scale 
farming. Created in 1926,  these agricultural schools reflected the ideology of 
President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–28), who favored technical assistance 
and infrastructural proj ects over systemic reform; his goal was increased 
agricultural production rather than land distribution.6 Taking the United 
States as a model, like his nineteenth- century liberal counter parts, Calles en-
visioned a countryside inhabited by individual small farmers.7 Constructed 
in old haciendas and equipped with modern machinery, agricultural schools 
 were designed as cooperatives whose three- year program would train agrar-
ian technicians. Duly equipped, gradu ates would return to their communi-
ties of origin to instruct campesinos on better production methods. While 
the agricultural schools  were supposed to be self- sufficient and stimulate re-
gional development, they  were plagued from the start by prob lems. Rather 
than undermining the power of exploitative landowners and caciques, they 
actually promoted a clientelistic relationship with the state. Moreover, their 
agricultural production undermined or competed with that of local ejidatar-
ios (communal farmers).8 Likewise, instead of being the  children of campesi-
nos, a high percentage of the students came from the families of merchants or 
middle- income groups.9 The lax entrance requirements reflected the institu-
tions’ difficulties in recruiting students. Fi nally, few of their gradu ates under-
took the expected advisory roles in remote communities, instead preferring 
urban centers. With all their shortcomings, however, the central agricultural 
schools attempted to tailor farming to the needs of popu lar sectors and to 
integrate agricultural engineers into the politics of education. They consti-
tuted a basis on which to link rural schools and agricultural production.10
Rural teachers would be trained at the rural normal schools. Established 
 under the purview of the Office of Cultural Missions, in keeping with the 
countryside’s urgent need of teachers, the rural normales began as two- year 
boarding schools and initially  housed between twenty and thirty students. 
They included family- style farms, light machinery, and woodworking and 
hide- tanning workshops (figure 2.1). Students engaged in teaching practice 
in nearby elementary schools, themselves often built along with the normal. 
To be eligible for a normal education, students had to have finished most or 
46 Chapter Two
all of elementary school, express a desire to teach, show good be hav ior, and 
be in good health. While in their early years the rural normales educated 
some students from well- to-do families, they increasingly recruited students 
from impoverished rural dwellings, providing them with modest scholar-
ships to undertake their education. The rural normales’ early design sought 
to mimic  family life by promoting the principal and his wife as parent figures 
who would tend “to students as they would their own  children.”11 Teach-
ers, in turn, constituted the older siblings whose deeds and actions  were to 
set a good example. This  family structure aimed in part to assuage parents’ 
fears about sending their  children, especially girls, to live far from home. The 
guidelines of the Ministry of Public Education (sep) emphasized that re-
lationships in the normales not be overly rigid and that life unfold “just as 
naturally as it does in the home.”12 While the principal was still a paternal-
istic figure, students and teachers had a say in  running the schools, a pro cess 
that cultivated a demo cratic spirit and contrasted with nineteenth- century 
positivist norms that emphasized order and obedience.13
By 1932 eight central agricultural schools, seventeen rural normales, and 
fourteen cultural missions had been established throughout the country.14 
While pro gress was made in training rural teachers,  there  were some seri-
ous institutional prob lems, especially with the agricultural schools, many of 
which reproduced some of the very exploitative structures they  were meant 
to address. Likewise, many of the rural normales  were located in or close 
to urban centers, while the cultural missions’ accomplishments  were ham-
pered by their transitory nature. The sep attempted to reform the system by 
creating regional campesino schools.  These institutions fused the central ag-
ricultural schools with the rural normales and cultural missions.15 At the re-
gional campesino schools, students undertook two years of agricultural and 
technical training,  after which they received land and equipment in their 
home region, where they could  either work the land or become agricultural 
advisers.  Those wanting to become teachers received pedagogical training 
for two additional years.16 Ultimately,  these institutions  were far more suc-
cessful in graduating teachers than agricultural technicians. Partly owing to 
a lack of personnel with pedagogical expertise in agriculture, this limitation 
also reflected the higher status of the teaching profession.
The regional campesino schools manifested the more progressive tenden-
cies emerging in the sep during the 1930s and further emphasized the social 
responsibility of their gradu ates, who  were to constitute “the rural or ga nizer, 
the multifaceted figure who advised ejidatarios, the accountant in the Agri-
cultural Credit Bank, the agronomist’s assistant, and the ‘right hand man’ 
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of the cultural missions’ directors.”17 To make sure the regional campesino 
schools served primarily the poor, admission required proof that students 
came from  humble backgrounds. Thanks to such mea sures and active re-
cruitment, by 1936 the proportion of students from campesino  house holds 
grew to almost 70   percent.18 During this time, the majority of students 
 were between sixteen and nineteen years old, and half of them had studied 
through fourth grade. They  were less successful in attracting indigenous stu-
dents; only 7  percent of pupils spoke a language other than Spanish.19 While 
historically the teaching profession had been socially acceptable for  women, 
at this point normal regulations still capped female entrants at 25   percent, 
an indication of how much the teacher as community leader was envisioned 
as male. The low female rates also reflected parents’ hesitancy to send their 
 daughters to coeducational boarding schools, especially as  these schools 
grew beyond the small, family- structured institutions of the 1920s. When 
figure 2.1 Hide- tanning workshop at the rural normal of Matamoros, Puebla (n.d.). 
Archivo General de la Nación, Photographic Archive, Normales Rurales, c1, Sobre 49.
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the sep divided the rural normales by gender in 1943, the number of female 
students increased (figure 2.2).20
The regional campesino schools, which  later became rural normal 
schools,  were the clearest expression of the Cardenista fusion of agrarian 
and educational reforms.  These institutions signaled the central place of 
rural teachers in the Cardenista proj ect. As governor of Michoacán from 
1928 to 1932, Lázaro Cárdenas had witnessed the impor tant role teachers 
played in organ izing the state’s  labor and peasant  unions, some of commu-
nist affiliation.21 Radicalized by the church and landlords’ opposition to 
education, teachers joined campesinos and helped or ga nize them to secure 
land and schools, demands to which Cárdenas was responsive. As the na-
tional government headed by President Calles took an increasingly con-
servative path, in Michoacán Governor Cárdenas distributed 400,000 
hectares of land and opened a hundred new schools.22 As he concluded 
his term as governor, Cárdenas was clear about the impor tant role teach-
ers might play at the national level, upholding them as brave guides of 
figure 2.2 Students cultivating the fields of what would become the  women’s rural 
normal of Palmira, Morelos, 1945. Archivo General de la Nación, Photographic Ar-
chive, Normales Rurales, c6, Sobre 26.
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 popu lar strug gle. They  were to “penetrate the fields of the or ga nized cam-
pesinos and the workshop of the strengthened  unionized worker.”  There 
they would hone in on the economic conditions and “defend the interests 
and aspirations of each.”23
In some sense, Michoacán represented the cradle of rural normalismo 
since, on the state’s initiative, that is where the first rural normales  were built 
during Francisco Mújica’s short stint as governor from 1920 to 1921. With half 
of the state bud get devoted to education, Mújica oversaw the construction of 
four rural normales, some of whose directors became prominent progressive 
figures in the state and  later in the nation’s education movement.24  These 
teacher- training institutions, moreover, served as models for the first feder-
ally controlled rural normales, one of which was built in Tacámbaro, Micho-
acán, in 1922.25 Accounts of its early dynamics vividly reflect the challenges 
rural normales faced: high dropout rates, interruption of activities owing to 
lack of funds, church hostility, harassment of female students, and the death 
of one of its first and youn gest gradu ates at the hands of Cristeros (Catholic 
rebels).26 Across the country, early directors reported similar challenges. To 
face  these obstacles, teachers devised numerous strategies, which would  later 
constitute part of the heroic lore of  these early institutions. Teachers and stu-
dents themselves built the school’s furnishings; educators contributed their 
personal funds for school material; the normal spearheaded community 
proj ects and invited the local population to attend school events and use its 
workshops; and classes  were held with open win dows to assuage fears pro-
voked by coeducation.27 The spartan nature of  these institutions, moreover, 
reinforced their association with a  humble student body who virtuously 
withstood such conditions. Campesinos  were, according to one school di-
rector, the only ones who possessed the “spirit of sacrifice and love necessary 
for anyone wanting to be a rural teacher, qualities hardly compatible with the 
customs of rich youth.”28
During Cárdenas’s tenure as president, the number of rural normales na-
tionwide increased to thirty- five (map 2.1). It was the only branch of edu-
cation that met, and indeed surpassed, the goals of Cárdenas’s Plan Sexenal 
(six- year plan).29 Not only did Cárdenas take the greatest interest in rural 
education and channel the necessary resources for its development, but his 
land re distribution went hand in hand with educational reform, providing 
the necessary structural transformation for schools to have a more transcen-
dent impact. While slow to take root, the reforms represented a dramatic 
improvement in rural education and would create a lasting legacy, especially 
with his implementation of socialist education.
P A C I F I C      



































G U L F   O F







Map 2.1 Regional Campesino Schools, 1936
1 Amuzgos, Oaxaca
2 Ayotzinapa, Guerrero
3 La Báscula, Colima
4 Bimbaletes, Zacatecas
5 La Chacona, Chiapas
6 Champusco, Puebla
7 Comitancillo, Oaxaca
8 Coxcatlán, San Luis Potosí
9 Coyuca de Catalán, Guerrero
10 Cuilapan, Oaxaca
11 Galeana, Nuevo León
12 Hecelchakán, Campeche
13 Huajintepec, Guerrero
14 La Huerta, Michoacán
15 Huetamo, Michoacán
16 Jalapa de Méndez, Tabasco
17 Lagos de Moreno, Jalisco
18 El Mexe, Hidalgo
19 Oaxtepec, Morelos
20 Ozuluama, Veracruz
21 Ricardo Flores Magón, Chihuahua
22 Río Verde, San Luis Potosí
23 Roque, Guanajuato
24 Salaices, Chihuahua
25 San Ignacio, Baja California










Source: Civera Cerecedo, Escuela como opción de vida, 143–45; and Secretaría de Educación Pública, 
Educación pública en México, 117–21.
Note: This map should be taken with a degree of caution since most documentation contains errors 
or inconsistencies. Especially during the first two de cades of their founding, regional campesino 
schools (which  later became rural normales) had short life spans and/or frequently changed 
location.
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 DAUGHTERS OF THE REVOLUTION
The writings students produced at rural normales illustrate the way in 
which they understood, or at least reproduced, sep directives. Focusing 
on themes that included the importance of play in learning, the benefits of 
sports, adult education, and the role of schools in the community, the papers 
of graduating teachers lauded nature over books, workshops over academic 
lessons, and loose discipline and a flexible schedule over hierarchical, regi-
mented instruction. But given that theirs was a civilizing mission, they often 
ignored the knowledge rural dwellers already possessed or simply character-
ized it as retrograde. As pioneers, teachers  were to inculcate new values, new 
ways of  doing  things, and a new culture.
“Rural schools are  daughters of the revolution” was a consistent refrain in 
teachers’ writing, and three broad tropes marked their academic work in the 
early 1930s, before the sep’s adoption of socialist education: rural schools 
as sites of a new modernity, the campesino and indigenous population as a 
dormant mass with  great potential, and teachers as the agents who would 
awaken and direct campesinos’ liberating instinct. Their triumphalist tone 
mirrored the revolutionary state’s official rhe toric, which framed teachers 
as central actors in the consolidation of a new order. For example, one 
normalista wrote, “The teacher, emerging from the small and obscure class-
room, draws back the curtain of an antiquated past to reveal a picturesque 
landscape: nature, life.”30 The new order was modern in its justice and allowed 
life to unfold naturally—an illustration of how nineteenth- century positivist 
notions persisted in postrevolutionary conceptions. Significantly, de cades  later, 
justice and modernity would become competing tropes as normalistas defended 
their schools based on the revolutionary proj ect while the state dismissed them 
as relics of the past. In the 1920s and 1930s, however,  these concepts  were com-
plementary. Wrote another student, “The only faith that gives life and breath 
to the country has been deposited not in palaces, factories, or skyscrapers but 
within the  humble wings of the rural school.”31 In this new origin story, the 
meager and rustic classroom would birth a new modern order.
This preoccupation with modernity led early sep officials to focus on 
cultural practices rather than structural inequalities. The rural normalistas 
followed suit and expressed that much needed to be done to “awaken [camp-
esino] ambition and love of pro gress [by eliminating] pessimism, egoism and 
vice.”32 In her description of adult education, for example, one teacher wrote 
that the school’s “socializing work transforms individual sentiments and iso-
lated thoughts[; it] keeps alive the collective spirit of justice that the Mexican 
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Revolution brought about. . . .  It converts selfish structures into ones that 
edify a universal fraternity.”33 The campesino condition, wrote another, is 
much like that of a “caterpillar that carries within it a butterfly . . .  that  will 
take swift flight.”34 While local communities would temper such conceit, it is 
a good indicator of teachers’ self- conscious participation in a larger transfor-
mative proj ect, one that in  later de cades transcended state directives.
The sense of superiority this missionary duty encompassed extended to teachers’ 
conceptions of ethnicity and gender. While educators tended to make  little 
distinction between the campesino and indigenous population— often using 
the terms interchangeably— they carried with them the logic of assimilation 
inherent in the sep’s approach to nation building. In an obvious allusion to 
Vasconcelos’s notion of the cosmic race, one normalista wrote, “The mestizo 
is a positive force in the social betterment of the campesino. With the  union 
of two cultures, the resulting one is better prepared. This is why the mestizo 
has more clarity about community prob lems and seeks solutions with more 
interest than the Indian.”35 His words likewise reflected the view of other 
educators like Rafael Ramírez, a chief architect of the cultural missions and 
director of the Department of Rural Education, who had admonished, “You 
need to be very careful that your pupils not only learn the Spanish language 
but that they acquire our customs and ways of life, which are undoubtedly 
superior to theirs.”36 The transformation began with the normalistas them-
selves, a pro cess the boarding- school structure made easier  because, accord-
ing to one director, it separated students from the “depressing influence of 
their homes.”37 Or, as another put it, “The timid Indians that a year ago ar-
rived at this institution . . .  now see their town’s life from a diff er ent  angle.”38 
Students at the normales reproduced this view, often articulating a noble- 
savage framework. “The ease with which the Indian joins civilization,” wrote 
one gradu ate, “is eloquent proof that the beating strengths, the racial forti-
tude, pristine in our Indian, are still alive.”39
A similar vision framed the approach to  women, of whom the sep held a 
contradictory view. As victims of the previously backward social order, they 
 were in need of redemption. But they  were also key figures in consolidat-
ing a new modernity. Teachers’ writings reflect this view as they emphasized 
that with their help,  women would emerge from the long lethargy imposed 
by both male selfishness and female cowardice. Educational proj ects would 
harness  women’s moral strength and natu ral kindness to construct the new 
society. Once  women received the same education as men, they would 
cease to be a burden on society and instead constitute “a veritable  factor in 
economic, moral and intellectual pro gress.”40
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Despite the sep’s paternalistic views on both ethnicity and gender, its 
proj ect denaturalized many aspects of the previous racial, gendered, and 
class hierarchies. While the teaching profession had long been accessible to 
 women, the revolutionary government’s charge that they or ga nize  women’s 
leagues and champion  women’s rights provided new opportunities for female 
po liti cal participation.41 Predominantly indigenous communities that might 
have initially resisted the sep’s attempt to transform their cultural practices 
and traditions over the long run “pursued their dialogue with teachers and 
educational authorities in order to bend the school to serve local interests 
and culture.”42 Moreover,  because so many rural teachers themselves came 
from a campesino- indigenous background, they exemplified the possibilities 
of a more flexible social structure. Fi nally, the very contradictions, limita-
tions, and re sis tance that teachers faced in carry ing out their charge tem-
pered their self- righteousness. They instead became conduits by which di-
verse communities could have a say in the pro cess of state formation. Rather 
than being the state’s missionaries, they facilitated revolutionary citizenship, 
one that did not always conform to the state’s vision.43
Overall, student term papers reveal the sep’s changing ideology, from one 
originally emphasizing social redemption and action pedagogy to one that 
addressed structures of exploitation and collective organ izing. Gradu ates re-
produced educational discourse and mandates, with early 1930s assignments 
reflecting spiritual or liberal ideals and  those  toward the latter part of the 
de cade demonstrating a more materialist perspective. “And if the previous 
apostles of Chris tian ity built churches,” wrote a gradu ate in 1933, “ today the 
advanced soldiers of the revolution create schools. And if the former substi-
tuted idolatry with the gospel, the latter replace agony with joy.”44 If teachers 
 were the new protagonists in this narrative of conquest, priests  were the new 
villains. For example, in an essay entitled “The Teacher as the True Social 
Leader in the Communities,” a gradu ate from the rural normal of Ayotzin-
apa devoted much of his essay to contrasting the teacher’s noble commu-
nity work to the self- interested actions of the priest. Rather than eschewing 
Christian doctrine, however, he hailed teachers as its true adherents. They, 
“filled with faith and love,” heeded the revolution’s call and “took on the 
noble crusade of liberating the  people.”45
The  grand charge assigned to students at rural normales instilled in 
young teachers a sense of their own importance. Rather than being corpo-
ratist institutions that fostered passivity or compliance,  these schools based 
their  whole philosophy on the idea that their gradu ates should promote 
community change. Moreover, sep publications such as El Maestro Rural 
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would become venues to denounce the misery of the countryside, foment a 
campesino and indigenous identity based on collective rights and action, ex-
pand on the possibilities of justice offered by noncapitalist modes of organ-
ization, and prepare the terrain for socialist education.46 The magazine also 
published the writings of rural teachers themselves, thus creating an intellec-
tual community that enriched their experience, encouraged their laboring 
commitment in the face of constant challenges, and reinforced their key role 
in Mexico’s progressive transformation.
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE  BATTLE OVER EDUCATION
The state’s educational proj ect had an obvious antagonist in the Catholic 
Church. The 1917 Constitution contained several anticlerical provisions, in-
cluding a mandate for secular education. In the latter part of the 1920s, when 
President Calles implemented laws compelling religious figures to register 
with civil authorities, prevented the church from making po liti cal decla-
rations, and prohibited public religious pro cessions, the Catholic Church 
and its faithful mounted a power ful rebellion. Concentrated primarily in 
the central- western states of Mexico, the Cristiada, as the religious revolt 
became known, involved tens of thousands of campesinos who often tar-
geted teachers, the most vis i ble symbols of the new order. In retaliation 
for the government converting churches into stables, Cristeros burned 
schools and tortured teachers. Cutting off their ears and leaving their bod-
ies wrapped in banners reading “Long Live Christ the King” became a sig-
nature Cristero mark.
The dynamics  behind the Cristero rebellion  were complex and involved 
both elite and popu lar strains. The former, constituted by the church and 
large landowners, saw their interests threatened by the new revolutionary 
order and reacted violently to teachers’ efforts to or ga nize peasant and work-
ers’  unions. Hacendados, caciques, and mine and plantation  owners spon-
sored armed bands to target teachers, while priests delivered impassioned 
sermons threatening to excommunicate parishioners who sent their  children 
to school. Previously liberal partisans who had benefited from the Porfirian 
legislation against indigenous collective landholding recruited Cristeros to 
preserve order against  those they characterized as immoral agraristas (pro-
ponents of land distribution).47 In the northeastern region of Michoacán, 
the US- owned lumber com pany had their workers sign a pledge promising 
not to send their  children to the newly built school. In several places priests 
urged community members to run off teachers.48
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But it would be wrong to characterize all Cristeros as pawns of priests and 
landlords. The movement also reflected a deep- seated religiosity and defense 
of local autonomy threatened by the revolutionary state.49 Many campesinos 
challenged the legitimacy of property arrangements, citizenship, authority, 
and cultural identities promoted by the new set of liberal elites.50 While the 
vast majority of Mexico’s campesinos  were Catholic, their varying levels of 
commitment, practice, and identity structured their religious culture and 
often determined their reaction to schools, agrarian reform, and anticlerical 
legislation.51
The state defeated the first Cristero revolt in 1929, though more outbursts 
followed in the 1930s with the implementation of socialist education.  Under 
minister of education Narciso Bassols (1931–34), the sep moved increasingly 
leftward, further activating the ire of conservatives and even moderates. 
A Marxist, Bassols promoted the “essentially economic aspect” of rural edu-
cation as a way to modify systems of production, distribution, and access 
to wealth.52 Operating  under the assumption that rural dwellers could not 
be well educated  until they  were well fed, the minister promoted agrarian 
reform as a principal component of rural education. Collectivist approaches 
to farming, he believed, could remedy campesino poverty, while indigenous 
culture harbored virtues that far surpassed cap i tal ist tenets.53
 Under Bassols’s leadership, the sep made headway in secularizing ed-
ucation and creating institutions for teacher professionalization. Bassols 
promoted coeducation and supported the Mexican Eugenics Society’s rec-
ommendation that sex education be taught in schools. This latter position 
rallied conservative sectors of the population already angered by the immi-
nent adoption of socialist education. The National Parents Union and the 
church mounted alarmist allegations that  were eagerly published by newspa-
pers like Excélsior. Rumors thus flourished that the study of sexual reproduc-
tion constituted basic pornography, that lessons involved kids disrobing, and 
that teachers would rape young girls.54 The campaign soon targeted Bassols 
specifically, in part  because of his radical politics. Like socialist education, 
the right saw sex education as an example of a more general affront to re-
ligious and private control of schools, not to mention an attack on the 
patriarchal order.
As a way to temper the campaign against the government, Bassols re-
signed as minister of education in May 1934, seven months before President 
Cárdenas took office and socialist education saw its strongest push forward. 
His resignation may have alleviated tensions, but the state was about to 
embark on an experiment with socialist education, which in many parts of 
56 Chapter Two
Mexico provided the ideological glue for some of Cárdenas’s most ambitious 
collectivization proj ects.55
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIALIST EDUCATION
Predating Bassols, the socialist school had its precursors in the early part of 
the twentieth  century, when pedagogues such as José de la Luz Mena pro-
moted the idea of rationalist education. Implemented as official policy in 
the states of Yucatán and Tabasco by progressive governors Felipe Carrillo 
Puerto (1922–24) and Garrido Canabal (1920–24, 1931–34) in the early 
years  after the revolution, the rationalist school was scientific and antireli-
gious, upholding re spect for individual difference as a way to create a more 
humane and just society. Eschewing intellectualism, authoritarianism, and 
single- sex education, it valued manual  labor and advocated the active role 
of the teacher in  family and community life.56 John Dewey’s philosophy 
bridged the rationalist and socialist schools— action pedagogy became prac-
tical lessons, and historical materialism’s emphasis on the truth replaced the 
previous focus on real life as the basis for pedagogical inspiration.57
As a  matter of policy, the directors of the cultural missions first discussed 
socialist education in a 1932 conference. In debating the type of instruction 
best suited for the countryside, the attendees agreed it should be one that 
“satisfied the economic needs of the rural class . . .  tending to transform 
systems of production and distribution of wealth, with a frank collectivist 
aim.”58 When Mexico’s recently consolidated National Revolutionary Party 
(which  later became the Institutional Revolutionary Party, pri) held its con-
vention in 1933 and outlined its six- year plan, a faction within the educa-
tional commission advocated the adoption of socialist education. While this 
group failed, during the following year, socialist education obtained support 
from certain branches of the teachers’  union.59 Significantly, it received an 
unlikely boost from Calles, who, while no longer president, was the jefe máx-
imo, Mexico’s most power ful po liti cal figure. Hardly a partisan of progressive 
reform, Calles’s contempt for the Catholic Church led him to promote so-
cialist education, which to him and many  others simply meant secular, anti- 
Catholic schooling.
When socialist education was approved by Congress in October  1934, 
few could agree on the meaning of socialism. Interpretations ranged from 
a need to achieve broad- based unity in a country with profound social and 
ethnic differences, to the creation of schools as instruments of social change, 
to a necessary step in the path  toward a modern society, to an  actual stage 
 A New Kind of School 57
in socializing the means of production. Ultimately, the adoption of socialist 
education reflected the popu lar concerns of the revolution, the severe crisis 
of capitalism triggered by the  Great Depression, the presence of progressives 
within the sep, and the link so many reformers saw between education and 
the creation of a more egalitarian society. While both the left and the right 
criticized the fact that socialism was not clearly defined, its ambiguity in some 
re spects facilitated its implementation.
Socialist education had its greatest impact in the countryside, where it 
reinforced notions of the teacher as a community leader whose sympathies 
lay with the poor.  Those who  were already politicized took it as a mandate 
to continue their organ izing work. For example, teachers from the rural nor-
mal of Oaxtepec in Morelos issued a manifesto to campesinos and work-
ers, stating, “We happily assume the vanguard position that has been given 
to us and  will direct the crystallization of your ideals as a  battle of hope.”60 
Socialist education thus heightened the link between schools and the need 
for structural transformation of the economy, in which teachers  were to be 
central protagonists. Where agricultural workers, campesinos, and teachers 
 were already mobilized, it had the most enthusiastic support. In the northern 
region of La Laguna, long marked by social unrest, the new educational man-
date reinforced  unionization efforts, ejido formation, and cooperatives, often 
placing the school house as the organ izing center and teachers as leaders.61
In training teachers on its implementation, sep publications stated that 
socialism was at its core “a system to enable socioeconomic justice.” In con-
trast to the bourgeois school, which emphasized individual success and the 
accumulation of wealth— “the only and major goal of capitalism”— the so-
cialist school resolved one’s needs by harmonizing them with collective jus-
tice. Indeed, the socialist school was but one more institution born of the 
revolution and should be “the select child of the  union, the ejido, the coop-
erative, and the government, of all the active products of the revolution.”62 
At a microlevel, socialist education was to address home dynamics, improv-
ing the  house hold’s economic, spiritual, and moral organ ization. Teachers 
would guide inhabitants on proper dress and food habits,  battle superstition 
and religious fanat i cism, instruct on proper hygiene habits, and combat al-
coholism and gambling.63
At rural normales the use of Marxist language was more explicit. For 
example, instructions on one exam asked students to complete the exercise 
shown in figure 2.3 by drawing a line that connected the appropriate cate-
gories in the column on the left with the groups of  people on the right. The 
correct answer placed peons and workers  under the Exploited category while 
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the rest  were Exploiters. Next was a three- part question asking whose  labor 
was used to extract raw materials, who produced commodities, and who ob-
tained the illegitimate profit in this pro cess.64
Normalistas  were also tested in socialism’s po liti cal, economic, social, ra-
tionalist, and cultural function. When one student answered that its po liti-
cal nature meant campesinos should gain judicial authority, it was corrected 
to “power in general.” Its economic nature, expressed the student, meant a 
campesino should “strug gle to acquire a plot of land to . . .  sustain his  family.” 
But the evaluator noted that the student missed “a lot of what this aspect 
entailed.”65 Indeed, socialist lessons often involved the broad princi ples that 
explained school as an ideological tool of the revolution, the need to elimi-
nate the vestiges of capitalism, the expropriation of private property, and the 
eventual rule of the proletariat. Upon graduation, normalistas  were thus to 
teach a materialist conception of history and the universe, explain that class 
strug gle drove  human pro gress, and influence the  middle class to think of 
themselves as proletarians.66 Such lessons reinforced class consciousness and 
legitimized an agenda of social justice by explaining basic power dynamics 
that teachers, in turn, espoused in the communities where they taught.
Normalistas reproduced such analytical frameworks in their graduating 
term papers. One normalista, for example, expressed the need to build a new 
 future, one “in which current class divisions,  those where exploiters own all 
the wealth and the exploited work, are replaced by an egalitarian society in 
which wealth is distributed equally.”67  After articulating the power relations 
between rich and poor and explaining the nature of class conflict in Marx-
ist terms, another paper characterized the rural school as a product of each 
par tic u lar historical stage. In the past  there had been convents and semi-
naries, religious and lay schools. The moment was now ripe for the socialist 
Students were asked to draw lines connecting the groups  
on the right with the appropriate categories on the left.
Exploiters      Peons
       Estate owners
       Businessmen
       Capitalists
       Clergy
Exploited       Workers
figure 2.3 Categorization exercise on a January 1940 entrance exam for the rural 
normal of Tenería, Mexico State.
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school. The opposition to it merely reflected the class conflict at play in the 
formation of an egalitarian society.68
In their communities teachers espoused such messages in  whole or in part. 
Some reported that socialism simply gave a name to what they already did; 
 others used it to encourage community initiatives or social agency, and  others 
to denounce church corruption.69 But some took the doctrine literally. Seem-
ingly alluding to the Marxist slogan “From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his need,” one teacher reported trying to make the kids un-
derstand that “joint work, equally distributed according to ability, was more 
productive.”70 More broadly, another teacher stated that she taught “in accor-
dance with the interests of the revolutionary proletariat who fight to transform 
cap i tal ist Mexico into socialist Mexico.”71  These  were of course the normalistas’ 
words to the sep. As Mary Kay Vaughan has shown, in communities they soft-
ened state rhe toric that would conflict with long- standing local traditions.72
Still, church and hacendado hostility appears as a constant and early 
challenge to rural educators. Priests circulated flyers warning families that 
 children would now be taught to obey the state, not their parents. “This 
same socialist school,” one flyer elaborated, had “already been implemented 
in Rus sia where kids have lost re spect and love for their parents, not hesi-
tating to denounce them. . . .  Their poor, el derly parents had been jailed, 
beaten, and humiliated to the  great satisfaction of their very own off-
spring.”73 Newspapers publicized complaints that “rural communist teach-
ers” prompted other wise compliant campesinos to take over hacienda land 
and resources.74 The Cristero movement saw renewed episodes, and teachers 
continued to be principal targets. They  were threatened, their homes and 
school houses burned; many  were mutilated, lynched, or killed, often in quite 
a gruesome manner. In 1936, for example, in the municipality of Tabasco, 
Zacatecas, a band of armed men killed and dismembered the young educator 
María Murillo and then exhibited her breasts as a warning of what happened 
to communist teachers. The following morning the priest held mass and ab-
solved  those responsible.75
The constant vio lence against or assassination of teachers—223 docu-
mented cases between 1931 and 1940, though  there  were likely many more— 
created an environment in which Cristero actions became  etched in nor-
malista memory and formed a constituting ele ment of their origin story.76 
Even before socialist education, teachers faced the hostility of the country-
side’s power holders, whose vio lence radicalized them and increased their 
loyalty to the government’s socialist education.77 The class nature of the vio-
lence against teachers is evident from the numerous attacks they faced in states 
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with no Cristero movement, such as Chiapas, where plantation  owners, local 
officials, and hired gunmen regularly targeted teachers.78 For subsequent gen-
erations, the  battle between church and state, between pro gress and reactionary 
forces, encompassed part of the legacy that made theirs a noble and brave pro-
fession. Moreover, as discussed in the next chapter, socialist education provided 
a power ful analytical framework by which  future generations moved beyond 
the church- state dichotomy in the  battle over education.
RURAL NORMALES AND STUDENT GOVERNANCE
The educational philosophy born of the revolution created an environment in 
which students acquired an impor tant say within rural normales. The initial 
space for student voices came with the early orga nizational model meant to 
mirror  family relations, one that emphasized re spect, caring, and a decision- 
making pro cess that benefited all participants. Moreover, as previously dis-
cussed, action pedagogy undermined nineteenth- century philosophies that 
held that teaching should be regimented, hierarchical, and authoritarian. In 
their early reports, rural normal directors continuously emphasized their 
schools’ “demo cratic organ ization,” their encouragement that normalistas 
form student associations, their adoption of a discipline system based on 
the “students’ active collaboration” in its enforcement and “the most free-
dom pos si ble.”79 Gradu ates would, in turn, reproduce  these tendencies in the 
communities where they taught and thus would distinguish themselves from 
previous generations whose practices  were encapsulated by the philosophy 
la letra con sangre entra (spare the rod, spoil the child). Pedagogical methods 
taught at normales increasingly valued  children’s “freedom, in de pen dence, 
and spontaneity as the first step in the educational pro cess” and emphasized 
that discipline and good conduct should come from within rather than be 
imposed by the teacher’s authority.80
The undercurrent of progressivism that long characterized rank- and- file 
teachers also contributed to a strong student say in the rural normales. In 
addition to liberal teachers who promoted student participation as an act of 
democracy in the 1920s, cultural missionaries who witnessed the prob lems in 
poor communities emphasized collective action as a means to resolve them. 
Likewise, teachers and agricultural technicians who  were members or sym-
pathizers of the Mexican Communist Party fought for a voice in institutional 
decisions. As educators pushed for  unionization, they transmitted po liti cal 
lessons to their students, many of whom linked social reforms to change at 
their normal.81 Thus, even before the sep formally sanctioned it in the 1930s, 
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student participation in normales’ government had been a de facto practice. 
As students created their own organ izations and demanded a say in how 
their schools  were run, they appropriated and often reframed state goals. In 
the pro cess, their vision became radicalized and formed the basis for a revo-
lutionary ideology they maintained for generations (figure 2.4).
As the rural normales grew in both size and number during the 1930s, the 
 family model gave way to a cooperativist framework, one that emphasized 
the needs of the collective over  those of the individual (figure 2.5). Indeed, 
as sep officials spoke increasingly of fomenting leadership qualities in  future 
figure 2.4 Mural at the rural normal of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, which reads, “For a 
socialist revolution, long live worker- campesino- student unity.” The mural’s style sug-
gests it was done by José Hernández Delgadillo, whose anecdote opened this chapter. 
Photo graph by author.
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rural teachers, student participation in the normales’ governing structure 
became a logical place to promote assertive be hav ior and to undo what 
Ignacio García Téllez, head of the sep from 1934 to 1935, characterized as 
the “conformist mentality of the exploited.”82 In its 1937 action plan, the 
Department of Agricultural Instruction and Rural Normal, the office within 
the sep then in charge of secondary rural education, emphasized that 
rural normales had been “created essentially to make the  children of poor 
campesinos . . .  youngsters with a class consciousness capable of transforming 
our rural population.” To cultivate “organ izing skills, a sense of responsibility, 
and ability to promote class interests,” student councils would assume the 
school’s leadership with no “inferiority complex” and in this way participate 
in “the country’s destiny.”83
The biggest impulse for students’ say in rural normales came with socialist 
education. This legislation provided a framework by which top- down goals 
intersected with the undercurrent of popu lar mobilization spearheaded by 
teachers’  unions and the Mexican Communist Party. At the rural normales, 
this pro cess crystallized with the formation of the Mexican Federation of 
Socialist Campesino Students (fecsm). Seeking to combat the bourgeois 
ideology of traditional student organ izations, the fecsm traces its origin to 
1934, when a normalista del e ga tion from Tamatán, Tamaulipas, attended a 
statewide student conference in which they  were brushed aside by “univer-
sity students who had no inkling that students from the campesino class ex-
isted.” The majority of the students at the conference, continued the fecsm 
manifesto,  were of urban, bourgeois origin. How could they even understand 
the campesino condition when “the city and the countryside have been eter-
nal rivals[?] . . .  The city  houses the accumulation of wealth and well- being, 
while in the countryside  there is misery, wanton exposure, and unceasingly 
brutal work.”84 Such statements exemplify the type of po liti cal consciousness 
that would take shape in the rural normales, one in which students identified 
as members not only of the exploited class but of the rural exploited class. 
In some ways, the fecsm is representative of the popu lar organ izations that 
emerged  under Cárdenas: it united a newly constituted sector of society in a 
broad national association; its socialist outlook was acceptable to a govern-
ment that had legalized the Communist Party and encouraged a critique of 
cap i tal ist exploitation; and it politicized rural normalistas’ understanding 
of themselves and their institutions. “One belonged to the fecsm,” recalled 
Mariano Orozco Álvarez, who studied at the rural normal of Huetamo, 
Michoacán, from 1938 to 1941. “That’s how I began to learn the theory of 
scientific socialism.”85 The fecsm thus provided a noninstitutional venue 
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to reproduce Marxist discourse, one that was not eliminated with the over-
turning of socialist education in the 1940s.
The fecsm’s early language bears the  great sense of possibility that 
characterized the 1930s, when the crisis of capitalism created expectations 
of profound social reor ga ni za tion that would fi nally meet the needs of the 
poor. “We are living a transcendent historical moment,” opened the 1934 call 
to form the federation, “witnessing the rise of a humanity unknown  until 
now.  Today it rises with previously undreamed longings and with desires and 
hopes that even a few years ago would have been characterized as utopias.” 
This context had produced “millions of young campesinos anxious to learn 
but, above all, to strug gle for the betterment of their class.”86
The fecsm’s constituting congress took place in 1935 in the rural normal of 
El Roque, in the state of Guanajuato. In their conference resolutions, the rural 
normalistas declared themselves in “frank opposition to capitalism, the bour-
geoisie, the clergy, and po liti cal demagoguery.”87 Their demands included an 
increase in the number of rural normales (as promised by the government’s six- 
year plan), a call for training teachers specifically for their schools (to mitigate 
the situation in which most of the teachers hailed from urban normales), the 
right of the fecsm to report on teachers and administrators who shirked 
figure 2.5 Rural normal of Galeana, Nuevo León, 1934. Archivo General de la 
Nación, Photographic Archive, Normales Rurales, c2, Sobre 9.
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their responsibilities or acted  counter to the revolutionary ideology, and a 
say in disciplinary procedures.88
Early fecsm proclamations that saw the possibilities offered by the histori-
cal moment soon acknowledged the  great obstacles standing in the way of their 
utopias. A 1937 congress call, for example, stated that, against the backdrop of 
tragedies like the Spanish Civil War and Japan’s invasion of China, “our coun-
try,  under the rightful progressive politics of General Cárdenas, advances 
the Revolution’s purpose, fighting against the imperialism that oppresses us 
and destroying latifundismo’s [landed estates’] hold.”89 More than any other 
student group, rural normalistas identified with the Cardenista proj ect, 
both  because they came from campesino origins and  because, being on the 
front line of Cárdenas’s reforms, they experienced firsthand the challenges 
of its implementation. The rural normales’ early history involved fending off 
Cristeros, battling rumors that theirs  were schools of the devil, and carry-
ing out community proj ects. Through direct experience, classroom lessons, 
or the right’s persecution, rural normalistas identified closely with the cause 
of the oppressed,  those whose interests Cárdenas championed. The distinct 
dynamic at the rural normales did not go unnoticed within the broader com-
munity of educators. Alberto Morales Jiménez, a student at Mexico City’s 
National Teachers’ School, wrote about his visit to a national congress of 
rural normalistas at El Roque, Guanajuato, “President Cárdenas had [in the 
rural normales] a true, loyal, and firm right hand.  These youths stood arm 
in arm with rural teachers and in agrarian communities, towns, and villages 
withstood the attacks of white guards, hacienda  owners, and the fanatics at 
the ser vice of the po liti cal priests. . . .  If the university youth had opposed the 
Cardenista government,  there, standing firm, was the rural youth to defend 
him!”90 Referring  here to the university community’s opposition to social-
ist education, Morales captures an impor tant quality inherent in normalista 
politicization: a juxtaposition of city and countryside, the former a place of 
privilege and the latter a site of marginality. As the fecsm manifesto put it, 
 until Cárdenas, the government had neglected the countryside or overseen 
policies that funneled the countryside’s wealth to the cities.91
While the sep initially sanctioned and even promoted student participa-
tion in the normales’ governing structure, the student federation ultimately 
threatened official control over  these institutions. The sep thus engaged in 
a series of strategies to guide student voices through channels that excluded 
the fecsm. In 1936 the sep’s Rural Educational Council designed statutes 
that gave students a voice in institutional governance but did so through a 
framework linking that voice to the goals of the institution. The question of 
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who would define the institution’s ultimate proj ect was momentarily tem-
pered by the adoption of socialist education, which provided a sufficiently 
radical rationale to forefront issues of class. Still, the sep’s trepidation is 
evident in its language: “Students are not called upon to participate in the 
school’s government to decree rights or prerogatives but to study the school’s 
prob lems and to help realize the social ends of the institution. The school is 
not or ga nized against students but in their  favor. And they, for their part, 
should or ga nize in  favor, not against, the school. They should do so not as 
a separate entity but as integrative ele ments of the school community.”92 
An attempt to bring student leaders into the institutional fold, such asser-
tions also reflected an effort to outline a clear hierarchy. The sep officials 
emphasized that students would be consulted but could not legislate policy 
and underscored that the normal’s director was the institutional authority 
ultimately accountable to the sep. But the normales’ philosophy that the 
school constituted a community gave students ample justification to assert 
their voice. Normal statutes, for example, read, “The  whole notion of what is 
official or hierarchical within the school needs to be shed in  favor of a sense 
of solidarity and responsibility, one in which every one confronts the neces-
sary work.”93 This was more than rhe toric: the sep formalized a design that 
gave students a role in virtually  every aspect of the school’s inner workings. 
This took place through the Student- Teacher Council, a body composed of 
the school’s director, teachers, and elected student representatives. Charged 
with linking socialist ideas with life at the normal and the education of its 
students, the council examined technical, economic, and administrative 
 matters related to its daily functions and relationship to the community; 
considered sep resolutions pertaining to student life, material resources, and 
specific school prob lems; and or ga nized concrete committees dealing with 
agriculture, sports, social life, work, academic achievement, school desertion, 
coordination with alumni, and discipline.94
Despite the sep’s declarations that the Student- Teacher Council was a 
consultative rather than an executive body, in most rural normales it acquired 
substantial say in shaping, and in some cases even determining, internal pol-
icy. The tradition of teacher mobilization, the fecsm’s resolve to or ga nize 
students across the normales, and a change in sep personnel that by 1936 
had implemented socialist education all contributed to giving students an 
unusually impor tant role in their school’s governing structure.95 Addition-
ally, participation in school government provided the perfect opportunity 
for students to both develop leadership skills and acquire the civic princi ples 
necessary to any democracy.
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Early concerns about demo cratic values focused on student discipline. 
José Santos Valdés, director of several rural normales in the 1930s and 1940s 
and  later the sep’s regional inspector of normal education, was a key figure 
in designing the disciplinary code  adopted at most rural normales. “Disci-
pline,” held Santos Valdés, “cannot be the product of theoretical specula-
tions. It has to be the outcome of daily life and experience, of the interaction 
among  children, between  children and teachers, and between  children and 
the environment.”96 For this reason, the disciplinary code needed the input 
of all community members, including students. Only in this way could they 
understand its logic and the implications of breaking the rules. Adopting 
such practices required that teachers give up old privileges, specifically  those 
emanating from their position as authority figures, which, Santos Valdés ar-
gued, came from the state and rendered them untouchable or subject only to 
the judgment of their colleagues or superiors.97 Instead, the logic of the collec-
tive, agreed upon, understood, and enforced by all, should frame the question 
of discipline. Violating the rules would thus challenge not a single teacher or 
administrator but the school community. This structure, according to Santos 
Valdés, represented a key difference between a school that prepared students 
for “enslavement and a life of servitude, and the school that educated for 
democracy.”98
 These ideals  were put into practice through a code of conduct that em-
phasized student rights and responsibilities, mea sured through a point 
system: if students neglected their responsibilities or defied school regula-
tions, they lost points. They began with 100 points, and reaching 40 merited 
expulsion. While the school director determined the value assigned to each 
violation, students had a role in enforcing school conventions, especially in 
ensuring student participation in work commissions, often considered more 
impor tant than academic per for mance.99
The Committee of Honor and Justice, the committee charged with  matters 
of student discipline, became one of the clearest expressions of student voice 
in the rural normales. Composed of the school director and selected teach-
ers and students, this council determined the type of punishment for  those 
who  violated the code of conduct. The meetings took place before the entire 
student body and involved group debates that often went on for hours. 
The cases brought before  these councils included neglecting assigned duties, 
engaging in amorous relationships, stealing, and getting in physical fights, 
often involving weapons.100  These open meetings created an environment of 
public debate, student participation, and individual accountability to the col-
lective. For example, José Ángel Fabre Baños documented a case at the rural 
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normal of Galeana in which a male student was expelled for striking a female 
peer. In that decision the general assembly issued the following statement: 
“The socialist school attempts to defend  women; we want to make it clear 
to the entire world that we give  women all the consideration they deserve 
and that we  will severely judge all that is unjustly done against their interests 
 whether she is a student or not of our school.”101 In keeping with broader revo-
lutionary tropes that  women should be rescued from men’s abusive clutches, 
such declarations still treated  women as passive subjects. But Fabre Baños’s 
account shows how open debate linked broad ideological philosophies such 
as socialism to concrete incidents on the school grounds. In  these discus-
sions, students learned how to articulate a grievance, mount a defense, weigh 
potential punishments, and make a case to the school authorities—exactly 
the type of skills expected of community leaders.
the educational architects of the 1920s and 1930s set out to cre-
ate a new kind of school with a new kind of teacher. While Mexico’s early 
twentieth- century educational proj ect was one of state consolidation, the 
revolutionary strug gle that produced the Mexican state imbued it with a 
progressive current that found expression in radical politics such as socialist 
education. And even before the socialist curriculum, early experimentation 
with action pedagogy, collectivism, and agricultural education and the em-
phasis on teachers as community leaders structured rural normales as insti-
tutions uniquely poised to preserve the popu lar undercurrent of the revolu-
tionary strug gle. While the state would soon halt  these progressive forces, 
the goals that had previously been articulated  were not easily set aside. A 
 whole generation of teachers trained in socialist education would continue 
to espouse radical princi ples through their three de cades of professional 
ser vice. Many, moreover, became teachers at the rural normales, effectively 
continuing socialist education even as the state abandoned it. Students, for 
their part, conscious of the invaluable opportunity a  career in teaching rep-
resented, would be increasingly active in the defense of rural normales in the 
face of a government that in the 1940s turned its attention to the cities at the 
expense of the countryside. This created an institutional context in which 
the original progressive philosophies  were not only preserved but furthered.
felipe Cortés martínez, who in the 1950s studied and  later taught 
at the rural normal of El Mexe, located in the central state of Hidalgo, con-
siders the first attacks on  these schools to have come in 1940: “It’s not the 
same to have [Ávila] Camacho as president as it was to have Cárdenas. And 
that’s when the main blow came, when they took away socialist education.”1 
Indeed, the presidency of Manuel Ávila Camacho, who took office in De-
cember 1940, signaled a rightward shift in the course of Mexico’s revolution-
ary proj ect. Social reforms had already slowed significantly  after 1938, the 
year President Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized Mexico’s oil industry, an act 
considered the culmination of his progressive policies. Still, President Ávila 
Camacho’s conservative direction had impor tant repercussions for Mexico’s 
educational system as his administration implemented a series of changes 
that privileged urban over rural schools, transformed the character of the 
countryside’s teachers, ended coeducation in boarding schools, and over-
turned socialist education.
The international context precipitated by World War II facilitated a change 
in the Mexican government’s rhe toric from emphasizing social justice to priv-
ileging national unity. This shift had impor tant policy implications as sub-
sequent regimes replaced wealth re distribution with urban infrastructural 
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development. The  battles between church and state of the 1920s and 1930s 
drew to a close as President Ávila Camacho publicly declared himself a “be-
liever,” marking a stark departure from  earlier regimes that held strictly sec-
ular positions. In this way, the president initiated a modus vivendi with the 
Catholic Church, which soon found common cause with a state whose dis-
course became increasingly anticommunist. In addition to openly proclaim-
ing his Catholic faith, Ávila Camacho declared shortly before taking office 
that he was a demo crat, not a socialist. In his government  there would be 
no communists.2 His successor, President Miguel Alemán (1946–52), went 
even further. His administration actively persecuted communists, a label 
that,  under the Cold War framework, was broadly applied to popu lar lead-
ers, dissidents, or critics. Soon  after taking office, Alemán created the Fed-
eral Security Directorate, an agency modeled  after the US Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and ostensibly charged with protecting national security. 
Instead, it infiltrated, spied on, and repressed campesinos, workers, students, 
and even official organ izations.3 The country’s major newspapers, such as El 
Universal and Excélsior, whose  owners had held a fierce anticommunist line 
since the 1920s, likewise drew few distinctions among Mexico’s diverse leftist 
groups, labeling most forms of popu lar organ izing communist.  These news-
papers operated with close ties to the ruling inner circle, and their edito-
rial lines, paid advertisements, and numerous articles— some written in the 
United States— uncritically reproduced the Cold War’s bellicose language 
and magnified the supposed communist threat.4
The education system, too, began to undergo a series of changes.  Under a 
framework of modernization and professionalization, the Ministry of Pub-
lic Education (sep) implemented curricular reforms to make rural normales 
more like their urban counter parts. This meant emphasizing academic in-
struction over community development, farming expertise, and the basic set 
of trade skills the institutions had previously prioritized. Funding for rural 
normales was itself jeopardized. No longer the regime’s priority, the num-
ber of schools decreased.  Those that remained increasingly needed student 
mobilization to preserve what was already a precarious existence. Whereas 
rural teachers had previously held a special place in the educational system, 
the sep reformulated the pay and benefits structure to reward professional 
training over years of ser vice.5 This new system relegated rural teachers— 
who  either had  little formal training or took their jobs before attaining 
their degree, or whose remote location hampered their ability to enroll in 
professional development courses—to the bottom rung of the pay scale. Ac-
companying  these changes was a deliberate transformation in rural teachers’ 
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prescribed role. Their social leadership, so touted by the early educational 
architects, became civic duty: rather than advocating for the working class 
or rural communities, teachers  were to limit their role to the classroom and 
emphasize self- realization over po liti cal militancy.6
But the fervor of the previous two de cades, especially in the countryside 
during the Cárdenas years, had created an imprint that was difficult to erase. 
While discourse and policy at the top changed, the state could not easily 
transform the ideals and dynamics of educators working on the ground. De-
spite a changing context in which national unity replaced social justice as the 
official operative discourse, the rural normales preserved the more radical 
ideals of the revolution, making them bulwarks of Cardenismo, socialism, 
and justice for the poor. This pro cess took place, this chapter argues, for 
three interrelated reasons. First, socialist education had grown deep roots in 
 these institutions as it provided an explanation for the existence of poverty, 
emphasized its unjust nature, and charged its gradu ates with changing the 
conditions that produced it. Moreover, socialism offered a language to chal-
lenge the state’s narrow definition of modernity, which assumed that sup-
port for industry would produce social equity. Second, student participation 
as a mainstay of institutional reproduction at rural normales reinforced a 
collectivist logic that normalistas soon internalized as a strategy of strug gle. 
Appeals for students to identify with their school’s integrity worked, though 
not necessarily as the sep intended. Directives that students be mindful of 
the institutional reputation and thus adhere to the discipline the authorities 
demanded clashed with the need to preserve the normales’ very existence. 
The schools’ woeful underfunding led students to mobilize for basic im-
provements with tactics such as strikes that inherently challenged authority 
and drew attention to the normalistas as unruly subjects. Third, and fi nally, 
in the course of such strug gles, the Mexican Federation of Socialist Campes-
ino Students (fecsm), the rural normales’ student federation, increasingly 
consolidated its power, holding steadfastly to a socialist framework even 
as the sep purged communists from the administrative ranks. The fecsm 
gradually translated the say students had in quotidian school norms into 
po liti cal power and increasingly prioritized ideological formation. As the 
po liti cal context became more hostile to the poor’s vindications— first 
 because national unity to confront the fascists demanded restraint and 
then  because the Cold War rendered the poor’s demands subversive— rural 
normalistas blazed a path that increasingly diverged from that set by the sep. 
In so  doing, the rural normales developed a unique po liti cal culture in which 
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student action, socialist discourse, and justice for the countryside became 
inextricably linked.
 “THE  GREAT CALAMITY”
The retreat from the progressive policies of the 1930s took vari ous forms. 
 Toward the end of his term, Cárdenas’s reforms had already slowed as capital 
flexed its muscle, making evident the limits of state autonomy.7 Cárdenas’s 
conciliatory policies included the choice of Ávila Camacho as his successor. 
Upon taking office, the new president emphasized that national unity would 
structure policy and would be the path to “honor and bolster the high moral 
values of the Mexican  family.”8 Class strug gle as an analytical framework and 
popu lar vindication as a collective goal  were no longer officially sanctioned 
ideas. Whereas Cardenista reforms had challenged the sacred right to pri-
vate property and asserted Mexico’s economic nationalism, Ávila Camacho 
sought a closer relationship to the business sector and to the United States, 
appealing to a continental unity that would create a “nobler and more just 
Christian international order.”9 Modernization became the new buzzword 
and signaled a systematic abandonment of the countryside.
 These changes affected the sep almost immediately. This agency had come 
to  house numerous socialists, who saw in the doctrine an opportunity to ad-
dress the countryside’s historical in equality. Luis Sánchez Pontón, for exam-
ple, who came from the Cardenista tradition and headed the sep as President 
Ávila Camacho began his term in office, defended socialist education and 
attempted to clarify, if tone down, its meaning. He upheld an educational 
philosophy committed to collective over individual rights, one that strength-
ened the “ideals of justice, fraternity, and equitable distribution of wealth” and 
based itself on the progressive notions of science.10 Sánchez Pontón reiterated 
the ideals of the revolutionary school as linked to work and democracy and 
counterposed it to the “school of indifference,” which, he declared, produced 
“erudite, pompous individuals who fancied themselves geniuses.”11 Despite 
a language that framed allusions to socialism within the Mexican context 
and denied it was a foreign- inspired doctrine, right- wing protestations, em-
boldened by the new president’s moderate stance, saw a new light. That an 
incident at a rural normal led Minister Sánchez Pontón to resign exemplifies 
the central place of  these institutions in the  battle against radical education.
In 1941 students from the rural normal of Ayotzinapa in the coastal state 
of Guerrero initiated a strike demanding the resignation of the school’s 
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principal, Carlos Pérez Guerrero, whom they characterized as authoritarian 
and accused of violating numerous regulations set forth in the normales’ gov-
erning statutes. According to the students, Pérez Guerrero lived in the neigh-
boring town of Tixtla rather than at the school as required, did not offer the 
obligatory number of classes, and made decisions with utter disregard for 
the normal’s governing council.12 In response to the strike, the director cir-
culated rumors— which the national press eagerly published— that students 
at Ayotzinapa had acted in a blatantly unpatriotic manner against the na-
tional insignia. In the version published by newspapers, the normalistas had 
taken the Mexican flag, stomped on it, burned it, and in its place flown the 
anarcho- syndicalist red- and- black flag. Protest letters poured into the pres-
ident’s office denouncing the school’s adherence to a “Muscovite doctrine” 
and its invasion by communist cells.13
 There was never any proof that  these events tran spired in this way. The sto-
ry’s origins lay in a ceremony held the previous school year in Mexico City, 
where President Cárdenas gifted students the nation’s flag to fly on the school 
grounds. Awaiting the local ceremony to deliver that flag to Ayotzinapa’s 
principal— which owing to the school’s vacation and  later its strike, never 
took place— the student who received the flag folded it up and kept it with 
his personal belongings.  Under Mexican law, this represented an offense to 
the national symbol, but it in no way approached the gravity of the charges 
levied in the press. Still, seven teachers and two staff members  were fired, 
and six students  were expelled. All  were jailed.14 When their peers protested 
their detention by mounting a strike, the state governor sent the local army 
battalion to dislodge the students from the school. Thorough in his job, the 
commanding coronel ordered additional detentions, including, according to 
a former school director, seizing the portrait of Karl Marx that hung on the 
cafeteria’s wall. “The Rus sian communist leader” would be dealt with in Ig-
uala’s military headquarters.15
Vari ous organ izations as well as student associations from other rural 
normales wrote to the president declaring solidarity with the jailed stu-
dents, staff, and teachers. Student statements emphasized their loyalty to 
the government, and a few stated that they had even campaigned in  favor of 
President Ávila Camacho.16 It was the school director, declared the “Ricardo 
Flores Magón” student association of Ayotzinapa, who was a traitor to the 
nation, for he had often spoken against Mexico’s oil expropriation.17 More-
over, they continued, Pérez Guerrero had expressed nothing but contempt 
for their normal, maligning it as a center of prostitution, a characterization 
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consistent with the right’s propaganda that rural normales  were immoral, 
communist hubs replete with sordid sexual practices.18
The National Parents Union, an organ ization of private- school par-
ents that had long fought socialist and secular education, in concert with 
Mexico’s major newspapers (whose  owners opposed the leftist tenets of 
the revolution), blamed Ayotzinapa’s conflict on the minister of education 
himself. The attacks reached a crescendo when Minister Sánchez Pontón was 
called to answer before congress. Soon  after, he resigned. The brigadier gen-
eral Octavio Véjar Vázquez, who had no experience in education, replaced 
him. Supported by the right- wing National Action Party, the National Par-
ents Union, and other right- wing groups such as the Freedom and Private 
Initiative Defense League, Véjar Vázquez immediately made explicit his goals: 
the elimination of socialist education and the mending of relations with the 
Catholic Church.19 The press welcomed him as a “young and dynamic pro-
fessional.” Reports in the national newspaper Excélsior expressed that just a 
few days  after taking office, the new minister had established unity among 
the left, the right, and the private sector and highlighted his declaration to 
oversee “a school of love, not hate, one that  will unify rather than divide us 
and promote a school that  will affirm our nationality.”20
To normalistas, the removal of Sánchez Pontón was one in a series of public 
attacks against the rural normales. Writing on the subject two de cades  later, 
Hipólito Cárdenas Deloya, Ayotzinapa’s former director, termed the incident 
“the  great calamity.” Not mincing words, he charged the “mercenary, whorish, 
and venal press” with representing the interests of  those seeking to “outlaw the 
Communist Party! Elicit the confidence of Yanqui imperialism! . . .  Use Ayo-
tzinapa to punish teachers nationally! . . .  And veer the Mexican Revolution 
off course.”21 In his memoir— like in many  others written by normalistas— 
Cárdenas Deloya, incensed by the claim that students had acted in an unpa-
triotic manner, details the virtues of the rural normales, defends their mission, 
and situates socialist education as the secret to their ability to serve the poor.
Even during its heyday, socialist education had been controversial. Lib-
erals had attacked it based on the princi ple of academic freedom, while the 
right relied on a campaign of moral panic to incite opposition. The National 
Action Party, the National Parents Union, and Véjar Vázquez himself pro-
moted an association between Marxists— long supporters of coeducation— 
and immorality. What, other than engage in improprieties, would the two 
sexes do in such close proximity?  Under the communist watch,  these groups 
argued, rural normales constituted centers of loose sexual mores where 
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students cavorted with one another, pregnancies abounded, teachers raped 
their pupils, and spurned lovers committed suicide or had abortions. Based 
on rumors of the most extreme kind— for example, that the grounds sur-
rounding the rural normal of Tenería in Mexico State  were littered with 
aborted fetuses— the right propagated the idea that young  women,  whether 
as temptresses or victims, did not belong in the same institutions as men.22
While instances of unauthorized relationships, sexual harassment, and 
rape no doubt took place at rural normales,  there is no evidence that  these 
 were more frequent than in the society at large. In fact, given the strict po-
licing and students’ ability to collectively mount a case against offending 
staff or teachers, such abuses  were likely less common than at other insti-
tutions or workplaces. To the extent that it did occur, gender- based vio lence 
was a product not of rural normal culture but of the general subordination 
of  women, which the socialists  were, however imperfectly, committed to 
addressing. In fact, this was their  whole argument for coeducation: equal 
instruction might help mitigate and eventually do away with “the in equality 
that has persisted across time and made  women the slaves of men.”23 Sig-
nificantly, some advocates of socialist education went even further. Not only 
should female students be trained in tasks traditionally considered men’s 
realm— farming and small industry— but male students should take home 
economics courses.24
Still, as is evident from Ayotzinapa director Cárdenas Deloya’s character-
ization of the press as whorish, misogynist proclivities  were not the exclusive 
domain of the right. Socialists responded to critiques of moral transgression 
with requests for more funding to better police student be hav ior ( little was 
said about controlling abusive teachers, though engaging in a relationship 
with a student constituted grounds for faculty expulsion).25 As it was, in-
teractions between male and female students  were strictly guarded, rela-
tionships  were prohibited, and school medics  were charged with monitor-
ing female students’ periods.26 Significantly, when the right won the  battle 
against coeducation, its allegations of immorality did not cease. Instead, 
they reappeared as campaigns against homo sexuality, which supposedly 
abounded at rural normales. Students and teachers, for their part, rebuked 
such allegations based on heteronormative values and again demanded re-
sources to prevent or police such relationships. For example, one director’s 
request for more beds stated that the shortage meant students slept two to a 
bed, a practice that “elicited sexual vices.”27
The division of normales by gender in 1943 eased some parents’ anx i-
eties about sending their  daughters to coeducational boarding schools, but 
  “And That’s When the Main Blow Came” 75
it ultimately undermined  women’s structural equality: once the schools 
 were separated, female students  were sent to smaller schools, and the better- 
equipped, larger institutions  were reserved for male normalistas.28 Tellingly, 
in their justification for ending coeducation, some school authorities pro-
posed what amounted to female students subsidizing the reduced system- 
wide spending.  Women’s schools would not need cooks, washerwomen, or 
cleaning staff as the young girls  were themselves equipped for such tasks, rea-
soned one report.29
The campaign against coeducation and socialist pedagogy went hand in 
hand with the right’s attempt to roll back Cardenismo. More broadly, the 
right fought the activist teacher, a figure, detractors maintained, who sowed 
a divisive dogma and substituted po liti cal agitation for learning. Such at-
tacks set the stage for critiques of rural education itself. It was in the coun-
tryside that the most radical teachers taught and had been given the explicit 
charge to mobilize the poor.  Because of socialist education, stated a 1942 
Novedades article, “the Mexican government now had to contend with the 
sinister figure of a teacher saturated with doctrines of hate, engendered by 
the fetid Marx- Lenin- Stalin trilogy and transmitted to them by the virulent 
commies of the rural normales.” The generation of teachers who graduated 
between 1937 and 1942, continued the piece, “carried within them the seeds 
of communism, poisoned consciences, and went on to destroy our valuable 
Mexican ideals.”30 The critique extended to the very conception of teach-
ers as community leaders, a mainstay of the rural educational system. Since 
rural schools  were po liti cal proj ects, reported another piece, “anyone with 
the desire to engage in demagogical practices could become a teacher.” Or, 
rather, declared an official sardonically, they “could disguise themselves as 
a teacher” since their mandates “ were not to teach but to do social work.”31
It would take Ávila Camacho’s entire sexenio (six- year term) to eliminate 
socialist education from national policy altogether. During his first state- 
of- the- union address, the president declared that Article 3’s socialist provi-
sion needed a clearer definition. To this end, his education minister, Véjar 
Vázquez, announced a consultation with vari ous sectors of the population, 
including state governments, university rectors, school principals, and parent 
associations. The minister of education said nothing about input from teach-
ers, whose increasingly power ful  unions distrusted a minister whose designs 
also sought to undermine their collective bargaining. Notably, rural educators 
 were the most radical among a generally militant membership. In the 1930s 
one out of  every eight teachers belonged to the Communist Party. And, as 
scholar David Raby reminds us, for  every member of the Communist Party, 
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 there  were three or four sympathizers.32 In places like Guerrero, 90  percent 
of rural teachers  were members of the Communist Party as well as four out 
of  every six federal inspectors.33
At a time when the official party sought to unite Mexico’s educators  under 
one  union as a means of consolidating its control over them, Véjar Vázquez’s 
 battle against communists exacerbated preexisting differences among the 
vari ous teachers’  unions. The minister’s intransigence— his hostility was 
directed not only against communists but against the  unions themselves— 
ultimately led to his replacement in 1943. Before he stepped down, however, 
a December  1941 congressional reform of Article 3— undertaken without 
the consultation of the promised groups— replaced previous allusions to sci-
entific socialism with Mexican revolutionary socialism, a term defined as a 
commitment to reduce social and economic in equality.34
The right, unabashed in its disdain for materialist- based social critiques, 
celebrated an official sep announcement that ordered the burning of a mil-
lion textbooks, an act that would relegate this “demagogic educational mate-
rial” to the past.35 Such praise came from the very sector promoting national 
unity to fight the fascists, themselves also engaged in book burning. The church, 
for its part, offered Catholicism as the cultural ele ment capable of bonding the 
country’s classes in a common history and purpose. As would become more ex-
plicit once President Alemán took office in 1946, the government recognized 
Catholicism as a central component of the national identity whose focus on 
the  family and social order coincided with the anticommunist rhe toric of the 
Cold War. Pope Pius XI’s 1937 Divini Redemptoris, which expressed specific 
concern for Rus sia and Mexico “where Communism has been able to assert 
its power” and “striven by  every pos si ble means . . .  to destroy Christian civi-
lization,” would see renewed circulation.36
In the meantime, the new education minister, Jaime Torres Bodet (1943–
46), continued to roll back socialist education but in a subtler manner, with 
the po liti cal finesse his pre de ces sor lacked. Unlike Véjar Vázquez, the new 
secretary had a background in education. A writer and diplomat, Torres 
Bodet had also worked closely with Vasconcelos during the latter’s time as 
rector of the National Autonomous University of Mexico and had been in 
charge of the Library Department at the sep. His relationship with Vascon-
celos notwithstanding, Torres Bodet deemphasized teachers’ community 
action and appealed instead to civic duty.37 Ending socialist education also 
meant abandoning the community empowerment approach that had previ-
ously characterized the sep’s policy  toward the countryside. Teachers’ social 
responsibility would be to care about and support the needy, not to mobilize 
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the masses. But, above all, the teaching corps required professionalization. 
As the sep sought to temper teachers’ broad social role, it moved to reform 
their training programs, attempting to make rural normales more like urban 
ones. Not all references to socialism  were immediately eliminated from Ar-
ticle 3 of the Mexican Constitution, but this shift paved the way for the final 
removal of any such language in 1946.38
 “A THOROUGH HOUSE CLEANING”
While the sep’s leadership reflected the regime’s rightward shift, consolidat-
ing the doctrine of national unity in an agency that  housed so many commu-
nists would take time. A considerable number of teachers, especially rural 
ones, opposed the abandonment of socialist education. Their own  humble 
background, the large proportion who belonged to or sympathized with the 
Communist Party, and the extent to which socialism provided a lens to un-
derstand educational shortcomings not as technical prob lems but as social 
ones motivated many in its defense.39 Thus, even as the sep handed down 
directives such as the 1945 reform that unified the curriculum at rural and 
urban normales, at national conferences, rural teacher delegates reaffirmed 
their training institutions as socialist, coeducational, regional, and agrar-
ian.40 The contradiction of declaring rural normales to be coeducational two 
years  after their students had been separated by gender, and of affirming so-
cialist education when such pedagogy had been all but eliminated, reveals 
the lack of consensus about Ávila Camacho’s educational proj ect.
Indeed, the president’s own administration proceeded in a contradictory 
fashion. Education Minister Torres Bodet emphasized the need to profes-
sionalize the teaching body, yet he and other officials increasingly called on 
educators’ sense of duty to compensate for the system’s lack of resources. The 
hardship entailed by long hours, large classrooms, remote communities, and 
 little pay should be counterbalanced by teachers’ satisfaction at serving their 
fellow citizens. Through a  labor of love, teachers  were thus to subsidize a 
system it was the state’s responsibility to maintain.
At rural normales, where, “against the basic princi ple of  labor rights,” 
pointed out one director, “we have always been asked to give all our time to 
the school,” the 1945 urban- rural curricular unification spread teachers in-
creasing thin by expanding the years of study from four to six and bringing a 
greater number of students to each institution.41 More and more educators 
found themselves teaching subjects for which they had no training or act-
ing as dorm monitors or night and weekend guards even as they  were paid 
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only for their classroom hours.42 Torres Bodet did worry about the condi-
tions  under which rural normales languished. “The dorms have no supplies. 
The shelves have no books. And what can we say about the laboratories and 
workshops that we are so often unable to equip with agricultural tools or 
farm animals?” he lamented. Such conditions would not only fail to produce 
the professional teachers the minister longed for but, more ominously in his 
mind, “intensify the resentment that invades the soul of the dispossessed.”43 
Subsequent sep reports echoed this sentiment, noting that if youth  were by 
nature rebellious, poor normalistas  were especially so since “the immediate 
situation of misery in which they live makes them more sensitive . . .  accentu-
ating a  great social resentment and increasing the general impulse to rebel.”44 
And yet the increased funding that Torres Bodet procured as education min-
ister went predominantly to urban normales, even though the rural ones ed-
ucated two- thirds of the country’s teachers.45
As the years wore on, students demanded that sep authorities increase 
the funding, their sense of indignation fueled by administrations that, de-
spite presiding over unpre ce dented levels of economic growth, demanded 
austerity of rural normalistas. If President Ávila Camacho had slowed the 
precious revolutionary gains, his successor, Miguel Alemán, attacked them 
outright. His administration oversaw a policy that purged  labor  unions of 
their leftist leadership, surveilled and repressed activists, and applied the 
law of social dissolution— implemented during World War II to target Axis 
activity in Mexico—to criminalize leftist protest. Notoriously corrupt— 
amassing a personal fortune that led him to figure among the world’s richest 
men— Alemán reduced educational expenditures to 7.1  percent of the bud-
get, the lowest since 1925.46 If he expressed concern for education, it was 
only to better satisfy the country’s industrial needs.47 Manuel Gual Vidal, 
Alemán’s education minister, whom a US consular report characterized 
as “the most conservative of recent incumbents in the position,” placed 
the very existence of rural normales in question.48 The number of schools 
was already depleted—of the twenty- six that existed in 1940, only nineteen 
survived in 1948— and Gual Vidal also reduced the number of scholarships 
by 10   percent in 1950 (map 3.1).49 When students responded with a strike, 
rather than negotiating with them, the minister closed the rural normales 
“in order to study and rehabilitate” them.  Little interested in the fecsm’s 
proposals for ways to raise educational funds— taxing alcoholic beverages 
or instituting lottery sales—in a private meeting Gual Vidal declared that 
“a student on strike ceases to be a student and as a consequence is not in pos-
session of his rights thereby.” He further threatened the movement leadership 
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Map 3.1 Rural Normal Schools, 1948–1949
1 Ayotzinapa, Guerrero
2 Cañada Honda, Aguascalientes
3 Colonia Matías Ramos, Zacatecas
4 Comitancillo, Oaxaca
5 Galeana, Nuevo León
6 Hecelchakán, Campeche
7 Huamantla, Tlaxcala
8 El Mexe, Hidalgo
9 Palmira, Morelos
10 Ricardo Flores Magón, Chihuahua
11 Salaices, Chihuahua
12 San Diego Tekax, Yucatán
13 Tamatán, Tamaulipas
14 Tamazulapan, Oaxaca





Source: Meneses Morales, Tendencias educativas oficiales, 3:377; and Secretaría de Educación Pública, 
Memoria, 1949–1950, 160–63.
Note: This map should be taken with a degree of caution since most documentation contains errors 
or inconsistencies.
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with permanently shutting down the striking schools.50 While at the na-
tional level the fecsm received hundreds of declarations of support from 
a variety of schools, teacher organ izations, and agrarian communities, Gual 
Vidal’s threats effectively deterred the National Polytechnic Institute and the 
National Teachers School from launching strikes in solidarity with the rural 
normales.51
Federal education inspectors proceeded to dislodge striking students 
whose takeover of the schools undermined Gual Vidal’s closure mandate. But 
the sep inspectors’ task was hampered by the local support for normalistas. 
At the rural normal of Hecelchakán in Campeche, the education authorities 
noted that the parents association frustrated efforts to close the school since 
families maintained the cafeteria through their own food contributions. In 
Atequiza, Jalisco, the municipal president staunchly advocated on behalf of 
the striking students and, in an impassioned speech, declared that he would 
“take up arms to defend” them.52 While in places like Palmira, Morelos, offi-
cial threats succeeded in having the majority of the student body oppose the 
strike, in Tamazulapan, Oaxaca, students would not “listen to reason,” and 
the teaching staff exhibited a “remarkable indifference” to controlling them. 
Reporting such “insubordinate be hav ior” to parents proved equally futile 
since, even if they did not support their  children’s actions, families held 
 little moral sway over them. In this context, lamented one school director, 
“one person could do  little against the strike actions of all the students.”53
Such support for the normalista strike was not surprising; the schools’ 
precarious conditions  were obvious to anyone who looked. The sep’s general 
director of normal education, vari ous school principals, and “neutral student 
circles” (presumably  those not supporting the strike) agreed that the nor-
malista demands—an increase in daily rations, building repairs, and better 
school equipment— were just.54 However, on systemic issues— the reinstate-
ment of coeducation, equalization of the pay structure between gradu ates of 
rural normales and  those of the National Teachers School, and reinstatement 
of the scholarships Gual Vidal had cut, sep authorities  were unyielding.55 
 After thirty- three days, the fecsm was ultimately forced to call off its strike. 
Despite the minister of education’s refusal to negotiate, the sep did respond 
to student pressure by implementing a slight increase in food rations and 
authorizing new funds for building repairs.56
But true to his conservative reputation, Gual Vidal moved to identify 
and oust teachers and staff who had supported the normalista mobiliza-
tion.57 With national newspapers calling for “a thorough  house cleaning,” 
the president’s office followed up with a broader campaign to counteract 
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socialist influence by creating the Institute of Youth, an organ ization that 
would “instill patriotism and demo cratic tradition in young  people.”58 The 
new organ ization was meant to undermine the Confederation of Mexican 
Youth, a national student coordinating body of which the fecsm was a 
part and which was affiliated with the International Union of Students and 
the World Federation of Demo cratic Youth.59 The press greeted the initia-
tive with  great enthusiasm. An Excélsior editorial, for example, celebrated 
President Alemán’s directives as liberal mea sures that contrasted with “the 
totalitarian efforts that just a few years ago in Mexico sought to tie youth to 
the heavy shackles of Marxist dogma.”60
The purging of leftists from the sep continued  under President Adolfo 
Ruiz Cortines (1952–58) and his education minister, José Ángel Ceniceros, 
who, wrote the US ambassador to Mexico, “without any fuss or fanfare is 
weeding out and separating the Communist from the teaching force of the 
schools. He is not putting it on the grounds of Communism but merely as 
an administrative  matter.”61  These mea sures affected high- ranking members 
such as the undersecretary of the sep, José Gómez Robleda, who had re-
portedly been appointed to the position on the recommendation of former 
president Cárdenas. Robleda was condemned by reactionaries for his “com-
munist plan” to adopt “intense propaganda among rural teachers” and dis-
seminate “pedagogical princi ples that would predispose  children to Marxist 
doctrine,” and Ceniceros scored a victory with his ouster.62
José Santos Valdés, who in the 1940s and 1950s served as director at five 
diff er ent rural normales and in the 1960s was the sep’s inspector and  later 
supervisor of  these institutions, wrote of socialist education, “We knew it 
was an insurmountable contradiction to carry out socialist education in 
a country with a system based on private property. But it offered a mag-
nificent opportunity for the necessary creation of a consciousness that, 
among  children and youth, would facilitate the change that Mexico’s rev-
olutionaries longed for. The bourgeoisie understood this, and that’s why it 
mounted such fierce opposition.”63 Indeed, despite the 1946 elimination of 
socialist education from Article 3 of the constitution, the right’s hostility to 
an education system emanating from the revolution continued. Significantly, 
this hostility now came from within the state itself as the sep leadership 
sought to align policy with Cold War tenets that deemed most forms of left-
ist popu lar organ izing communist. Given the education system’s centrality as 
a tool of social reproduction, the  battle to define its par ameters continued. 
So did the language of socialism. And  here the rural normalistas experienced 
what elites called Marxist dogma in profoundly liberating ways.
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A SPACE TO PERSIST
The common tropes in normalista narratives show how, before socialism 
functioned as an explanatory ideology for their own class position or the 
country’s pervasive poverty, it served as a felt experience that helped make 
sense of their families’ generations- long exploitation, the per sis tent obstacles 
in their quest for an education, and the possibility of collective action among 
a peer group whose common denominator was poverty.  Here the fecsm 
served as a structuring and mobilizing body. Made up of representatives 
from the student association at each rural normal, the fecsm constituted 
the principal venue by which to channel normalista voices into a formal 
national organ ization recognized by the sep. The student federation con-
tinued to uphold the Cardenista notion that rural schools  were on the side 
of the poor and that as such the teacher had to be politicized.
Like other popu lar  unions formed during the 1930s, the fecsm had 
officialist affiliations. As part of the Confederation of Mexican Youth, the 
counterpart to the Confederation of Mexican Workers and the National 
Campesino Confederation, organ izations operating  under the official party 
umbrella to harness and channel popu lar support for the Institutional Rev-
olutionary Party (pri), the fecsm counted on state financial assistance for 
its annual conferences, which  were frequently inaugurated by state gover-
nors, sep officials, or municipal presidents. The fecsm leadership, more-
over, had the right to miss class, schedule makeup exams, or spend a sub-
stantial amount of time at normales other than their own for the purposes 
of  running the federation. Despite such mea sures, unlike the Confederation 
of Mexican Workers or the National Campesino Confederation, the fecsm 
did not develop into a clientelistic network delivering  wholesale support for 
the pri. While some of its leadership did go on to become state officials, the 
dynamics, ideology, and organ izing strategies of the fecsm  were so combat-
ive that in 1969 the government ceased to recognize it.
As discussed in chapter 2, the fecsm began as an organ ization advo-
cating for the rights of campesino students. During Cárdenas’s presidency 
this meant securing the newfound gains that enabled poor youth to ac-
cess a teaching  career. It also meant spreading the revolution’s ideals of so-
cial justice, whose collectivist princi ples  were frequently framed or under-
stood as socialist. As the more conservative regimes of the 1940s and 1950s 
changed course, the fecsm sought to defend previous gains, combat attacks 
on Cardenismo, and maintain the rural normales’ viability amid an increas-
ingly hostile po liti cal climate.  Because securing an education required con-
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tinuous student action, the pro cess produced a dialectic in which students 
both cherished the invaluable opportunity to study and refused to accept its 
unsettlingly precarious nature.
On the one hand, rural normales offered them conditions that, however 
modest,  were for most an improvement on their home life.64 This condition 
awakened in the youngsters a sense of possibility as they accessed spaces from 
which their families had historically been barred. Receiving a modest sti-
pend and uniforms and being assured a meal three times a day gave them a 
glimpse of what it might mean to or ga nize society along the logic of shared 
wealth. On the other hand, given the bare- bones character of rural normales, 
 there was always a pressing need to improve their tenuous situation. This cre-
ated a long- standing dynamic in which the fecsm mobilized to assure the 
schools’ basic function and maintenance. Upon arrival, normalistas quickly 
learned— sometimes intuitively, sometimes as the deliberate result of fecsm 
organ izing— that the chance to escape poverty lay in collective action. The 
fecsm’s lessons in class strug gle and revolutionary justice  were hardly ab-
stract; the students had but to examine their own  family history. That history 
helps explain socialism’s staying power at rural normales.
The memory troves of rural normalistas who studied from the 1930s 
through the 1960s include their families’ experience in the late Porfiriato, the 
revolution, or the effervescence of Cardenismo. “I still experienced the  cattle 
hacienda regime,” recalled Mariano Orozco Álvarez, who was born in 1921 
and spent his childhood on the Hacienda de Ojo de Agua in Michoacán’s 
tierra caliente (hot, low- lying region), which, as he tells it, was replete with 
estates whose land grants dated to the colonial period. In 1938 Orozco at-
tended the rural normal (then known as a regional campesino school) of 
Huetamo, which, he remembered, “the federal government [had] established 
on an expropriated parish. . . .  Lázaro Cárdenas founded it for both men and 
 women.”65 The location was replete with symbolism given the church’s long 
history of siding with the landed oligarchy. That the government set up many 
other rural normales on expropriated haciendas further reinforced a sense 
of poetic justice. In the spaces that had previously exploited their ancestors, 
campesino youth would now receive an education.
Even for  those who did not personally witness the hacienda system, their 
families’ history provided a vivid foundation for their own experience. For 
example, José Ángel Aguirre Romero, who attended the rural normal of 
Salaices in the 1950s, related his story starting with his  family’s arrival in 
Nuevas Delicias, land they and other hacienda workers received  after the 
revolution. To hear the detail with which Aguirre recounts the 1923 settling 
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of a community founded fourteen years before his birth, one would think 
he had witnessed it himself.  Those who came to Nuevas Delicias previously 
“ didn’t own the land, they had to share every thing they farmed with the 
boss, and generally they  didn’t have enough to survive, not even to eat. They 
lived in crowded rooms, shacks, on top of one another.” To get to their new 
land, “men,  women, and  children walked; they walked and walked, for three 
days,  until they got to a prairie, an inhospitable place. . . .  The  people  were all 
poor; some managed to bring a cow or two, spurring them along.  Others not 
even that. Some came with  those metal carts that have two wheels and are 
pulled by a burro, a mule, or a  horse, not carry ing  people but where they put 
the few  things they had: a sack of corn, a sack of beans, a bench.”66 To such 
epic stories,  others add their families’ legacies of strug gle. José Luis Aguayo 
Álvarez, who studied at Salaices a few years  after Aguirre, shared his  family’s 
legacy of exploitation and  battles for justice: “My grandparents  were agraris-
tas at the end of the nineteenth  century. They  were also slaves in the southern 
haciendas. I learned of the subhuman conditions in which they lived and 
worked. That was the environment in which I grew up. My  uncles had long 
waged agrarian  battles. When I was young, they taught me about that strug gle. 
And I listened: I had breakfast, lunch, and dinner with the agrarian code.”67 
That the normalistas convey their life stories in a way that so clearly corre-
sponds to episodes in the country’s revolutionary history— colonialism, 
Porfirian exploitation, and revolutionary upheaval— also reflects the type of 
education they received at rural normales, one the fecsm reinforced in its 
meetings and study groups.
The obstacles campesinos continued to face in gaining an education  after 
the revolution enhanced socialism’s appeal. Not only was  there a dearth 
of schools in the countryside, but  family  labor needs made it difficult for 
 children to attend elementary schools even when  these did exist in their com-
munities. An elementary school education was required to enter the normal, 
but many attended grade school irregularly, began when they  were quite 
advanced in age, or took excessively long to complete a basic education.68 
Othón Salazar, an indigenous normalista from the coastal state of Guerrero, 
for example, attended elementary school sporadically. “I’d register for two 
months and then out I went to work my land parcel or any other  thing that 
could help sustain my  family,” he related.69 Manuel Arias Delgado, who came 
from a mining  family in the northern state of Chihuahua, vividly recalled 
the harsh conditions  under which his  father and grand father labored in an 
American- owned mine. Black lung disease, mining accidents, and wages that 
hardly supported a  family of nine  children marked Arias’s early life. As a 
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young boy, he did “anything my mom could think up”: he shined shoes and 
sold bread, tamales, and popcorn on the street. His other duties bordered on 
the macabre. Arias’s  mother, a seamstress, “made every thing from the wed-
ding dress for the neighborhood bride, to the tunic for the young child who 
died.” When Arias was nine, he related, “My  mother would send me, tape 
mea sure in hand, to rec ord the angelito’s— the dead child’s— dimensions. I 
was  really scared, but I had to do it: to mea sure from head to foot, and then 
from shoulder to shoulder. It was the first time I touched dead flesh. It made 
quite an impression on me. And since I was from one of the poorest neigh-
borhoods,  there  were many dead  children.  There was no  running  water, no 
drainage system, and very  little food. So child mortality was high.” Arias, 
whose  mother birthed fourteen  children but had only nine survive, was no 
stranger to infant deaths.70
The stories of Salazar, Aguayo, Aguirre, and Arias— experiences shared by 
many  others— made normalistas keenly aware of the extent to which injus-
tice still structured their lives. Though few understood it as such  until they 
participated in the fecsm’s mandatory assemblies, for many, the difficult 
road to that institution already provided telling po liti cal signposts. Priests, 
for example, continued to appear as foes in normalista narratives, even as 
church- state relations improved. Felipe Cortés Martínez, whose words opened 
this chapter, described how, having lost his  father at a young age, he faced 
special hardship when he wanted to attend the rural normal of El Mexe. He 
was twelve and did not even have enough money for the transportation to 
take the school’s entrance exam. So he went to his godfather, a priest who 
lived about a day’s walk from his town. “What I  didn’t know is that priests 
 will not share a cent with anyone. They  will receive money from every one,  will 
bless you, give you advice and affection.” But when Cortés explained why he 
needed the money, the priest replied, “El Mexe is where our enemies reside, 
so I cannot help you.  Here is a scapular, and this rosary, and God  will help 
you.” Cortés thanked the priest for his help but did not take the tokens. “I 
returned to my  house in tears. It was another day’s walk home.”71
Such experiences gave normalistas clarity on where the church’s allegiance 
lay. Their dire material needs, moreover, often rendered priestly warnings 
of eternal damnation in effec tive. For example, Reynaldo Jiménez, who at-
tended the rural normal of La Huerta, Michoacán, in 1956, related how the 
town priest tried to dissuade his  father from sending him  there. “He said 
I’d become a Bolshevik, a communist. . . .  [But] my parents, who  were very 
poor fishermen and farmers,  didn’t want me to inherit their misery.”72 Nor-
malista narratives reflect a context that placed their schools on the dark side 
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in the Cold War’s  battle between good and evil. But as they and their fam-
ilies navigated the realm between need and fear, the former often won out. 
Their misery, the hand- to- mouth existence that marked the home life of so 
many normalistas, intensified their experience at the normales, where food 
and shelter  were secure.
Tellingly, most remember in far greater detail the type of food they ate 
than the subjects they studied. For their main meal, stated Cortés, “We 
had three tortillas, a bit of watered- down soup with a few kernels of rice or 
pasta morsels floating in it, a tiny piece of meat and beans. That was it. And 
yet if you only knew how happy  those of us who came from the countryside 
 were,  because at least we ate— half- ate— three times a day. What did many 
eat in the outskirts? One or two tortillas.  Those who ate beans  were the rich 
ones.”73 In a similar vein, Aguirre stated, “When I studied at Salaices, we had 
to do without a lot. The food was meager. I was placed in a dorm where  there 
was no bed, nothing. I had only the pair of sheets we  were asked to bring, and 
we all slept on the floor. Of the four dormitories in the school, two had no 
beds, and  those  were for the newly arrived. So we slept on the floor, on a bit 
of cardboard, and it was very cold.” But, continues Aguirre, “would you be-
lieve it? I was in heaven!  Because even if the food was meager, it was at least 
assured, and where I was from, sometimes we had nothing to eat.”74
As 1940s and 1950s regimes rolled back the more progressive aspects of 
the revolution, including support for rural normales, the fecsm stepped 
up its demands to address school needs. And  those  were many. Directors’ 
own reports emphasized the dire conditions. “Our poor school buildings . . . 
are so deteriorated they are close to collapsing,” and food allocations  were 
“insufficient by any definable mea sure,” reported the principal of San Mar-
cos, Zacatecas.75 Rosalva Pantoja Guerrero, who attended the rural normal 
in Tamazulapan, Oaxaca, in the 1950s, remembers that it took them three 
years of organ izing to fi nally have their school’s central building constructed. 
“It was like that in all the normales,” she related. But thanks to a prolonged 
strike, “it was built, and our [food] rations  were increased. Since then the po-
liti cal strug gle has continued strong  because all the normales came together 
 under the [fecsm’s] organ ization.”76 Similarly, Graciela Cásares, from the 
rural normal of Atequiza, Jalisco, recalled that  after a strike in 1953, “We fi-
nally got some relief and ate a  little better. We began drinking milk. Before 
that,  there was no milk; every thing was made in  water.”77
That the fecsm acted as the organ izing structure most capable of attain-
ing basic needs codified it as the most impor tant venue for normalista 
politicization, a role it deliberately reproduced with each incoming class. 
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It or ga nized mandatory student assemblies, implemented initiation rituals 
for first- year students, and instituted the Po liti cal and Ideological Orienta-
tion Committee, an organ ization dedicated to reading Marxist texts, invit-
ing speakers, and training students in oratory skills.78 While during the 1960s 
the fecsm would become an increasingly impor tant venue to discuss inter-
national events such as the Cuban Revolution and the possibilities of bring-
ing about a socialist revolution in Mexico, during the 1940s and 1950s, the 
federation more often conflated socialism with Cardenismo. The words of 
Vicente Estrada, who studied in Ayotzinapa in the 1950s, are a good example 
of this tendency: Cárdenas “was of the mind that Mexico could be a social-
ist country. . . .  In fact, it was during his government that the normales and 
their youth saw their biggest boom in the sense that they even had to learn 
‘The Internationale.’ That is part of history. And he had the idea that the 
rural normales would forge the teachers who’d carry the po liti cal catechism 
throughout the country.”79 The fecsm, moreover, constituted the primary 
vehicle by which the idea of socialism— however vague— persisted at rural 
normales long  after it was eliminated from Article 3 of the Mexican Consti-
tution. Felipe Cortés Martínez, for example, stated that while socialism was 
not part of the formal curriculum when he studied at El Mexe, Hidalgo, in 
the 1950s, “in practice it was,  because a socialist mentality is not the same as 
a cap i tal ist one. In a cap i tal ist mentality, the individual comes first, second, 
and third, time is money. In a socialist one, the idea is to help one another 
mutually. To say ‘Compañero [comrade/brother], what’s wrong? How can I 
assist you?’ Not to say, ‘Oh,  you’re  dying, well die.’ We graduated with that 
mentality, to help the needy.”80
As Cortés’s words reveal, many normalistas conflated the socialist tenets 
of collectivism with the spirit of ser vice that the sep also sought to inculcate 
in them. While, for the most politicized student sector, the notion of jus-
tice inherent in the revolutionary pro cess clashed with the spirit of national 
ser vice demanded by an increasingly conservative state, for  others the no-
tions complemented one another. As Luciano Vela Gálvez, also a 1950s stu-
dent from El Mexe, asserted, “Since the fecsm sustained the philosophical 
princi ples of the Mexican Revolution, it helped imbue students’ spirit with 
that humanist sense of ser vice to society. . . .  What’s more, we learned that 
the princi ples of the collective come before  those of the individual.”81 The of-
ficially designed pedagogical doctrine linking socialism to education that ex-
isted in the 1930s had created a remarkable legacy that rural normalistas used 
to express their feelings about the experience of being part of a collective, the 
discipline that regimented their study, and the consciousness it awakened. 
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Socialism became the central mediating concept, and it had liberating effects 
on normalistas, marking their education not as social reproduction but as 
consciousness. This po liti cal awakening was fueled by students’ experience 
of poverty, nurtured through collective institutional norms, deepened by a 
sense of indignation as the government neglected their schools, and chan-
neled into action by the fecsm.
That normalista youth lived, studied, and worked together further led 
many to conflate social solidarity with interpersonal concerns. As Aguirre 
put it, “We reached the conclusion that socialism was better  because it is an 
altruistic system, the opposite of selfishness, and capitalism meant the ex-
ploitation of man by man. That’s what we carried within us and understood 
in our treatment of one another, the re spect we owed to each other, to the 
teachers, other students, the leaders and the led. It was a fraternal relation-
ship that I would call socialist but a somewhat utopian socialism.”82 To char-
acterize even interpersonal relationships as socialist demonstrates the extent 
to which students internalized their ideological position. To acknowledge it 
as utopian shows an awareness of the context, the structural limitations—no 
doubt brought into relief by hindsight—of socialist experiments in cap i tal ist 
Mexico.
Rural normales opened up a world of possibilities for youngsters who 
lived and studied with their peers from diff er ent parts of Mexico and, aside 
from their regular course load, engaged in sports tournaments,  music and 
dance recitals, and field trips that took them throughout the country. Many 
saw the nation’s capital or the ocean for the first time. In school deliberations, 
students had their voices heard and noticed that their opinion mattered. Just 
as significantly, by living far from their parents, they escaped domestic patri-
archal constraints, a dynamic that, as discussed in chapter 6, was especially 
significant for female students. In this pro cess, the day- to- day experience had 
as much effect as the po liti cal dimension offered by the fecsm.
 “SCHOOLS THAT EDUCATE FOR DEMOCRACY”
Spending day and night together while conducting myriad diff er ent group 
activities no doubt primed student receptivity to collectivist po liti cal princi-
ples. The institution’s very design reinforced this logic. To a remarkable extent, 
students participated in the maintenance, reproduction, and enforcement 
of school norms in institutions that by the 1950s had evolved from small, 
family- style boarding houses with a  couple dozen students to bustling cen-
ters of activity where two hundred to three hundred youth lived, studied, 
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and worked. The sep’s rationale for incorporating students into all aspects of 
the institutional fabric was threefold: to train them in the skills they would 
need as rural teachers, to connect classroom learning to daily practices, and 
to reduce administrative corruption. While the sep’s intent with such in-
volvement differed from the fecsm’s logic of student power, in practice, it 
reinforced many of the federation’s own collectivist princi ples. Concerned 
with student discipline, institutional integrity, and the need for gradu ates to 
teach in remote areas, the sep continuously emphasized that normalistas be 
invested in the well- being of their school and the fulfillment of their mission. 
To that end, students had a say in creating and enforcing regulatory norms 
of comportment “so they could understand how to govern themselves and 
participate in the leadership of the community they  will eventually be a part 
of.”83 School officials sought to inculcate “a collective ideal that satisfies the 
mind, that moves the spirit, and that captures student interests and fanta-
sies.”84 Faculty members  were to help normalistas “understand and feel that 
 human beings owed not to themselves but to the social group to which 
they belonged. Rural teachers should commit themselves to the  people and 
their race, whose interests they are to serve.”85 While such directives could 
have positivist implications, and the state’s language of ser vice conflicted 
with normalistas’ notions of justice, the message that they  were to do right 
by the country’s poor majority was emphasized by student and institutional 
leadership alike.
Depending on the type of school in their home communities, youngsters 
could be anywhere from eleven to sixteen years old when they began studying 
at a rural normal. Worried about adolescents’ restless nature, the education 
authorities designed days tightly packed with activities.86 “Seen from above,” 
reflected a former student, rural normales “must have looked like beehives 
with teachers and students all engaged in multiple activities.”87 The rigor-
ous schedule began at 5:30 a.m., when a military- style band sounded the 
wakeup call. Five minutes  later, students  were in the school’s courtyard for 
roll call. Once that was completed, they had twenty minutes to wash up and 
make their beds. Their first class began at 6 a.m. An hour  later, students  were 
to clean their assigned areas: yards, gardens, or classrooms. Breakfast was at 
8 a.m., and classes resumed an hour  later and lasted  until 1 p.m. Normalistas 
then had their main meal and could rest  until 3 p.m., when a diverse set of ac-
tivities began anew.  These included tending to the school’s farm animals and 
crops or participating in workshops such as carpentry or metalwork. This 
was also the time for students to rehearse dance,  music, and poetry for their 
Friday social gatherings, for sports teams to practice, and for commissions, 
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clubs, and committees to undertake their duties. At 7 p.m. students had a 
light meal and at 8 p.m. a mandatory hour of studying. A no- noise call was is-
sued at 10 p.m., when roll was again taken to ensure that each student was in 
bed. Students had lighter days on Saturdays, with morning classes and  either 
physical education or agricultural practices in the early after noon. Sundays 
they had off and could take care of personal  matters or visit nearby towns.88 
Given the distance from their home communities, most students stayed in 
the normales throughout the school year and many through the summer. 
Some went years without seeing their families.
In 1945 the sep increased the years of study from four to six, the first 
three secundaria (ju nior high school), the latter three professional teacher 
training. Rural normales also had two complementary years of study corre-
sponding to fifth and sixth grade since most elementary schools in the coun-
tryside went only through fourth grade. Except for the farming activities, 
the curriculum of the complementary and secundaria years corresponded to 
that of other schools. Students studied math, science, geography, and lit-
er a ture. As their foreign language, they could opt—in theory— for  either 
En glish or an indigenous language. In practice, the latter was rarely, if ever, 
offered. Students also enrolled in a series of workshops in agriculture, animal 
husbandry, industry, woodworking, and metalworking, as well as home eco-
nomics. Their extracurricular activities included expressive media (art and 
painting), education aesthetics (song,  music, and dance), pedagogy and its 
psy chol ogy, physical education, and civics. Students also had elective clubs 
and directed studies.89
The last three years of the normal  were specifically devoted to pedagogi-
cal training. Each semester students took courses on teaching methods and 
pedagogical theory where they produced didactic material. For example, 
with the assistance of their physics teacher, they constructed laboratories with 
basic equipment for experimentation with general laws of motion. The first 
year, they made tools to teach pupils how to mea sure; the second, they con-
structed audiovisual material; and in the third year, they focused on building 
 simple devices for experimentation and proof.90 Their workshops operated 
 under the assumption that they would be pioneers of sorts. For example, in 
their woodworking class, they learned every thing from the types of trees na-
tive to par tic u lar regions to the construction of doors, win dows, and  simple 
furniture for both schools and homes. They also took courses in metalwork, 
beginning with sheet metal the first year, blacksmithing skills the second, 
and the application of  these techniques to mechanical classes during their 
third.91 Students also made periodic visits to surrounding communities, the 
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same places where they undertook their teaching practices. Such activities 
linked the normal to the local population, a design dating back to the 1920s 
and meant to connect the school and home environments and to coordinate 
health, sanitation, or infrastructural policy from government and, at times, 
private agencies.
The sep sought to link academic lessons to practical knowledge through 
vari ous school committees composed of students, faculty, and staff. The 
Nutrition and Rations Committee, for example, worked with the cafeteria 
staff to improve students’ food and figure out the best use for school crops. 
In this committee they learned how to construct bud gets for weekly stu-
dent menus, check the market prices for meal ingredients, and find ways to 
secure discounts,  whether though planning in advance or buying in bulk. 
The Agricultural and Industrial Promotion Committee was to make farm-
ing practices and workshops compatible with the surrounding region’s local 
production, while the Social Action Committee or ga nized literacy and 
hygiene campaigns as well as civic activities in neighboring communities.92 
Moreover, teachers  were expected to develop class lessons around committee 
duties. They could, for example, use math class to close out the monthly bud-
get, track ware house expenses, and develop a cost- of- living index. In biology, 
students might determine the number of calories needed for diff er ent types 
of  labor and assess the nutritional values of their own food and the vitamins 
contained in each ingredient.93
Most significantly,  these student committees had the capacity to enforce 
norms. The Committee of Honor and Justice upheld disciplinary rules, han-
dled conflicts, and meted out sanctions or commendations. The Hygiene and 
Material Improvement Committee, which promoted student health, made 
sure the school grounds remained clean, assessed infrastructural needs, and 
reported individuals neglecting their duties. The Library Committee, which 
worked to improve access to research material, ensured that students prop-
erly used the study hours, and the Nutrition and Rations Committee had 
access to spending ledgers to reduce the tendency of “teachers and admin-
istrative staff to siphon off food or other supplies.”94 In  future years,  under 
this same logic, normalistas would fight for membership in their school’s ad-
missions committee and a presence in grading entrance exams to ensure that 
students  were accepted based on need and merit rather than po liti cal  favors.
A disciplinary code made up of a point system existed at most normales. 
The Office of Normal Education handed down guidelines, but each school 
developed its own disciplinary code, which applied to students, faculty, and 
staff. Each member of the school community began with a hundred points, 
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and points  were deducted based on the severity of the infraction. At some 
schools, reaching fifty points constituted a basis for expulsion; at  others, it 
was not  until students reached zero (though in the latter case the same type 
of violation would result in a larger deduction). Leaving the school without 
permission,  going to bars, or selling equipment that belonged to the insti-
tution constituted the largest deduction of points, eight to fifteen; fights, 
smoking, or disrespect to staff or visitors would lead to a deduction of four 
to five points; less serious infractions, corresponding to deductions of one 
to three points, included littering, lack of proper hygiene, disrespect for 
the flag, damaging of school property, failure to participate in an assigned 
commission, or use of profanity. For staff and faculty, the larger infractions 
stemmed from sustaining a relationship with a student (a hundred points), 
“agitating” the student body (fifty points), or defaming colleagues (a hundred 
points). Disobeying the director or being intoxicated on school grounds or in 
adjacent communities led to a twenty- five- point deduction; lying, fighting, 
smoking in class, or dancing more than one song in a row with a student 
would lead to the loss of between ten and fifteen points; improper language, 
tardiness, failure to hand in reports, or neglect of the assigned work or com-
mission would lead to a deduction of between one and four points.95
Students cite this point system, which applied to all members of the 
school community and in whose elaboration and enforcement they partici-
pated, as creating a truly demo cratic environment.96 José Santos Valdés, who 
in the 1940s and 1950s served as director at five diff er ent rural normales and 
was one of the main proponents of active student involvement in all aspects 
of school governance, asserted that their say in disciplinary  matters con-
stituted “the fundamental difference between the school that educates for 
enslavement and servitude and that which educates for democracy.”97 Not 
all agreed. High- level sep officials constantly tried to rein in student power 
and reminded school directors that they constituted the maximum author-
ity.98 While the goal was to form students who  were “neither submissive nor 
timid,” normalistas also needed to be well mannered, attentive, respectful, 
and mindful of the proper ways of interacting with authority figures.99 Some 
officials  were outright hostile and characterized student participation in 
rule making as communist, equivalent to a soldier who debated a sergeant’s 
order.100
Proper student comportment could of course conflict with normalista po-
liti cal actions, and as the years wore on, the authorities increasingly conflated 
their mobilizations with bad be hav ior, insubordination, unchecked student 
power, and damage to the school’s reputation. The principal and vice principal 
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of the rural normal of Comitancillo, Oaxaca, painted one such picture. So 
bellicose was the students’ nature in this account that it is hard to discern 
where legitimate concern for the school’s integrity ends and contempt for 
normalista empowerment begins. By the director’s account, the school had 
been in a state of chaos since 1948,  after the sep made a series of concessions 
to students that resulted in the constant departure of school directors (seven 
in eleven years) since students would  either oust  those too strict or take ad-
vantage of  those too lenient. Other student abuses included disregarding 
the academic calendar, leaving campus as they pleased, ignoring their work 
commissions, rebelling against dictates they did not like, and destroying or 
selling school property “in some cases to satisfy their recreational desires and 
in  others to gratify vices they had acquired.” Their “instinct to gain power” 
had transformed their school “into an institution at their exclusive ser vice,” 
while their disobedience and “indecorous attitudes to employees of both 
sexes undermined any princi ple of authority.” Such unbridled student power 
all took place  under the direction of “communist shock brigades” sponsored 
by the fecsm and the Confederation of Mexican Youth. To “guarantee a 
greater stability in the educational order,” the director proposed turning 
Comitancillo into a  women’s normal.101 Such proposals ignored female stu-
dents’ active participation in rural normal strikes; while far less vis i ble in the 
leadership, they constituted a vital piece of overall normalista re sis tance.
While it is likely that, on occasion, students unjustifiably sought the 
ouster of teachers, directors, or staff, not to mention demanded the transfer 
of individual students opposed to strikes, far more pervasive  were blanket 
portrayals by the sep, the press, and the government that described rural 
normales as institutions that  housed immoral be hav ior, gave cover to  those 
unwilling to study, bred subversion, and  were of low academic quality, all 
characterizations harnessed against legitimate student grievances. As with 
the allegation that Ayotzinapa students had burned the Mexican flag, the 
press ran with, and the authorities acted on, demonstrably false informa-
tion.102 Indeed, as subsequent chapters show, the black legend that to this day 
characterizes rural normales has long been cultivated through such rumors, 
falsehoods, and misinformation.
But the demonization of rural normales also reflected larger social anx i-
eties about the poor’s potential to challenge their place in the class hierarchy. 
As already discussed, sep authorities saw in the dispossessed an inherent 
social resentment that produced restless be hav ior. As education minister 
Torres Bodet put it, given their social condition, normalistas could “accu-
mulate a dark rancor that, once transmitted to the population,  will end up 
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representing tragically fermented discord.”103 Empowerment of the sort that 
poor, indigenous, or female youth experienced at rural normales— for ex-
ample, the ability to collectively remove authority figures— stoked larger 
fears of popu lar defiance. The institutional culture, social relations, and per-
vasive nature of socialism as an operative framework denaturalized poverty 
by showing its historically material basis and undermined hierarchy through 
collectivist princi ples, and patriarchy by promoting  women’s participation 
in heretofore exclusionary spaces. For the authorities, wrote Santos Valdés, a 
staunch advocate of student participation in school governance, “it is a form 
of communism that students, with their inferior status, demand to review 
the bud get and expenditures of the administrators— their superiors.”104 In 
the de cades to come, the sep would increasingly wield educational reform 
mea sures to combat this student power.
 “A CRISIS IN EDUCATION”
By the 1950s it had become increasingly common to speak of a crisis in educa-
tion, especially rural education. The crisis resulted, declared sep officials, from 
“a lack of centralized planning, direction, and programs that are adapted to 
the country’s changing conditions,” and its manifestations  were many: the 
countryside’s disproportionately high level of school- age  children— about 
half— who had not set foot in a classroom; teachers’ propensity to migrate to 
the cities; the high attrition rates at the country’s normales, especially rural 
ones; in effec tive or antiquated pedagogical methods at teacher- training 
schools; and the low quality of their gradu ates.105 To address this situation, 
the sep convened a conference on rural education in 1953, followed, a year 
 later, by one on the teacher- training system. The deliberations from the heads 
of vari ous sep departments, technical bodies, zone inspectors, and normal 
directors provide a glimpse into how the state would frame teacher training 
over the next two de cades.
Notably, the sep’s approach was contradictory. On the one hand,  there 
was a general consensus about the need to professionalize the teaching ranks 
since too many instructors taught with  either no, incomplete, or woefully 
deficient training. Partly reflecting the need for more teacher- training insti-
tutions, this condition also dated back to the 1920s and 1930s when, urgently 
in need of instructors, the authorities showed a  great deal of flexibility about 
their qualifications. In 1950 the majority of elementary schoolteachers— 
forty- three thousand out of sixty- five thousand— did not possess a diploma 
from a normal.106 On the other hand, conference delegates consistently 
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lamented the loss of an “educational mystique,” that quality inherent in the 
early generation of teachers who, deficient in training but generous in spirit, 
gave themselves to community instruction while asking for  little compen-
sation.107 Current teachers, bemoaned education officials, too easily turned 
their back on their fellow citizens by migrating to the cities in search of in-
dividual prosperity.
Ironically, the sep’s approach to teacher professionalization had contrib-
uted to their migration. Based on the framework of national unity, urban 
modernity, and the logic that since urban teachers  were of better quality, 
rural ones should be trained in their image, in 1945 the sep had  adopted 
a uniform teacher- training curriculum that facilitated rural normalistas’ 
ability to transfer to urban normales, especially Mexico City’s National 
Teachers School. In the 1954 conference on normal education, sep officials 
recognized the  mistake of this mea sure and soon prohibited such transfers. 
Furthermore, rural normalistas  were to pledge that, upon graduation, they 
would teach wherever the ministry sent them.108 Parents, too, had to sign 
letters indicating that their sons and  daughters would continue at the rural 
normal past their secundaria years.109 At national conferences, delegates in-
creasingly proposed using the entrance exam as a metric to assess who pos-
sessed a true teaching vocation.110 While in the coming years attrition rates 
did slow and more rural normales  were established, the long- term movement 
to the cities continued.111 With few secondary schools in the countryside, 
students turned to rural normales not only to become teachers but to access 
other professions. For  those who remained in education, a move to the cit-
ies still made sense since teaching in urban schools entitled them to higher 
wages, not to mention better living conditions.
Such migration was part of a larger pattern of urbanization, which the 
sep assigned the school house the impossible task of containing. “We must 
reestablish the rural school’s role in linking  people to the land and preventing 
campesino migration to the cities and abroad,” declared Education Minister 
Ceniceros in his closing remarks at the 1953 conference on rural education.112 
To that end, the agrarian component of teacher training received renewed 
attention. It revealed a grim real ity. Rural normales did not have agricultur-
alists with proper pedagogical training; even when they did, they lacked a 
clear vision about their role. In the absence of well- articulated goals about 
the relationship between agricultural skills and education, this component 
could not fully take root. “Was the aim to produce qualified agricultural 
technicians, candidates for higher- learning agricultural schools, aspiring 
state bureaucrats, or educators truly qualified to teach in the countryside?” 
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asked one evaluation. Each path, it concluded, demanded a diff er ent level, 
depth, and scope of preparation. Additionally, agricultural cooperatives at 
the rural normales needed more attention and resources in order to better 
equip teachers in rural community development.113
Santos Valdés, then director of the rural normal of San Marcos, Zacatecas, 
argued that if the sep wanted to reduce attrition rates at rural normales, it 
needed to improve the basic conditions, making them at least on par with 
Mexico City’s National Teachers School. The sep, he urged, should fortify 
their physical infrastructure, double the allocation for food rations, provide 
a basic set of clothing twice a year, and have full teaching personnel so stu-
dents could actually take the courses they needed to gradu ate. If the goal 
was to keep teachers in the countryside, given the challenges that working in 
impoverished rural areas imposed, they should be paid more, not less, than 
their urban counter parts.114 Progressive officials within the sep also pointed 
out how teachers’ meager pay contributed to low teaching morale. “The liv-
ing conditions of rural teachers,” declared the ministry’s general inspector, 
Luis Álvarez Barret, “are unquestionably inferior to  those they had twenty 
years ago. Their nominal salaries are, of course, much higher, but  money’s 
lower purchasing power and the high living cost reduce it to such an extent 
that their salaries are now half what they  were twenty and likely thirty years 
ago.”115 This situation caused absenteeism since low pay led teachers to seek 
supplemental income, thus limiting the time and attention they devoted to 
communities.116
And yet, despite teachers’ material real ity, education officials continued 
to bemoan their loss of a ser vice ethic, educational mystique, and genuine 
teaching vocation. Proposed solutions reflected this logic. The following is 
a good example:
The teachers who created a rural Mexican school with an international 
profile did so  because of the atmosphere created by the Mexican Revo-
lution: as long as the state that orients and directs the educational policy 
does not create a new fervor, a new educational mystique, a new human-
istic current in which man can be the friend of man, in which collective 
interests are placed above  those of the individual, the plans and programs 
 will serve to prepare teachers technically and professionally but in and of 
themselves  will not achieve the model of an individual identified with the 
needs of the  people.117
Recognizing the extent to which the revolution had spurred a laudable 
education proj ect, officials invoked a return to  those princi ples. But they 
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reduced the state’s role to creating a new fervor, a mystique or humanistic 
current by which teachers’ dedication made up for the state’s commitment 
to industry. Absent was the national wealth re distribution that marked the 
 earlier revolutionary proj ect. Despite the enormous economic windfall 
brought about by the Mexican miracle, the proportion of federal spending 
devoted to education went from 12.6  percent in 1935 to 8.2  percent twenty 
years  later.118 The regime would no longer put the interests of the majorities 
above  those of elites nor satisfy popu lar material needs if it meant sacrificing 
business or industry profits. The much- celebrated levels of economic growth 
that from 1940 to 1970 hovered at 6.5  percent did  little to address unemploy-
ment, rural poverty, and wealth in equality. On the contrary, the in equality 
increased. Between 1950 and 1963, 10  percent of the population controlled 
half the national income.119 Mexico’s Gini coefficient, a mea sure of national 
in equality and wealth distribution, was the highest in the hemi sphere, trail-
ing only Honduras and Brazil. Globally, it was comparable to countries in 
sub- Saharan Africa.120
The crisis in rural education reflected the larger crisis of campesino liveli-
hood in the wake of diminishing state support. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
Mexican agriculture saw a fiscal policy that taxed more than it invested, a 
banking system that garnered more in profits than it extended in credit, 
and a price structure unfavorable to farm products, all of which ensured 
substantial transfer of wealth from the countryside to the cities.121 The 
public and private resources that flowed to the countryside increasingly 
went to export- oriented agricultural products. As the government declared 
large- scale agribusiness producing winter fruit and vegetables and the  cattle 
industry immune from re distribution, provided subsidies, sponsored irri-
gation proj ects, and focused the Green Revolution’s technical innovations 
on large farming ventures, the ejido and small- scale campesino production 
floundered.122
Within the confines of this model, sep efforts to build more schools, 
train more teachers, and reform the curriculum could only fall short. Even if 
the sep addressed systemic issues— teachers’ low pay, deficiencies in the ag-
ricultural training, a general dearth of school houses and instructors— the 
wider state policy that privileged cities, agribusiness, and industry pushed 
 people to migrate. Even reports from the official teachers’  union, which gen-
erally acted in alliance with the pri, pointed out that “the roads, the expen-
sive and ostentatious buildings, the large dams do not in themselves have 
the magic power to modify the standards and ways of life of the  people.”123 
While some officials acknowledged that the dismal education rates in the 
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countryside reflected rural poverty, most ignored the extent to which the 
state’s proj ect of modernity displaced the rural population and was itself an-
tithetical to the small- scale community development that the school house 
was supposed to spearhead.
the end of Cárdenas’s presidency saw a halt of the most radical revo-
lutionary princi ples and a rise in urban and industrial development. The 
pro cess led to large- scale rural- to- urban migration that by the 1960s had 
tipped the population scales in the cities’  favor. Increasingly, that is where 
the state concentrated its social infrastructure and where the  middle class 
grew from about 16  percent of the population in 1940 to about 22  percent 
in 1960.124 Against this backdrop, the country’s poor majorities— urban and 
rural— fought for their share of the national wealth.  These de cades saw some 
of the  century’s strongest  labor movements, with teachers and rail, oil, and 
telephone workers rebelling against the pri’s domination of their  unions, a 
control that demanded  labor discipline and kept industry profits high. Rural 
inhabitants, too, fought for a decent way of life in the countryside, with rural 
unrest taking shape through electoral challenges to the pri, sporadic armed 
strug gle, land takeovers, and  battles against caciquismo (local bossism).125
 These strug gles seeped into rural normalista consciousness, and students 
increasingly framed their educational demands in light of this broad social 
injustice. The fecsm would soon prioritize solidarity with campesino mo-
bilizations, and rural teachers stood as vis i ble figures in the countryside’s 
unrest. At the same time, rural normalistas  were caught in the forces of 
urban migration, and their radical tendencies did not cease when they 
arrived in the cities. That two of the most militant confrontations the sep 
faced in Mexico City— one by elementary schoolteachers and the other 
by students at the National Teachers School— were led by former Ayotzin-
apa students is hardly coincidental. Such challenges caused the sep to reeval-
uate its approach to rural education and to again modify the teacher- training 
curriculum. Just as significantly, Jaime Torres Bodet, who returned to head 
the sep in 1958, reconsidered the boarding- school structure  because its very 
design facilitated student power.
othón salazar, who in the 1950s would lead one of Mexico’s most 
impor tant teacher mobilizations, was born in 1924 to a Mixtec  family in 
Alcozauca, Guerrero. Longing for the type of re spect elicited by the village 
priest, Salazar wanted to master the art of public speaking and, at an early 
age, sought to join the seminary. Upon hearing of this plan, his elementary 
schoolteacher presented an alternative: “ Wouldn’t you rather be a  lawyer like 
don Benito Juárez?”— Mexico’s indigenous mid- nineteenth- century presi-
dent credited for holding the nation together during the Reform War and 
the subsequent French invasion. Salazar would become neither. Like for 
other poor youths with professional aspirations, his most  viable option was 
teaching. In 1941 Salazar enrolled in the rural normal of Oaxtepec, More-
los. “I was 17 years old when I first left Alcozauca, and my consciousness 
was filled with faith. When I returned,  after a year in Oaxtepec, I was itching 
for a fight with the church.” Salazar thus expressed his politicization at the 
rural normal, where, he remembered, “ there was not one teacher who  didn’t 
invoke the revolution.” But it was in Ayotzinapa, where Salazar soon trans-
ferred, that “I began to lose the fear and timidity from which I had always 
suffered. My practices in oratory began to bear fruit.” A year  later, Salazar 





of Ayotzinapa  were gradu ates of the National Teachers School, and I wanted 
to be like them,” stated Salazar as one of the reasons for this change.1
The stream of students who started at rural normales and ended up in 
Mexico City’s National Teachers School was so  great that in the mid-
1950s, the Ministry of Public Education (sep) began to prohibit their en-
rollment  there.2 By then, their large numbers had translated into a high 
concentration of teachers in the capital. Grouped in Section IX of the state- 
controlled National Union of Education Workers (snte), such numbers 
gave them leverage, which the Revolutionary Teachers Movement (Movi-
miento Revolucionario del Magisterio, mrm) used to fight for better wages, 
benefits, and working conditions. Headed by Salazar and joined by massive 
numbers of dissident teachers, the mrm fought a corrupt  union leadership 
whose corporatist logic delivered votes to the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (pri) more than it protected its members’  labor rights. The snte’s cre-
ation in 1943 had marked a state victory over more militant and in de pen dent 
teachers’  unions, and in the following de cades, it played a central role in an 
education system whose continued expansion added ever more members to 
the  union ranks. Through patronage networks and control over hiring, pro-
motion, and se niority rights, the snte rivaled the sep’s power. Any federal 
education reforms required negotiation with the  union leadership, which 
could mobilize its base in support of or opposition to such mea sures. But like 
their counter parts in other charro (state- allied)  unions, the leaders occupied 
such positions thanks to the support of pri officials and  were rewarded with 
government offices if they proved to be successful po liti cal operatives. This 
corporatist structure was a cornerstone of pri rule— one, however, that did 
not go unchallenged.
In the 1950s oil and telegraph workers took to the streets, rejecting official 
 union appointees and demanding the right to freely elect their own repre-
sentatives. Most militantly, rail workers rebelled throughout 1958 and 1959, 
gaining bread- and- butter concessions, but  were defeated when it came to 
 union democ ratization. The government halted such demands by using 
the army to force strikers back to work. Charged with social dissolution, 
the movement’s leaders  were jailed. Many languished  there for years. Other 
impor tant mobilizations marked the capital during this period, including 
the 1956 student strike at the National Polytechnic Institute, for which the 
government also deployed the army. Against  these movements, the state 
wielded the Cold War’s ideological tool kit and had in the press a power ful 
means to define the narrative: popular- movement leaders  were subversives, 
 Education at a Crossroads 101
agents of foreign governments intent on bringing communism to Mexico.3 
Only the pri, went the state rhe toric, could safeguard the revolution from 
such enemies.
Education, too, became a major battlefront. The 1956–58 teachers’ strike, of 
which Salazar became the principal figurehead, sought the democ ratization 
of the teachers’  union and  labor concessions its leadership had been loath 
to make. If during the 1940s the doctrine of national unity constituted the 
primary framework by which to tame the radical princi ples that in the 1930s 
had linked rural education to land re distribution and conceived of teachers 
as promoters of social justice, in the 1950s the  battle against communism 
served as the justification to contain  those who mobilized for  labor rights 
and  free elections for  union leadership. To draw out this context, this chap-
ter opens with an account of Mexico City’s teachers’ movement in 1956–58. 
That their leader came from a rural normal was not merely an example of 
 these schools’ radical legacy but a product of an economic context that chan-
neled the population  toward urban centers. And it was the sep’s attempt 
to reverse the concentration of educators in the capital that embroiled the 
ministry in an additional  battle, this time with students from Mexico City’s 
National Teachers School, which for years had received hundreds of pupils 
transferring from rural normales.4  Here, too, an Ayotzinapa transfer student 
led the normalista challenge to sep minister Jaime Torres Bodet (1943–46, 
1958–64). The far- reaching nature of teachers’ militancy, I argue, led the sep 
to step up its efforts to depoliticize their training.
The events this chapter details unfolded largely in the context of the 
Eleven- Year Plan, a state initiative to expand school access in part by pro-
viding  free government- issued textbooks as part of a larger educational 
overhaul that also included curricular changes at normales. The church, in-
dustrialists, and wealthy families seized on this textbook initiative to make 
up for the ground they had lost as a result of revolutionary reforms. In a 
vivid example of the Cold War as counterrevolution, they, too, employed 
the threat of communism to fight for old privileges long buttressed by 
 family, religion, property, and a minimal state.5 Accusing the government 
of impinging on families’ religious prerogatives and teachers’ freedom of 
speech, organ izations such as the church- affiliated National Parents Union, 
whose members’  children studied in private schools now compelled to adopt 
government- issued textbooks, characterized this mea sure as a clear path to 
communist totalitarianism. Likewise, business groups presented it as a so-
cialist decree whose inevitable next step would be greater government control 
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of industry. Most loudly, the Catholic Church mobilized its faithful, seeking 
to recover its lost say in education, which Article 3 of the Mexican constitu-
tion deemed the state’s responsibility.
In this context, popu lar sectors sought to preserve the crucial link be-
tween po liti cal and economic rights enshrined in institutions like  unions, 
the ejido, and boarding schools. Rural normalistas, for example, fought to 
preserve the material integrity of their institutions as the sep promoted 
curricular reforms in teacher- training schools and increasingly propa-
gated a model that dispensed with boarding houses. While the government’s 
Eleven- Year Plan, a proj ect to eliminate illiteracy, necessitated an increase 
in the number of teachers, the sep— rather than better funding rural nor-
males, building more of them, or expanding their capacity, as their students 
demanded— created a new type of institution, the Regional Normal Teach-
ing Centers (Centros Regionales de Enseñanza Normal, crens). Built in 
peripheral cities like Ciudad Guzmán in the state of Jalisco and in Iguala, 
Guerrero,  these schools would train teachers in semiurban areas. Like rural 
normal students, their gradu ates  were explic itly charged with teaching in the 
countryside. But unlike the rural normales, the crens deliberately moved 
away from the boarding- school model; their students instead received a sti-
pend to cover their room and board. According to Education Minister Tor-
res Bodet, this would help avoid “so many of the prob lems at the National 
Teachers School that had diminished the moral and professional quality of 
their gradu ates.”6
Rural normalistas recognized the po liti cal nature of the sep’s approach 
and in the wake of  labor’s defeat at the end of the 1950s sought to move be-
yond bread- and- butter demands. They did so more in theory than in practice. 
Their strikes continued to focus on food rations, living conditions, learning 
supplies, and school infrastructure. But their organ izing pro cess constituted 
part of the very foundation for their radical challenge in subsequent de cades. 
As the pri hollowed out concepts of democracy by attacking po liti cal ac-
tion and branding basic economic rights as communist, the socialist legacy at 
rural normales anchored educational demands in material sustenance. This 
link the state was unable to break.
 “A FRONTAL  BATTLE AGAINST OUR CONDITION AS APOSTLES”
“ Those of us from Guerrero  were one of the largest groups,” stated Plutarco 
Emilio García Jiménez, who, like Salazar, initially studied at Ayotzinapa and 
in 1954 transferred to Mexico City’s National Teachers School. “The majority 
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 were from Mexico City, but we had the second largest number. . . .  And we 
 were or ga nized in groups, and  there  were several groups from diff er ent parts 
of Guerrero, all very politicized.”7 The state- by- state student breakdown at 
the National Teachers School is difficult to verify. Guerrero, along with Oax-
aca and Chiapas, was among Mexico’s poorest states and relatively close to 
the capital. The presence of a prominent guerrerense contingent— which, if 
not the largest, was certainly significant— facilitated more transfers from the 
state, despite the sep’s attempt to prohibit them. Vicente Estrada, another 
1950s Ayotzinapa student, recalled his arrival at the school: “Some of my 
compañeros went to the National Teachers School. Once  there, they sent 
word that I should come to Mexico City, that it was better  there, and that I 
 really should be with them— inseparable as we  were in every thing, including 
the strug gle. So I came to Mexico [City] with the intent of registering, but 
that was a  whole other fight since they  wouldn’t just let us in. It took me half 
a year to enroll.”8
This flow from Guerrero was perhaps distinct from the larger pro cess of 
urbanization; however, it mirrored it insofar as it stemmed from the better 
professional opportunities offered in the capital.9 High transfer rates made 
for an unwieldy situation at the National Teachers School, which had 7,000 
day pupils, 5,000 eve ning students, and an additional 1,200 normalistas 
who lived in the school’s boarding house, whose capacity was 600. In con-
trast to the situation at the Higher Normal School of Mexico, which trained 
postprimary educators, the majority of students at the National Teachers 
School came from a poor background. Day students residing in Mexico 
City received a modest meal stipend, factory and domestic workers seeking 
a better- paying job constituted the eve ning student body, and students from 
outside the capital resided in the overcrowded dorms. A 1953 strike led by 
the boarding- school contingent succeeded in improving some basic sanita-
tion and dining facilities but failed to gain concessions on, to quote a U.S. 
embassy report, “points of considerable importance.”  These included a new 
dorm and auditorium, 250,000 pesos to fund teaching practicums in schools 
outside Mexico City, and the reinstatement of the Cárdenas- era coeducation 
structure at the National Teachers School.10
Upon graduation, most teachers sought work in the capital, where they 
became members of the snte’s Section IX. Membership in the official 
teachers’ union— long a pri stronghold— had grown in concert with an ex-
panding educational system. Not only did its leadership hold tremendous 
power, but it became notoriously corrupt, a situation that its base increasingly 
refused to tolerate. Like the rail workers, Mexico City teachers first demanded 
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improved wages and benefits, and this then evolved into a strug gle for  union 
democracy— in de pen dence from government- vetted leaders who served to 
limit  labor’s demands. In July 1956, when the state- appointed leadership ac-
cepted a raise of less than half the amount demanded by the rank and file, a 
strike broke out.11 Over the next two years, Section IX teachers, calling them-
selves the mrm, convened mass demonstrations in the capital and received 
widespread public support despite police repression and a relentlessly hostile 
media campaign. The official  union leadership depicted the in de pen dent 
 union strug gle as a mere power grab by teachers interested only in the well- 
being of Mexico City’s educators. The conflict came to a head in May 1958 
when, in response to Education Minister José Ángel Ceniceros’s (1952–58) 
refusal to meet with them, the mrm occupied the sep. Ten days  later, the 
government agreed to begin negotiations. But while  these  were taking place, 
President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–58), accompanied by the snte’s gen-
eral secretary and its two previous leaders, announced a raise for teachers 
throughout the country.12 This move sidelined the negotiating pro cess with 
the mrm and gave the official  union credit for the pay increase. Headed 
by Salazar, the mrm leadership refused to accept a raise clearly meant to 
break their unity, nor would they relinquish their hold on the sep offices. 
To return to work, Salazar demanded a meeting with the president. At stake 
was the recognition of the mrm as the rightful representative of the official 
 union’s Section IX teachers. As it stood, not only had the snte taken credit 
for the raise, but it was now accusing the striking teachers of insubordination 
and threatening their dismissal if they did not return to work. At this junc-
ture, the government leveled charges of social dissolution based on a World 
War II law created to persecute agents of foreign governments but for years 
used almost exclusively against po liti cal activists.13
Hoping to end its  battle from a position of strength, the mrm de cided 
to call off its strike. Despite the efforts to pre sent the raise as the work of the 
snte, the wage hikes in fact revealed the lies  behind government claims 
that higher pay was a bud getary impossibility. Having achieved this material 
victory, the mrm sought to continue the  battle for  union democracy. In Au-
gust 1958, when the snte held a convention to renew its local leadership, 
mrm teachers held a parallel meeting, electing Salazar as the representative 
of Mexico City’s Section IX. The contested convention meant that the  Labor 
Ministry would now determine the  union’s representative. To win a favorable 
outcome, the mrm stepped up its mobilization efforts.14
The government may have acquiesced to bread- and- butter issues, but 
 union in de pen dence was intolerable. The snte, alongside state and sep 
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representatives, openly attacked Salazar. President Ruiz Cortines threatened 
to violently disband the movement, declaring in his final state- of- the- union 
address, in September 1958, that “if force was necessary to maintain the rule 
of law, the government would be obliged to use it.” A week  later, police forc-
ibly dissolved an mrm demonstration, surrounded its office headquarters, 
and arrested its leaders— including Salazar— charging them, among other 
crimes, with social dissolution.15 “They barged into my  house in spite of my 
nine- month- old baby, tied me up, blindfolded me, and took me to the dis-
trict’s garbage dump,” recalled Salazar. “At three in the morning, with a gun 
to my head, they asked how many rubles the Soviet Union sent me.”16
While the arrests  were a major blow, the in de pen dent teachers had cause 
for optimism. In response to the mrm’s  battle to represent Section IX edu-
cators, the  labor tribunal ordered new  union elections. The imprisonment 
of Salazar and the other leaders, however, made them ineligible to run. The 
mrm proposed new candidates, and when  union elections took place on 
October 30, the in de pen dent candidates scored a crushing victory of 9,805 
to 37 against the charro (official) leaders.17 Shortly  after assuming office in 
December 1958, President Adolfo López Mateos ordered the release of the 
jailed mrm leadership, and the sep announced that the long- demanded 
raises would go into effect the following month. Through their mobilization, 
the dissident teachers had scored a power ful victory. In control of Section 
IX, the snte’s most numerous  union local, the mrm then sought to extend 
its movement to other parts of the country.18
From the beginning of its strug gle for teacher rights, the mrm had pro-
claimed “a frontal  battle against our condition as apostles that surrenders 
us each day to hunger and misery.”19 The declaration constituted a direct 
challenge to the idea that it was educators’ role to sacrifice. Born of the 
twentieth- century state- consolidation narrative, official discourse long cele-
brated teachers’ role in implementing constitutional reforms. Likening them 
to colonial missionaries, the revolutionary state’s origin story emphasized 
how early twentieth- century educators had traveled to the country’s most 
remote corners, endured poverty and isolation, erected schools, and been 
martyred by Cristeros. Their commitment in the face of a perilous situation 
was a badge of honor. Many teachers accepted this narrative— indeed, many 
had lived it. Rural normalistas especially deployed it in defense of their in-
stitutions, the schools designed to assure a steady flow of educators to the 
countryside. In their condition as laborers, however, such a narrative justified 
exploitation, and the revolution had not demanded perpetual sacrifice but 
imposed justice.
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But the sep held steadfastly to the notion that it was teachers’ duty to en-
dure hardship for the good of the nation. It added, however, another, almost 
antithetical dimension, that of professionalism: the acquisition of specific 
training norms, disciplined comportment, systematized knowledge, and 
standardized teaching styles. The contradiction of demanding a profession-
alized workforce while appealing to apostolic values and offering wages and 
working conditions corresponding to a volunteer endeavor was lost on the 
sep. As the new minister Torres Bodet took office at the close of the turbu-
lent 1958  labor year, he implored the press, “I ask for your help in convincing 
the country of what, to my mind, is an essential point and an immutable 
premise: teachers’ and students’ sense of civic duty and their loyalty to the 
Republic’s destiny.”20 Perhaps he anticipated protest against the directive 
he would issue a month  later to channel teachers out of the capital. And that 
fury did come, in the form of a strike from Mexico City’s National Teachers 
School. Plutarco Emilio García Jiménez, introduced  earlier as one of the stu-
dent transfers from Ayotzinapa, led this latest revolt in the nation’s largest 
normal school.21
 “MORE DISCIPLINE, MORE COMPETENCE,  
AND STRONGER MISSIONARY FERVOR”
President López Mateos’s 1958 appointee to head the sep was not new to the 
post. Torres Bodet had held this office from 1943 to 1946, overseeing the end 
of socialist education and the unification of the urban and rural normal 
curriculum. A disciple of José Vasconcelos, a poet, an essayist, and a diplo-
mat, Torres Bodet now sought an ambitious proj ect for the nation’s educa-
tion system, one that included a “spiritual renovation” of rural normales to 
produce “active, capable, loyal, and responsible” educators.22 Assessing Mex-
ico’s dramatic educational shortcomings, the minister wondered what had 
happened in the years since he first occupied the post. “Neither did our 1944 
programs bear the fruits we had hoped for, nor did the new normal gradu ates 
want to hear anything of ‘apostles’ or ‘missions,’ ” he lamented.23 The minis-
ter wrote of a transformed teaching body that lacked the “ humble and virile 
frankness” that characterized 1940s educators and instead “invoke[d] the 
respectability of their profession to demand raises and benefits.”24  These re-
flections, written about his first twenty- four hours back as minister, did not 
consider that since 1925 teachers’ salaries had not kept pace with inflation. 
Indeed, not  until 1965— and thanks largely to the mrm’s 1950s strug gle— 
did instructors’ monthly earnings recover their 1925 real wage value.25
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Torres Bodet moved to reduce the concentration of teachers in the cap-
ital. To that end, he announced a “social ser vice” requirement in early 1959 
that, effective immediately, assigned gradu ates of the National Teachers 
School to a one- or three- year position in a location determined by the sep.26 
Proposed as a mea sure to address the lack of teachers in the countryside, the 
decree generated strong opposition among students in Mexico City’s Na-
tional Teachers School. Gradu ates  there objected to its abrupt nature, the 
lower pay scale to which it would subject them, and the lack of relocation 
funds. A significant proportion of the students at the school had moved to 
the capital expressly  because of the professional opportunities offered  there. 
In Mexico City normalistas could continue their studies at the Higher Nor-
mal School of Mexico (which trained secondary teachers as well as  those for 
normales) or other institutions of higher learning, the proximity to the sep 
headquarters eased the burden of the constant paperwork, and the capital 
provided greater job options, be they in teaching or in other professions.27
With an appeal to social responsibility and the stroke of a pen, Torres 
Bodet sought to combat the centripetal force created by two de cades of 
economic policy that had focused on urban development at the cost of the 
countryside. Moreover, argued normalistas, Mexico City schools still needed 
educators. Why  were  these positions, they protested, increasingly allotted to 
teachers from private normales?28 The new requirement was also irrespon-
sible, they argued, since, as an urban normal, the National Teachers School 
did not prepare normalistas for the exigencies of rural elementary schools, 
most of which  were escuelas unitarias, one- classroom learning centers com-
posed of multiple grades.29 Torres Bodet responded that by its very nature 
the National Teachers School trained them to work throughout the country, 
an argument that would have had greater weight had previous sep minis-
ter Ceniceros heeded  earlier student requests to fund practicums in rural 
areas.  Needless to say, the objections of graduating teachers— which they 
subsequently expressed as a strike— only confirmed Torres Bodet’s view of 
an entitled generation with no commitment to the nation.
The strike at the National Teachers School began on March 2, 1959. Nor-
malistas received strong support from Mexico City’s Section IX members, 
who,  under in de pen dent leadership since 1958, continued to fight for fair 
wages, an increase in their yearly bonus, and the prompt payment of raises 
owed to them since January (many teachers had not received the mandated 
increases, and, amid bureaucratic confusion, a number had obtained no pay 
at all). Other grievances included violations to their se niority system since 
the sep frequently appointed outsiders over  career teachers to administrative 
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posts. Their demands merged with  those of the normalistas, a natu ral alli-
ance given that National Teachers School gradu ates went on to populate the 
Section IX ranks.
The press quickly branded the normalista movement a communist con-
spiracy. Excélsior editorials labeled it the work of a “red commando,” while 
reactionary sectors took it as proof of what they had long proclaimed: the 
National Teachers School was a “communist seedbed.”30 Joining the cho-
rus, the snte characterized the strike as “sterile agitation” over “artificial 
issues” and chastised normalistas’ lack of patriotism, for which it blamed the 
mrm.31 The in de pen dent Section IX leadership denied involvement, but 
mrm teachers did join the normalistas on their March 24 march from the 
National Teachers School to sep headquarters.32 The authorities, taking ad-
vantage of the small contingent left guarding the school, retook the campus, 
where the swat team, plainclothes police, and two companies of military 
troops charged the school, arrested sixty students, and temporarily detained 
350  others.33 The military occupation spurred  great protest. Angered by the 
government’s show of force, students from the National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico and its vari ous affiliated high schools, previously reluctant to 
join the normalista strike, now marched alongside them.  Labor and normalista 
demands expanded to calls for individual rights; social guarantees; freedom 
for po liti cal prisoners; an end to worker, student, and teacher persecution; 
and a call for the authorities to re spect the nation’s constitution.34
Torres Bodet expressed contempt for the protestors. About a negotiating 
commission that visited his office, he wrote, “Never had I been surrounded 
by so many dirty jackets, so many shirts in need of ties, so many dirty finger-
nails, and hair so long and unkempt it symbolized the ideas of  those who 
proudly waved it.” The minister’s solution was to close the dormitories of the 
National Teachers School, “for it was the dorms that gave refuge to the most 
aggressive troublemakers,” he wrote. “Never again would we make the  mistake 
of funding boarding schools that serve violent youth.”35
This decision was telling. The government had responded similarly to the 
1956 student strike at the National Polytechnic Institute, and this increas-
ingly became a  matter of policy. From the perspective of the state, teachers 
had to be incentivized and controlled. For example, the sep  later reported 
about the National Teachers School: “ Until 1959 this campus offered room 
and board, which caused academic and discipline prob lems. This administra-
tion replaced it with a system of scholarships increasingly perfected so that 
 today  these funds— issued by the nation— not only constitute help for low- 
income students but are a real incentive to study.”36 Rather than a right, access 
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to education became conditional; scholarships  were not a  matter of justice 
but depended on student be hav ior. By this logic, boardinghouses—as spaces 
where youth congregated, or ga nized, and discussed po liti cal  matters— had 
the noxious effect of disengaging students from their patriotic duties.
While the social- service requirement triggered this latest conflict, at stake 
 were larger princi ples for  those who labored in education. By invoking the 
missionary fervor of an  earlier generation, the state expected abnegation. 
The rewards endowed by a noble profession  were to compensate for meager 
material well- being. This flew in the face of  labor rights. That students who 
had received a scholarship had to commit to three years of social ser vice, as 
opposed to the single year required of  those who paid their own way, further 
undermined notions of a right to an education.
“Confronted with the demand that we pay back our scholarships or com-
ply with the social ser vice,” remembered García, one of the strike leaders, “we 
replied that a teacher’s ser vice is always social and that the scholarships came 
from the  people, so why would we have to return the money?”37 It was a deli-
cate line to walk. If teachers characterized their job as a social ser vice funded 
by the  people, then their duties  were indeed subject to public need. As la-
borers, however, teachers sought some protection from an employer— the 
state— that demanded, on the one hand, the selfless commitment of apos-
tles and, on the other, an objective professionalism in which they performed 
their assigned classroom duties and dispensed with the social leadership of 
yesteryear. The state demanded all this while it paid a salary that offended 
the dignity of the profession and eliminated the cherished infrastructural 
support that boarding houses represented.
The prob lems originated from the countryside’s vast poverty—as the gov-
ernment’s own study on school dropout rates recognized.38 Teachers opposed 
paying the price for a state proj ect that left the countryside to languish. They 
refused to conform to the model President López Mateos invoked in his 
inauguration speech, which demanded of teachers “greater efforts, more 
discipline, more competence, and stronger missionary fervor.”39 For this 
refusal Torres Bodet thought them absurdly entitled. He, like other sep 
officials, blamed part of the countryside’s educational prob lems on teachers’ 
unwillingness to live and work in remote areas. “It was precisely the capital,” 
expressed the minister, “that turned the youth (the majority of whom  were 
born hundreds of kilo meters away from Mexico City) into boastful mani-
acs, accustomed to demand what  others would have been ashamed to solicit: 
to  settle, with their backs turned to the republic, in the  middle of the city 
that insulates so many men and  women from the excruciating pain of our 
110 Chapter Four
 people.”40 The minister did not reflect that such an assessment applied to 
the government’s own policy, which focused resources and infrastructure on 
the cities and kept agricultural prices low to satisfy urban consumption. Not 
only teachers  were seeking a better life in the cities; most sectors of the coun-
tryside  were also migrating. With no attention to its root  causes, migration 
would continue unabated.
That the  labor mobilizations  were a reaction to an economic model that 
extracted ever more profits from  labor is perhaps most evident in the ex-
tent to which Cardenismo still acted as a reference for the revolutionary 
proj ect. The real material gains that workers and campesinos had attained 
with Lázaro Cárdenas’s expropriations— themselves achieved through their 
mobilization— haunted the right and inspired the left. According to sources 
close to the U.S. embassy, the government repressed the teacher and nor-
malista movement  because it would have other wise “marked the beginning 
of a long series of extremist disturbances.” Allegedly, the former president 
Cárdenas sought to force “the pre sent regime to adopt a more leftist and 
nationalistic approach to economic prob lems such as  labor and foreign 
investors.” Such interpretations— that Cárdenas himself was pulling the 
strings— were, in the words of the reporting officer, “vague and poorly sub-
stantiated and the Embassy has virtually no information which supports 
them.”41 Indeed, the  labor unrest resulted not from the machinations of the 
former president but from the deliberate abandonment of a revolutionary 
proj ect rooted in social justice programs and nationalist princi ples. To at-
tribute the popu lar mobilizations to a single man was to deny the social vio-
lence caused as the state charted a new course, not to mention the tenacity of 
peasants, workers, and students in resisting that proj ect.
For the left, the Cárdenas years symbolized the possibility of building 
a progressive social structure. For teachers especially, the former president 
held im mense appeal even as, arguably, his regime had demanded greater sac-
rifice of them, embroiled as they  were in  battles with Cristeros and caciques 
during his term in office. A critical difference, however, lay in the palpable 
social gains Cárdenas’s policies had engendered, which reinforced notions 
of justice. Tellingly, the 1959 gradu ates of the National Teachers School 
chose Lázaro Cárdenas as their class name, “ because we  were leftists and 
Don Lázaro was at the time a figurehead of the left,” stated García, the stu-
dent president.42
Invoking Cárdenas as an inspiration reveals how much teacher and nor-
malista  battles  were still about the course of the revolution and, ultimately, 
Mexico’s twentieth- century national proj ect. This dynamic would become 
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painfully clear as right- wing protest emerged in response to the sep’s free- 
textbook program. First initiated by groups long hostile to the revolutionary 
state— the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, pan), the Na-
tional Parents Union, and the Catholic church hierarchy— the movement 
gained traction as it mobilized its religious base and invoked the communist 
menace.  These groups became a de cided threat when business potentates as-
sumed the mantle, signaling their hostility to even modest tilts to the left.43
THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY
The free- textbook program proved to be the most controversial aspect of 
President López Mateos’s Eleven- Year Plan. While the state fought teachers’ 
demo cratic  union repre sen ta tion and closed boarding schools  because 
they facilitated student collective action, it spent millions of pesos ensur-
ing all primary schoolchildren had access to textbooks. The dedication of 
such resources speaks volumes about the logic of the pri, a party that in 
the mid- twentieth  century was less averse to public spending than to in de-
pen dent popu lar organ izing. The free- textbook programs, moreover, could 
strengthen the state by better allowing it to shape the national narrative kids 
learned in school. The right saw the initiative as an opportunity to recover 
ground lost  after the revolution. The pri thus found itself on the receiving 
end of the very right- wing hysteria it had marshaled against teachers and in-
creasingly wielded against rural normales.
Before 1959, private companies, with state subsidies, had produced school 
texts, which parents  were responsible for purchasing. This market- based sys-
tem meant that only 25   percent of students— mostly in private and urban 
schools— had access to schoolbooks.44 Understanding poverty as one of the 
 causes of the high dropout rates, the sep hoped that  free access to learning 
materials would help extend school coverage. To that end, the sep took over 
the textbook production and distribution pro cess, and President López 
Mateos appointed the prominent liberal writer Martín Luis Guzmán to 
head a committee that would select and write new history, language, geog-
raphy, math, science, and civics texts for elementary schools. In keeping with 
the sep’s policy that education be a source of national unity, the new books 
would emphasize solidarity, civic virtues, and love of country and—in an im-
plicit critique of socialist education— dispense with “views that might incite 
rancor or hate, prejudices, or sterile controversies.”45 National integration was 
the guiding princi ple, and the sep instructed history- book writers to structure 
the narrative around a pantheon of Mexican heroes. Their actions, rather than 
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social pro cesses,  were history’s driving force.46 Textbooks, moreover, under-
scored the significance of mestizaje and treated the colonial period as one of 
“gestation and development of the Mexican  people.”47 When it came to reli-
gion, the government’s texts  were quite moderate. They exalted missionaries 
for learning indigenous languages, acculturating the native population, and 
protecting them against conquerors’ abuses. They  were, however, critical of 
the church, which, they pointed out, had sided with Spain and excommuni-
cated in de pen dence leaders. Civics texts pointed to the demo cratic character 
of Mexican institutions, whose origins lay in the nineteenth- century liberal 
republic, a framework that placed the revolution not as a break but as a res-
toration of  those values.48
In almost  every aspect, the books differed  little from the privately pro-
duced ones already in circulation. Their vision was in fact consistent with 
ideals dating back to Justo Sierra, the education minister  under dictator 
Porfirio Díaz.49 Indeed, as with previous mea sures to forjar patria (forge a 
nation), current efforts had as their premise a strong, centralizing state that 
would establish a uniform national identity. In that logic the state made the 
books mandatory— all private, state, and municipal schools  were to adopt 
them. If teachers wanted to assign additional texts,  those had to be optional; 
students could not be required to purchase them.50
The outcry from the right was not long in coming and soon developed 
into a power ful storm. Former textbook authors and the companies employ-
ing them  were among the first to object. Bringing the writing and produc-
tion pro cess  under state control stymied a profitable venture, and publishing 
 houses argued that such a mono poly doomed the books’ quality by under-
mining competition. Their mandatory nature elicited critiques that the 
books  were pedagogically constraining and ignited debates over academic 
freedom, state authoritarianism, and a  family’s right to determine the nature 
of their child’s education. The Catholic Church, through lay groups such as 
the National Parents Union, which in the 1930s had staunchly opposed so-
cialist education, quickly protested the mea sure and mobilized broad sectors 
against the state’s control of education.
The religious hierarchy, which still resented the constitutional curtailment 
of its power, saw the government’s textbook initiative as an opportunity to 
test the po liti cal  waters. It once again challenged the legitimacy of Article 3, 
claiming it gave the state a dual mono poly over education since, in addition 
to curricular oversight, the government controlled the teachers’  union.51 In 
the Cold War context of the late 1950s— which the Mexican government 
intensified by constantly invoking communism to repress  labor— religious 
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allegations that the public education system harbored Marxists found new 
echoes. Indeed,  under their “Bolshevik” leader, Othón Salazar, teachers had 
taken to the streets for almost half the de cade.52 In sermons and publications 
and through lay groups, the church warned that the normales  were breeding 
grounds of a renewed communist threat. One article contained the follow-
ing calculus: “Annually, about a thousand teachers finish their studies. If each 
one of them educates sixty  children a year, do the math. . . .  A  people  will 
think as instructed by their teachers, just as the teachers think in accordance 
with what they learn at the normal. Mexico  will be what the normal is. That’s 
where the communist lair is.”53 Warnings became ever direr with the 1959 tri-
umph of the Cuban Revolution, as conservatives propagated rumors that the 
Mexican government would follow suit and nationalize private schools. In 
this context, the church positioned itself as a defender of religion,  family, and 
nation against a government whose education policy would, like the apocry-
phal stories about Cuba, end with  children in the Soviet Union.54
The National Parents Union denounced Mexico’s textbook program as 
Soviet and Nazi inspired and demanded reforms to Article 3 that would re-
turn to parents “the individual education liberties that had been stripped 
from them for over half a  century.”55 The organ ization criticized the “ma-
terialist and atheist” perspective of the new texts based not so much on the 
books’ content as on their sin of omission: the books’ spiritual emptiness 
and ignorance of religion, which was detrimental to  children’s relationship 
with God.56 Yet more was at stake than religion. Beyond threatening parents’ 
worldviews, the texts undermined carefully guarded class privileges.57 Elites 
had long distrusted the quality of public education. With more resources and 
a lower teacher- student ratio, private schools avoided many of the prob lems 
that plagued public ones. Private- school parents, moreover, could purchase 
learning instruments, texts, and workbooks above and beyond what the state 
made accessible to all. Why should their  children now be constrained by new 
national standards?
As members of upper- class families, business leaders sought to protect the 
economic model from which they had benefited handily during the previous 
two de cades. The constant  labor mobilizations during the late 1950s threat-
ened a social breakdown. Despite President López Mateos’s willingness to 
restore order though force, some of his policies and declarations made him 
suspect— such as when he famously stated that, while staying within the 
constitutional rule, his government was to the extreme left.58 The Cuban 
Revolution and the president’s apparent support of it disturbed power ful in-
terest groups, which used the textbook controversy to register their criticism. 
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In cities like Monterrey, Guadalajara, Morelia, and Puebla, business lead-
ers took unpre ce dented mea sures. In November  1960, for example, three 
of Mexico’s most power ful business groups published a declaration in the 
national newspaper Excélsior entitled “Which Path Mr. President?” stating 
their disapproval of recent state actions such as the nationalization of the 
electric com pany. The text ended with a question: “Are we headed  toward 
state socialism?” More alarming than the letter itself was the group’s decision 
to voice such discontent publicly. Traditionally,  these  matters had been re-
solved through private channels.59
The controversy also strengthened the right- wing pan, which received the 
support of the disgruntled Textbook Authors Association, the National Par-
ents Union, and the recently created Christian  Family Movement. A long-
time ally of the Catholic Church and an opponent of broad social spend-
ing, the pan criticized the textbook program as yet another manifestation 
of government despotism. Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, the pan’s president, 
denounced that the texts’  free distribution pursued a “uniformity of con-
sciousness  under the direction of an authoritarian state.”60 In López Mateos’s 
attempt to define his government as leftist within the confines of the consti-
tution, the pan saw increased control of industry, state intervention in the 
private sector, and a preponderantly public workforce as proof that “state 
capitalism was equivalent to a communist regime.”61
The communist hysteria— domestically a product of the pri’s own 
propaganda— fortified the pan’s longtime arguments. In using the red scare 
to justify its repression of popu lar mobilizations, the government had cast a 
net so wide that the right could now characterize the state’s own national-
ist and liberal policies as dangerous doctrines foreign to Mexico’s innately 
conservative tradition— which the pan had positioned itself as long up-
holding. The state’s  battle against Mexico City’s teachers and normalistas, 
moreover, deprived the government of committed allies, as they had been for 
Cárdenas in the 1930s. Instead, the official teachers’  union, seeking to pre-
vent further divisions within its ranks, made only meek pronouncements in 
support of the free- textbook initiative.62 Dissident educators, embroiled in 
their own  battles against the sep and the official  union,  were  little inclined 
to close ranks with officialist teachers  behind a state that branded them as 
communists, incarcerated their leaders, and deployed the army against them.
In an environment rife with anticommunism, the campaign against the 
government textbooks became virulent. Groups in some schools confiscated 
and burned the sep- issued texts.63 In a 1962 parade in Chihuahua celebrat-
ing the revolution’s anniversary, members of the crowd hurled objects at a 
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float on which  children proudly waved the textbooks.64 As they had in the 
1930s, church officials again advised parents against sending their  children to 
school.65 For rural teachers, this hysteria could not but evoke the Cristero wars 
when Catholic militants had torched school houses and mutilated teachers in 
protest of socialist education. The connections  were made more palpable as 
President Cárdenas became an out spoken defender of the Cuban Revolu-
tion and criticized the Mexican regime’s authoritarian practices.66
The crisis came to a head in February  1962, when business groups, 
the National Parents Union, and the church or ga nized a massive pro-
test in the northern industrial city of Monterrey, Nuevo León. With cries 
of “Chris tian ity, not Communism!” and “Religion,  family, and country are 
sacred; do not tarnish them,” 150,000  people demonstrated against the gov-
ernment textbooks.67 The march reverberated nationally, forcing the govern-
ment to act. The sep sent a negotiating committee to Monterrey and agreed 
that local organ izations could study ways to adapt the national curriculum to 
the particularities of the state. While government officials continued to in-
sist on the obligatory nature of the textbooks, they allowed the Nuevo León 
Parents Association to propose and distribute its own pedagogical materials 
within the state. This strategy portended an informal national arrangement 
by which private schools would continue to demand other texts  under the 
guise that they  were complementary. The sep proved accommodating and 
looked the other way when private schools refrained from using books from 
the official list.68
While the government had shown a willingness to negotiate in Nuevo 
León, it sought to reassert its power by taking a hard line in states like San 
Luis Potosí and Guanajuato, where it defended the textbook program as a 
necessary popu lar reform to benefit the  people. It shored up its promotional 
campaign through the Confederation of Mexican Workers and the National 
Campesino Confederation, publicizing the extensive support it received from 
rural school families, ejidos, and  unions and showcasing their gratitude for the 
regime’s revolutionary mea sures.69 The official teachers’  union, too, stepped up 
what had been timid support and focused its arguments on the defense of 
Article 3, pointing to private schools as a threat to popu lar education.70
Meanwhile, business leaders, satisfied with the show of force they had dis-
played in Monterrey, began to withdraw from the issue. Two events at the 
national level helped mitigate their concern about López Mateos. First, Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy’s 1962 visit to Mexico created much fanfare among 
Catholics and validated the Mexican president’s credentials among many 
right- wing sectors. López Mateos’s defense of Cuban self- determination 
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notwithstanding, Kennedy’s trip won their confidence in the government’s 
fervent anticommunism. Joint U.S.- Mexican declarations about individual 
liberties and the condemnation of totalitarian institutions received wide 
praise from Mexico’s business groups and the church hierarchy.71 Second, the 
right was further appeased a year  later with the unveiling of Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz as the pri’s 1964 presidential candidate. The choice of Díaz Ordaz, 
minister of the interior  under López Mateos and a fierce anticommunist, 
heralded an institutional hard line against popu lar mobilizations. The new 
president would not disappoint.
PROFESSIONALIZING TEACHERS
The textbook controversy has long overshadowed other significant aspects of 
the Eleven- Year Plan. Not since Vasconcelos in the 1920s or Cárdenas in the 
1930s had  there been such a concerted federal effort to expand schooling.72 
Education Minister Torres Bodet took an active role in defining elementary 
school study programs and curricular changes at normales, directed their 
implementation, and used his office as a bully pulpit to harness public sup-
port. Having penned the 1946 reform of Article 3 that replaced socialist 
education with an emphasis on individual  human development and patrio-
tism, his second tenure as education minister in the 1960s would further his 
long- term imprint on the Mexican education system.73 Sincere in his con-
cern for Mexico’s educational plight, as a  matter of policy he sought both to 
increase elementary school coverage and to better prepare the workforce— 
skilled and semiskilled  labor, technical workers, and professionals— for the 
country’s industrial and ser vice sectors.74 Reluctant to accept Alliance for 
Pro gress money and conscious that Mexico’s private sector could not be 
counted on to invest in education— “their reaction to the free- textbook pro-
gram showed the extent to which their indifference was a mark of disdain,” 
he wrote— Torres Bodet pushed to increase the country’s embarrassingly low 
levels of education spending.75 To reformers like him, the three million Mex-
ican  children who by midcentury still did not attend school represented a 
dereliction of the state’s constitutional responsibility for education.76
Torres Bodet conceived of teachers as moral guides whose authority and 
effectiveness he sought to strengthen through professional development. 
Aside from increasing their number in the countryside and building more 
schools, his reforms sought an overhaul of teacher- training programs to 
eliminate their lackluster quality and modernize their pedagogy. He first 
turned to the massive number of instructors—58   percent in 1955— who 
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taught without proper credentials.77 Torres Bodet thus increased the fund-
ing and infrastructure of the Federal Institute for Teacher Training. Created 
in 1945, during his first term as education minister, this institute offered 
courses to the hundreds of maestros empíricos, teachers who taught with  little 
or no formal preparation. By 1958, through correspondence courses, week-
end workshops, and summer training, this institute had granted degrees to 
15,620 teachers.78 During Torres Bodet’s second term, the sep increased the 
institute’s capacity and extended its reach by creating twelve regional offices 
and thirty- eight coordinating agencies. Along with this expansion, the sep 
published new manuals and textbooks and broadcast radio lessons.79 It also 
or ga nized professional development programs to disseminate the new cur-
riculum and provided additional training for teachers who already had their 
degrees. The pace of its accreditation increased markedly, and by 1964 it had 
granted degrees to 17,472 additional teachers.80
The second mea sure to professionalize educators focused on the 53,376 
teachers (out of the country’s total of 89,932) who had attended a normal and 
completed their coursework but had not fulfilled the final requirements— 
through an exam or thesis—to receive their degree.81 Declaring that “their 
teaching experience constituted sufficient guarantee of preparation and 
aptitude,” President López Mateos waived the thesis and exam requirements 
for  those teachers who had attended federal normales, had completed their 
coursework no more than five years prior, and had taught for five consecutive 
years. To minimize this prob lem in  future de cades, his decree also established 
a two- year limit on the time between finishing coursework and passing the 
professional exam.82 A degree not only provided instructors with additional 
training but also allowed them to benefit from a rank and se niority system 
other wise inaccessible to them.83
But Mexico did not just need professional teachers; it needed more 
teachers, especially in the countryside, where the educational infrastructure 
was significantly inferior to that of the city. In the late 1950s, when Mexico’s 
population was distributed about evenly between urban and rural centers, 
81  percent of schools in the countryside did not reach through sixth grade, 
and the vast majority operated with one teacher who instructed several 
grades si mul ta neously. Thus, of the enrolled student population, over half 
(55  percent) was in first grade, and 91  percent in grades 1 through 3.84 In 1955 
the student- teacher ratio in rural elementary schools was 51 to 1, compared 
to 43 to 1 in cities and 31 to 1 in private schools.85
The López Mateos regime set out to build more schools in rural areas. 
One sep program commissioned the mass production of prefabricated 
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school houses through which communities received the building’s basic 
components, which they then assembled and adapted to local climactic 
conditions. The building sets also included furniture, a small library, didac-
tic equipment, and small living quarters for the teacher, a design the sep 
hoped would encourage educators to  settle in the communities and reduce 
the absenteeism caused by a commute from distant urban centers.86 During 
his term López Mateos founded 6,760 new schools, and the normal system 
issued 50,772 teaching degrees.87
Still, the prob lem of staffing persisted. While most of the new schools 
 were built in rural areas, the majority of the new teaching positions went to 
urban and semiurban population centers.88 In 1960 the sep tried to correct 
this imbalance through a new type of institution, the crens, that would 
train teachers in semiurban areas but dispatch them to the countryside. Un-
like the rural normales, however, the crens deliberately dispensed with the 
boarding- school structure and instead provided students with a stipend to 
cover their room and board. The first two  were established in Ciudad Guz-
mán and Iguala in 1960, and the tone of policy makers conveys the sense that 
the crens held the solution to the prob lem of entitled and obstreperous 
teachers.89 In its assessment of the sexenio’s educational accomplishments, 
a sep publication stated that the crens’ first graduating class possessed a 
“notable professional responsibility, a teaching devotion and a spirit of cooper-
ation and efficiency in their educational duties.”90 When Torres Bodet visited 
 these new schools in 1963, he highlighted the “friendly atmosphere between 
students and instructors,” contrasting  these normalistas with  those of Mexico 
City’s National Teachers School. “What a difference between the former’s pa-
triotic  will to help and the selfishness demonstrated by Mexico City’s 1960s 
gradu ates!” At the cren, continued Torres Bodet, normalistas “understood 
what we expected of them. If sent to teach far from the capital, none would 
have felt exiled in their fatherland.”91 In this way, the minister reiterated the 
notion of teacher sacrifice and patriotic duty, which he hoped to cultivate in 
normalistas so it would bear fruit in the subsequent teaching body.
For Torres Bodet, the crens represented a fresh start— new institutions 
that still upheld the countryside as a site for Mexico’s spiritual renovation 
but  were not bogged down by the notions of revolutionary justice that pro-
duced the entitled teachers he had battled in the capital.  After all, increasing 
the countryside’s teachers could have been accomplished by expanding or 
increasing the numbers at rural normales, as long demanded by their student 
associations. But by the 1950s the government was loath to fund boarding 
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schools, a point vividly made when, in 1956, it closed the dorms in Mexico 
City’s National Polytechnic Institute and when, three years  later, it did the 
same at the National Teachers School. Despite the right’s fear of Cardenismo, 
a host of such mea sures demonstrated a state willing to do away with sites of 
collective empowerment. Rural normalistas would increasingly come forth 
to object.
THE  BATTLES AT RURAL NORMALES
During the 1950s rural normales  were not yet considered the repositories 
of radical student activism. Mexico City’s National Teachers School held 
that distinction. While the 1956 strike at the National Polytechnic Insti-
tute showed youths’ capacity to mount power ful movements,  labor strug-
gles  were much more dominant throughout the 1950s. The state’s repressive 
response to  labor did not go unnoticed by students at the rural normales. 
The Mexican Federation of Socialist Campesino Students (fecsm), the fed-
eration representing rural normalistas, understood the teachers’ and the rail, 
telegraph, and oil workers’ movements as  labor’s attempt to push forward 
the revolution’s progressive ele ments. Tragically, they concluded, “reaction-
ary, imperialist, and counterrevolutionary forces” revealed their strength. 
This context, according to fecsm, made it imperative to design demands 
that  were po liti cal in nature rather than limiting their  battles to material 
ends. According to rural normalistas, their schools “represented the reali-
zation of the revolutionary movement” and  were also  under threat as the 
government and the right “conjured up false claims, damaging maneuvers, 
and dangerous argumentation” against  these institutions.92 The federation’s 
battlefronts  were many: maintaining the basic material integrity of rural nor-
males, combating their schools’ reputation as anarchic learning centers, and 
opposing the pri- allied  union’s attempts to control their institutions’ inner 
workings (figure 4.1).
Throughout 1958, rural normalistas had undertaken vari ous walkouts to 
obtain more scholarships and expanded dorm capacity.93 In 1959 the fecsm 
presented the sep with a list of twenty- two demands to fortify the country-
side’s rural teacher- training system. Notwithstanding the federation’s decla-
ration that their strug gle was po liti cal, most of their demands  were material 
in nature. Three points, however, stand out for the ideological princi ples 
they sustained: a call for greater normalista supervision over the funds their 
schools received, an appeal for the sep to assert its dominion in the face of 
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private and religious groups that increasingly built their own schools, and a 
recognition of the boarding- school structure as central to the integrity of 
rural normales.94
Such calls  were premised on the notion of education as a right and sought 
institutional mechanisms by which to preserve the poor’s access to a profes-
sional  career. First, by overseeing funds, students sought not only to prevent 
school administrators from siphoning off food or other resource expendi-
tures but to assert some power against the state’s co- opting mechanisms. In 
the hands of school administrators (who, like teachers and staff,  were mem-
bers of the official  union), funds  were subject to co- optative politics, and 
as discussed below, the snte was indeed anxious to increase its power in 
rural normales. Second, the fecsm’s point about religious schools implic-
itly invoked Article 3 to remind the state of its educational responsibilities 
and warn of the right’s increasing power. Based on the reactionary sectors’ 
opposition to mass education  after the revolution, normalistas continued 
figure 4.1 Protesting rural normalistas in sep offices meeting with the director  
of normal education, 1955. Archivo General de la Nación, Photographic Archive, 
Normales Rurales, c24, Sobre 106.
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to denounce religious and monied interests as threats to revolutionary gains. 
That the textbook controversy revived old arguments about Article 3 and 
united the church, business groups, and the private- school sector demon-
strated the prescience of normalista fears. Fi nally, the fecsm insisted that 
dormitories  were critical. Any restructuring of the rural normal system had 
to recognize the centrality of their boarding houses. The material support 
provided to boarders,  after all, made pos si ble an education for the poor. 
Given the country’s demographic growth, dormitory capacity needed to be 
increased.  Here the fecsm used the language of the state to make its case. 
Boarding schools, it declared, “represented the guarantee of youths’ perfect 
civic formation in accordance with the state’s politics and philosophy.”95 
This logic linked patriotic duty to a fulfillment of students’ material needs, a 
sign of how students experienced dorm life—it entailed responsibilities and 
awakened national consciousness owing to their interaction with peers from 
other parts of the country (figure 4.2).
Ultimately, however, the material demands constituted the bulk of the 
fecsm’s petition. Normalistas sought an overall expansion of the rural nor-
mal system through an increase in the number of institutions, two thou-
sand new scholarships, and state and municipal contributions. To improve 
pedagogical training, the fecsm proposed better methods to select and 
prepare their teachers, including a call for a Higher Normal School spe-
cifically devoted to educating teachers for rural normales. The remaining 
points addressed very specific improvements, such as construction proj ects 
and building repairs at par tic u lar schools, electrification, improvement of 
schools’ medical centers, increases in food rations and stipends, and provi-
sion of equipment such as film projectors, laboratory tools, typewriters, and 
books.96
In its response, the sep acknowledged that rural normales needed to be 
expanded in accordance with the demographic pressure on the existing sys-
tem. It addressed each of the fecsm’s individual points primarily by listing 
the resources it had already invested and the vari ous proj ects then under-
way. The sep pointed out the recent construction of four rural normales 
and countered the fecsm’s calls for two thousand scholarships with 150, 
stating that the crens  under construction would ease the increased demo-
graphic pressure. On the fecsm’s emphatic point about the centrality of the 
boarding- school structure, the authorities warned that it would be main-
tained only if dorm life guaranteed the “civic and ethical edification of  future 
teachers” and constituted a “truly educational venue.” With regard to state 
and municipal funding, the sep replied that it could make suggestions but 
figure 4.2 Dorms at the rural normal of Misantla, Veracruz, 1956. Archivo General 
de la Nación, Photographic Archive, Normales Rurales, c27, Sobre 14.
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had no power to legislate in that  matter. On the issue of student oversight of 
resources, the sep remained  silent. About religious schools, it stated that the 
constitution already laid out the par ameters within which private schools 
had to comply with official curricular norms. The sep rejected the call for a 
new institution specifically designed to train rural normal teachers, since the 
Higher Normal School of Mexico already offered a program to that end. 
It referred to a recently instituted hiring structure that paid attention to 
the educator’s area of specialization as a mea sure to ensure better teachers. 
The sep further placed the onus on the normalistas themselves, stating that 
since most teachers at rural normales hailed from  these institutions, elevat-
ing their quality depended on improving the normal student body. With 
regard to material demands, it highlighted the current resource allocation, 
asserting that concrete assessments needed to be conducted if funds  were to 
go elsewhere (figure 4.3).97
Two issues stand out in the sep’s response: its conditioning of boarding 
schools on student be hav ior and its reference to crens as the institutions 
that would meet the demands of demographic growth. The student petition-
ers had carefully framed their appeal in a language of civic duty that might 
resonate with officials. The sep took the normalista point about complying 
with “the state’s po liti cal and philosophical orientation” as an opportunity 
to issue a veiled threat. It conditioned new dormitories on their educational 
purpose and students’ moral character and comportment. In appropriating 
state discourse, normalistas— like teachers— confronted the contradiction 
of asserting collective rights in a state that demanded compliant citizens. 
Tellingly, by citing the crens, institutions deliberately designed to dispense 
with dormitories, the sep declared boarding schools a  thing of the past. Ed-
ucation Minister Torres Bodet’s experience with Mexico City teachers had 
 shaped his conviction that dorms produced disruptive students who  later 
became entitled teachers.
The official teachers’  union, or snte, a close state ally, contributed 
to this view. With its Mexico City members in frank rebellion, it sought 
other mechanisms to flex its muscle and further ingratiate itself with the 
state. Rural normales stood as impor tant spaces for it to assert control, not 
only  because official  unions  were supposed to be instruments of the pri, 
but  because the snte itself faced constant challenges from normalistas, 
who brought forth grievances against affiliated school administrators, teach-
ers, and staff. In response to such actions, the official  union declared that 
rural normales suffered from a “crisis of moral values . . .  since disciplinary, 
academic, and moral standards grow worse  every day.” Students’ propensity 
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to oust personnel did not constitute a victory, it asserted, but evidenced a 
system suffering from an “inversion of values.”98 The PRI- affiliated  union dis-
missed student charges of sexual harassment, inhumane actions, or despotic 
be hav ior by school officials as fabricated grievances against  those who de-
manded rigorous work or dared to enforce unpop u lar rules.99 According to 
the snte, normalistas defended incompetent directors so long as they gave 
in to student concessions— likewise with teachers, who risked student ire if 
they handed out low grades. The worst- performing students, asserted the 
snte, spearheaded the ouster of school personnel. In a tone that invoked 
the state’s rhe toric of teacher sacrifice, the  union declared that teachers actu-
ally preferred to work at rural normales as a  matter of idealistic commitment 
even though at schools with no dorms they had more  free time and  were 
“respected, appreciated, and left alone in their private life.”100 Yet it was 
figure 4.3 The cafeteria at the rural normal of Misantla, Veracruz, 1956. Students 
referred to the  women who cooked for them as las tías (the aunts). Archivo General  
de la Nación, Photographic Archive, Normales Rurales, c27, Sobre 14.
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 precisely the ousted directors and teachers, warned the snte, who propagated 
the negative view of the rural normales as they recounted their expulsion. The 
snte chastised the student body for their constant agitation and appealed 
to the fecsm to stop defending the  causes of wayward students who made 
a  career for themselves as po liti cal leaders or who harbored personal resent-
ment against par tic u lar staff members.101 The snte likewise criticized any 
teacher or administrator who rallied students and advised staff “not to get in-
volved in student affairs nor to make common cause with them.” If teachers 
 were found mobilizing students in their own support or against school direc-
tors, “ they’d be expelled without discussion.”102 The official  union even refer-
enced the language of social justice by affirming that rural normales “stood as 
material accomplishments of popu lar longings.” But it then shamed students 
for their demands. With the money the sep had invested in student housing, 
asserted the snte, it could have improved thousands of elementary schools, 
indigenous boarding houses, literacy centers, and cultural missions.103
The snte’s discomfort with student leaders is evident in other appeals it 
made to the sep. For example, it warned the sep about  those it assigned to 
staff classes for the rural normales’ “complementary years” (fifth and sixth 
grades, offered to  those who had not finished their elementary school edu-
cation). The snte argued that precisely  because of the time normalista lead-
ers devoted to the strug gle, they  were unqualified teachers who could not 
meet the challenges of this par tic u lar teaching cycle. But the snte’s appeal 
revealed another concern: the moral suasion recent gradu ates could exert 
over the student body. When conflicts arose that pitted teachers or adminis-
trators against normalistas, stated the snte, the recent gradu ates felt more 
identified with the students. If gradu ates had to be placed in teaching posi-
tions at the rural normal, it should be “once their influence as student lead-
ers had dis appeared completely.” The snte sought further requirements for 
teachers designated to teach the complementary years: that they be the stu-
dents with the highest academic achievement, show impeccable discipline, 
be duly recommended by the school authorities, and pledge loyalty to the 
administration.104
The official teachers’  union presented the sep with suggestions to strengthen 
the power of school directors. One proposal involved relieving assistant prin-
cipals of their teaching duties so they could devote more time to disciplinary 
 matters. They would maintain work logs for staff, and discipline and achieve-
ment tallies for students, supposedly to apply proper penalties or sanctions. 
If the sep agreed to this mea sure, the snte would ensure that  those filling 
the assistant principal positions  were drawn from loyal ranks and pledged 
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their utmost collaboration with school directors.105 Such proposals must 
have been appealing to the sep given the constant challenges it faced from 
student associations that relentlessly invoked the princi ples of constitutional 
rights, the ideals of the revolution, and class- based vindications, frameworks 
often at odds with official calls for sacrifice, discipline, and professionalism. 
For now, the sep sought a curricular overhaul at rural normales, which of-
ficials presumed would help fulfill  these institutions’ historical mission of 
transforming an ailing countryside.
RURAL NORMALES, A CURRICULAR UPDATE
In 1956 the Normal Education Commission proposed to overhaul the teacher- 
training programs in an effort to transform a curriculum judged pedantic in 
its content, encyclopedic in its delivery, and overwhelming in its breadth.106 
Proposed reforms acknowledged the error of the 1943 decree that established 
a uniform curriculum across urban and rural normales. This mea sure, noted 
education officials, had contributed to the high transfer rate of students 
to urban normales or other professional schools and had reduced teachers’ 
overall commitment to the countryside. It had obscured, moreover, the 
unique mission and social implications of rural education, thus undermining 
the “educational mystique,” that selfless, spiritual commitment to modernize 
the countryside through education.107 Accordingly, in 1960 the sep again 
turned its attention to the distinct nature of rural education and formally 
divided the General Directorate of Normal Teaching into urban and rural 
branches.108 While rural normales would have the same sequence and cur-
ricular structure as urban teacher- training schools, their study plan would 
include a  whole set of pedagogical practices meant specifically for the coun-
tryside and, through elective classes, would offer flexibility to tailor activities 
or research proj ects to their region.109 Given their distance from the “restless 
and impatient city life,” declared Minister Torres Bodet in 1962, rural nor-
males  were well equipped to provide “active, capable, loyal, and responsible 
teachers to the suffering Mexican countryside.”110
Though approved by the sep in 1960,  these changes would not be im-
plemented in rural normales  until 1964  after being experimented with in 
crens.111 The rural normales presented both challenges and possibilities for 
the reforms. On the one hand, they lacked the basic infrastructure to put 
new programs into practice. Teachers complained that they could hardly 
conduct directed readings given their  limited book collections and in some 
cases asked students to buy texts out of their own pockets.112 The fecsm in 
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fact included in its 1965 petition better- supplied libraries since as they stood, 
they “lacked the books to comply with the reform’s requirements.”113 Teacher 
staffing, not to mention the retraining needed to adopt the new pedagogy, 
was another stumbling block. As it was, rural normal instructors often found 
themselves at the head of a par tic u lar class not  because it matched their 
academic background but  because that subject needed staffing.114 Other 
infrastructural needs included science laboratories, equipment and trans-
portation for fieldwork, and extracurricular activities, resources rural nor-
malistas consistently included in their petitions to the sep.
On the other hand, even as the spartan nature of rural normales presented 
extensive challenges to the new mandates, long- standing activities at  these 
schools had at their root two characteristics the new sep mea sures sought 
to emphasize: hands-on learning and community engagement. The latter, 
believed education officials, was crucial to teachers’ commitment to serve 
in the countryside. Rural normalistas had long or ga nized community fes-
tivals, run workshops for the local population, and conducted their teaching 
practicums in surrounding towns. The national networks of rural normales 
created additional opportunities for community outreach. The schools 
had an impor tant tradition of organ izing sports tournaments, literary fes-
tivals, and  music and dance recitals.  These activities both showcased nor-
malista accomplishments and provided venues to exchange and develop 
pedagogical proj ects.115 Noteworthy among them was the students’ own Po-
liti cal and Ideological Orientation Club, charged, among other  things, with 
instilling in new students the historical significance of the rural normales 
(figure  4.4).116 In some schools this club oversaw oratory instruction with 
the aim of “boosting po liti cal activity . . .  considering how fundamental 
public speaking is to politics.” Teachers’ ability to express themselves power-
fully and their command of language, stated one student declaration,  were 
necessary to fulfill “our role as community guides and to prepare us for 
confronting  those who are reactionary or enemies of our schools.”117 In this 
manner, the sep’s broader goal to professionalize teachers reinforced student 
notions that theirs was a transformative mission.
The new mea sures reduced the number of required courses at rural nor-
males, mandated more hands-on training through increased laboratories 
and workshops, and established seminars and research proj ects. The reform 
made its strongest push in the area of agriculture, instituting changes to the 
farming curriculum, a longtime defining feature of  these schools. The farm-
ing curriculum was conceived as a mea sure to both train normalistas in land 
cultivation (lessons they would subsequently impart to communities) and 
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provide resources and revenue for institutional sustenance, but in practice 
the schools routinely fell short of  these goals. As one report from the rural 
normal of Cañada Honda in Aguascalientes noted, “rather than an integral 
part of the curriculum,” agricultural activities “merely train students to be 
good field hands. . . .  The lands that border our schools are better cultivated 
and more productive and cause campesino incredulity about our good in-
tentions to provide guidance.” Like so many prob lems at rural normales, the 
shortcomings stemmed from a lack of resources, including a dearth of qual-
ified agricultural instructors.118  Those imparting farming classes did not have 
training in agricultural techniques, while bona fide agronomists knew  little 
about proper teaching methods.119
To address such shortcomings, the reformed study plan imbued agricultural 
practices with greater curricular importance, increasing the number of hours of 
weekly instruction in  these areas.120 New guidelines directed schools in choos-
ing crops appropriate to the area and encouraged production activities linked 
figure 4.4 Mosaic on the student association’s office at the rural normal of  
Tamazulapan, Oaxaca. Photo graph by author.
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to the farm animals they already possessed. Normalistas  were to engage with 
nearby ejidos and  cattle ranches, and agricultural teachers  were to collab-
orate with geography, biology, and math instructors to develop an overall 
pedagogical coherence. Instructors, moreover,  were urged to better integrate 
theory and practice by explaining to students the rationale for their specific 
techniques. Fi nally, normalistas  were given the charge to work with nearby 
elementary schools to develop gardens, green houses, seedbeds, fruit groves, 
and reforestation proj ects, as well as to survey surrounding farms and participate 
in efforts to improve animal husbandry and reduce plagues that destroyed 
crops or killed farm animals.121
Seeking to produce a well- rounded student with the confidence to spear-
head community development, the new program set immediate and long- 
term goals. In the short term, successful agricultural production at the rural 
normales would enrich student diets by using the grains, fruits, vegetables, 
meat, eggs, and dairy to stock the schools’ cafeterias. Excess goods could be 
sold and the funds invested in the school. This endeavor, the logic went, might 
help ameliorate some of the rural normales’ chronic economic prob lems and 
give students the satisfaction of engaging in remunerative activities.122
The long- term goal, emphasized education authorities, was not to pro-
duce skilled agronomists but to gradu ate teachers who could fulfill the 
princi ples of rural education: better the living conditions of campesinos 
by instructing them in the productive use of natu ral resources, awaken in 
schoolchildren a love of the land and its flora and fauna, encourage a harmo-
nious relationship between the school and the community, and undertake 
proj ects beneficial to the region’s inhabitants. Rural teachers would promote 
land rights as a key tenet of the revolution. Notably, efficiency rather than 
justice would now be the framing logic, in the belief that only through the 
“rational cultivation of their plots” would campesinos appreciate the “rev-
olution’s princi ples.” Teachers  were thus to emphasize modern techniques 
that made effective use of the region’s resources and to encourage links with 
the agricultural and livestock industry.123 That the interests of the industrial, 
agricultural, and livestock groups  were at odds with  those of small cultivators 
was not mentioned, a mea sure of how far the state had traveled from socialist 
education’s class analy sis.
The new curriculum would be divided into requirements, electives, and 
practices. Students could take electives as a way to  either improve their skills 
in core subjects (language, math, science) or cultivate a specialty such as in-
digenous education, arts and crafts, zoology, or health. This type of curricu-
lar restructuring, hoped education officials, would enable a new generation 
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of teachers to recover the devotion of  earlier de cades. The new study plan 
also emphasized an active learning pro cess. “Teacher gradu ates of our nor-
males  will not be adequately trained,” stated one sep commission, “if they 
can only count on theoretical knowledge and  don’t have the necessary prac-
tical experience of distinct activities to complement their training. This is 
why it is so impor tant to learn by  doing.”124 Class time was expanded, and 
teachers  were guided to use workbooks rather than impart dictation; they 
 were to incorporate directed research and emphasize class discussion. Stu-
dents would begin teaching  after they completed their six- year course plan 
but would not receive their degree  until they finished a year of instruction. 
During this teaching year, they would still be  under the normal’s tutelage 
and would attend regular seminars but would have the same salary, ben-
efits, and responsibilities as regular teachers. At the year’s end, the new 
teachers would write a report, to be evaluated by their supervising normal.125
The grading system was also amended. Rather than giving monthly exams, 
teachers  were to incorporate “exercises, research, quizzes, occasional tests, and 
extracurricular activities.”126 What mattered was that “the material, rather than 
a desire for high grades, awaken student motivation.”127 The exams them-
selves  were to assess critical thinking in place of memorization. Traditional 
courses and electives would still be given numeric marks (between 1 and 
10), but workshops, labs, home economics, art, classroom observation, and 
teaching techniques would be evaluated by  simple mea sures such as “very 
good,” “good,” or “bad.” The sep provided guidelines for  these formulations 
that included punctuality, dedication, care, and ability to work in groups. 
This grading system would “lighten the excessively theoretical load” and cul-
tivate a quality of “maturity . . .  difficult to verify through a written exam.”128 
Previous mechanisms by which students could make up a course by simply 
taking an exam  were significantly reduced, and certain core subjects could 
not be replaced by an exam at all.129 Students who had missed 15  percent or 
more of classes would not be permitted to take the final exam.130
Fi nally, class time and teaching styles  were also to be reformed. Smaller, 
longer classes would provide the space for greater student- teacher contact. 
Through seminars, students could take owner ship of the material by means 
of constructive, teacher- guided discussion.131 “Long gone,” explained one di-
rective, “ were the days when school was an institution in which the teacher 
led every thing and relegated the student to a passive, submissive, obedient 
receptacle.”132 Such initiatives represented an impor tant attempt to deepen 
rural normales’ mission as institutions of community development and to 
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cultivate assertive attributes in their students. Duly trained, the logic went, 
their gradu ates could aptly address the countryside’s prob lems.
And yet the rural crisis continued. Had they been adequately funded, 
such curricular reforms could have significantly improved rural normales. 
But their allocated resources remained sparse. Year  after year, the students 
mobilized to demand pedagogical and material improvements. But rural 
normales remained underfunded, a telling condition. School precarity was 
a hallmark of rural Mexico, a country that even in a time of unpre ce dented 
economic growth spent proportionately  little on education. President López 
Mateos’s education proj ect was significant, but its impressive nature lay partly 
in how  little the previous two administrations had devoted to education. His 
spending, for example, did not reach the percentage levels  under the Cárde-
nas administration.133 As a response to rural- urban disparities, moreover, 
extending primary- education access did  little to address the root  causes of 
poverty, migration, and in equality. And, however good their training, rural 
teachers could not ameliorate the crisis.
 “the expansion of primary education followed a promising path,” wrote 
Torres Bodet in his memoirs. “We multiplied schools even if we did not al-
ways feel proud of the teachers we assigned to animate them. We printed 
and distributed millions of textbook copies, and the campaign against them 
would not cease.”134 The minister thus expressed his frustration, on the one 
hand, with teachers who would not willingly go to or stay in the countryside, 
who demanded better pay and working conditions, and whose academic 
preparation often faltered and, on the other, with elites who resented an 
interventionalist state and actively sought to  counter revolutionary reforms. 
Torres Bodet’s acerbic critiques of the way power conditioned relations in 
the international realm— based on his experience as a diplomat and 
head of unesco (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organ ization)— are absent in his domestic analy sis and conception of edu-
cation as a liberal endeavor focused on the individual. Nowhere in his vast 
volume of writing, noted one analyst, is  there an understanding of education 
“as an integrative part of the social system. . . .  In vain one searches for indica-
tions of some study about the relationship between the school and social pro-
cesses, its effect on social stratification and mobility, and its contribution to 
income distribution. . . .  The perspective of all the enacted reforms is  limited 
to the direct responsibility of the public education ‘branch,’ understood as 
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a sector of activities isolated from the rest.”135 Viewed in structural terms, 
his efforts to combat illiteracy, build more schools, and professionalize the 
teaching corps, however heroic, did  little to mitigate the contradictions of 
an economic miracle that concentrated wealth in the countryside through 
land accumulation and in the cities through increased worker control and 
exploitation. As economic analyses for the 1960s have shown, an increase 
in the years of education did not correspond to a higher income or reduced 
unemployment, nor did it substantially improve intergenerational social 
mobility.136
If  labor constituted the most vis i ble form of social discontent during the 
1950s, in the 1960s students would take its place. In both de cades campesino 
protest was a constant, and, much to the state’s dismay, normalistas and their 
instructors, as well as rural teachers in general, supported, facilitated, and 
even led this pro cess. Significantly, rather than being narrow protests over ac-
ademic  matters, student strug gles consistently had at their core broader eco-
nomic or po liti cal grievances. As with  labor, the state would meet student 
challenges with the army, spurring a cycle of protest and repression through-
out the country.137 In this sequence, the most militant challenge came from 
rural and state normalistas in Chihuahua, where students and some teachers 
from Salaices, Saucillo, and Chihuahua City joined campesino land takeovers 
throughout the de cade. In distant sierra communities, teachers spearheaded 
marches, protests, and appeals for justice given the increasing campesino 
land dispossession and their murder at the hands of landowners’ hired gun-
men. In 1965,  after years of government inaction, a joint campesino- teacher- 
normalista group sought justice through armed means and formed a guerrilla 
group. Thus began the reputation of rural normales as guerrilla seedbeds.
in september 1964 the rural normal teacher Pablo Gómez wrote to Ed-
ucation Minister Jaime Torres Bodet protesting his transfer from Saucillo, 
Chihuahua, to Atequiza, Jalisco. Chihuahua’s governor, Práxedes Giner, had 
long sought Gómez’s removal, accusing him of taking students to campesino 
land invasions. Students took action of their own accord, protested Gómez. 
They, like youth around the globe,  were conscious of the world’s prob lems 
and sought practical solutions. Teachers may have had an influence, but 
that was only in “accordance with the social implications specified by Ar-
ticle 3.” What right, continued Gómez, did state politicians, “enemies of 
normal education, and of President Adolfo López Mateos’s  great  free text-
book program,” have to remove him? So hostile had  these same authorities 
been to federal education policy that Saucillo’s municipal president had sug-
gested storming public schools to burn the government- issued textbooks.1
As Gómez pointed out,  those now objecting to the  free textbooks  were 
the same groups long hostile to public schoolteachers and demeaning of the 
institutions that trained them. Not only had Article 3 of the Mexican Con-
stitution undermined the church’s historic dominion over schooling, but 
in its expansive definition of the educator’s role—to aid in land distribution, 
or ga nize  unions, and publicize agrarian rights— the revolutionary state had 
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birthed po liti cal agents. Notwithstanding  later efforts to transform teachers’ 
role to one more akin to social work, rural normales preserved the Cardenista 
tenets of socialist education. Justice for the countryside remained a constitut-
ing ele ment of their institutional culture, one continuously infused by stu-
dents’  family histories of exploitation and by promises of revolutionary re-
form, not to mention normalistas’ own coming of age amid a socioeconomic 
order that, in several regions of the country, eerily resembled Porfirian times. 
This presence of campesino consciousness made rural normales particularly 
radical educational sites.
By showcasing the nature of rural normalistas’ participation in northern 
Mexico’s agrarian strug gles of the early 1960s, this chapter highlights how stu-
dent protest marked Mexico’s periphery before the widely recognized 1968 
movement in the capital. Hidden in plain sight, normalista mobilizations in 
Chihuahua challenge the notion of student movements as a uniquely urban 
phenomenon. In the country’s periphery, students from the rural normales 
of Salaices and Saucillo participated in land takeovers alongside campesinos, 
dramatizing the country’s increasing land concentration and the vio lence that 
undergirded it. In this strug gle, teachers like Pablo Gómez and Arturo Gámiz 
acted as leaders, advisers, organic intellectuals, and links with organ izations at 
the national level. They  were the vis i ble incarnation of the socially committed, 
po liti cally militant teachers the revolutionary state had once held as models.
Emerging from the ranks of the Popu lar Socialist Party (Partido 
Popu lar Socialista, pps) and the in de pen dent General Union of Mexican 
Workers and Campesinos (Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de 
México, ugocm), Mexico’s agrarian strug gle of the 1950s and early 1960s 
reinforced the progressive ideology on which rural normales  were founded. 
Internationally, the 1959 triumph of the Cuban Revolution expanded the 
spectrum of possibilities and stoked their imagination. Normalista frame-
works of justice increasingly pushed Cardenista notions beyond campesino 
empowerment to a state controlled by workers and campesinos. When the 
hardening repression and ever more elusive reforms produced a local guer-
rilla group in 1965, its actions crystallized the broad- based association be-
tween rural normales and the radical protest of their students.
CHIHUAHUA: LATIFUNDISMO AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Chihuahua has long been a source of wealth for foreign investors, Mexican 
business  owners, and local caciques. During the early twentieth  century, 
thanks to Porfirio Díaz’s business- friendly policies, families like the Terrazas 
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and Creels built empires that rivaled  those of U.S. magnates of the time.2 
Their mono poly over land,  cattle, banking, manufacturing, and mining was 
so  great that, unlike in other northern states, no dissident elite emerged to 
challenge them during the revolution. Instead, the  middle class, peasants, 
and workers allied against them and forced reform over the years of fierce 
fighting.3 But Chihuahua’s per sis tent oligarchs, to use Mark Wasserman’s 
term, proved  adept at navigating the new order. While the northern rev-
olutionaries Francisco Villa and Álvaro Obregón expropriated much of 
the Terrazas- Creel land for re distribution during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
relatives of the large landowners repurchased it, often with the very money 
obtained as compensation for previous expropriations. Their postrevolu-
tionary holdings represented but 20   percent of their previous possessions; 
however, it was some of the state’s best land and nearly matched the total 
acreage redistributed by the government during the 1930s. Other magnates 
arose from the ruins of the Terrazas- Creel estates. Families like the Valli-
nas, Almeidas, Quevedos, and Borundas— pervasive names in campesino 
grievances— purchased many of their previous holdings.4 Chihuahua’s min-
ing,  cattle, agriculture, and lumber sectors provided seemingly endless possi-
bilities for wealth. Exemption decrees, which deemed certain businesses key 
to the national economy, aided the pro cess by shielding the  great  cattle and 
agro- export industry from expropriation. As had been the case during 
the Porfiriato, po liti cal connections helped protect and grow investment. 
The new elite formed banking associations, cattlemen’s organ izations, and 
a chamber of commerce, interest groups that wielded im mense power 
regionally and nationally. While no single  family achieved the previous 
Terrazas- Creel power, by midcentury the Vallinas—in partnership with 
Terrazas descendants— came close.5
Bosques de Chihuahua is a good example of the pro cess by which new 
elites built fortunes on the remnants of Porfirian- era enterprises. In 1946 
Eloy Vallina, a prominent banker, and Carlos Trouyet, a power ful entrepre-
neur, acquired half a million hectares of land held by Northwestern Railway, 
a com pany founded in 1909 that,  under foreign owner ship, consolidated 
Chihuahua’s rail and timber industries. Bosques de Chihuahua’s success came 
in no small mea sure thanks to President Miguel Alemán, who would become 
a  silent partner in the venture.6 Before leaving office, Alemán issued a presi-
dential decree wherein the Mexican state bought the railway lines now  under 
Bosques’ control; this business deal helped provide Vallina and Trouyet with 
funds to expand the com pany’s timber industry.7 More impor tant, in 1952 
President Alemán granted Bosques a fifty- year concession of half a million 
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acres on which the com pany would supply raw materials to three key paper 
and lumber businesses.8 For generations prior, small- scale ranchers had inhab-
ited this land as well as the 260,000 hectares Bosques bought from North-
western Railway and now proceeded to enclose, partition, and sell. Arguing 
that the com pany constituted a latifundio, residents petitioned the govern-
ment for owner ship rights. Thus began a years- long strug gle against an enter-
prise whose investing partners, in addition to the former president, included 
some of Chihuahua’s most power ful men: Antonio Guerrero, a former mil-
itary commander; Teófilo Borunda, the state’s governor from 1956 to 1962; 
Tomás Valle, a businessman and state senator; and members of the Terrazas 
and Almeida families.9
If, on the one hand, Bosques de Chihuahua exemplified the crony capital-
ism that in Mexico lay at the heart of huge fortunes during the latter part of 
the twentieth  century, on the other, the Ibarra  family, who bought portions 
of the land and forcibly removed its occupants, epitomized the vio lence that 
undergirded this pro cess.10 Newspapers and federal agents reported a grow-
ing list of victims murdered by the Ibarras, whose terror methods also in-
cluded rape. So common was their sexual vio lence against  women that José 
Ibarra produced a noticeable crop of unacknowledged offspring.11 The mur-
ders of prominent local activists at his hands would be an impor tant catalyst 
of Chihuahua’s popu lar unrest.
In 1949 organ izations disenchanted with the government- controlled 
National Campesino Confederation formed the ugocm and channeled 
that unrest into direct action. In the subsequent two de cades, the ugocm 
spearheaded three principal forms of strug gle: local and federal elections; a 
defense of collective rights, especially as related to the ejido; and demands 
for the breakup of latifundios and distribution of land. The ugocm was 
affiliated with the Popu lar Party (Partido Popu lar, pp), formed in 1948 by 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, which grouped communists, reformists, and 
critics of the increasing reactionary tendencies of the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (pri)  under President Alemán; members of the  union’s exec-
utive council also belonged to the party’s national board. Prominent among 
them was Jacinto López, the ugocm’s secretary general, who in 1949 ran 
for governor of Sonora  under the pp banner.12 The party’s and  union’s orga-
nizational structure provided networks that crisscrossed Mexico’s northern 
states and frequently passed through Mexico City. The pp’s focus on elec-
toral strategy, however, would be a source of tension, as local leaders and 
rank- and- file members pushed for direct action. Some ugocm members 
and teachers like Pablo Gómez and Arturo Gámiz, who ran for local office 
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 under the party’s banner, would eventually become radicalized and ulti-
mately insist on armed strug gle.
Rural normales and other educational centers serving Chihuahua’s poor 
became impor tant hubs of party support. In 1960 the pp became the pps, 
which together with its affiliate, the Popu lar Socialist Youth, enjoyed sub-
stantial teacher and student support.13 Party lit er a ture and orga nizational 
strategy encouraged student involvement in campesino strug gles.14 But the 
pps also found fertile ground  because the teachers and students saw their 
own  family history reflected in campesino  battles for land. In addition to 
the rural normalistas from Saucillo and Salaices, students in Chihuahua 
City who attended the State Normal School, the Arts and Trade School, 
the Ladies’ Industrial School, and the vari ous Normal Night Schools became 
impor tant participants in the mounting agrarian  battle.15 If students’ poor 
background imbued them with a sensitivity to campesino grievances, board-
ing schools provided the space, and student associations the vehicle, for them 
to act on this sentiment. While Chihuahua’s State Normal School lacked the 
institution- wide boarding- school component of the federal rural normales, 
it provided living quarters for low- income students who came from outside 
the capital.  These dormitories  were located in the same building as  those for 
the Arts and Trade School and the Ladies’ Industrial School.16 In 1962 stu-
dents from  these three schools as well as the rural normales and numerous 
ju nior high schools formed the Chihuahua Student Federation. A portent of 
what was to come, their inaugural meeting was attended by three thousand 
delegates.17
 “BOSQUES DE CHIHUAHUA, ASSASSINS”
The November 29, 1959, murder of Francisco Luján Adame, a rural teacher 
from Madera, triggered the unrest that shook Chihuahua for the following 
half de cade. Killed in his home by a man  later identified as Encarnación 
García, Luján Adame had been a regional secretary of the ugocm and 
long assisted Madera’s campesinos who sought ejido expansions. Madera 
residents never accepted the knife- wielding assailant as the lone murderer; 
they pointed instead to José Ibarra as the crime’s intellectual author. Luján 
Adame traveled frequently to Mexico City to carry out paperwork on behalf 
of campesinos and denounced Bosques de Chihuahua agents who constantly 
harassed rural dwellers into vacating their lands.18 His death drew the larg-
est funeral pro cession in Madera’s history, reported one state newspaper, as 
mourners emptied “the community in  silent protest of the macabre act.”19 In 
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the months that followed, demands for Bosques’ expropriation merged with 
calls for justice over Luján Adame’s murder.20
Before the assassination of Luján Adame, the region’s campesinos had al-
ready faced a series of murders, many at the hands of the Ibarra  brothers. For 
example, Ibarra henchmen had killed Anselmo Enríquez Quintana, a campes-
ino who refused to give up his land. For this murder José Ibarra was indicted 
but never arrested. On September 4, 1959, his nephew, Rubén Ibarra, killed 
another teacher, Luis Mendoza. Six months  later, Rubén’s  father, Florentino 
Ibarra, shot and killed Carlos Ríos, a Pima indigenous activist. Despite re-
ceiving an eight- year prison sentence, Florentino spent only three days in jail. 
José Ibarra, the most notorious of the  family, had a murder rec ord that dated 
back to at least 1942.21 Despite this—or perhaps  because of it— the state au-
thorities let him command the military and state police, who terrorized the 
population by hanging campesinos from trees. Instead of a noose, Ibarra’s 
men used a knot that would strangle but not kill their victims, referred to as 
cordadas. Federal intelligence agents reported such abuses, the support the 
Ibarras had from both state and federal forces, and their success in forcing 
many campesinos off their land.22
“Bosques de Chihuahua, Assassins,” soon became a rallying cry as pro-
tests spread to the state capital.23  There students, especially normalistas, held 
rallies in support of the sierra’s campesinos. The youth articulated a clear 
connection to the agrarian strug gle: they  were the sons and  daughters of 
campesinos, who  were the land’s “legitimate  owners.”24 Arturo Gámiz, then a 
student at the Chihuahua State Normal School, delivered a moving speech. 
Offering a damning analy sis of the country’s situation, he ended with an im-
passioned plea: “The youth cannot allow their teachers to be murdered. On 
the contrary, the youth, as part of the  people, must actively fight against in-
justice. Even though we are young, we worry about the fatherland’s prob lems. 
We students are poor; we are the  children of campesinos and workers. That’s 
why we are  here, asking the  people to raise their voice in protest, demanding 
justice.”25 In asserting both their campesino origin and their status as youth 
“worr[ied] about the fatherland’s prob lems,” Chihuahua’s students insisted 
on the link between the fate of campesinos and that of the nation. Normalis-
tas especially positioned themselves as natu ral advocates of the rural poor. 
Such a responsibility resonated profoundly as a rallying cry for Chihuahua’s 
students during the first half of the 1960s and would push many of them to 
the sort of decisions their grandparents had made during the revolution.
At the one- year anniversary of Luján Adame’s murder, when the ugocm 
or ga nized a nine- day march from Madera to Chihuahua City, students  were 
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among the first to join campesino calls for land and justice. Designed to co-
incide with López Mateos’s visit to the state capital, the ugocm protest led 
delegates to meet with the president and demand he expropriate Bosques’ 
land and address the impunity  behind Luján Adame’s murder.26 The presi-
dent was unsympathetic. He criticized the marchers for their “unnecessary 
agitation” and inability to recognize that Bosques de Chihuahua was an “in-
dustry that benefited the nation” and dismissed calls to prosecute José Ibarra 
when the material perpetrator had already been imprisoned.27
“We have been subjected to all sorts of abuse,” wrote Leonel Luján, son of 
the slain teacher, shortly afterward. In a public letter to Chihuahua governor 
Teófilo Borunda, Luján detailed the long history of abuse in Chihuahua’s 
sierra, “not only assassinations . . .  but the burning of our  humble homes and 
eviction from land we possessed for more than fifty years.”28 Where President 
López Mateos saw agitation, normalistas saw the dignity of their families; 
where the president saw a prosperous com pany, normalistas saw an insult 
to the letter and spirit of agrarian legislation; and where the president saw a 
just criminal court system, normalistas saw another murdered activist. What 
kind of a  future did such a system hold for poor youth?
Thus, the murder of Luján Adame, a rural teacher who had long denounced 
repression and fought for campesino rights, became a catalyst that drew nor-
malistas into the center of a storm. For half a de cade, together with campesinos 
and rural educators, they forged a movement bonded by a common origin 
and shared— almost sacred— constitutional rights: land and education. In 
the context of the 1960s,  these twin princi ples increasingly provided the 
basis for a radical trajectory, one that reverberated with par tic u lar intensity 
at the rural normales, where the link between agrarian justice in the pre sent 
and education’s hope for the  future constituted a founding princi ple.
ARTURO GÁMIZ AND PABLO GÓMEZ
Few figures personify the revolutionary essence of the committed rural 
teacher better than Arturo Gámiz and Pablo Gómez, even if they themselves 
 were not schooled at rural normales. It was partly  because of their charis-
matic leadership that hundreds of normalistas joined Chihuahua’s agrarian 
strug gle. Their legacy, like that of Genaro Vázquez and Lucio Cabañas in 
Guerrero, would become intimately linked to the narrative— both official 
and popu lar—of the rural normales. Gámiz’s and Gómez’s personal histories 
and po liti cal leadership gave them a strong presence among a cross section of 
Chihuahua’s aggrieved population. Both came from a  humble background 
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in northern Mexico, both studied for a time in Mexico City, both became 
involved in the pps, and both returned to Chihuahua.  There they delivered 
their lives to agrarian justice.
Gómez and Gámiz  were not the sole leaders of Chihuahua’s 1960s agrar-
ian strug gle. Just as significant  were campesinos like Álvaro Ríos and Salva-
dor Gaytán, with whom Gómez and Gámiz shared similar life experiences.29 
The two teachers planned actions in concert with Ríos and Gaytán, and  these 
campesino leaders profoundly  shaped their ideology. Their relationship is an 
example of the dialectical nature of po liti cal consciousness. As much as the 
government and the media portrayed the agrarian unrest as stemming from 
teachers and normalistas who agitated the campesinos, poor rural folks  were 
just as responsible for developing educators’ consciousness. The attention to 
Gómez’s and Gámiz’s leadership  here stems from my focus on rural normal-
ismo. Partly  because of  these two teachers, who waged a strug gle that bridged 
classroom and field, Chihuahua’s normalistas could imagine and follow a 
revolutionary path. Their biographies are thus worth exploring. Each life is a 
mea sure of the dynamics that produced movement leaders in the context of 
broader social processes— migration, urbanization, schooling— taking place 
in midcentury Mexico.
Born in Durango in 1940, Gámiz came from a  humble background, and 
 there  were several rural teachers in his extended  family, who also had a tradition 
of involvement in local strug gles.30 Gámiz spent his early youth in Mexico 
City, where his  family moved in 1950.  There he attended the National Poly-
technic Institute (Instituto Politécnico Nacional, ipn) and was active in the 
youth section of the pp. In 1956 ipn students went on strike demanding greater 
participation in school governance; the resignation of the director, whom they 
charged with being corrupt and autocratic; and increased funding for schol-
arships and school infrastructure. The movement reverberated nationally as 
schools across Mexico— including the rural normales— joined their strike.31 
As a student at the ipn, Gámiz participated in the mobilizations and distin-
guished himself as a skilled orator and sophisticated thinker.32 The govern-
ment ultimately responded to this strike with repression. In a prelude to Chi-
huahua governor Giner’s attack on the state’s normales, the army occupied 
ipn dormitories on September 23, 1956, forcibly removing students in the 
early morning hours.33 Targeting dormitories was an effective strategy since 
 these living quarters  were impor tant spaces of po liti cal organ izing.
Soon  after, Gámiz moved to Chihuahua and worked as a teacher in the mu-
nicipality of Guerrero. He remained  there for two years and in 1959 applied to 
Chihuahua’s State Normal School, where he studied for two additional years.34 
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At the normal, Gámiz participated in student mobilizations, especially  those 
in support of campesino strug gles, including a November 1960 caravan from 
Madera to Chihuahua City. Gámiz’s charisma, his po liti cal activism, and his 
passion for agrarian justice quickly made him an inspiration to other stu-
dents, who followed his footsteps and joined campesino mobilizations. Tell-
ingly, the agrarian leader Salvador Gaytán referred to him as “the young man 
who always brings a lot of students to the campesino marches.”35
In 1962 Gámiz moved to Mineral de Dolores, a community on Chihuahua’s 
border with Sonora.  There he joined Gaytán, whom the community had 
elected as their representative. In a town that had not had a teacher in twenty- 
eight years— caciques  were using the school as a stable— Gámiz set up a 
makeshift classroom in the town plaza, where he taught sixty- five  children. 
Once he and Gaytán recovered and rebuilt the school house, they named it 
the Escuela Primaria Prof. Francisco Luján Adame,  after the Madera teacher 
slain in 1959.36 Mineral de Dolores had once been a prosperous town, but the 
foreign- owned mines had halted activities twenty years  earlier, “taking with 
them all the wealth, leaving nothing but ruins, bare mountains, and nostal-
gia,” wrote Gámiz. But the region’s economic depression, he continued, “is 
not only due to the end of mining;  there is another impor tant reason: the 
formation and entrenchment of a cacicazgo, an empire of assassins.”37 Gámiz’s 
work in Dolores followed a script straight out of the 1930s: build a school, 
teach the  children, assess the community’s needs, make them aware of their 
rights, and or ga nize them to attain  these rights. But, thirty years  later, the 
sep (Ministry of Public Education) wanted instructors whose work stayed 
within the classroom walls. Lázaro Cárdenas’s stewards of social justice had 
 little place in Cold War Mexico.
Two years  later, jailed, Gámiz recounted his experience to Salvador del 
Toro Rosales, an agent from the attorney general’s office whom the federal 
government sent to investigate the state’s increasing protest and vio lence: “I 
am an unemployed normalista teacher. They took my job away long ago,” 
Gámiz told Toro Rosales.
How do I survive? Well, thanks to the help of campesinos. I teach their 
kids how to read and write, and in return they give me some food; and 
when they see I have no shoes, well, they buy me some; sometimes they 
give me the clothes they no longer wear. That’s how I get by. . . .  Living 
among rural folks, I learned of their fatigue and misery, and, as paradox-
ical as it may seem, authorities deny them the right to the soil they walk 
on, even though their parents and grandparents are the legitimate  owners 
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of the roads, forests, and ranchos in the state of Chihuahua. . . .  As soon as 
it became known that I helped campesinos, I was blacklisted and labeled 
a communist agitator.38
Reproduced years  later by Toro Rosales, Gámiz’s words may say as much 
about the young teacher as they do about Toro Rosales’s reflection of the sit-
uation he was sent to investigate.  Either way, Toro Rosales was clearly moved 
by Gámiz. If he had this effect on  those from the establishment, it is no won-
der he galvanized the students and campesinos around him.
Fourteen years his se nior, Pablo Gómez was another impor tant protagonist 
in the state’s mobilization. Born in 1926 “to an agrarista campesino  family,” as 
his  daughter Alma put it, his early life was one of poverty. In a region where 
temperatures can drop below freezing during the winter months, with no 
heating at home and few warm clothes, Gómez would take refuge in local 
cantinas, where he would sleep curled up atop a billiard  table “ until the bar 
closed,” said his  daughter. Like Gámiz, Gómez prepared for a teaching  career 
at Chihuahua’s State Normal School, where he met his wife, Alma Caballero, 
who also studied  there. But Gómez’s dream was to become a doctor, a  career 
he would pursue in the early 1950s at the National Autonomous University 
of Mexico in the country’s capital. Three of his five  children  were born during 
this time. To support his  family, Gómez taught elementary school by day 
and attended medical school by night.  After obtaining his medical degree, 
he chose to practice medicine in Flores Magón, a town in the northwest-
ern part of Chihuahua where he knew several teachers at the rural normal. 
Unable to sustain a medical practice  because he consistently treated poor 
patients for  free, he supported his  family by teaching at the rural normal.39 In 
Flores Magón and  later in Saucillo, where the rural normal moved in 1962, 
Gómez was always active in local campesino strug gles and became a member 
of the pps and a ugocm delegate.40 “During that  whole pro cess of cam-
pesino mobilizations, he, his  brother, and other leaders faced repression,” 
recalled Alma, who witnessed the new wounds that continually appeared 
on her  father’s body as his involvement intensified. “He had a scar from an 
attack with a glass  bottle; his nose was broken; he had a stab wound in his 
back. He was detained several times. It was an environment of both gener-
alized and selective repression. . . .  His last time being jailed, I remember he 
told my  mother, ‘I prefer to die than to live  under this repression.’ ”41 Aside 
from the physical aggression Gómez suffered as state and federal forces dis-
lodged him and other campesinos from land takeovers, Governor Giner, and 
eventually the sep authorities, sought his transfer out of the state. Accusing 
 “Infinite Injustice” 143
him of inciting Saucillo’s normalistas to participate in land invasions, the sep 
reassigned him to Atequiza, Jalisco, in 1964.42 Gómez quit rather than accept 
this transfer. He sought instead to move to Cuba with his  family, but this 
plan was reportedly blocked by the upper echelons of the pps.43
Alma described her home environment as liberal. “Four of the five of us 
[siblings]  were baptized but only  because my  father liked having compadres. 
But we never went to church. We did not have a religious upbringing.” As the 
years wore on and Alma’s  father became more involved in local land strug-
gles, her home environment went from liberal to radical. The triumph of 
the Cuban Revolution in 1959 provided a framework of hope in a local con-
text where striking injustice was punctuated by popu lar and dramatic acts 
of re sis tance. From a very young age, Alma remembered her  father glued to 
their shortwave radio. “ Every day, very early in the morning when I woke 
up, I’d hear my dad listening to Radio Habana. We’d hear speeches by Fidel 
and Che, all that.” It was an aty pi cal  house hold, a situation Alma realized 
early on through the constant harassment she and her siblings suffered, espe-
cially when they moved from Flores Magón to Buenaventura, a town about 
forty- five miles away where Alma’s  father wanted to practice in the clinic of 
a surgeon he admired. “In spite of every thing, the situation in Flores Magón 
was diff er ent  because of the environment created by the normal. But in the 
Buenaventura valley,  there was no counterweight; it was an incredibly reac-
tionary town. We lived  there for a year, and it was a very difficult time for 
us. My  brother Pablo and I often had to take a taxi to school  because on 
the streets  they’d hound and throw stones at us for being communist.” Alma 
searched for ways to fit in and thought church could be a venue: “I went 
to mass  every Sunday, and on one Sunday, in his sermon, the priest began to 
explain that when, in an apple orchard,  there is a rotten apple, if it’s not re-
moved in time, it  will rot and contaminate the rest. Same with tomatoes, and 
I  don’t remember what other examples he used. Then he said: ‘That’s what 
happens in society. Sometimes  there are  people who can contaminate and 
ruin the rest of society. And  these  people need to be eliminated. In the case 
of this community, it is Pablo Gómez.’ ” Alma felt as if the earth had parted 
beneath her. “I felt afraid, anxious, and angry, but I  didn’t want to worry my 
parents, so I  didn’t say anything.” But news travels fast in small towns. Before 
Alma even got home, her parents knew. Her  father was furious and prohib-
ited her from ever  going back to church. “I was eleven. . . .  That’s when my 
religious life ended.”44
In 1962,  after a year of living in Buenaventura, the Gómez  family again 
moved, this time to Delicias. Her  father continued to teach at the rural 
144 Chapter Five
normal, which had relocated from Flores Magón to Saucillo.  There Alma 
began her studies in 1963. “I  don’t remember the moment nor the circum-
stances in which I de cided to become a teacher. I think it was a very natu ral 
pro cess. Since my childhood I had been close to the normal. My  father was a 
teacher  there. I would often stay in the dorms with the girls [muchachas]. . . . 
So I had a  really close relationship with the normal. . . .  I never even asked 
myself if I wanted to be a teacher; I just went straight to the normal.” Alma 
Gómez, like her  father, would be an impor tant activist in Saucillo and in the 
1970s joined a guerrilla movement.45
Gámiz’s and Gómez’s  humble beginnings, travel to urbanized centers, 
social mobility through education, strug gle for an elusive agrarian justice, 
and state persecution exemplify the broader social experience of many rural 
normalistas. That students from Salaices and Saucillo became impor tant 
protagonists in their strug gles intertwined  these teachers’ legacies with that 
of the rural normales. In the pantheon of unofficial heroes, Gómez and 
Gámiz stand alongside figures like Rubén Jaramillo, Valentín Campa, Deme-
trio Vallejo, Othón Salazar, Lucio Cabañas, Genaro Vázquez, and Ramón 
Danzós Palomino— popu lar figures who fought the pri’s authoritarianism 
and paid a heavy price. Gómez and Gámiz are ignored by official history— 
except to illustrate that rural normales have a subversive tradition. From 
below, however, that tradition looks more like dignified re sis tance to a long 
history of injustice.
 FAMILY HISTORIES, LEGACIES OF RE SIS TANCE, 
AND PATHS OF STRUG GLE
Chihuahua’s 1960s agrarian strug gle, with its appeals to campesino rights, its 
direct action, and a leadership that invoked the Cuban Revolution, provided 
rural normalistas ample opportunities to act. Education officials might no 
longer have advocated for an activist teacher, but in places like Chihuahua, 
the ugocm’s strug gle did.  Those who heeded such calls came to understand 
the strug gle through ideology as much as through their  family’s history and 
poverty. For example, José Luis Aguayo Álvarez, who studied at the rural nor-
mal of Salaices and in 1965 became head of the school’s student association, 
recalled his early po liti cal awakening: “Our  family was very poor. . . .  Early 
on I perceived the social division, we  were not all the same. And since my 
 uncles  were active in the strug gle— they  were agraristas— they’d emphasize to 
us, to their kids, that one had to be committed to the  people.”46 Such personal 
memories could grow deep roots at the rural normales, institutions whose 
 “Infinite Injustice” 145
founding logic was to improve the campesino condition. As José Ángel Agu-
irre Romero, also from Salaices, stated, “We  were educated to give ourselves 
 wholeheartedly to the campesino  causes. And in that time [the 1950s]  there 
was a lot of caciquismo in the state;  there  were huge latifundios  here. One 
latifundio, Bosques de Chihuahua, made up almost half the state. So land- 
petition groups began to emerge, and we  couldn’t be detached from such 
 causes.”47 Aguirre, whose  family had received land in 1923 as a result of the 
revolution, described in painstaking detail the hardship his  family endured 
even with such reform:
The conditions  were almost worse [than in the hacienda where they pre-
viously worked]  because they got land but no protection. That land had 
been expropriated from another hacienda. . . .  They did not even have a 
plow to farm and had to break the land with a pick and shovel and culti-
vate small plots of corn, beans, squash, what ever they could. But the yield 
was quite small; some had to go work in a nearby town at the hacienda of 
El Sauz, where a few got jobs. But the majority went to the nearby sierra 
to cut wood and collect it in  little carts. Then they sold it in Chihuahua 
City. It would take four days to go, fill a  little cart, come back, and sell 
it.  They’d receive six pesos, six pesos they would use to buy some corn or 
beans;  there was no hope of buying meat or anything like that.48
Bosques de Chihuahua would  later enclose the forested lands, which many of 
Chihuahua’s inhabitants used to supplement their  house hold income. And 
like Aguayo, Aguirre would also become head of Salaices’s student federa-
tion, the Mexican Federation of Socialist Campesino Students (fecsm), an 
experience that likely reinforced and politicized the memories of his  family 
history.
From a diff er ent social sector but with a similar story, Manuel Arias 
Delgado, who came from a Chihuahua mining  family, vividly recalled the 
harsh conditions  under which his  father and his grand father labored in a 
U.S.- owned mine. Black lung disease, mining accidents, and wages that hardly 
supported a  family of nine  children marked Arias’s early life. To help sup-
port his  family, Arias worked vari ous odd jobs, including as a gardener in a 
U.S. neighborhood in Chihuahua. “That neighborhood was straight out of 
a postcard:  there was grass, pools, fine- bred dogs. . . .  The gringitos looked 
like they  were from a Gerber commercial. . . .  My toy was a metal wheel that 
I would push around with a hanger. And they had bicycles they left lying on 
the grass. They had grass!  Here we had rocks.  There they had a pool;  here we 
 didn’t even have drinking  water. And I thought, ‘Why such in equality?’ I 
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was the example of poverty in the  middle of an insulting abundance.” In that 
abundance Arias found the explanation of his own poverty: “They have what 
I lack. And why do they have this money? Well,  because they took it from 
my  father and his compañeros. That’s it, an unequal distribution.” It is no 
surprise to hear Arias articulate this Marxist  labor theory of value. Indeed, 
he characterized the rural normales as “centers of socialist ideological forma-
tion.” Students had a mobile revolutionary library: “That’s where we became 
acquainted with Marx, Engels, and Lenin. It was a mobile dynamic library. 
 These  were books whose pages  were all loose  because of so much use.”49
Out of a student body with this background, figures like Gámiz and Gómez 
engaged in the state’s agrarian movement. And while such personal histories 
alone would not spur po liti cal strug gle, the rural normales’ own radical cul-
ture, the 1960s po liti cal effervescence (especially among youth), and the 
inspiration of the 1959 Cuban Revolution created a propitious context for 
rural normalistas to act on their institutions’ long- proclaimed ideals.  Doing 
so enhanced an already radical tradition. It also aggravated the authorities, 
who saw the alliance among teachers, campesinos, and students as proof that 
social unrest was the work of agitators rather than the result of unfulfilled 
or betrayed revolutionary promises. As normalistas invoked the Cuban ex-
ample, they joined youth throughout Latin Amer i ca who  were hungry for 
alternative po liti cal proj ects and expanded the notion of the pos si ble. U.S. 
aggression against the island served to confirm the righ teous nature of the 
Cuban road.
Across the rural normales, organ izations like the fecsm circulated im-
ages of bearded revolutionaries constructing a new society with agrarian and 
educational reforms at the center. The island’s revolution itself offered new 
material for po liti cal study circles. Silvina Rodríguez, a student from the 
rural normal of Saucillo, for example, recalled, “We’d have meetings on Fri-
days, and at  those meetings Prof. Pablo Gómez would bring a map and ex-
plain to us how the Cuban Revolution was  going, who had advanced in what 
moment and on what day. So Fridays we’d hear how events had unfolded for 
the week.”50 Her classmate, Alma Gómez Caballero, likewise remembered, 
“On May 23, ‘Students’ Day,’  there  were a series of activities, among them a 
parade with vari ous floats. And  there is a picture that must have been taken 
in 1961, where on one of  those floats the girls are dressed with beards and in 
olive green clothing. That was the influence of the Cuban Revolution, and 
how it came all the way over  here.”51 A few years  later, the 1967 graduating 
class at this normal voted to call itself the “Castro Ruz Class,” a name they 
wanted printed on their diplomas.52
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The enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution, moreover, provided addi-
tional opportunities for alliances between students from diff er ent schools. 
As was the case throughout Mexico, Chihuahua’s students protested the Bay 
of Pigs invasion, and on April 24, 1961, Chihuahua’s State Normal School 
and Cuba’s Friendship Society or ga nized a demonstration condemning the 
U.S. aggression. Hundreds gathered in the state capital. The event turned 
violent when a fight broke out between demonstrators and members of the 
Catholic Youth Association, who, according to the student protesters, threw 
tear gas bombs into the crowd. El Heraldo, a newspaper long disparaging 
of social protest, reported that the “pseudo students” in a “commie romp” 
had instigated the vio lence, unprovoked, by beating an innocent bystander 
who  later died from his injuries. In a premeditated act, continued the piece, 
demonstrators then vandalized the newspaper’s headquarters. In a tone char-
acteristic of the official press’s portrayal of rural normalistas, the newspaper 
asserted that the demonstration’s organizers, “in cahoots with the teachers of 
the rural normales of Salaices and Flores Magón [ later Saucillo], nests of per-
manent agitation, brought irresponsible students to this city with instruc-
tions to deface El Heraldo’s building.”53 Normalista participants insisted that 
the right- wing youth had provoked the vio lence. An agent provocateur, 
they maintained, threw a Molotov cocktail into the crowd. The reported 
death, according to one normalista, had not taken place but was made-up gov-
ernment propaganda.54 The magazine Política  later reported that the bishop, 
Monseigneur Espino Porras, had mobilized Sinarquistas (an ultranationalist 
Catholic organ ization founded in the late 1930s) and members of the right- 
wing National Action Party to attack the demonstrators.55 Regardless of who 
triggered the vio lence, the skirmish illustrates how high passions ran when 
it came to Cuba. Just as it inspired the left, it created fear among the right. It 
also provided a con ve nient new phantom that the church used to relaunch 
its critique of secular education.56
“All  were brought from the rural normal of Salaices,” El Heraldo head-
lined its article on the six students arrested during the day’s events.57 That 
 those apprehended  were all from Salaices was likely a coincidence. A group 
from this rural normal had parked their truck by the newspaper offices, and 
police nabbed them as they returned to their vehicle.58 But El Heraldo’s ref-
erence to the rural normales as “nests of permanent agitation” and allega-
tions that their students  were brought to the city— implying they  were will-
ing troublemakers— are telling examples of the long- standing vilification of 
 these schools. This narrative demonized rural normalistas, but it did not de-
mobilize them. On the contrary, the arrests galvanized Chihuahua’s students, 
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who in the following weeks vigorously protested the students’ detention and 
ultimately gained their release.59
“Nothing has infused the oppressed of the Amer i cas with the same 
hope and trust in the  future as the Cuban Revolution,” proclaimed Arturo 
Gámiz.60 Rural normalistas still preserved socialist education as an ethos to 
articulate notions of justice, but to it they added another layer. Normalistas 
mounted increasingly radical critiques of the Mexican government, which 
had  little tolerance for socialist appeals at home, its defense of Cuban self- 
determination notwithstanding. The Cuban Revolution had an influence 
in the rural normales, a Salaices gradu ate would  later write. “Leftists groups 
that went beyond the liberal Cardenista politics characteristic of the board-
ing schools began to proliferate.”61 This was not an uncontested pro cess. 
While per sis tent, the notion of the politicized teacher carried with it certain 
contradictions.  There was an inherent tension between the prospects of up-
ward mobility a teaching  career afforded the poor and the charge to serve the 
 people. For teachers in training, moreover, the po liti cal mobilizations them-
selves triggered a range of debates— many of them contentious— about goals 
and strategies. As Arias put it, “We had every thing: from the honest radicals 
to the radical demagogues. . . .  And from  there the indifferent ones: ‘I came 
to study, and when I gradu ate, I’ll be a teacher, locked inside my  little school. 
I’ll have my  family, and the world can turn as it may.’ Between  these two 
perspectives,  there was a broad spectrum of diff er ent character profiles.”62
As with any politicized sector, rural normalistas  were usually divided. 
In the context of 1960s Chihuahua,  these divisions manifested themselves in 
two ways. First, some students thought that at the rural normal, their 
responsibility was to complete their teaching preparation and then, degree 
in hand, aid and participate alongside campesinos. To that end, they thought 
po liti cal participation should be confined to issues involving resources 
needed to complete their studies. A second source of contention was the 
form that po liti cal participation itself should take. Some advocated peaceful 
and  legal mobilizations, while  others sought more dramatic actions, ones ca-
pable of precipitating a revolutionary uprising.
Gámiz himself addressed the  matter and rejected the notion that nor-
malistas best served the cause by first obtaining their degree. “If the goal is 
to serve the  people,” he wrote, “it is necessary to participate in their strug-
gle, and  here a degree has no relevance. One does not serve the  people as 
a professional, one serves them as a revolutionary, and no university pro-
vides a degree for this cause.” To mount separate strug gles, argued Gámiz, to 
think that it should be “students alongside students, campesinos alongside 
 “Infinite Injustice” 149
campesinos, workers alongside workers, and men alongside men, is to raise 
a  Great Wall of China between one another. That benefits only the oligar-
chy.” Wanting a  career was not in itself negative, Gámiz clarified; “collective 
interests could combine with  family and personal ones. The danger, the real 
betrayal, is the pretext it gives to abandon the ranks of the proletariat, the 
group [whose taxes and  labor] fund the professional schools.”63
Gámiz made such declarations as he reflected on the First Gathering of 
the Sierra, an event he, along with other teachers like Pablo Gómez and his 
 brother Raúl, as well as the campesino leaders Álvaro Ríos and Salvador 
Gaytán, or ga nized in an effort to broaden and define Chihuahua’s agrarian 
movement. It was held on October 7–12, 1963, in Cebadilla de Dolores in the 
municipality of Madera, and the organizers invited campesinos, students, 
and workers to discuss “the youths’ role in resolving the general prob lems of 
the  people.”64 The attendees  were  housed by the area’s campesinos or camped 
in the community’s elementary school. The meeting’s chosen location was 
itself significant. First, it signaled to the sierra’s caciques that land- hungry 
campesinos  were not alone in their strug gle.65 Indeed, with representatives 
from eighty- five diff er ent associations in attendance, organizers hoped to 
expand the movement beyond Chihuahua.66 Second, for students from the 
state capital, this was a chance to venture beyond the urban areas that had 
predominated as protest sites. Indeed, the ten- hour walk to the Cebadilla 
ejido was in itself a test of  will, a small taste of the physically demanding 
nature of radical action.
According to government in for mants, about seventy- five  people jour-
neyed to Cebadilla de Dolores, where they  were received by sixty- four ejida-
tarios.67 The delegates discussed an array of topics ranging from the forging 
of closer connections with countries of the socialist block, to a condemna-
tion of U.S. imperialism, to the role they should play in Mexico’s upcoming 
presidential elections. Shortly  after the First Gathering of the Sierra, Gámiz 
issued his own theoretical piece discussing students’ revolutionary potential. 
Published in the weekly magazine Índice, Gámiz’s text alluded to a point 
of contention within the Salaices student del e ga tion.68 The students of this 
rural normal, he maintained, held the “curious and idealistic view that be-
fore making the revolution and taking power, they must teach the masses 
ethics.” As would be expected, continued Gámiz, other students as well as 
the campesinos, themselves schooled by years of strug gle, rejected this no-
tion. If students wanted to be the vanguard, asserted Gámiz, they had to act 
deliberately and with abnegation, “not with absurd notions that the student 
movement was pure and untainted.”69
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The discussions held at the First Gathering of the Sierra reflected wider 
debates over strategy. While figures like Gámiz, Gómez, and Gaytán recog-
nized the need for electoral strug gle— indeed, they  were members of the 
pps and had run for local office— they increasingly clashed with the na-
tional leadership. State leaders like Jacinto López and national ones like Vi-
cente Lombardo Toledano demanded moderation and, in certain instances, 
opposed grassroots direct action, yet the rank and file grew impatient. In fact, 
this meeting may well have marked a point of divergence between the radi-
cals and  those they regarded as reformist.70
 “RURAL PROFESORCILLOS RILING UP THE HEN HOUSE”
In the months  after the First Gathering of the Sierra, Chihuahua witnessed a 
significant number of campesino land invasions. Coordinated and led by the 
ugocm and with the heavy participation of rural normalistas,  these actions 
 were meant to dramatize Mexico’s land concentration and to pressure the 
agrarian authorities to resolve pending distribution petitions. Hundreds of 
campesino families occupied vacant land— sometimes si mul ta neously, some-
times in relay fashion— until the authorities removed them. While for the 
urban marches and demonstrations the press and government agents cited 
the participation of the student bodies from several professional schools, in 
the land invasions the authorities dwelled on the involvement or leadership 
of students from the rural normales. This dynamic solidified the reputation 
of rural normales as particularly radical.  After all, rural teachers— the official 
narrative went— were agitating the other wise quiescent population of the 
countryside. Based on this logic, rather than addressing campesino demands 
for land, the state sought to contain student- teacher involvement, a tactic 
that, to the more radically inclined, confirmed the need for armed strug gle.
The 1964 land takeovers thus paved the road to armed strug gle. Cam-
pesinos from the northwestern municipality of Janos marked the New 
Year by occupying the property of the  cattle rancher Hilario Gabilondo. 
They remained  there for twenty days  until the military violently removed 
them.71 Denouncing the army’s unrestrained cruelty, in which soldiers beat 
 women and  children with their bayonets and  rifle butts, ugocm leaders 
stated that if “ those responsible  were not punished, the campesinos and the 
 people would mete out justice by their own hand.”72 Deaf to such warnings, 
Governor Giner declared that  future invasions would be “repressed with no 
[special] considerations and the full rigor of the law.”73 Meant to instill fear 
and deter  future land takeovers, such threats had  little effect, and February 
 “Infinite Injustice” 151
marked a particularly intense month of land invasions. Chihuahua appeared 
like a game of checkers, with normalistas and campesinos invading lands 
and the army removing them, while new invasions took place in other 
parts of the state. On February 19 alone, the state witnessed at least eight 
simultaneous land takeovers. In the municipalities of Saucillo, Delicias, 
Lázaro Cárdenas, and Meoqui, reported intelligence agents, students from 
the rural normales led or advised the invaders. “Young ladies from Saucillo 
dressed as men interspersed themselves among campesino ranks,” read one 
such report.74 Reacting to the ubiquity of rural normalistas in  these actions, 
Benjamín Fuentes, assistant director of teacher- training education, per-
sonally visited Saucillo, urging the students to end their “agitating and 
disorienting actions.”75 Officials from the sep tried again and again to 
dissuade Saucillo students from participating and advised educators to use 
“moral suasion and take advantage of the affection the students had for their 
teachers in order to orient and control them.”76 Some  were harsher, instruct-
ing all rural normal directors to prevent students from joining po liti cal acts 
by threatening them with sanctions.77 Teachers at  these schools, many them-
selves sympathetic to the campesino strug gle, countered by citing students’ 
commonsense notions of justice, “an ideology that leads them to act in  favor 
of the  humble classes. . . .  While they listen respectfully, they had an agreed- 
upon course of action to which they  were intractably committed.”78 The 
decision on  whether to expel  those who chose to act on their commitment 
soon passed into the hands of Education Minister Torres Bodet.79
As sep officials sought to control normalistas through institutional repri-
mands, state authorities jailed campesino leaders. Neither strategy worked. 
On the contrary, the state’s heavy hand gave them further reason to mo-
bilize. In Saucillo, for example, rural normalistas congregated outside 
the municipal jail where the authorities had detained and charged several 
ugocm leaders with property dispossession and criminal association. The 
students remained  there  until late in the night and the following day or ga-
nized a demonstration in Saucillo’s town plaza. Intelligence agents reported 
1,500  people in attendance.80
Protests soon extended to the state capital. On February 22, students from 
several normales and one ju nior high school gathered in Chihuahua City’s 
central plaza demanding the freedom of jailed ugocm leaders and the res-
olution of the state’s agrarian prob lems. As the event unfolded, a group of 
between two hundred and three hundred students made their way to the 
agrarian offices, with about fifty of them forcing their way into the building. 
 There they demanded that the administrator phone national headquarters. 
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The agent instead called security forces. When the students refused to va-
cate the agrarian offices, the swat team forced them out with tear gas. The 
authorities detained thirty- five students and hauled them off to the nearby 
government offices for pro cessing. In a city center now guarded by munic-
ipal police, the secret ser vice, and the swat team, students gathered in the 
city plaza demanding the release of their peers. By then, their numbers had 
swelled, perhaps the result of reinforcements from “outside normales,” noted 
one newspaper.  After the students refused to heed General Manuel Mendo-
za’s  orders to disperse, the police fired some thirty tear gas canisters, leading 
to a prolonged skirmish instead of the desired quiescence.81 And  here the 
general was acting with restraint: “If it  were a diff er ent time,” he  later boasted 
to a federal agent, he would have beat up  these “insolent and disrespectful 
youngsters. . . .  There would be none of this nonsense that  because they are 
students we  can’t touch them.”82
While the general decried the protection afforded by student status, stu-
dents themselves invoked their campesino identity. As they  were corralled 
and detained, they shouted, “We are sons and  daughters of campesinos and 
 won’t remain indifferent to the injustices in the countryside.”83 The students, 
almost all  under the age of eigh teen, insisted they had no leaders and had taken 
action of mutual accord. The authorities  later released thirty of the detained 
but charged the older participants with inciting the younger students. Among 
the five  people accused of forced entry, attack on the general communication 
lines, injury, and armed assault was Carlos Herrera, a teacher from Ciudad 
Juárez and a former student of the rural normal of Salaices.84 Herrera de-
clared that “he defended the interest of the campesino class that, with no real 
advocates, had in desperation turned to the student youth.”85 The student- 
campesino link thus resulted not only from  family connections but from 
students’ social responsibility, which they emphasized to show how badly 
the revolution had failed the countryside.
With a maddening disregard for real ity, Governor Giner declared that in 
Chihuahua  there  were no latifundios. The increasing unrest was the work of 
“rural profesorcillos [no- good teachers] riling up the hen house.” Accordingly, 
he moved to treat the symptom, not the disease: he requested that the sep 
close Chihuahua’s rural normales “ because they are veritable serpents’ nests, 
complete communist nests.” If their closure  were approved, boasted Giner, 
he would “turn them into pig farms and oust all the lazy students;  those who 
want to work can raise pigs.”86 State authorities  were especially disparaging 
of female normalistas. In an explic itly gendered critique of Saucillo students, 
one agent described how they “slept in the fields alongside campesinos with 
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no regard to the honor lady students should preserve.”87 Mendoza, the same 
military general who lamented that he could not beat students in the ways 
of yesteryear, declared about female participants, “They are like  those lowlife 
 women from the streets. . . .  What are  those girls  doing with campesinos out in 
the hamlets? . . .  What are they  doing far from home at night, at dawn?”88 Not 
to be outdone, the governor mocked the female students when they protested 
his attempts to close their normal: “Why do they want boarding schools if 
they like to sleep with campesinos in the field[?]” he declared.89 So pervasive 
 were  these attacks on female normalistas’ morals that the ugocm felt com-
pelled to protest—if paternalistically— against the numerous allegations. “Re-
garding the female students who have supported us,” read an ugocm state-
ment, “we see them not as soldaderas [ women who fought in the revolution] 
but as our  daughters, and as such we have offered them what is at our disposal: 
our sincerity and, above all  else, our profound re spect and admiration.”90
Federal authorities, for their part,  were increasingly alarmed by rural nor-
malista participation. Schools like Saucillo and Salaices, one intelligence re-
port stated, “are graduating teachers who, deforming their educational and 
social function, constitute real prob lems when they start teaching in their 
assigned communities. Their attitudes are ones of anarchy and cause confu-
sion and disorientation, especially among campesino groups.”91 Two months 
 after the sep’s assistant director had visited the schools, a sep commission 
returned, this time headed by the normales’ general director himself. The di-
rector scolded students and their instructors, stating that their actions  were 
detrimental not only to the profession but to the nation. He had believed 
 earlier claims about their po liti cal participation to be exaggerations but now 
proposed assigning Salaices and Saucillo gradu ates to positions outside Chi-
huahua. Within the state, he asserted, they had too many ideological links 
with “communist cells and extremist groups,” code words for campesinos de-
manding land restitution.92
Everywhere in Chihuahua, it seemed, teachers and normalistas  were at 
the center of campesino unrest. Their storming of the agrarian offices in the 
state’s capital represented the final straw  after months of protest, declared 
Governor Giner. He vowed no more tolerance and promised to “energeti-
cally repress all acts that encouraged the violation of our laws.”93 Before he 
could make good on such threats, the federal government stepped in. The 
state’s unrest had reached such levels that in late February 1964 the attorney 
general’s office sent two officers to Chihuahua. To take stock of the situa-
tion, the lead investigator, Salvador del Toro Rosales, met with state authorities 
as well as students. His memoirs reveal a dismay with Giner and his cabinet, 
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whom he characterized as ignorant and crass. For Gámiz— brought from jail 
to meet with Toro Rosales—he conveyed admiration. Less sympathetic to 
Gómez, whom he portrayed as manipulating campesinos, Toro Rosales rec-
ognized the unjust nature of the situation, though not the critical level it 
had reached.94 In a press conference, he soon announced the liberation of the 
detained students, teachers, and campesinos and declared that the federal gov-
ernment would dispatch a team of agronomists to study the disputed lands. 
Careful not to legitimate popu lar protest, he emphasized that campesino pe-
titions would be pro cessed as a mea sure of justice, not as a response to their 
“agitation.”95 For a certain group of teachers and campesinos, this was too  little 
too late.
A DEEPENING CRISIS
The first signs of guerrilla activity came at the end of February 1964. With 
Gámiz in jail, a group close to him burned a bridge along Bosques de Chi-
huahua’s industrial road. Calling themselves the Popu lar Guerrilla Group 
(Grupo Popu lar Guerrillero, gpg), atop the rubble they left a message read-
ing, “We burned this bridge to demand the freedom of campesinos and stu-
dents and the resolution of the agrarian prob lem.”96 A few days  later, gpg 
members killed the cacique Florentino Ibarra to avenge the murder of the 
campesino leader Carlos Ríos, whom Ibarra had shot in cold blood  because 
of Ríos’s refusal to abandon his land.97 On April 12, in Dolores, the group 
detonated homemade bombs on the Ibarras’ property, destroying the 
 family’s radio transmitter. This site, which state authorities used as a com-
mand center, would again come  under guerrilla attack on July 15, 1964, when 
the gpg surprised the very group charged with tracking them down.  There 
the guerrilla members captured the five state agents led by Rito Caldera 
Zamudio, a former Ibarra  family henchman.  After a prolonged discussion, 
the guerrillas de cided to spare the state agents’ lives, taking only their arms 
and ammunition.98 In response, Governor Giner commissioned the army to 
join in pursuing the guerrillas. He also advised José Ibarra, the  brother of the 
slain Florentino, to leave the state for his own safety.99
In the state capital, the po liti cal tension also intensified. In early 
April  1964, vio lence broke out in Chihuahua City at an election rally for 
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.  After the presidential candidate spoke before a crowd 
that, according to intelligence agents, numbered thirty thousand  people, the 
normalista José Mariñelarena stormed the stage and began an impassioned 
speech enumerating student and campesino grievances. As security agents 
 “Infinite Injustice” 155
moved to cut the microphone, many in the crowd chanted, “Let him speak.” 
Audience members, including campesinos sitting in the front row, fought 
to hear the student. They threw their folding chairs at security agents, 
forcing Mariñelarena’s release. The normalista then led the crowd to Díaz 
Ordaz’s  hotel— located a block from the plaza.  There the unrest contin-
ued as rocks, sticks, and wood pieces flew from all sides, one striking Díaz 
Ordaz himself. Not long  after, as protesters and Díaz Ordaz supporters bat-
tled it out, someone set the stage ablaze. The adjacent Municipal Palace also 
caught fire. Eventually, a military dispatch arrived, emptied the plaza, and 
“took control of a large swath of the city.”100
Students from Salaices and Saucillo “planned the events that took place 
during Gustavo Díaz Ordaz’s campaign visit to the city of Chihuahua,” an in-
telligence agent  later reported.101 Governor Giner, too, blamed the rural nor-
males, though he charged the shiftless teachers with equal culpability.102 The 
day’s events initiated a hardening of the government’s position as Giner sent 
the army to occupy the Salaices and Saucillo campuses, where, according 
to students, soldiers had  orders to beat or jail anyone attempting to leave. 
The governor cordoned off an additional area, instructing the state’s public 
transit not to allow students to board. The situation, the students declared, 
evoked Porfirian times.103
The government’s understanding of such unrest—as conveyed through 
intelligence sources— was simplistic at best. Reports dwell on what lead-
ers, po liti cal organ izations, or subversive ideology led teachers, students, 
and campesinos to protest. Some reports pointed to José Santos Valdés, 
the supervisor of Mexico’s northern rural normales, as the one pulling 
the strings. From his residence in Torreón, Coahuila, he reportedly con-
trolled the directors of Saucillo and Salaices and teachers like Pablo Gómez. 
Since Santos Valdés oversaw student stipends in the amount of 1.5 to 2 
million pesos, he used this money, implied one agent, to support po liti cal 
activity. Rural normal directors and their teachers, the majority of whom 
sympathized with the pps, according to intelligence agents, influenced the 
po liti cal ideology of the students, inciting or allowing them to participate in 
land invasions.104 The composite picture is an upward spiral of blame: older 
students brainwashed younger ones; teachers brainwashed their normalista 
pupils; together they manipulated campesinos into protest. This all occurred 
 under the aegis of an old socialist guard of normal teachers and directors, the 
most prominent of whom was Santos Valdés.
As tensions mounted, rumors circulated that the next president would 
close twenty of the country’s rural normales. As it turned out,  these accounts 
156 Chapter Five
 were not that far off the mark, but for now the sep feared that closing the 
institutions would provoke too much re sis tance.105 Governor Giner was less 
apprehensive and closed normales and dormitories  under his jurisdiction. In 
the cities of Ojinaga, Parral, Juárez, Saucillo, and Chihuahua, the governor 
closed the Normal Night Schools, arguing they had served their purpose. In 
a state with an excess of teachers, reported an article announcing the closure, 
 there was no reason to maintain  these schools.106 Curiously, the same front 
page of El Heraldo that explained the closure by citing an overabundance of 
educators included— two columns over—an article about the number of un-
filled teaching positions the state faced when the federal government failed 
to send the teachers it promised.107 Holding that dormitories constituted 
sites of promiscuity and homo sexuality and inhibited learning, the governor 
also closed the dormitories of the State Normal School of Chihuahua and 
 those of the Arts and Trade School and the Ladies’ Industrial School.108
Youth did not accept  these mea sures without a fight: the State Normal 
School quickly declared a strike. Seeking to prevent the rural normales from 
joining, the local authorities postponed the start of classes, arguing that the 
buildings had to be repaired, a lie that students did not let pass uncon-
tested. Once classes started, the assistant director of the rural normales 
again traveled to Saucillo and Salaices, urging students not to support 
the strike, declaring that the leaders’ intent was to create “a climate of agi-
tation that would harm their studies.”109 When the rural normal of Saucillo 
planned consecutive work stoppages and invited campesinos from the re-
gion to attend their demonstrations, the police inspector general ordered the 
interception of any vehicles carry ing campesinos to Saucillo.110 The teachers’ 
 union joined its voice to the protest. They criticized Governor Giner for un-
dermining the revolution’s princi ples and pointed out that while the govern-
ment closed institutions serving the poor, the number of private schools was 
rising.111
The student protest did not succeed in preserving the Normal Night 
Schools, nor in saving the dormitories of the Chihuahua State Normal 
School, the Arts and Trade School, and the Ladies’ Industrial School. 
Nonetheless, students ended their strike in December 1964 when the state 
government agreed to fund alternative student housing, subsidize rent, ex-
pand medical care, provide scholarships for the students of the closed eve-
ning normales so they could attend private schools, and refrain from retal-
iation against students, teachers, and families who supported the strike.112
By the year’s end, the state of Chihuahua faced a critical situation. 
Blinded by their focus on teacher and student culpability, state authorities 
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had fueled the growing unrest. In the sierra, a teacher- campesino contingent 
had taken justice into their own hands; the state capital was the scene of con-
stant demonstrations, some with violent outcomes; and the normales  were 
 either on strike or  under military occupation. While the federal government 
seemed poised to implement some reform, the choice of presidential candi-
date augured the ominous times ahead.
THE MADERA ATTACKS
In April 1965 Miguel Quiñónez, a gradu ate from the rural normal of Salaices 
who now taught in the Sierra Tarahumara, sent a letter to Javier Flores, also 
a rural teacher and Salaices gradu ate. The missive invited Flores to a series 
of talks, scheduled for  later that year and taking place in  either Saucillo or 
Salaices. Flores was to exercise extreme caution in the  matter and share the 
information only with compañeros in whom he had the utmost trust since 
“it regarded illegal methods of strug gle.”113 In his two years as a teacher, 
Quiñónez had undertaken an economic survey of the region, documented 
community needs, or ga nized a cooperative, and fought alongside the ejida-
tarios of Ariseáchic in defense of their land. The portion of his salary that he 
did not send to his parents he used to finance trips to Mexico City’s agrarian 
offices, where he and other community members sought federal interven-
tion in the region’s pressing land prob lems.114 “Miguel’s drive was palpable,” 
recalled Flores, his fellow teacher. “Rumors reached us about the conflicts 
throughout the state, particularly in the Sierra. We knew of the prob lems be-
sieging the normal of Saucillo. Campesinos continued to fight for land, and 
normalistas stood alongside them. Miguel had already expressed the need to 
take a position, to change the situations of the ejidos, especially the poorest 
ones. We had beautiful discussions, ones that illustrated and helped me un-
derstand the state of the world, the country, the region.”115
Quiñónez was born in Durango, the fifth of nine  children in a campesino 
 family. He had long been a good student, scoring at the top of the eight hun-
dred applicants who took the Salaices entrance exam in 1957. Possessing  great 
discipline and a calm temperament, he continued to stand out academically 
and socially at the normal, where he headed several student groups, includ-
ing the school’s fecsm. “He was radical in his thoughts and actions,” wrote 
Santos Valdés, “and even though he was happy and cordial and displayed a 
sense of camaraderie, when it came to ideological issues or po liti cal theory, 
he was stubborn, tenacious, per sis tent. If it concerned what he believed was 
a just po liti cal view, he willingly sacrificed a long friendship.” Quiñónez had 
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participated in Chihuahua’s numerous mobilizations and hoped the state’s 
leftist groups could form a unified co ali tion, one strong enough to effect 
change.116 Instead, the latter part of 1964 witnessed a slowdown in the land 
mobilizations with which the year had begun. State repression was indeed 
having an effect. In January 1965 Quiñónez and three other rural normalistas 
addressed a manifesto to “students of the rural normales, their alumni and 
parents association, and to all worker, campesino, and student revolutionary 
organ izations.” Mexico, declared the text, was dominated by latifundistas and 
despite repeated petitions that often took twenty years to pro cess, campesi-
nos remained empty- handed. In light of this situation, the writers declared 
their commitment to revolutionary strug gle and appealed to the students, 
whom they urged to join the workers and campesinos in a movement against 
the bourgeoisie. “It has been the youth, students,” noted the manifesto, “who 
in one way or another have bravely initiated the  great liberation movements 
in the world.” The declaration addressed rural normalistas specifically, urging 
them to reflect on this assessment “and,  whether you agree or not, pursue the 
complete liberation of our class, without giving up, much less betraying it.”117
The text was an example of the type of radicalization taking hold within 
a small group of students, teachers, and campesinos who had participated in 
Chihuahua’s land strug gle. Alluding to the reformist view that Salaices dele-
gates expressed during the sierra’s First Gathering, the declaration condemned 
that position, characterizing it as “diametrically opposed to the princi ples and 
revolutionary traditions that rural normalistas had always been proud of.” 
Such an attitude, continued the text, resulted from the influence of previ-
ously progressive sep authorities— including Santos Valdés— who had sown 
fear among the student body, warning that continued agitation alongside 
campesinos would deliver “a death sentence to the rural normales.”118
Previous ideological divides became tactical ones as the small guerrilla 
group sought to lay the groundwork for armed insurrection. The resolutions 
of the Second Gathering that took place on Durango’s northern border 
with Chihuahua are a good example of this radicalization. Organizers chose 
this location partly as a show of solidarity with the six hundred families of 
that region who had been fighting for the re distribution of the latifundio 
of Torreón de Cañas.119 Intelligence agents reported seven hundred  people 
 there, “all campesinos along with some students from the rural normales of 
Chihuahua and Durango.”120 The organizers’ own resolutions listed twelve 
diff er ent student, campesino, indigenous, normalista, and teacher organ-
izations in attendance.121 If, two years  earlier, the First Gathering’s resolu-
tions expressed a frustration with peaceful means, the Second Gathering’s 
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Five Resolutions foregrounded the path of armed strug gle. From a Marxist 
perspective, the text discussed imperialism, Third World liberation strug gles, 
Mexican history, the failures of its 1910 revolution, and campesinos’ revo-
lutionary potential. In a clear allusion to Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s writings 
on guerrilla warfare, this last resolution, entitled “The Only Path Forward,” 
made clear that the conditions for revolution could be created, even if by 
only fifteen or twenty guerrillas. “The strug gle  will be very long, one counted 
not in years but in de cades. That’s why it’s necessary to begin at once, while 
young, to gain the qualities that only come from years of action,” outlined 
the document.122 The guerrilla group would indeed remain small. As became 
increasingly clear, the teacher, student, and campesino participants in Chi-
huahua’s agrarian strug gle  were sympathetic to  those in arms, but few  were 
ready to make the revolutionary leap themselves.
Gradu ates of Saucillo and Salaices provided pivotal support networks 
that sustained the guerrillas in the Sierra Tarahumara, a striking vertical 
landscape with jutting canyons in a mountain range whose peaks climb to 
over nine thousand feet. In fact, a  whole network of rural teachers coalesced 
in this sierra.123 Javier Flores, who taught in the municipality of Guerrero 
 after graduating from Salaices, remembers the specific task Quiñónez as-
signed him: “I was to go to all the communities near Heredia y Anexas, 
 whether on  horse back, by foot— however I could. I would speak with the 
ejidatarios, the campesinos, the region’s indigenous  people, asking them to 
shelter the guerrillas and provide them cover if they needed to quickly es-
cape, found themselves isolated, or needed any other kind of help. Every-
one offered food for one or two  people, one or two  horses, and, of course, 
hiding places in the sierra’s caves.”124 José Ángel Aguirre Romero, another 
Salaices gradu ate who taught in the region, remembered that  people he did 
not even know sought him out on the recommendation of Gómez or Gámiz. 
Aguirre helped with logistical  matters and provided additional contacts. “I 
never got involved directly but [when they left], knowing that they never 
had any money, we’d reach into our pockets and take out twenty pesos; that 
was a lot in  those days.” Aguirre would further offer, “You  don’t have a place 
to stay? You can sleep  here.” Asked to participate in the attack on Madera, 
Aguirre rejected the invitation. He remembered telling Quiñónez, “Look 
at the conditions!  You’re asking me to come along, and I never even knew 
I was part of the plan. I’ve never even handled a weapon. If that’s the state 
of every one  else, think about it, they  will kill you all.”125 That was the last 
time Aguirre saw Quiñónez, who left angry, frustrated by his friend’s refusal 
to join the planned attack on Madera.
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 Because of its dramatic nature, the September  23, 1965, guerrilla attack 
on Madera’s military barracks has received a  great degree of attention, often 
obscuring the long and widespread mobilizations from which it emerged.126 
It was indeed a daring, if suicidal, undertaking. Conceived by teachers and 
campesino leaders who had been key figures in Chihuahua’s land strug gle 
since 1959, the assault followed the logic of the guerrillas’ previous clandes-
tine actions, especially the successful July 1964 ambush in Mineral de Do-
lores. The planned Madera assault was to involve between thirty and forty 
participants, twenty of whom had received military training from a former 
army captain in Mexico City.127 Madera’s choice was both strategic and sym-
bolic. The town lay at the heart of the region’s long strug gle against caciques, 
the guerrillas had the population’s sympathy, and the region’s mountainous 
terrain afforded good cover. The plan was straightforward: overpower the 
military barracks, expropriate the local bank’s funds, and issue a radio proc-
lamation publicizing their revolutionary princi ples. Their success would mo-
tivate groups throughout the region to take similar actions.128
Confident they could overtake a military installation that, by their esti-
mations,  housed two dozen soldiers, the guerrillas expected losses but not 
the carnage they suffered. What is startling about their attack is not the plan 
itself but the refusal to call it off when key components fell apart: two of the 
three armed contingents did not make it to Madera by the agreed- upon date. 
One was lost in the sierra, and the other, which had the military materiel 
(obtained during the previous attack in the Mineral de Dolores), could not 
traverse the raging rivers left by days of heavy rain. The Madera barracks, 
moreover,  housed not the two dozen soldiers the group had calculated but 
over a hundred, prompting Gómez and a few  others to propose postponing 
the attack. But Gámiz remained adamant, and his view prevailed.129
Predictably, the thirteen guerrilla members  were no match for the sol-
diers, whose rain of bullets killed eight of the attackers, including Gámiz and 
Gómez. Five soldiers reportedly died. Five of the guerrilla attackers managed 
to escape.130 That they  were not captured by the heavy military detachment 
ordered to comb the sierra bespeaks the support participants had among the 
local population, one cultivated by members of the group but also resulting 
from the population’s resentment against the authorities’ long- standing ha-
rassment and brutal counterinsurgency campaign, which included hanging 
 people from he li cop ters and dangling them along the jutting rocks.131
While the core of the gpg was eliminated, this hardly represented the 
end of guerrilla strug gle in Chihuahua, much less in Mexico. An armed 
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clandestine organ ization calling itself the Arturo Gámiz Popu lar Guerrilla 
Group continued to operate in the Sierra Tarahumara. Indeed, Mexico’s 
Cold War guerrillas  were nourished by a tradition of rural insurrection that 
had emerged almost immediately  after Cárdenas left office.132 In addition to 
the previous agrarista component, students, teachers, and gradu ates from 
Mexico’s rural normales helped fuel the socialist ideals of the 1960s radical left.
 “WE  WERE ALL  THERE”
At the time of the attack, Pablo Gómez’s  daughter, Alma, was fifteen years 
old and a third- year student at the rural normal of Saucillo. Alma’s cousin 
brought her the news of her  father’s death. “In that moment I  didn’t feel 
anything— obviously confusion,” she related, “but I  didn’t have a reaction.” 
 After talking to her cousin, Alma made her way back to the dorms, where 
she passed a group of “compañeras that had participated in the campesino 
marches and adored my  father. They also protected and took care of me. . . . 
I must have had a tormented expression  because they asked me, ‘Alma, what 
happened?’ ‘They killed my  father,’ I answered. That’s when I broke down in 
tears.”133
Of the eight participants who died in the attack, only Gómez, Alma’s  father, 
was over twenty- five. He was also the only one married with  children— five of 
them. “So every one is awed,” pointed out his  daughter, “that a man with kids 
made a decision like that. All the  others  were young and single. To make that 
kind of a decision is a very impor tant act. . . .  But I believe that a key  factor 
in this difficult choice was his compañera [partner/wife], a  woman who was 
a rebel, a leftist, intelligent, daring. He knew he was not simply abandoning 
us to a difficult situation. It is obviously not easy to bring up five kids, but 
he  wasn’t leaving us in total misery. He knew that my  mother would see us 
through. And she did.”134
Alma’s point is more than a personal vindication of her  mother. Her state-
ment concerns the broader mobilization that produced the now- mythical 
Madera attacks.  Women’s participation in  those mobilizations— which 
intelligence agents had noted with alarm, state authorities had disparaged 
with misogyny, and ugocm leaders had minimized with paternalism— 
was central. “We  were all  there,” stated Alma. “Yes, while we  didn’t go [to 
Madera], the assault was a pro cess in which campesina  women, students 
from the normales, we all participated. It was not just a man’s fight.”135 In-
deed, had it not been for guerrilla members’ views that  women needed to be 
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protected rather than treated as fighters in their own right, some normalistas 
from Saucillo might have joined the attack itself.136
The teacher- campesino contingent that attacked Madera did not propel 
the revolution forward, but it did puncture the narrative that armed groups 
did not exist in Mexico. Threatened by the broader strug gle that produced 
them, the authorities would not forgive such a bold transgression. Gover-
nor Giner issued explicit  orders preventing  family members from retrieving 
their loved ones’ bodies. Instead,  after the mangled, bullet- ridden corpses 
had been paraded around Madera, the governor had them thrown in a mass 
grave. In a play on the word tierra, which in Spanish means both “land” and 
“dirt,” Giner declared, “They wanted tierra, give it to them  until  they’ve had 
their fill.”137 While publicly dismissing the guerrilla attack as the work of a 
small group of agitators, the federal and state authorities responded with 
a massive show of force. Governor Giner characterized the action as insig-
nificant, “a crazy adventure at the  orders of Pablo Gómez.” He was,  after all, 
continued the governor, “a poisoner of the minds of inexperienced youth.”138
Just two weeks  after the attacks, government agents reported the arrival 
in Chihuahua of rural normalistas from vari ous parts of country.139 For nor-
malistas who knew the participants and had strug gled alongside them in 
marches, demonstrations, and land takeovers, and for the teachers who pro-
vided the under ground infrastructure that sustained the small cadre, Madera 
was to be celebrated. Within days of the attacks, normalistas issued pam-
phlets, visited the graves, and mobilized local support. One manifesto issued 
by the rural normales of Chihuahua praised the rebels who had placed them-
selves “at the ser vice of the  humble and oppressed class and whose bodies had 
been destroyed, riddled, and thrown in a common grave like animals.” As 
state and federal authorities sought to contain news of the attack, normalis-
tas publicized the event, deposited wreaths at the guerrillas’ mass grave, and 
issued declarations urging “the continuation of the revolutionary movement 
begun in Madera.”140
The local population’s reaction was more mea sured, with many res-
idents hesitant to celebrate the event. One demonstration planned by the 
fecsm had to be canceled  because teachers— gradu ates of the state’s normal 
school— opposed it, fearing it could turn the  people of Chihuahua against 
them.141 At a town council meeting in Madera, participants expressed varying 
views on the attack. Taking note of such divisions, the municipal president 
planned to issue a statement reading in part, “The inhabitants of Madera are 
lovers of peace and work and had nothing to do with guerrilla movements 
nor with the planned visit to the grave of  those who fell on September 23rd.” 
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Nonetheless, noted the government spy reporting on this meeting, the ma-
jority sympathized with the slain guerrillas, “a consequence of the grave 
abuses and arbitrary harassment the military dispatch committed against the 
inhabitants of the sierra’s hamlets and in the town of Madera itself.”142 Other 
reports also noted this abuse, describing how, in its investigation, the army 
mistreated, humiliated, and taunted the local population. In fact,  because 
of the vulgar manner in which the military inspected trains, conductors re-
fused to lend their ser vices in Madera. Aware of such abuses, the military 
general in charge considered them “la men ta ble but necessary” in the efforts 
to locate the escaped guerrillas.143
A year  later, state authorities remained intolerant of public commemo-
rations of Madera, detaining normalistas from Saucillo for handing out fly-
ers.144 Aguirre, the Salaices gradu ate who had declined Quiñónez’s invitation to 
participate in the attack, remembers the enduring climate of fear. Even though 
he disagreed with the guerrilla actions, he wanted to pay homage to the 
fallen participants. Traveling throughout Chihuahua as the teachers’  union 
representative, he recalled the anxiety he encountered. “Everywhere I’d go, 
I’d find a  great deal of fear. Anything having to do with organ izing had to be 
done clandestinely. Flyers  were made clandestinely and handed out quietly. 
The fear lasted a long time, especially in Madera. The first time I went  there, 
I held a meeting with the teachers of the  whole region.  There  were about 
150 teachers. . . .  As soon as I gave my pre sen ta tion, I honored the fallen 
compañeros. I remember that as we  were leaving the meeting, the teachers 
tried desperately to hide me. ‘ They’re  going to kill you.’ They did not kill me; 
nothing happened. But that’s how much panic  there was.”145
that rural normalistas drew such inspiration from the Madera at-
tacks is one of the many manifestations of the radical student culture brew-
ing within their walls. But it was also part of a more general student tendency 
that marked the global 1960s, a de cade on which youth protest left a lasting 
imprint. What normalista actions show is how this student protest took 
shape outside Mexico City. At rural normales, where the campesino world 
was ever pre sent through familial ties, agricultural pedagogy, and teacher 
commitment and was a constituting ele ment of the fecsm’s ideology, agrar-
ian movements had a power ful resonance. Indeed, the revolution’s campes-
ino strug gle had produced  these institutions, and it was a strug gle many nor-
malistas sought to further. To the campesino consciousness that permeated 
the schools, the 1960s added an international repertoire of strug gle inspired 
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by the Cuban Revolution, the worldwide student movements, and the de-
colonization strug gles. In this context, rural normalistas would increasingly 
posit their vanguard role. As one 1966 fecsm proclamation put it, “It is up 
to us, the youth, especially the campesino youth educated in the glorious 
rural normales, to bring about the fourth stage of our history: socialism, to 
achieve a nation that has fewer poor  people and fewer rich  people. This is 
how we, the students of the rural normales, think—we who come from the 
countryside and observe the infinite injustices committed against our class 
 brothers and our very families.”146
As the de cade wore on, the country’s rural normales would come to  house 
power ful ele ments of old- and new- left politics. The economic rights that 
Cardenismo had extended to the poor during the 1930s increasingly com-
ingled with youths’ awareness of themselves as po liti cal actors and the idea 
that a revolution could be made through deliberate and willful action in 
which students played a vanguard role. This combination— along with the 
hardening of the federal government— continued to pave the way for radical 
strug gle. Far from an anomaly, the Madera attack inaugurated two de cades 
of guerrilla movements that in other parts of the country would likewise be 
linked to rural normales.
on march 18, 1965, the director of normal education, Alfonso Sierra Par-
tida, held a meeting with teachers and staff from Palmira, Morelos, an all- 
women rural normal. At the meeting, convened in the offices of the National 
Union of Education Workers (snte), the state- allied teachers’  union, Sierra 
Partida discussed strategies to address the most recent unrest at the school. 
Palmira students had accused the director and four other teachers of cor-
rupt practices, drunken be hav ior, and sexual impropriety. Having stoned the 
principal’s home and held a demonstration in the state capital, Cuernavaca, 
Palmira students vowed to continue mobilizing  until the offending teachers 
and director  were dismissed. This protest came in the midst of a nationwide 
conflict between Mexico’s twenty- nine rural normales and the Ministry of 
Public Education (sep). In February the Mexican Federation of Socialist 
Campesino Students (fecsm), the normalistas’ student federation, had is-
sued a petition soliciting, among other  things, improved school infrastruc-
ture and teaching personnel, a rise in per- student funding, and an increase 
in the admission age. With the fecsm threatening a strike if  these demands 
 were not met, Sierra Partida showed frustration at the new dimension the 
Palmira conflict introduced. In need of drastic mea sures to confront what 
the sep considered “focal points of agitation,” Sierra Partida sought the 
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official  union’s collaboration to close or restructure  these schools. The general 
secretary of the snte’s state branch agreed, characterizing rural normalistas 
as subversives and an affront to President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70).1
With specific attention to students’ lived experience, this chapter tele-
scopes outward from the previous focus on Chihuahua to examine rural 
normalistas’ politicization during the 1960s. As their twenty- nine schools 
languished in precarious material conditions, normalistas ever more vocally 
demanded resources from the sep. Their organ izing pro cess fostered expan-
sive notions of democracy that combined po liti cal and economic rights. 
While their boarding schools nominally met their basic needs, the precarity 
of the system itself led students to a constant confrontation with the state, 
most often in the form of school strikes. During  these mobilizations for bet-
ter food, decent shelter, appropriate learning infrastructure, and protection 
from abusive teachers, students both honed their organ izing skills and tasted 
the freedom of upending hierarchies. Despite the specific constraints female 
normalistas faced, rural normales  were sources of newfound freedom for 
them especially. While they faced stricter vigilance from school authorities 
and their mobilizations  were often structured through a gendered division 
of  labor, such patriarchal limitations  were counterbalanced by the initiative 
 women developed in their collective defiance. Access to a teaching  career, 
moreover, gave them the economic stability that allowed them to make long- 
term choices with a degree of individual freedom lacking for  those who  were 
eco nom ically dependent.
Still, unlike other student sectors, who, as scholars have argued, represented 
harbingers of modernity, rural normalistas mobilized with an eye to the ful-
fillment of past proj ects and came of age within an institutional framework 
structured by the princi ples of the old left.2 The fecsm operated through a 
hierarchical structure, the logic of class strug gle, and the primacy of the group 
over the individual. Cardenismo constituted the most consistent reference, the 
Communist Party was a close ally, and democracy was conceived as access to 
public goods rather than po liti cal freedom. The fecsm, moreover, subsumed 
gender and ethnicity within the logic of class strug gle. But the analytical 
tools afforded by Marxism, the organ izing pro cess needed to pull off a school 
strike, and the interaction normalistas had— before, during, and  after their 
studies— with popu lar sectors awakened many to the way racism, sexism, 
and the education system itself structured their subjugation.
Like most poor youth, rural normalistas grew up fast.  Doing so far from 
their families, in institutions that assigned them a leadership role in the na-
tional proj ect, and amid a peer group whose orga nizational body emphasized 
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the collective, contributed to an “understanding of themselves as po liti cally 
consequential individuals,” a tendency Greg Grandin identified throughout 
Latin Amer i ca where institutions of the old left afforded the dispossessed a 
chance to have a say in their destiny.3 For rural normalistas, who during the 
turbulent de cade of the 1960s continued to populate the barricades, this dy-
namic played out in a militant culture whose emphasis on economic rights 
distilled other forms of consciousness, including race and gender.
 “I WENT  THERE  BECAUSE I HAD NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE”
When asked if he enjoyed his time at the normal, Ramiro Arciga, who first 
studied in Tiripetío, Michoacán, and  later transferred to Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, 
replied, “I’ll be honest, it is an extreme situation. I went  there  because I had no 
other alternative.” To study engineering, which is what he  really wanted, “cost 
money, and I was an orphan with no support. My studies would have ended 
in ju nior high school, so I had to accept a  career in teaching. It’s harder when 
one  doesn’t have that calling. But as time passed, the interaction with my com-
pañeros, living together, and working in groups with compañeros who had 
certain similar ideals gave me a path. It helped me. . . .  We even or ga nized 
field trips; the biggest one at Ayotzinapa was for  those who graduated, and I 
had the opportunity to go to Isla Mujeres. It was the first time I traveled by 
boat, from Puerto Juárez to Isla Mujeres.”4 Arciga, whose statement invokes 
his professional aspirations, po liti cal organ izing alongside his peers, and the 
personal awe he experienced through travel, is a telling example of how rural 
normales fused insurgent individuality and social solidarity, intensely po liti-
cal experiences that harmonized self- interest and the common good.5 Like 
Arciga, most other normalistas recount an early life of poverty; a challenging 
exam in which hundreds of applicants competed for a few dozen spots; the 
joy of securing a scholarship that entitled them to room, board, and a mod-
est stipend; and the won der of living among a peer group that, while simi-
lar in socioeconomic background, brought a diversity of  family, ethnic, and 
geographic experiences. But despite the nostalgia that tinges most accounts, 
normalistas also relate the difficulties of adjusting to life away from home. “I 
must say, for  those first few days,  there  were moments in which I temporarily 
hated my  mother [for sending me  there],” stated César Navarro about his 
early days at the rural normal of San Marcos, Zacatecas.6  Others cried most 
nights during the first month; their relative material security compared to 
their home life—an individual bed, three meals a day, a new set of clothes— 
could not make up for the separation from their families (map 6.1).
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Map 6.1  Rural Normales, 1968–1969
 School Official Name
1 Aguilera, Durango J. Guadalupe Aguilera
2 Atequiza, Jalisco Miguel Hidalgo
3 Ayotzinapa, Guerrero Prof. Raúl Isidro Burgos
4 Cañada Honda,  Justo Sierra Méndez 
   Aguascalientes
5 Champusco, Puebla Emiliano Zapata
6 Galeana, Nuevo León Gral. Mariano Escobedo
7 Hecelchakán,  Justo Sierra Méndez 
  Campeche
8 La Huerta, Michoacán Miguel Ángel de Quevedo
9 Mactumactzá, Chiapas Pantaleón Domínguez
10 El Mexe, Hidalgo Luis Villarreal
11 Palmira, Morelos Gral. Lázaro Cárdenas
12 Panotla, Tlaxcala Lic. Benito Juárez
13 Perote, Veracruz Gral. Enrique Rodríguez  
   Cano
 School Official Name
14 El Quinto, Sonora Plutarco Elias Calles
15 Reyes Mantecón, Oaxaca Moisés Sáenz
16 Roque, Guanajuato Lic. Gabriel Ramos Millán
17 Salaices, Chihuahua Abraham González
18 San Diego Tekax, Yucatán Gregorio Torres Quintero
19 San Marcos, Zacatecas General Matías Ramos
20 Santa Teresa, Coahuila Prof. Rafael Ramírez
21 Saucillo, Chihuahua Ricardo Flores Magón
22 Tamatán, Tamaulipas Lauro Aguirre
23 Tamazulapan, Oaxaca Vanguardia
24 Tenería, Mexico State Lázaro Cárdenas
25 Teteles, Puebla Carmen Serdán
26 Tiripetío, Michoacán Vasco de Quiroga
27 Xalisco, Nayarit Emiliano Zapata
28 Xocuyucan, Tlaxcala Lázaro Cárdenas
29 Zaragoza, Puebla Basilio Vadillo
Source: “Escuelas Normales Rurales,” February 20, 1968, Archivo General de la Nación, Dirección 
Federal de Seguridad 63-19, Leg.3, h75–76.
Note: This map should be taken with a degree of caution since most documentation contains errors 
or inconsistencies.
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But this physical separation also contributed to the intensity of their 
bonds with peers and the development and reproduction of a politicized cul-
ture. At rural normales, students operated  under a two- tiered set of norms 
and regulations, one set by the sep and overseen by the school’s administra-
tion, staff, and teachers and the second directed by the student governing 
council. The latter’s power, through both its say in institutional norms and its 
ability to or ga nize student collective action, often rivaled that of school au-
thorities. As one student put it, “In Reyes Mantecón attending the po liti cal 
orientation classes was more obligatory than the academic ones. The internal 
sanctions among us  were harsher.”7
Normalistas also had deliberate initiation rituals known as novata-
das, whose logic signaled a break with the past, an integration into the 
institution, and an allegiance to the collective student body. Most com-
mon at male normales was shaving incoming students’ heads and assigning 
them nicknames. Other activities included sweeping and mopping the halls, 
cleaning bathrooms, or performing specific tasks for older students. Many 
involved pranks such as locking entire groups in the basements “ because 
 they’d say we  were ugly and our presence would scare  people,” recounted 
one student from La Huerta, Michoacán.8 Proceso Díaz, from El Mexe, re-
membered how “ they’d throw us into the canal, which had sewer  water,” a 
tradition that made him cry.9 Such practices seem to have been exclusive to 
male normales and are thus noteworthy as a public display of masculinity.10 
In  these rituals, older students could demonstrate their power and leader-
ship, while the younger cohort’s ability to withstand the humiliation indi-
cated their strength and resilience, qualities necessary to navigate life in the 
normales and in the poverty- stricken communities where they would teach 
 after graduation.
De cades  later, former normalistas reflected on such practices in diff er ent 
ways. For some, they represented harmless youthful pranks;  others remem-
bered the glee when it was their turn to shave the heads of incoming class 
members; for a few students, they sat uncomfortably as a form of bullying.11 
 Others emphasized that normalista novatadas  were mild compared to  those 
practiced at Mexico City’s National Polytechnic Institute, the National Au-
tonomous University of Mexico, or their American football teams, where, 
as Jaime Pensado has described, students held yearly parades on the streets 
of Mexico City that “featured humiliating and ridicu lous displays, such as 
shaving of young novatos’ heads in public, forcing them to dress in diapers 
or other outlandish outfits, making them crawl like animals, or forcing them 
to  ride a tricycle sucking a pacifier or drinking from a gigantic baby  bottle.”12
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In contrast to the novatadas or the difficulty youngsters had in adjusting 
to a new environment, many speak of how older students provided protec-
tion and comfort. Proceso Díaz, who above recounted his painful memories 
of being pushed into El Mexe’s  water canal, said he soon found someone 
from his hometown to shield him from student pranks, to which the incom-
ing class was especially vulnerable. Likewise, Aristarco Aquino Solís from 
Reyes Mantecón, Oaxaca, remembered, “Fellow students at the normal who 
 were from my same community shielded me from the traditional actions that 
students did to the new ones, to the pelones [ those with shaved heads].  They’d 
protect me.”13 Older students also afforded comfort and affection, often act-
ing as a surrogate  family. Herminia Gómez Carrasco, from Saucillo, for ex-
ample, described it thus: “ There was a way in which the students from the 
higher grades would adopt and teach us. . . .  I was placed on the committee 
in charge of food. ‘Why me?’ They said I was too skinny, and they wanted 
to see if that would help me gain weight.”14 When asked if  there  were no-
vatadas at  women’s normales, students— male and female— responded with 
an emphatic no. On the contrary,  women emphasized how affectionate and 
protective their older peers  were. “It was an environment of total sisterhood,” 
responded Elsa Guzmán; “it never would have crossed our minds to engage 
in such practices.”15 More than notions of sisterhood— the counterpart of 
which also existed at male normales— traditional gender norms mitigated 
such rituals at  women’s schools. Indeed, shaving female students’ heads was 
unthinkable largely  because it challenged traditional notions of feminin-
ity. “It’s not like the compañeras  were  going to act like the allied forces 
did when they liberated France,” stated a normalista from San Marcos, 
alluding to the practice by which crowds publicly shaved the heads of sus-
pected female Nazi collaborators— often  because they had born  children 
of German soldiers.16
With both its conflict and its camaraderie, group living offered the time 
and space to fortify collective bonds. In fact, some youngsters secured a spot 
in the rural normales thanks to support from older students. As Isidro Ro-
dríguez from the rural normal of La Huerta, Michoacán, remembered,
I took the exam but did not score high enough to get a scholarship.  There 
 were so many who took the test, and so few who gained entrance. . . .  We 
did not have a right to food, dorms, or classes. But we could stay thanks 
to the aid of some friends who had scholarships, who supported us, who 
helped us find a  little space in the dorms. Sometimes we’d sneak into the 
cafeteria and  there  wasn’t a prob lem, but other times they  were closely 
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guarded and we  couldn’t get in. So our friends would sneak us out a bread 
roll with beans, a piece of meat, a  little cup of milk or coffee.17
Augusto Carrasco Orozco, who also arrived at Reyes Mantecón in Oaxaca 
thanks to this arrangement, stated, “ They’d call us pups; we  were the pups of 
 those in the fifth or sixth year at the normal, they  were the ones who’d protect 
us.” But such arrangements made for a precarious existence. “ There  were some 
sad moments,” continued Carrasco, “ because sometimes you  were about to eat 
breakfast— you’d be  there like any student who did have a scholarship— and 
all of a sudden a teacher would show up and take your food portion away.”18 
 These students faced a similar situation in the classroom. As Rodríguez re-
called, “Some teachers would make us leave class;  others  were more flexible 
and would let us stay. And so we’d strug gle. I fought alongside ten of my 
peers for six months  until we got the news that we could be regular students 
and have a scholarship. We still had to pass the exams. If we did, we could 
stay; other wise, we’d have to leave.”19 For such students, the experience of 
collective strug gle began even before they formally enrolled in the normal.
If the transition to their boarding schools was difficult for most youngsters, 
it was doubly so for  those from indigenous communities. Aristarco Aquino 
Solís, an indigenous Zapotec from Yalalag, Oaxaca, who arrived at Reyes 
Mantecón in 1967, stated, “It was a shock, first  because life in a boarding 
school is not easy. Second,  because of my  limited knowledge of Spanish. . . . 
I got  there without  really knowing that I would have to abandon my way of 
dress. I still wore sandals.”20 In a similar vein, Carrasco, who attended the 
same normal in the 1960s, stated, “About 60  percent of us  were indigenous 
and openly spoke Mixteco or Zapoteco— those  were the predominant eth-
nicities. Our prob lem was not speaking Spanish, and even among ourselves 
we’d make fun of one another. . . .  And  those 30 or 40  percent who did not 
speak an indigenous language and spoke Spanish would reprimand or insult 
us about speaking our own language. ‘Speak Christian’ [a colonial way of 
referring to Spanish],  they’d tell us. ‘Speak the correct way!’ ”21 While such 
an acculturation pro cess was painful, indigenous students  were also aware 
that learning Spanish could be a tool of empowerment. As Aquino himself 
explained in detail:
An aspiration of both teachers and our parents was that we learn Spanish . . . 
not just Spanish but good Spanish.  Because they knew, or they intuited, 
that it was a resource against what the pri [the Institutional Revolution-
ary Party] did to us. When we  were adolescents, we’d feel powerless as we 
heard of, saw, or got wind of the humiliation of  those who fought against 
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injustice, against impositions from the capital and for our  people’s right 
to decide through assembly and through consensus. All this made us rest-
less and started opening our eyes. I say this  because to confront  those who 
are in charge, who impose every thing, you must know Spanish; other-
wise, you’ll be at a disadvantage. The other side of this was that we  didn’t 
take sufficient care to preserve the Zapoteco language.22
From the outset, Mexico’s education proj ect had been a state effort to forge a 
mestizo nation. Indigenous languages, dress, and practices  were to be abandoned 
or subsumed within a campesino class identity. However, rather than supplant-
ing indigenous culture and history, at rural normales being campesino— ever 
expansive as a category— meant many  things, including being indigenous, despite 
a curriculum, student culture, and general framework that reinforced the 
logic of mestizaje. Many indigenous normalistas who in the 1960s studied 
in the rural normales of Oaxaca and Chiapas went on to become prominent 
members in the 1970s movement for  union in de pen dence and demo cratic 
repre sen ta tion. In the de cades to come, they would increasingly demand a 
curriculum based on indigenous language, culture, and practice.23 Without 
forgetting the discriminatory practices of their teachers and peers, indigenous 
students cited the po liti cal awakening they experienced at rural normales, a 
basis for how they  later understood exploitation of indigenous  people— and 
re sis tance to it. For this they credit the fecsm.
 “THAT’S WHERE I FIRST HEARD  
THE SECOND DECLARATION OF HAVANA”
“One of the first activities that caught my attention,” related Aristarco 
Aquino Solís, “was when [older students] gathered us to tell us we’d initially 
be attending weekly talks on po liti cal and ideological orientation. That’s 
where we learned of the existence of the fecsm, about the rationale for par-
ticipating in their strug gle.”24 The fecsm had long assumed the responsi-
bility for strengthening student power as a way of shielding rural normales 
from policies that chipped away at the revolutionary gains. By the 1960s, 
fecsm committees constituted a mainstay of the rural normal system with 
a power ful hold on school life. Student associations, which in each school 
 were affiliated with the fecsm, prioritized po liti cal education, had a say in 
institutional  matters, and consistently promoted involvement with popu lar 
strug gles outside campus walls. In their meetings and initiation activities, the 
fecsm exposed students— most arriving when they  were barely adolescents—
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to a politicized world before they understood the meaning of po liti cal in-
volvement. Students as young as eleven piled into crowded cafeterias that 
doubled as assembly halls.  There “we’d discuss anything from trivial  matters 
related to daily life in the dorms, to the advances of international socialism, 
to the growing development of proletarian class consciousness in the world 
and the country,” detailed a student from the rural normal of Mactumac-
tzá, Chiapas.25 It was at  these assemblies that many students first heard of 
revolutionary teachers like Arturo Gámiz, Pablo Gómez, Genaro Vázquez, 
or Lucio Cabañas, who would become icons of rural normalismo. As one 
student recounted, “I was too young to be interested in politics. But at the 
assemblies I’d see  others debating, reading letters from Lucio Cabañas— 
Cabañas would send us letters when we had mobilizations, encouraging us 
[in the strug gle].”26 Aside from their missives,  these figures often made per-
sonal appearances, thus serving as an early marker in the pro cess of po liti cal 
awakening. As César Navarro stated, “Having met Arturo [Gámiz] and then 
hearing that he’d died in such an incredible, astonishing act [in Madera], 
then hearing about Lucio and his strug gle with other compañeros, it makes 
you ask, ‘What is happening  here?’ ” International events also provided early 
po liti cal signposts. Continued Navarro, “I remember that one of the agenda 
items was to play a rec ord; . . .  that’s where I first heard the Second Declara-
tion of Havana. I assure you, I did not understand a  thing! I was too young.” 
But students trea sured that rec ord, stated Navarro, who felt proud when his 
turn came to guard it.27
As venues where students took charge, made plans, and had a voice, the 
student- organized assemblies  were as significant as the content of their 
discussion.  After impassioned speeches and contentious debates, normalis-
tas voted on resolutions involving school strikes or solidarity with mobilized 
popu lar sectors or discussed motions to redress  matters related to staff, teach-
ers, or school administrators. On a practical level, too, it “was a formative 
pro cess.  After five or six years attending such assemblies,  you’re bound to 
pick up something, even how to or ga nize a meeting, how to put an agenda 
together, how to come to an agreement. We would vote and then end by sing-
ing the federation’s anthem, the anthem of the International Student Union, 
whose headquarters  were in Prague, and we would always close with ‘The 
Internationale.’ ”28 For many, this experience was remarkable and evoked 
collective pro cesses in their home communities. “ Until then,” described 
one student, “I had never witnessed, much less participated in, the type 
of a situation my  family, as campesinos, and my  father, as an ejidatario, had 
lived.”29 The practice fed an impor tant dialectic that provided an opportunity 
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for  individual expression but could be articulated only through collective 
action. Like the ejido that the revolution bequeathed to campesinos, stu-
dents came to understand rural normales as a  matter of justice encompass-
ing collective rights and responsibilities.
Not all, of course,  were interested in politics.  Those who  were not re-
membered sports, cultural events, or recreational activities as their primary 
pastime. Belén Cuevas, who studied at Saucillo, Chihuahua, for example, 
explained that she “was never  really aware of politics. . . .  I was sociable. I was 
always on the social events or recreational committee, organ izing tributes 
to the flag.” Pedro Martínez Noriega, from Reyes Mantecón, Oaxaca, like-
wise stated, “I was never passionate [about politics]. I never seriously got 
involved. . . .  We  were fourteen or fifteen, so at that age some of us  were indif-
ferent to marches or philosophical theories.” And yet in the next breath both 
normalistas invoked the politicized environment around them. Continued 
Martínez, “We  were drawn to Castro Ruz and ‘Che’ Guevara,  because they 
 were our idols of the time.  There  wasn’t much about China, . . .  but Cuba and 
Rus sia  were our inspiration.” Cuevas, for her part, remembered, “In  those 
times we  were filled with the ideas of Fidel Castro, which we would hear very 
clandestinely; . . .  sometimes on one of our teachers’ radios, we would listen 
to Radio Havana. So we  were filled with socialist ideas of protest.”30 Such ac-
counts speak to the broader culture of rural normales, an indication not that 
 every student was politicized but that all  were exposed to an environment in 
which socialism, however vague, was a pervasive reference point.
Still  there  were doubtless students who, by surreptitious means, under-
mined collective organ izing. A good portion of the information in gov-
ernment intelligence reports likely came from student in for mants. And, by 
normalistas’ own accounts,  there  were plenty of cynics and opportunists. 
“Radical demagogues,” one gradu ate from Salaices termed them, “ those who 
advocated armed revolution from within our school as if we as youngsters 
had the logistics or the military discipline to carry that out.  Those  were 
the ones who ended up selling themselves out completely. They are  today the 
worst persecutors of teachers, the most charro leaders.”31 Indeed, normalis-
tas commented that student leaders  were especially attractive as targets of 
co- optation by  those in power as their organ izing skills could be useful to 
the pri. At a more general level, another student put it as follows: “ There is 
plenty of talk about students who  were socialists, but once they participated 
in civic life, they became conservative and even reactionary. Of that type 
 there are plenty of examples throughout history, not just in this country, in 
any country.”32
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Students thus engaged with the fecsm to varying degrees. But all  were 
exposed to it, and all had to reckon with the hold it had on school life. Even 
for  those students antithetical to po liti cal activity, collective action was the 
surest way to preserve their spot, gradu ate, and secure a teaching position. 
Peer pressure, too, operated as a motivating force during strikes. Some teach-
ers “tried to draw us back to class, and it was up to you if you went. But no one 
did  because they did not want to be singled out as betraying the movement,” 
recalled a student from Atequiza, Jalisco.33 Or, as another student put it, “Some 
[participated] out of tradition rather than conviction.”34  Those not interested 
in po liti cal strug gle thus made calculated choices. “We participated in what 
we had to,” stated Catalina Calderón. “I was involved but only within the 
school, in the roles I had to assume. But nothing outside campus. . . .  I liked 
to read, to do my homework and prepare for class. That was my focus.”35
That the fecsm concerned itself as much with broad po liti cal ideals such 
as socialism and anti- imperialism as it did with school maintenance, food 
rations, and enrollments naturalized its existence for students who may 
not have other wise been drawn to po liti cal strug gle. Unlike in any other 
educational institution in Mexico, the fecsm held a power ful hold on 
institutional life. It ran parallel educational activities in the form of po liti cal 
organ izing, enforced a disciplinary comportment in accordance with collec-
tive action, and tied both pro cesses to the betterment of the rural normal 
system. “Democracy, as a critical, personal judgment, was not in and of it-
self a goal at our normal,” synthesized one student. “We dispensed with such 
simplistic and basic notions. . . .  Self- governance was the demo cratic means 
to participate; the end goal was to improve ourselves by improving our 
school.”36 Improving their school usually meant mobilizing, since, as Alma 
Gómez put it, “ Unless we or ga nized a strike, our petitions would never be 
addressed.”37 Indeed, the fecsm’s petitions— always ambitious— met with 
piecemeal concessions. And even the few concessions the sep did make  were 
often implemented only  after student strikes. The survival of the rural nor-
mal system thus became premised on student actions, a dynamic that helps 
explain the fecsm’s enduring centrality.
 “TALKS THAT WENT NOWHERE”
If the fecsm’s po liti cal assemblies provided normalistas’ ideological educa-
tion, strikes imbued them with practical experience in collective action. And 
rural normalistas went on strike almost continuously during the turbulent 
1960s, a necessity, as they saw it, against a regime that had condemned their 
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schools to a slow death. The government, the fecsm pointed out, devoted 
more money to food rations for military  horses than to normalistas.38 In-
deed, as the dramatic events of 1968 unfolded in the country’s capital, the 
fecsm was in the midst of negotiating a long list of demands with the sep. 
For some, this dynamic constitutes evidence of their narrowly material con-
cerns compared to Mexico City’s university students, who put forth po liti cal 
grievances.39 And yet the framework rural normalistas employed, rooted in 
the poor’s right to an education, was grounded in expansive notions of de-
mocracy where po liti cal and economic rights went hand in hand. The strikes, 
in turn, helped forge a culture of militancy  because, in their fight, students 
transgressed institutional norms to fashion the necessary building blocks of 
strug gle. They created cross- campus alliances, appealed to surrounding com-
munities for support, used their stipends to sustain the movement, and held 
an ideological vision that linked student grievances to  those of campesinos. 
In  these practices the state saw anarchy and selected ele ments of student 
organ izing strategies to malign the rural normales, constructing a narrative it 
would  later invoke to justify their closing.
The length of fecsm petitions from the 1960s— with demands that rep-
licated points made a de cade and a half  earlier— reveals the degree to which 
students  were the primary advocates for their own education. Aside from 
increases in students’ food, medicine, stipends, and uniform allocation, 
normalistas sought infrastructural repairs for  water and electricity in some 
schools and the construction of dorms, cafeterias, classrooms, and sports 
facilities in  others. The fecsm also petitioned for laboratories, workshops, 
library books, movie projectors, and musical instruments— the tools to de-
velop the basic skills the sep demanded of them as teachers. In a similar 
fashion, students sought trucks for their agricultural work, transportation to 
their practicums, funds for community festivals, and typing and stenography 
courses to better complete their culminating proj ects, such as  theses and field 
reports, or to elaborate didactic material.40
Normalistas also made staffing and administrative demands. Some simply 
sought teachers for required subjects.  Others, however, aimed specifically 
at diminishing corruption and, partly to that end, sought a greater student 
role in institutional governance. The fecsm’s 1963 petition, for example, 
requested personnel to oversee food distribution and mitigate administra-
tors’ tendencies to siphon off supplies.41 To preserve the integrity of the 
admissions pro cess, prevent the sale of enrollment spots, and ensure their 
schools remained “strictly for working- class and campesino families,” in 
1965 the fecsm demanded a student presence in the committee that graded 
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entrance exams. It also critiqued the exam itself, stating that it mea sured in-
telligence based on theory rather than knowledge, a quality that privileged 
urban applicants.42  Because the countryside’s students usually started ele-
mentary school at a  later age than their urban counter parts and took longer 
to finish, the federation called for an increase in the age limit for admission 
(set at fifteen years for  those starting secundaria and nineteen for the pro-
fessional course cycle). As they stood, argued the federation, the age limits 
made it especially difficult for indigenous students to qualify given the pov-
erty,  family  labor needs, and lack of schools in their communities. This 1965 
petition also objected to the sep’s school- zone demarcations, geographic 
restrictions that  limited to which rural normales students could apply. Such 
rules, argued the fecsm, stifled the otherwise- enriching dorm life engen-
dered when it grouped students from a wide number of states.43
In the 1960s strikes, the fecsm also called for an expansion of the rural 
normal system itself. Normalistas’ 1963 petition, for example, sought three 
thousand more scholarships.44 In 1965 they demanded that in  every admis-
sions cycle, schools accept an additional 4  percent, students who would be-
come eligible for scholarships as spots opened up.45 As it was, each normal 
had between 80 and 120 students (about 30   percent of the student body) 
who lived in dorms and attended classes but had no funding. As described 
above, they stayed at the school thanks to the initiative of individual stu-
dents or to informal agreements between directors and student leaders who 
collected and contributed stipend money to sustain them.46 The status of 
 these students was a constant source of tension. When schools took too hard 
a line, as at La Huerta, where a new director expelled eighty of them, stu-
dents went on strike, appealing to other normales to join them.47
While the sep conceded  little in relation to the fecsm’s long and de-
tailed list of demands, the students’ relentless strug gle achieved some fa-
vorable arrangements. For example, the sep agreed to implement formal 
procedures by which nonfunded students could enroll. If they scored well 
enough on their final exam, they would be eligible to occupy the spots va-
cated by  those who deserted or  were expelled. But concessions  were  limited. 
In fact, this was the sep’s  counter to the fecsm’s 1963 demand for three 
thousand new spots.48 And yet, while the sep explic itly stated that this was a 
one- time arrangement, by 1965— based on renewed petitions— sep officials 
formally  adopted a policy by which rural normales accepted 4  percent more 
students than  there  were spots available.49
For the most part, however, the sep only promised to study normalista 
requests. Any mea sures it did agree to, it implemented at a snail’s pace—so 
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much so that students frequently engaged in follow-up strikes, not  because 
they had new demands, but  because the sep had failed to comply with signed 
agreements.  Little seems to have come, for example, from the fecsm’s 1963 
petition. During the latter part of the year, normalistas pressured the author-
ities through a series of rolling strikes. By 1964 they threatened actions at 
sep headquarters in Mexico City. But Sierra Partida, director of normal ed-
ucation, dissuaded them from such an escalation and convinced the leaders 
to instead pre sent a revised petition.50 The fecsm had already withdrawn its 
demand for three thousand additional scholarships, heeding Sierra Parti-
da’s assertion that such a concession would produce too many teachers and 
thus hurt their job prospects.51
The following year, on March 8, 1965, the fecsm once more presented the 
sep with a twenty- two- point list of demands, mostly a reiteration of  those 
issued in 1963. Faced again only with a promise to consider their list, on 
March 26, students in all but two of the rural normales— Tenería, Mexico 
State, and Xocoyucan, Tlaxcala— began rolling walkouts.52 Agustín Yáñez, 
head of the sep from 1964 to 1970, warned that his office would not begin 
talks  until students desisted from what he characterized as blackmail. Re-
sponding that their demands dated back to 1963, the fecsm declared they 
 were “tired of initiating talks that went nowhere” and would escalate their 
actions  until their calls received attention.53 On April 2, 1965, they began a 
general strike that stretched across the country.54
At that juncture, the fecsm’s system- wide mobilization merged with the 
local grievances at the rural normal of Palmira, where students demanded 
the removal of four teachers and the school director for drunken be hav ior 
and sexual harassment.55 The sep had created two commissions to investi-
gate the charges, both of which had cleared the faculty and director of any 
wrongdoing. The students dismissed that outcome as the foregone conclu-
sion given that the commission was headed by a pri loyalist. The parents 
association at the school also rejected the findings.56
It was not uncommon for male teachers to proposition, harass, or engage 
in relationships with female students, although this appears sparingly in 
the documentation. The fecsm’s 1965 petition, for example, demanded the 
firing of a male teacher from the  women’s normal of Atequiza, Jalisco, for 
seducing students.57 Charges at other  women’s normales dated back to the 
1950s, such as in Cañada Honda, Aguascalientes, where the head of the stu-
dent council denounced a teacher for having sexual relations with two diff er-
ent students.58 Rosalva Pantoja Guerrero, a 1950s student and  later a teacher 
at the rural normal of Tamazulapan, remembered a case of a teacher who 
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was forced to retire  after several instances of exchanging grades for sexual 
 favors. “But that was thanks to the intervention of the parents association,” 
stated Pantoja, who wished that, as students, they had protested  earlier 
and more vociferously. “It was sad, humiliating, that for a grade we’d have 
to stoop to that level. . . .  For crying out loud, [re spect] was why we came [to 
school]!”59
The case at Palmira, with which this chapter opened, was one of the few 
that produced a school- wide movement against the offending teachers. Tell-
ingly, however, the federation did not prioritize the case among its demands, 
and the sep and the snte, the pri- allied  union, closed ranks to dismiss the 
young  women’s charges. Likewise, from the outset, the sep sought to contain 
Palmira’s normalistas. Hoping to reduce the critical mass necessary to sustain 
the protest, Sierra Partida sent letters to parents instructing them to with-
draw their  daughters  until the conflict passed. The snte, in turn, ordered 
school personnel to abandon the campus. Cafeteria ser vices  were closed.60 
But Palmira students and their parents garnered support from the surround-
ing community, and local shop  owners donated supplies.61 National fecsm 
representatives as well as delegates from the National Central of Demo cratic 
Students (a communist student organ ization) traveled to Palmira and  there 
joined strategizing meetings, a move the Morelos governor condemned as 
outside interference.62 The snte was especially passionate in defending its 
accused members. It demanded their full restitution and a faculty vote of 
confidence and declared that “to avoid this type of  future disorders, the en-
tire rural normal system needed to be restructured.”63 Unabashedly, Mario 
Aguilera Dorantes, a high- ranking sep minister, declared to the Palmira stu-
dents, “I  will not take on the entirety of the country’s teachers just to punish 
the five instructors you accuse.”64
Despite the high stakes at Palmira, the case became subsumed within the 
larger system- wide normal strike. If the national strike could be addressed, 
asserted intelligence agents, the sep could quietly resolve  matters at Palmira 
by simply replacing the school director.65 Indeed, Palmira students joined the 
national mobilization that by the end of April 1965 had received some con-
cessions, the most significant of which involved changes to the admissions 
pro cess. The sep agreed to expand age limits for eligibility by eight months. 
It also accepted student participation in the admissions pro cess. Moreover, 
33  percent of admissions would be reserved for indigenous students, whose 
own communities would recruit and select them. The sep likewise affirmed 
a continued policy of accepting a 4  percent excess of applicants, who could 
occupy spots as they became available. As for material demands, the ministry 
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approved an increase in funds for food, medical attention, and transporta-
tion as well as library books and lab supplies.66
When the fecsm first presented its 1965 demand list, the sep stated that 
it would take 38 million pesos to meet it and instead countered with conces-
sions that would total 2 million.67 The fecsm accepted, much to the chagrin 
of some students who saw the decision as bowing to the ministry’s  will.68 
But even that amount was not provided. A year  later, the normalistas com-
plained that they had received barely 287,000 pesos  toward their petition.69 
When the fecsm convened in 1966 to renew its executive committee, stu-
dents again discussed a list of unmet demands.70 By 1968 they had drafted 
a new petition that included appeals made since 1963: increased funds for 
food, medicine, uniforms, pedagogical material, and library books as well as 
building repairs; an increase in the age limit for admission and the staffing 
of needed positions; and more scholarships— six hundred specifically for 
 women—to be distributed throughout the female schools or through the 
creation of a new  women’s rural normal.71
The sep issued its standard response. It agreed to a few demands, pointed to 
existing policies that addressed  others, and promised to take most of them into 
consideration. Ramón Bonfil, the new head of normal education, praised 
students’ willingness to dialogue and assured them  there would be “no need 
for combative be hav iors” since his office shared the “goal of improving con-
ditions in all the schools in the rural normal system.” Demands would be 
fulfilled if a sep commission determined  there was need and if the ministry 
could bud get the funds (figure  6.1). Bonfil also reiterated an invitation to 
fecsm representatives to accompany him as he toured the schools to iden-
tify specific needs. Unconvinced by this response, in February 1968 all but 
three of the rural normales began strikes.72
A week  later, the sep made additional concessions that addressed just 
over half of normalistas’ demands. But it also warned that “if the prob lems 
went beyond the school realm,” it would no longer be the ministry that me-
diated the conflict.73 The fecsm, still dissatisfied, further resented what 
it saw as a veiled threat. Education authorities in the meantime sought to 
bypass the fecsm leadership by appealing directly to the student body, in-
structing the school directors and state governors to convene meetings that 
would publicize the ministry’s concession. The sep also instructed local 
school authorities to issue a warning: strikes counted as absences, and too 
many would make students ineligible to take the final exam, requiring them 
to repeat the year.74 Additionally, to temper teacher support for students, the 
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sep appealed to the snte to control its members: none should aid or abet 
striking students.75
The sep, moreover, enlisted the pri- controlled National Campesino 
Confederation to publicize the ministry’s spending and portray student 
leaders as deceitful to their base. The confederation sponsored radio adver-
tisements urging normalistas to return to class and published declarations 
that the money spent on rural normales could be better utilized aiding 
peasant production.76 Students thus denounced “the press, radio, and other 
media outlets that, for a few pesos, published a false version of events to con-
fuse  people . . .  to distort our good intentions.”77 Other pri- affiliated organ-
izations also mobilized against normalistas. Most alarmingly, the Confeder-
ation of Mexican Youth (the pri’s youth branch) called for eliminating the 
country’s rural normales altogether. In the national newspaper El Universal, 
figure 6.1 Representatives from rural normal parent and student associations 
meeting with Ramón Bonfil, director of normal education, 1968. Archivo General de 
la Nación, Photographic Archive, Normales Rurales, c79, Sobre 44.
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it declared that  these schools  were foci of agitation and parasitic institutions 
with an overwhelmingly lazy student body.78 In the rural normal of Cañada 
Honda, Aguascalientes, the parents association protested the government’s 
lies that claimed normalistas had rejected a resolution meeting 80   percent 
of their demands. “Only a fool would believe that students would reject a 
victory of that nature,” pointed out school parents.79 This type of media cam-
paign was, in the end, one of the most effective tools against normalistas, 
limiting popu lar support and contributing to a perpetual black legend about 
their schools. Reactionary forces had effectively used this publicity tool 
kit since the 1930s, at the time against government reforms; now the state 
wielded it in an attempt to contain and roll back revolutionary gains.
Despite such odds, sustained normalista pressure again succeeded in 
extracting some concessions. In early March  1968, the ministry agreed to 
pending demands—an increase in food, clothing, and medical supplies. 
When the student leadership brought the sep’s offer to a system- wide vote, 
70   percent of the school delegates approved it. But the mobilization had 
taken its toll and created some internal conflict. At vari ous points during 
the approximately two- week strike, some schools had refused to participate 
(Tenería, Galeana, El Quinto, and Reyes Mantecón), while  others (Cham-
pusco, La Huerta, and Palmira) joined despite strong internal opposition. 
In Tamatán the government’s propaganda was effective, leading students to 
believe their leaders had deceived them. Fi nally, not all  were happy with the 
outcome. When voting on the sep’s third offer, Mactumactzá delegates ex-
pressed dismay that not all demands  were met. Moreover, once the fecsm 
voted to end the strike, five schools (Tekax, La Huerta, Tiripetío, Tamazu-
lapan, and Mactumactzá) refused to heed the decision, possibly jeopardiz-
ing the sep’s concessions, delegates worried. Two months  later, during the 
fecsm’s May 1968 national congress, delegates complained that the sep had 
not met the agreed- upon demands. By October  there was discussion of an-
other strike.80
 “THERE IS NO AUTHORITY TO STOP THEM”
More than their assemblies, the logistical tasks that students undertook to 
resolve quotidian  matters as they para lyzed their schools fortified a long- 
lasting, po liti cally militant normalista culture. The tactics necessary to pull 
off a strike involved local, regional, and national coordination. Since the 
authorities would end cafeteria ser vice, normalistas sought donations from 
surrounding communities.81 To finance the negotiating committee’s stay in 
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Mexico City, they pooled portions of their scholarships.82 To fortify their 
takeovers, students traveled to each other’s schools. Gómez provided a view 
from the barricades: “Our compañeros from Salaices would send reinforce-
ments [ because] we’d close access to the school. We’d stand guard at night so 
no one could enter. During my time  there  wasn’t repression, though had  there 
been, our compañeros  wouldn’t have been much use in stopping it. Still, they 
 were  there as reinforcement.”83 This accompaniment, which Gómez recog-
nized would have been futile in the face of state forces, was nonetheless more 
than symbolic. It fed strategies of collective action, instilled commonsense 
notions of re sis tance, and imbued students with the experience of challeng-
ing authority and confronting state repression.
Normalistas consistently or ga nized along gendered lines. As male students 
from Salaices reinforced the guard at the  women’s normal of Saucillo, female 
students from Palmira traveled to El Mexe and Ayotzinapa to prepare meals 
for the male student body  there.84 Despite the conservative notions such a gen-
dered division of  labor reinforced, overall the strikes created a disruption that, 
by force of circumstance, broke down other social constraints. In the words of 
one intelligence agent, “Disorder reigns in the rural normal of Palmira, only 
four days  after the strike at all the country’s rural normales began; the stu-
dents come and go as they please, and  there is no authority to stop them.”85 
The report’s alarm stemmed from the fact that not only  were Palmira’s stu-
dents moving freely on and off campus, in the absence of the school staff, but 
law students from the state university of Morelos had come to the normal to 
confer with them, creating the potential for broader alliances.86
But most troubling from the state’s point of view  were student alli-
ances with campesino groups.  These  were also the actions that most deeply 
challenged patriarchal structures. Female normalistas, whom teachers and 
staff subjected to far stricter vigilance than their male counter parts, defied 
the school authorities and in so  doing revealed the extent to which purported 
school safety mea sures  were actually about controlling young  women. As 
Belén Cuevas remembered, “The teachers followed our steps. . . .  They’d give 
us twenty minutes to go to the stores in town, to buy soap, toothpaste, what 
we needed. . . .  On Sundays we’d get a half hour; some had their boyfriends 
in town, and so we’d have to be careful not to arrive late or we’d be written 
up, and you’d have points deducted. So that’s how it was, you’d have to run 
back to your gilded cage as we used to say. Though that cage certainly  wasn’t 
gilded.”87 Another student, also from the rural normal of Saucillo, Chihua-
hua, who was expelled for her po liti cal activities, commented on the hypo-
critical nature of such control: “ There was such strict discipline, specifically 
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 because we  were girls. For example, when vacation started,  they’d send letters 
to our families to make sure we could be released. So how is it pos si ble that 
[when they expelled us] they just threw us out on the street? ‘ Here are ten 
pesos, and go who knows where with  those ten pesos!’ ”88
School authorities reported such activities to parents, often in vain.89 
One student, for example, spoke of how the school director at Saucillo sent 
her parents and  others a letter that read, “ ‘Your  daughter Herminia Gómez 
participated in a march from Parral with 120 workers from this date to that 
date.’ ” She continued, “Our parents  were furious, thinking we had gone and 
spent the night with the workers. . . .  But once we explained to them that we 
came and went and  didn’t sleep  there [in the factory], the situation calmed 
down.”90 Similarly, Silvina Rodríguez, also from Saucillo, recalled that if they 
did not receive permission to leave the school, “We’d take off anyway.” In Rodrí-
guez’s case, her  father ignored the first notice he received about his  daughter’s 
po liti cal activities. But when a second one arrived, he began to worry. “So he 
came to the normal, to the principal’s office, to talk to him. Then my  father came 
to me— I  don’t think the director had  really convinced him of anything! My 
 father was a campesino and operated  under a diff er ent logic. In his mind, what 
I was  doing was magnificent.”91 The reaction of Rodríguez’s  father was likely 
not the norm; in fact, many parents  were alarmed to learn their  daughters 
had left the school’s watchful eye. But this case exemplifies how student- 
campesino alliances could stretch traditional gender constraints. Rather 
than ordering his  daughter to remain  under the school’s guard, Rodríguez’s 
 father was heartened by her defense of their  family’s class interests.
The authorities worked the public- opinion  angle by spreading rumors of 
sexual promiscuity and asserting that older students exerted undue influence 
on younger ones.92 The types of charges differed by gender. At male schools, 
education authorities charged, dorms fomented homo sexuality as older stu-
dents seduced younger ones.93 The coexistence of “students of diff er ent ages, 
tendencies, and interests,” argued one official, “led to abuses, deviation, and 
disorder.”94 Ultimately, this would be one of the justifications for separat-
ing the ju nior high school cycle from the three years of professional train-
ing.95 The fecsm understood charges of immorality as specifically directed 
against the normales’ dorm structure and pointed to their ridicu lous nature 
by taking such accusations to their logical conclusion. If boarding schools 
 were indeed breeding grounds for immorality, unesco (the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organ ization) itself should call 
for dismantling all boarding schools, including  those in the United States, 
the Soviet Union,  England, and France.96 Army barracks should also not be 
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exempt from that logic.97 Normalistas further argued that if education au-
thorities  were genuinely concerned about student well- being, their attention 
should be directed against porros, agents provocateurs that infiltrated cam-
puses and  were especially ubiquitous in Mexico City’s universities.98
Indeed, had the authorities been sincerely troubled about impropriety or 
sexual abuse, they could have taken seriously the charges female normalistas 
levied against their male teachers who accosted them. And yet, as the case of 
Palmira demonstrates, in such instances the sep and the official  union closed 
ranks, ensuring the power structure remained intact. No won der that, even 
despite normalistas’ orga nizational logic that sent male students to reinforce 
their compañeras’ barricades and female normalistas to cook,  women expe-
rienced their po liti cal mobilizations as a source of empowerment. While 
a teaching  career offered the possibility of economic in de pen dence, it was 
“above all the po liti cal formation,” emphasized one normalista, “that devel-
oped our critical ability to challenge injustice.”99
 “OTHERS ENJOY THE FRUIT OF OUR PARENTS’  LABOR”
Amid one of the many strikes rural normalistas or ga nized during the 1960s, 
judicial police arrested three students from Salaices and Saucillo who  were 
handing out leaflets. “Go to Salaices,” read their flyer, “find out how students 
live, how they sleep on hay and withstand the intense cold.” Lawmakers, the 
text elaborated, oblivious to injustice, made only empty promises and ma-
ligned the institutions that stood as “the last stronghold of the 1910 armed 
movement.” “We demand what is ours,” it then asserted, since “ others enjoy 
the fruit of our parents’  labor.”100 The justice owed to the countryside as a 
result of the revolution continued to provide a structuring framework for 
normalista demands. Through their agricultural training, which sought to 
ground students’ identification with the countryside as members of insti-
tutions built for the descendants of campesinos, the state had itself created 
rural normales  under the logic of revolutionary justice.
And along with  these rights came responsibilities, which the fecsm artic-
ulated through involvement in campesino strug gles. At the fecsm’s national 
conferences, where delegates from the twenty- nine rural normales met to 
elect their leadership, they also reported on local school  matters; discussed 
regional, national, and international strug gles; and formulated strategies of 
action. A 1965 congress in Aguilera, Durango, provides a vivid picture.  There 
students from the rural normal of San Diego Tekax in Yucatán gave a pre-
sen ta tion about  labor conditions, reporting that campesinos who worked 
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for the henequen com pany Cordemex “worked from sunup to sundown, 
earning five pesos daily while living in subhuman conditions”— this in a 
com pany “whose influence was so  great it imposed or removed authorities at 
 will.” Students from Nayarit similarly reported that the Anderson and Clay-
ton Com pany “condemned its workers to poverty” and was but one of the 
many examples of the worldwide ramifications of “Yanqui imperialism.”101 
The national leadership assigned delegates to study relevant prob lems and to 
produce assessments about the  causes, nature, and potential for normalista 
involvement. Such conferences frequently included visits from  labor and 
campesino leaders. On this occasion, for example, Othón Salazar, the head 
of the Revolutionary Teachers Movement, spoke about workers’ rights, the 
criminalization of protest, and the country’s numerous po liti cal prisoners.102 
International solidarity, too, was an ever- present theme at fecsm confer-
ences. Students condemned U.S. intervention in countries like Vietnam and 
the Dominican Republic and expressed support for the guerrilla strug gle in 
Guatemala.103
In addition to its own conventions, the federation took advantage of the 
annual system- wide cultural and sports gatherings to exchange impressions 
and strategize for upcoming strug gles.104 While athletic competitions might 
be devoid of politics—in fact, students who excelled as athletes had the reputa-
tion of being less political— other activities at  these festivals provided ample 
opportunity to display militancy. At a 1965 system- wide oratory contest, for 
example, students delivered speeches highlighting campesinos’ historic par-
ticipation in Mexico’s strug gles, denounced foreign companies’ exploitative 
practices, and highlighted the systemic poverty of the countryside. Diff er ent 
orators asserted the need for students and teachers to devote themselves to 
achieving justice, condemned the limits of the 1910 revolutionary pro cess, 
and urged  future strug gle— even through armed means.105
Most significantly, normalistas participated in popu lar mobilizations in-
volving workers and campesinos. While sporadic, their involvement, when it 
took place, had impor tant  ripple effects that both challenged conventional 
norms of student comportment and created alliances across social groups. 
From land takeovers in Durango, Sonora, and Chihuahua, to support for 
the indigenous Ajijic community in Chapala, Jalisco, to accompaniment of 
workers at lumber and bottle- making factories in Chihuahua, normalistas 
consistently displayed a presence in strug gles outside their school walls; they 
joined marches, publicized worker and campesino grievances, and supplied 
dissidents with food from school ware houses. Students did this despite the 
authorities’ threats, detentions, and checkpoints meant to prevent them from 
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traveling to conflict sites.106 Such acts of solidarity  were impor tant to camp-
esinos and students alike. As the agrarian leader Álvaro Ríos expressed to 
the five hundred normalistas who joined a campesino march from Durango 
to Mexico City, “You are to us the closest and most notable compañeros; 
you are the sons and  daughters of campesinos, and together we can reach 
new heights. . . .  This meeting between campesinos and students marks the 
beginning of a renewed Mexican revolution to defeat capitalism and install 
socialism.”107
The potential for such alliances led some students to conceive of 
themselves— often problematically—as the revolutionary vanguard. While 
normalistas cited their own  humble origin as a natu ral source of allegiance with 
campesinos, their student status marked them as a group apart. For example, at 
a 1966 campesino- student caravan, one student declared, “We want to remove 
the blindfolds of the  humble classes, and that’s how we can initiate unity 
between students and campesinos.” Such language positioned normalistas 
as agents of redemption and echoed the vision of the state intelligent sia 
who conceived of the educational pro cess as a civilizing mission— one that 
would redeem and assimilate backward rural folk. It also reveals a larger con-
tradiction: while a culture of po liti cal militancy existed at rural normales, 
upon graduation this militancy did not always persist, a dynamic not lost on 
campesinos. One  woman at this rally thus urged the students to “continue 
being as revolutionary as you are now, since once you become professionals 
and start earning money, you forget about the  people.”108 Her words bespeak 
the extent to which it was campesino notions of justice that infused rural 
normales with their par tic u lar militancy. The class transformation students 
underwent once they graduated militated against long- term radical action. 
Looking back, most rural normalistas themselves recognized this dynamic. 
This is partly why lifelong militant teachers like Othón Salazar or  those like 
Lucio Cabañas, Pablo Gómez, Arturo Gámiz, and Genaro Vázquez, who lost 
their lives in the course of the strug gle, made such an impression on them.
 there is something unique, scholars have noted, about the way 
 people remember revolutionary times or instances of collective action. La-
tent sensations and previously passive or unsettled observations come into 
sharp relief and have long- lasting effects on past and subsequent experiences. 
This sense “of accelerated time (or timelessness),” in which individuals be-
come aware of societal structures, partly accounts for the outsized role po liti-
cal participation plays in normalistas’ memories. Reflecting on their youth, 
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most do so with nostalgia and ascribe meaning to their lives by highlighting 
instances in which they  were part of something bigger than themselves.109 At 
the same time, the deliberate po liti cal education undertaken by the fecsm— 
itself part of the institutional structure— ensured student exposure to an 
ideological world of radical politics that interwove the schools’ very existence 
with a history of justice for the dispossessed. For campesino and indigenous 
students, hailing from a life of poverty, such justice was hardly abstract. An 
education,  free room and board, and a teaching job  after graduation repre-
sented the palpable material evidence. That the state had created a dynamic 
in which students had to petition, strike, and mobilize to preserve the insti-
tutions giving them a chance at a better life placed individual advancement 
squarely within the framework of collective action.
Such action took many forms. While it mostly focused on securing the 
continuation of the rural normal system, the fecsm’s broader ideology 
also led to participation in agrarian and worker mobilizations, a sector with 
whom normalistas professed to have a natu ral allegiance. This interaction 
reinforced a revolutionary ethos already widespread among youth during the 
1960s. As incubators of re sis tance, rural normales thus constituted both a 
building block for a larger repertoire of strug gle and a component of the 
1960s groundswell of youth action. Not surprisingly, as general student un-
rest grew during the 1960s, the authorities increasingly worried that nor-
malista grievances would merge with  those of other student co ali tions.110
Like their counter parts around the globe, elites in Mexico searched for 
ways to control a generation intent on challenging established norms. Turn-
ing their attention to rural normales, the education authorities saw a system 
in crisis, sites where “instability and anarchy” reigned.111 In their eyes, student 
power had remained unchecked for too long. In 1967 the sep thus convened 
a national conference where it proposed to study the rural normales to im-
plement changes that would at once update the system and restore what, 
in the eyes of the state,  were its original princi ples. Tellingly, in his opening 
remarks education minister Yáñez declared, “Normal is derived from norm. 
Norm is the rule that leads to order, that which is indispensable to the pro-
posed achievements.”112  Needless to say, the achievements proposed by the 
sep and the student body differed markedly.
in may 1967 the Ministry of Public Education (sep) summoned supervi-
sors, directors, teachers, and students to a national meeting on rural normales, 
to be held  later that summer in Mexico City. Participants would evaluate the 
prob lems affecting the countryside’s teacher- training system and propose 
solutions. In the meeting’s inaugural remarks, Education Minister Agustín 
Yáñez described the rural normales as “an innovation of the revolutionary 
regime” and praised the schools that had once produced committed teachers 
whose spirit of ser vice led to a “heroic period” of education in the country-
side. The narrative— a cele bration of a revolutionary proj ect whose attention 
to the countryside had proved transformative— was a familiar one, long re-
peated by officials, teachers, and students alike. But if the normalistas in-
voked  earlier regimes, especially that of Lázaro Cárdenas, for their commit-
ment to the countryside, sep officials did so to highlight teachers’ abnegation 
in ser vice of the nation. Yáñez’s speech proceeded in this latter tradition. 
Only through “au then tic patriotism,” he emphasized, could Mexico relive 
the achievements of the 1920s and 1930s.1
Front and center in both the opening remarks and the conference pro-
ceedings was the issue of student comportment. Yáñez lamented normalistas’ 
tendency to approach issues “emotionally rather than thoughtfully.” This 
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conference, he stated, would offer a chance to mediate that passion with the 
knowledge of experts. And yet he then proceeded with more of a reprimand 
than a sage mediation. Students needed to understand, declared the minis-
ter, that the social justice they demanded was a quid pro quo: “If you freely 
accept the benefits of an education that is conditioned to a specific goal, this 
goal must be fulfilled.” Normalistas should be treating their schools “not as 
a gold mine of personal privileges but as sites made for work and for the 
privilege of serving Mexico.” Yáñez specifically criticized collective action for 
promoting “misguided solidarity” and stifling “genuine liberty”—in this case 
the individual rights of younger students, whom he charged older ones with 
manipulating. He concluded with a warning typical of the official character-
ization of dissent: “The Mexican teacher must be an agent of Mexico, not 
of foreign interests or, worse, of interests that go against Mexico.”2 The un-
dersecretary of normal education, Federico Berrueto Ramón, who followed 
Yáñez, went even further. Normalista demands actually “conspired against 
Mexico” for, in such a poor country, their myriad petitions detracted atten-
tion from the educational needs of  others. Declaring accusations of blame 
useless, Berrueto Ramón— with no apparent sense of irony— proceeded to 
fault the teachers at rural normales for the system’s shortcomings. “I’ve often 
asked myself,” he stated, “if the pervasive agitation in our normales results 
partly from poor teacher leadership.”3
Yáñez’s and Berrueto Ramón’s words reflect a common trope regarding 
state authority vis- à- vis an unruly populace, all the more characteristic of 
a de cade marked by youth mobilization. But  there is an additional layer to 
their critique, one discernible in their disbelief that campesino students 
 were not simply grateful for the chance to attend school and in turn  eager 
to serve the state that had granted them this opportunity. That normalis-
tas demanded school improvements demonstrated a sense of privilege un-
becoming of their social class. Since they  were unappreciative and, as the 
authorities saw it, unresponsive to their corresponding duties to study dili-
gently and serve eagerly, the state would do better to channel its resources to 
the millions of other poor campesinos.
Normalistas, however, did not see school funding as a zero- sum game, 
at least not one to be played out against members of their own social class. 
They did not dispute the critical state of rural education, but the  causes they 
identified and the solutions they proposed differed markedly from the sep’s. 
While the authorities attributed educational shortcomings to demographic 
growth, teachers’ lack of commitment, and educators’ poor training, rural 
normalistas understood them as symptoms of structural prob lems, including 
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insufficient spending, educational goals that did not challenge systemic ex-
ploitation, and an unequal distribution of wealth.4 In this conception, social 
justice mea sures  were not a quid pro quo but necessary policy to right his-
toric wrongs.
This chapter examines  these two visions of education. Turning first to the 
1967 conference proceedings, it shows education authorities’ preoccupa-
tion with student- body discipline. While official assessments also addressed 
 matters related to resources, academic programs, and faculty  labor condi-
tions, the pervasive attention to students’ perceived power at once reveals 
their per sis tent activism and the degree to which their actions disturbed the 
authorities. Concerned about the teacher- training system more broadly, in 
the spring of 1969, the authorities met again to discuss reform mea sures. By 
fall they had implemented a broad set of changes that included increased 
course requirements, an additional year of study, the separation of normales 
from their affiliated ju nior high schools, and new pedagogical methods. 
Framed as a mea sure of professional efficiency and meant for all normales, 
the reform had a particularly drastic effect on rural ones, first  because  these 
 were the normales that had affiliated ju nior high schools and, second,  because 
the reform converted fourteen of the twenty- nine into technical agricultural 
schools.5 The institutions that once constituted the backbone of rural educa-
tion  were now reduced by half.
That this initiative came on the heels of a de cade marked by widespread 
youthful unrest signaled to rural normalistas an effort to tame their power. 
Unique among Mexico’s student body, campesino students had generally 
inserted themselves into the terrain of strug gle through the framework of 
justice owed to the countryside. But the latter part of the 1960s had brought 
them closer to their urban peers, and in concert with them, they or ga nized 
national actions and experienced state repression. This interaction added an 
additional dimension to their strug gle, one in which they began to consider 
educational content as a  matter of cap i tal ist reproduction. They did not go 
far with the implications of this analy sis. The 1968 student movement and 
its repression soon overwhelmed their momentum and initiatives. The ar-
my’s massacre of civilians peacefully demonstrating at Tlatelolco had  ripple 
effects throughout the rural normales. Significantly,  these  were less related to 
normalista participation in the events leading up to the massacre or to the fact 
that state repression moved many to more radical action in the years there-
after. What most connected normalistas to Tlatelolco was the 1969 restruc-
turing of their schools, a mea sure they experienced as retribution for their 
generation’s crime of rebelling.
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 “DISOR GA NIZED AND ANARCHIC”
The 1967 National Assembly on Rural Normal Education, the first of its kind, 
is best understood within the context of a renewed plan for education re-
form. The last major restructuring, the 1959 Eleven- Year Plan, had increased 
elementary school coverage, expanded general education requirements in ju-
nior high and high school, and created more technical training opportuni-
ties. Ending illiteracy, having a culturally informed citizenry, and preparing a 
 labor force better equipped for the country’s modernizing development had 
been the sep’s key goals with such changes. “Well intentioned,” as one ana-
lyst characterized them, the mea sures focused on the education system as if it 
operated in isolation from the broader social structure, which rendered them 
“ simple improvisations.”6 Aggravating the prob lem was the sep’s haste in 
implementing new reforms, the product of changing presidential admin-
istrations, each more concerned with differentiating their own approach 
from their pre de ces sor’s than with productively engaging past ones. More-
over, successful educational overhauls meant retooling teachers— including 
at normales, where  those instructing  future teachers would also have to be 
retrained. “The changes proposed to the 1960–1964 study plan  were pro-
found,” explained one study, “and even though they  were supposed to be im-
plemented in a gradual and progressive manner . . .  their content was never 
applied, both  because of lack of time to evaluate the results, and  because of a 
lack of the specific preparation and retraining of teachers at normales.  There 
the 1964 graduating class would have been the first trained in the new ap-
proach, and yet by 1969 the decision had been made to once again radically 
change the 1960–1964 study plan.”7
At rural normales,  these  earlier changes had involved reducing the number 
of academic requirements while increasing agricultural activities, conceiv-
ing the curriculum through long- term holistic goals rather than a laun-
dry list of mandated subjects, and improving pedagogical methods through 
more discussion- based classes and holistic evaluation rather than a numerical 
grade. The 1967 National Assembly on Rural Normal Education would eval-
uate  these reforms along with six other aspects of the teacher- training proj ect: 
school governance, institutional supervision, postelementary school restruc-
turing, the academic calendar, professional training, and schools’ material 
needs. An assessment of each of  these seven topics was precirculated among the 
rural normales and would constitute the basis for each panel discussion. Sig-
nificantly, in a sign of how much student activism had become characteristic 
of the schools,  these evaluations turned continually to normalistas’ po liti cal 
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involvement. Characterized as a disregard for hierarchy, excessive power, and 
an overblown sense of rights, student mobilizations, stated the evaluation, 
had created a crisis of authority. One assessment made a particularly drastic 
proposal to address  these issues: dorms should be eliminated, and students 
should instead receive scholarships to find room and board in private homes. 
All twenty- nine rural normales should be converted into technical agricul-
tural schools for ju nior high school students. In their stead, six new rural 
normales— each with the capacity for a thousand students— should be cre-
ated. Establishing technical agricultural schools, proponents of this mea sure 
reasoned, would help curtail migration to the cities by educating students 
in rural development strategies. Moreover, eliminating the boarding- school 
component of rural normales would end many of the prob lems inherent in 
 these institutions, including the wide range in pupils’ age (some as young as 
twelve with older ones in their early twenties), the lack of academic correla-
tion between secundaria and the three years of professional training, and the 
insufficient number of teachers and ser vice personnel— doctors, psycholo-
gists, social workers—to provide support for “the psychobiological changes 
all adolescents go through.”8
Such proposals stoked normalistas’ worst fears. “Any policy involving the 
closure of boarding schools is reactionary,” protested the Mexican Federa-
tion of Socialist Campesino Students (fecsm). “Only the enemies of public 
education who dream of turning the teaching profession into a right- wing 
tool repeatedly focus their attack on our schools.”9 While creating  career 
paths other than teaching for the  children of campesinos was indeed laud-
able, intelligence documents also speak to the po liti cal motivation for elimi-
nating dorms. “Political- ideological control could be applied to scholarships 
and enrollments, thus ending conflicts such as strikes or work stoppages,” 
reported Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, then head of Mexico’s Federal Security 
Directorate. This arrangement, he continued, would end the pervasive mo-
bilizations around food rations and dorm conditions.10
Invited to attend the 1967 conference, the fecsm understood its pres-
ence as a mere formality in a meeting meant to approve rather than debate 
changes to the system. “A select group of PhDs in pedagogy have summoned 
us to Mexico City, where  we’ll be informed that our normales can no lon-
ger exist,” declared one normalista flyer protesting the conference.11 They 
 were not opposed to reform, “but educational experiments take time to 
bear fruit;  until then, we consider it neither just nor revolutionary to mu-
tilate rural normales.”12 Students’ outrage gave the authorities pause, and the 
sep soon eliminated the point about restructuring the secundaria years from 
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the conference proceedings.13 And yet the students  were not mistaken in their 
alarm. Two years  later, the sep implemented a version of this very mea sure 
when it converted half of the rural normales into technical agricultural schools.
In the meantime, the meeting proceeded with a discussion of the other 
six topics. Despite the range of issues, at almost  every turn, school officials 
identified student agitation as a major prob lem. For example, the first discus-
sion point, school governance, while recognizing the importance of student 
voices, critiqued their po liti cal involvement, frequent and direct appeals to 
the sep offices in Mexico City, and repeated moves to oust teachers, staff, or 
administrators. Recommendations thus sought to channel normalista ener-
gies through the proper school governing council, strengthen the director’s 
authority, and  handle problematic staff through  labor law and  union struc-
tures rather than in response to student mobilizations.14 This latter propo-
sition was reasonable, except that it was student protest that brought staff 
and faculty transgressions to the attention of the relevant authorities. The 
National Union of Education Workers (snte), Mexico’s official teachers’ 
 union, not only was a longtime ally of the state but wielded im mense power 
within the sep itself. When it came to inept, authoritarian, or abusive teach-
ers, the snte shielded them from normalista protest.
If the first working group sought to strengthen the institutional hierar-
chy within rural normales, the second, on school supervision, emphasized 
system- wide hierarchies, namely, sep oversight of each normal. Rural nor-
males  were “disor ga nized and anarchic”  because ministry supervisors had 
insufficient funding and  little reach to gauge pedagogical outcomes. No one 
evaluated how classes  were structured, how students learned, and how in-
structors taught. As a result, rural normales produced bad teachers. The solu-
tion lay in making the system more legible by better delineating supervision 
and assigning oversight. Recommendations included creating ten regional 
zones, assigning each to a supervisor who would conduct extensive visits and 
have the authority to determine and implement changes.15
The third commission, charged with evaluating the de cade’s  earlier reforms, 
produced a bleak assessment. Not only had the new educational norms not 
been properly applied at rural normales, but to the extent that they had, 
they  were counterproductive. The reforms had generally been conceived for 
urban institutions, had been precipitously implemented, or could not be 
applied owing to a lack of staff and resources. Meaningful research or tran-
scendent school proj ects could hardly be conducted in the outdated labs, 
bare libraries, and dilapidated workshops of the rural normales. Moreover, 
agricultural training was so lackluster that it was problematically similar to 
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hacienda peonage. Students tilled or weeded assigned plots but had no cor-
responding vision for the land. When it came to teachers, stated the assess-
ment, “student po liti cal interests, sectarian politics, as well as personal and 
 union rivalries,” hindered the constructive work of the system’s few effective 
instructors.16 As boarding schools, rural normales required greater devotion, 
and yet teachers  were other wise engaged, since low pay forced them to seek 
supplemental jobs. Better campus housing, full- time teaching positions, and 
updated professional training could help ameliorate this prob lem. Students, 
for their part, should receive instruction more tailored to the pedagogical 
real ity they would face as teachers, including preparing them for escuelas 
unitarias, the multigrade, single- classroom schools that predominated in the 
countryside.17
The state of the academic calendar, the subject of the fifth working group, 
was, according to the assessment, another cause of the “anarchy that deformed 
the character of  future teachers.”18 Again the evaluation posited student power 
as a major source of the prob lem. The students, stated the precirculated as-
sessment, pressured teachers to cancel classes for noncivic holidays like the 
Day of the Dead, Holy Week,  Mother’s Day, or regional festivals. Other class 
disruptions included field trips, school festivities, or anniversary commem-
orations. Fi nally, too many students missed class owing to their involvement 
in the student council, the fecsm’s Committee of Po liti cal and Ideologi-
cal Orientation, or po liti cal activities in general.  These disruptions  were a 
prime example of the inordinate student power “since student leaders made 
demands in the name of the entire student body, assuming  they’ll automat-
ically gain authorities’ approval.”19 Some of the blame, continued the evalu-
ation, lay with the teachers and staff, who  either coaxed students to request 
class cancellations or— fearing retribution if they did not succumb to stu-
dent wishes— were quick to grant requests for unauthorized holidays. To 
help ameliorate the prob lem, the commission outlined regulations on sched-
uled activities, recommended national- level approval for any changes, and 
advised sanctions for teachers who “incited” students to demand additional 
holidays. Interestingly, while the precirculated assessment advocated puni-
tive mea sures for students who  violated attendance policies, the conference 
recommendations focused more on institutional practices and the teachers 
who enabled them. “Good professional preparation itself inspired youth” to 
remain in class, the conference proceedings concluded.20
The sixth commission assessed teachers’ and students’ professional qual-
ity. Instructors, it stated, had high turnover rates,  were disillusioned or 
conformist, and tended to evade their responsibility, while pupils  were uncul-
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tured,  displayed a general disregard for authority, and acted irresponsibly in 
support of student leaders with unchecked prerogatives. Solutions included 
purging bad instructors, offering ongoing professional development, and 
better screening  those hired. A similar logic applied to students: officials 
needed to pay closer attention to the pupils they admitted and to exert 
greater control over student organ izations. Significantly, the committee 
did note the need for improved facilities such as libraries, laboratories, and 
workshops so that teachers could have instructional resources.21
“The designated amount is never enough,” began the final point, devoted 
to an economic analy sis of life at rural normales. It was not enough for “stu-
dent ser vices; not enough teachers and staff; not enough to run the agricul-
tural and workshop production of the schools.”22  These prob lems, continued 
the assessment, had existed from the outset  because the sep had never done 
adequate research and planning. Instead, it had formulated an idealized view 
of what could be done with the assigned funds— budgets that had not been 
reassessed in de cades. Rather than adjusting plans to fit the funds actually 
assigned, directors— under student pressure— solicited more money from 
the sep. Rural normales had thus developed a paternalistic culture, con-
stantly petitioning the sep for more rather than taking the initiative to solve 
their own needs. The committee proposed solutions that fit into three broad 
categories: a sep commitment to meet basic student and infrastructural 
needs, realistic bud gets conceived with schools’ input, and teacher- student 
proposals to better rely on their own productive capacities.23
The 1967 conference proceedings reveal much about rural normales, 
about the sep’s conception of the prob lems therein, and about official 
strategies to address them. Mainly, they should be understood within the 
framework of modernizing development, in which education served to ease 
but not transform structural in equality. Despite variations from administra-
tion to administration, the sep’s general approach since the 1940s had fo-
cused on modernizing pedagogical techniques, increasing school access, and 
professionalizing the teaching body.  There was indeed an official consensus 
that the lack of resources affected the academic quality of rural normales as 
well as a recognition that  earlier reforms seeking to make them more like 
urban normales had been detrimental. Their condition of scarcity, however, 
was aggravated by teachers’ inability or unwillingness to adhere to the latest 
pedagogical mandates. With insufficient school inspectors, the sep could 
not enforce compliance. Exacerbating  these deficiencies, according to the au-
thorities, was the unbridled student power; students’ po liti cal commitment, 
insistence on celebrating folk holidays, and tendency to resort to federal 
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rather than school authorities undermined the institutional hierarchy and 
the very resourcefulness that could help address the situation. This latter 
dynamic especially bewildered sep officials, who, given the pervasive rural 
poverty, held that ideal students should “be cognizant of their unbridled 
privilege, given the living real ity of millions of young campesinos . . .  and un-
derstand their training is made pos si ble through the sacrifice of the  people.”24
The conference proceedings do not make evident the nature of student 
participation, though, judging from the more tempered quality of the pub-
lished recommendations as compared to the precirculated assessments, their 
presence had an effect. Significantly, their  earlier protest had managed to ex-
clude the proposal to restructure rural normales and eliminate their dorms. 
The extent to which the fecsm’s vision contrasted with that of the educa-
tion authorities is evident in their discussions and in the proclamation they 
issued in the two years following the sep’s 1967 meeting. The Atequiza Dec-
laration, named  after the rural normal in Jalisco where students met to discuss 
the  future of their schools, for example, reveals the fundamentally diff er ent 
premise  under which the normalistas operated. First, student representa-
tives did not accept the argument that the country had  limited resources for 
education that simply could not keep up with demographic growth. They 
pointed to the United Nations’ 1963 Conference on Education and National 
Social Development, which recommended that countries dedicate at least 
4  percent of the gross domestic product to education.25 Mexico’s spending 
ranged from 1.94 to 3  percent in the latter part of the 1960s.26 Second, the 
fecsm objected to the derisive class perspective that framed schooling for 
the poor as a privilege rather than a right. The resources they sought, asserted 
one of their declarations, constituted part of “workers,’ campesinos,’ and 
youths’ historic strug gle to achieve structural, social, and economic change 
for the country.”27 Fi nally, the fecsm’s under lying logic was that structural 
reform was both necessary and pos si ble, an assumption that contrasted with 
the sep’s reformist or modernizing approach. This conception of educa-
tion reform was rooted in the radical example of the 1930s and the renewed 
sense of possibilities brought about with the 1959 triumph of the Cuban 
Revolution.
In a new approach, normalistas vowed to begin to “challenge the content 
and orientation of the education” they received.28 For de cades the federation 
had emphasized material demands and had rarely included course content. 
This transition meant understanding education as a mode of cap i tal ist re-
production. While the fecsm did not develop subsequent proposals in 
this regard— likely  because the sep’s elimination of half of their schools 
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in 1969 forced them into a defensive strug gle for survival— the call speaks to 
a broadening ideological vision and an increasing disjuncture between stu-
dents’ lived experience and their classroom lessons.  Here their interaction 
with Mexico’s broader student movement, especially the National Central 
of Demo cratic Students (Central Nacional de Estudiantes Demócratico, 
cned), helps explain this evolution.
A SCIENTIFIC, DEMO CRATIC, AND POPU LAR EDUCATION
If normalista participation in the early 1960s agrarian strug gles of Chihua-
hua (chapter 5) represented the clearest manifestation of their links to cam-
pesinos, their alliance with the cned exemplified their relationship to 
the broader student movement. This national organ ization was short- lived, 
dominated mainly by youth affiliated with the Mexican Communist Party, 
and represented an attempt to unite diverse student organ izations, harness 
radical activism, and challenge the hold of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (pri) on worker and peasant  unions. With this in mind, the organizers 
convened their first meeting in Morelia, Michoacán, in 1963. Two hundred 
and fifty delegates, reportedly representing 100,000 students, gathered at this 
first congress. Participants began their convention with a minute of silence 
honoring campesino leader Rubén Jaramillo and rail  union activist Román 
Guerra Montemayor, both recently dead at the hands of the army. Students 
then invoked the names of prominent po liti cal prisoners. This act at once 
vocalized their solidarity with popu lar strug gles and condemned the pri’s 
repressive apparatus. To articulate their vision, cned leaders drew up the 
Morelia Declaration, a document setting forth three goals: a student alliance 
with the masses; a demand for popu lar, scientific education; and the creation 
of an in de pen dent, demo cratic, and revolutionary student movement.29
Their goals speak volumes about the nature of student grievances and the 
context of the 1960s. In their evaluation of the terrain of strug gle,  labor’s 
defeat in late 1950s loomed large as the pri managed to stymie teachers’ and 
rail workers’ strug gle for in de pen dent  unions. Schools, ablaze with protest, 
had picked up the baton. In Guerrero, Puebla, Michoacán, Sinaloa, Durango, 
and Mexico City, students had mobilized for university autonomy, ousted 
corrupt or authoritarian state governors, and or ga nized protests against U.S. 
imperial aggression.30 An especially significant strug gle took place, at the 
University of Michoacán San Nicolás de Hidalgo (popularly known as Nico-
laita), which became a battleground where both the national government 
and local right- wing forces sought to contain Cardenismo, which had most 
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recently manifested itself through the former president’s out spoken defense 
of Cuban self- determination specifically and Latin American liberation— 
from foreign and oligarchic domination— more generally.31
While ultimately overwhelmed by the 1968 student movement in Mexico 
City, the cned constituted an impor tant attempt to harness radical student 
activism, unite diverse campus groups, and challenge the Confederation of 
Mexican Youth, the pri’s youth association. In the five years  after its cre-
ation, the cned held two other congresses, or ga nized a National Day of Ac-
tion in 1967, and in February 1968 convened a march from Dolores Hidalgo 
in the state of Guanajuato to Morelia, the capital of Michoacán, demanding 
freedom for po liti cal prisoners. The impact of  these actions on the power 
structure was less significant than the individual experience of  those who 
participated in them, many of whom internalized the goals of solidarity with 
nonstudent sectors or acquired organ izing skills they employed long  after 
the cned dissolved.32
For rural normalistas, cned actions became opportunities to expose 
the precarious nature of their situation, seek broad student support, and 
establish connections with schools outside the teacher- training system.33 
The central’s articulated goals fit almost naturally with rural normalistas’ 
grievances, which consistently dramatized the condition of schools meant to 
serve the poor. Normalistas’ rural background and propensity to act along-
side campesinos, moreover, represented a vivid manifestation of cned ideals 
that linked students to popu lar organ izing. In the next few years, the cned 
consistently invoked rural normalista rights, defended their schools’ dorm 
structure, and insisted on the poor’s right to a professional education.34
In April 1967 the cned programmed a series of nationally coordinated 
actions specifically calling for the democ ratization of education, the im-
provement of student ser vices (dorms, cafeterias, medical care, and schol-
arships), and freedom for po liti cal prisoners. According to La Voz de 
México, the Communist Party newspaper, up to 150,000 students through-
out the country, including at all the rural normales, participated in this event 
through strikes and demonstrations.35 Other national cned events involved 
the February 1968 March for Liberty demanding freedom for po liti cal pris-
oners.36 Starting out from Dolores Hidalgo, the cradle of Mexico’s 1810 war 
of in de pen dence, the organizers evoked Mexico’s historic strug gles for lib-
eration. Tellingly, the Justice Ministry ordered local agencies to prevent ac-
tivities associated with the march, and the sep instructed school directors 
to expel students who participated.37 As it had long done, the government 
conflated the student prob lem with communist infiltration, thus fanning 
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hysteria against youth. Rural normalistas who participated speak of the hos-
tilities they endured and their effort to mitigate violent attacks by placing 
female students at the head of the march, hoping crowds would be less likely 
to attack  women.38 “ There was a  whole media campaign saying, ‘ Here come 
the communist students who eat  children,’ ” remembered Alma Gómez Ca-
ballero, who, along with a contingent from the normal of Saucillo, partic-
ipated in the march.39 Indeed, in several places reactionary groups like the 
Sinarquistas, or pri- affiliated  unions like the National Campesino Confed-
eration, jeered the marchers.40 With cries of “Long live Christ the King,” 
“Down with the reds,” “Go back to Cuba,” or “Go back to Rus sia,”  people 
threw stones, tomatoes, and eggs at the students.41
The  little tolerance the government showed for the cned is a testament 
to its significance. In Valle de Santiago, fifty- five miles from their destination, 
the military intercepted the 1,800 marchers. Using a train derailment to 
construct further propaganda against the students, the press reported the 
incident as student sabotage. The army soon surrounded the marchers, “re-
turning us prisoners,” as one normalista from Roque, Guanajuato, put it, “to 
the very towns and cities we had just traveled through.”42
Since its inception, intelligence agents had characterized the cned as an 
extreme leftist group and sent “special inspectors” to its events with instruc-
tions to “weaken the association and prevent the organizers from achieving 
success.”43 Indeed, the cned encouraged the formation of regional student 
federations, which emerged in Chihuahua, Morelos, Puebla, and Guerrero, 
thus facilitating coordinated action by students from diff er ent types of ed-
ucational institutions.44 The cned, moreover, showed a consistent presence 
in local normalista strug gles, including Palmira’s 1965 effort to oust teach-
ers accused of sexual harassment and that year’s system- wide rural normal 
strike.45  Because of such actions, intelligence agents warned, the cned was 
poised to take over the leadership at both rural and urban normales, lead-
ing to “a total politicization of  future teachers, an unfortunate communist 
fanat i cism.”46
What intelligence agents painted as communist fanat i cism normalista 
participants saw as a “program of demo cratic renewal,” as one student leader 
from Saucillo put it. “We wanted a renewal of normalismo, and we partic-
ipated in the national movement with that intention, alongside university 
students from the entire country.”47 The cned contributed to a broader 
normalista engagement with the student movement by spurring connec-
tions with other educational institutions. Its national conferences, days of 
action, and ambitious mobilizations increased the contact students from 
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diff er ent types of schools had with one another and gave rural normalistas 
an opportunity to compare grievances and establish alliances. The cned’s 
goals for a scientific, demo cratic, and popu lar education echoed many of the 
fecsm’s historic princi ples. For example, normalistas had long defended sec-
ular schooling, identifying the church and the landed elite as the enemies. The 
cned updated such notions by pointing to international cap i tal ists as the new 
power holders in the post- Cardenista order. The confederation’s calls for sci-
entific education not only  were anticlerical but constituted a vision in which 
schools created a conscious citizenry rather than a pliant workforce. To be 
demo cratic, moreover, educational opportunities  ought to not only be ex-
panded but incorporate student voices in their design and execution. Fi nally, 
the cned’s call for popu lar education emphasized connections between the 
school campus and the factory and the fields. In this latter characteristic es-
pecially, it was rural normalistas who could best assist the cned in putting 
its ideals into practice. The relationship was thus a two- way street.
Meanwhile, events in Mexico City continued to heat up during the sum-
mer of 1968. The escalating state repression generated student fervor and, in-
creasingly, public attention. The growing mobilizations, the students’ creative 
tactics, and the international spotlight on Mexico as it prepared to host the 
Olympic Games proved too unnerving for President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, 
who during his September state- of- the- union address condemned restless 
youth for violating the rule of law and tarnishing Mexico’s image abroad. 
“We have been tolerant to a fault,” declared the president, “but every thing 
has its limits.” Ominously, he invoked his powers as commander in chief and 
lauded the military’s role in maintaining order.48 A month  later, on Octo-
ber 2, troops opened fire on student demonstrators in the Tlatelolco Plaza, 
leaving hundreds of civilians dead.
In the months leading up to the October 2 massacre, the rural normalis-
tas issued statements of solidarity with the students, staged walkouts, and 
protested the government’s mounting repression.49 Rural normalistas had 
participated in the mobilizations in Mexico City and had been arrested in 
the government crackdown.50 But at the rural normales, the aftershocks of 
the Tlatelolco massacre  were slow and uneven. Proceso Díaz, who began his 
studies at the rural normal of El Mexe, Hidalgo, that fall, remembered stu-
dents suspending classes: “I was new to po liti cal  matters and  didn’t  really 
understand what was happening. I saw the red- and- black flags, for the strike, 
to mourn the October 2nd massacre. And so with that I felt that something 
was happening.”51 At other schools such as La Huerta, Michoacán, activities 
proceeded normally. “October 3rd was our school anniversary,” remembered 
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José Francisco Casimiro Barrera, “so many  didn’t even notice [Tlatelolco] 
 because we  were busy celebrating.”52
But a storm was brewing. In November the sep temporarily closed seven-
teen normales, in some cases using the army.  Those not closed went on strike 
in protest.53 When classes resumed  later that month, students noticed the 
absence of some of their peers. “We knew how involved they  were in ’68 and 
that their participation continued,” recalled Aristarco Aquino Solís from 
Mactumactzá, Chiapas. “They  were expelled since they no longer showed 
up [to class]. We’d get wind of them occasionally, nothing lengthy nor too 
precise. . . .  I know they ended up in the mar.”54 The Revolutionary Action 
Movement (Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria, mar), one of the many 
armed groups that emerged in the aftermath of 1968, would count on the 
significant involvement of rural normalistas, many propelled by the closure 
of their normales or by their expulsion.55
The government’s repression at Tlatelolco confirmed an ideological po-
sition many already held: peaceful or reformist calls for change  were futile. 
Rural normalistas had, moreover, an impor tant radicalizing pre ce dent in 
the 1965 attack on the Madera military barracks in Chihuahua. Despite its 
failure, students celebrated what they saw as a heroic challenge to an author-
itarian state. Even before 1968 some rural normalistas furthered the legacy 
of the September  23 martyrs, by providing support for the Arturo Gámiz 
Popu lar Guerrilla Group, that operated in northern Mexico.56 In the south, 
Lucio Cabañas, the former head of the fecsm and a gradu ate of Ayotzin-
apa, would soon lead an armed guerrilla movement in the coastal state of 
Guerrero.
As the 1960s drew to a close, rural normalistas, like other students, had 
experienced a turbulent de cade. The Cuban revolutionary pro cess, espe-
cially its re sis tance to imperial attacks; Mexico’s own agrarian mobilizations 
and the government’s assassination of its leaders, so egregiously personified 
by the army kidnapping and murder of Rubén Jaramillo and his  family in 
broad daylight on May 23, 1962; and the constant string of student  battles 
in universities throughout the country all fomented youthful agitation and 
compelled many to act. That the student movement sowed panic in the halls 
of power is most exemplified by the state terror at Tlatelolco on October 2, 
1968. But the government would not rely on brute force alone. In the case 
of the rural normales, the sep implemented the mea sure students had long 
feared, closing half of their schools. Labeled an education reform by the sep, 
the closure was experienced by students as a mutilation of the rural normal 
system, one that dealt a major blow to the fecsm.
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AN OVERHAUL OF NORMAL EDUCATION
“One of the major results of the recent student disturbances,” stated a U.S. 
embassy report from Mexico, “was to give new impetus to the prob lem of 
education reform.”57 Despite  earlier insistence that communist and other 
nefarious international forces  were responsible for the 1968 student 
movement, President Díaz Ordaz now expressed that the root cause 
was an education system in need of profound reform. Accordingly, the 
president ordered a reassessment of all educational levels with the broad 
charge to focus on quality over quantity, critical thinking, and the idea that 
learning was a lifetime endeavor. When it came to Mexico’s teacher- training 
system, the president decried normales for producing improvised teachers 
who lacked not only sufficient abnegation but also basic knowledge.58 Thus, 
in 1969, when education authorities met in Saltillo, Coahuila, to discuss 
changes to the country’s normales, improving teachers’ foundational knowl-
edge (cultura general) became a principal preoccupation. Broadening cultural 
knowledge, emphasized Education Minister Yáñez in his opening remarks, 
would be the foundation on which to render effective the sep’s imminent 
reform, whose specific mea sures included increasing course requirements, 
adding a year of professional training, rewarding the type of training over 
years of ser vice, and implementing new pedagogical approaches that priv-
ileged active learning by students. Well- rounded teachers would transmit 
knowledge to their students while linking that knowledge to vocational and 
professional training through modern teaching methods. Cultured teachers 
would be moral ones. Their civic concerns would translate into a spirit of 
ser vice that would  counter a situation that had made normales “fodder for 
anarchy against the country’s institutional order.”59
The conference proceedings followed up on some points discussed in 
the 1967 National Assembly on Rural Normal Education, for example, on the 
need to draw students specifically interested in becoming teachers rather 
than  those who used the normal as a springboard to other professions. With 
this in mind, the ju nior high schools currently linked to normales would 
be separated, a mea sure that affected mainly rural normales, whose years of 
study began with seventh grade. The only other normal with affiliated ju-
nior high schools was Mexico City’s National Teachers School. In the latter 
case, the schools’ jurisdiction was transferred to the Department of Second-
ary Education, where they  were redesignated as regular secundarias rather 
than feeding schools for the normal. In the case of the former, the change 
was more dramatic since it not only separated secundarias and normales but 
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entirely transformed fourteen of the twenty- nine rural normales into tech-
nical agricultural schools. This drastic restructuring, according to education 
officials, was necessary to offer rural youth  careers other than teaching. Now 
 under the jurisdiction of the Office of Technological, Industrial, and Com-
mercial Education,  these secundarias preserved their dorm structure but 
would train agricultural technicians, who, it was hoped, would remain in the 
countryside and use their skills to improve campesino agrarian production.
If the philosophical underpinning of the 1969 education reform was 
that learning was a lifelong pro cess, the practical one linked critical think-
ing to technological instruction that would increase economic production. 
“Learning while  doing” and “teaching while producing” became oft- quoted 
man tras to describe the new pedagogy. While this approach was laudable, 
stated one in de pen dent analy sis of the reform, the lack of teacher training for 
its effective implementation, school facilities with inadequate technology, 
and the lack of basic equipment for scientific activities continued to render 
education quality low.60 Specialists like Pablo Latapí, the founder and head 
of Mexico’s Center for Education Studies and a lifelong researcher of ped-
agogy and education policy, critiqued the 1969 reform as a disjointed plan 
that lacked any scientific basis and was inoperable in practice.61 In private, 
Latapí was more frank. A U.S. embassy representative related that Latapí did 
not believe  people in the sep  were willing or able to implement real reform. 
According to the American official, Latapí believed that “ ‘learning while 
 doing’ and ‘teaching while producing’ are empty slogans that are not new 
and signify no substantial reform of the education system.”62
Among the mea sures Latapí critiqued publicly was the assumption that 
technical agricultural schools— such as  those created from previous rural 
normales— would have any discernible effect on diminishing migration to 
cities or mitigating unemployment prob lems in the countryside. For  those 
schools and other rural education mea sures to be successful, he wrote, re-
sources would need to be channeled to peripheral areas; training would 
have to target not only youth but adult campesinos; and the rural popula-
tion would need to be conscious of their rights in order to participate in the 
po liti cal and economic choices that affected them.63 Other critics pointed 
out that to truly improve education quality, the state needed more revenue, 
which could be attained by taxing the rich or implementing fiscal reforms, 
neither of which would happen  under the Díaz Ordaz administration, whose 
rate of spending on education diminished significantly.64 Just two years  later, 
in 1971, the new president, Luis Echeverría, would convene a diff er ent com-
mission to again overhaul the education system. Many of the 1969 changes 
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would thus go unimplemented and also unstudied. Their main merit, to 
again quote Latapí, was that “for the first time,  there was open critique of the 
state of national education in which even some public officials recognized its 
deficiencies.”65
 “THE REACTIONARY FORCES’ GRAVEST, MOST CRIMINAL 
AND ANTIPOP U LAR DREAM”
A permanent mea sure of the 1969 reform, and the one rural normalistas 
most resented, was the conversion of half of their institutions into techni-
cal agricultural schools and the elimination of the secundaria years at the 
remaining fifteen. This was the biggest transformation the system had seen 
since the early 1940s, when coeducation and socialist pedagogy  were elim-
inated. Institutions that had previously encompassed up to eight diff er ent 
school grades (three of ju nior high school, three of normal, and one or two 
complementary years for  those who had not completed elementary school) 
 were now reduced to four. The fecsm saw no merits in the sep’s arguments 
and interpreted the restructuring as a retaliation for the 1968 student mobili-
zations in general and a strategy to undermine the federation specifically. De-
nouncing the restructuring as a move “against all the forces participating in 
the popular- student movement that began on July 26th,” the fecsm claimed 
that the government harbored special fury  toward rural normalistas  because 
of their combative nature. The fecsm did not oppose the creation of tech-
nical agricultural schools, but why, leaders protested, did  these have to come 
at the expense of rural normales? With such mea sures the government had 
carried out the “reactionary forces’ gravest, most criminal and antipop u lar 
dream: the elimination of our boarding- school system.”66 If the sep sought 
to improve the quality of teacher gradu ates, why not expand the resources 
for the three- year professional cycle rather than add an additional year of 
study? This mea sure placed undue hardship on poor students, according to 
the fecsm, since it delayed their salary and thus their ability to support their 
parents and siblings, who still languished in poverty.67
In response to the sep’s argument that the current structure yielded edu-
cators who  were not motivated by a teaching vocation, the fecsm cited the 
example of Cuba. The island’s government, stated the federation, sought com-
mitted teachers not by searching out  those with an innate predisposition— 
the calling that education officials constantly bemoaned that Mexican teachers 
lacked— but by cultivating it in a “revolutionary environment that is 
constructing a new society.”68 Indeed, one might see the environment in 
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Mexico during the 1920s and 1930s— the period the authorities themselves 
constantly invoked—as heroic, but its structural reforms, such as land re-
distribution and industry nationalization, had been not only abandoned but 
actively reversed by the state.
It is difficult to establish the 1968 student movement as the rationale for 
separating the secundaria from professional training at rural normales. Cer-
tainly, the timing does not seem coincidental. But such proposals had been 
discussed since 1954, and calls for the bachillerato (high school) requirement 
dated even further back.69 Moreover, as was evident in the 1967 Mexico City 
conference on rural normales, education authorities saw students’ per sis tent 
mobilization as a prob lem before the dramatic events at Tlatelolco. The sep 
would likely have separated the professional cycle from the secundaria and 
increased it by a year regardless of 1968’s events. However, the specific act of 
transforming half of the rural normales is drastic enough to suggest a strategy 
of containment, if not directly linked to the student movement in the capital, 
then at least in response to a de cade of youthful unrest. That rural normales 
existed throughout the country,  were interconnected through the fecsm, 
had recently developed ties to urban students through the cned, and had 
a tradition of participating in campesino strug gles made them significant 
organ izing nodes, ones Díaz Ordaz’s administration was loath to tolerate.
A clear sign that a plan was in the works before the events at Tlatelolco is a 
February 1968 report commissioned by the Federal Security Directorate. That 
an intelligence agency rather than an educational one conducted the study be-
speaks its po liti cal nature. This geostrategic study described the size, cultiva-
tion, and po liti cal affiliation of the ejidos surrounding each of country’s rural 
normales.70 Significantly, once the sep issued the order to transform four-
teen of the rural normales into secundarias, it relied heavi ly on official camp-
esino organ izations to  counter protest. During the summer months of 1969, in 
addition to the police, military, and other security forces, campesino members 
of the pri- allied League of Agrarian Communities guarded the schools, hav-
ing been promised that their  children would receive spots  there.71 The latter 
strategy effectively pitted the poor against each other and was a manifestation 
of  earlier declarations that if the normalistas did not appreciate the oppor-
tunities they  were given,  these would be directed to campesinos who did, 
ones, moreover, who  were loyal to the regime. The level of state and federal 
coordination as well as the number of organ izations involved in carry ing out 
the change is striking. In addition to the League of Agrarian Communities, 
the state relied on other official organ izations such as the National Camp-
esino Confederation and the National School Repairs Commission as well 
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as vari ous security forces, including the federal and state police, undercover 
agents, the military, and the transit police— the latter installed roadblocks to 
prevent support contingents from reaching individual schools.72
In the months leading up to the change, normalistas met to determine 
how best to resist the restructuring. Aristarco Aquino from Reyes Mantecón, 
one of the rural normales in Oaxaca that would be transformed into a tech-
nical agricultural school, remembered, “We formed brigades;  those from the 
sierra  were to make their way to the communities to inform, to explain the blow 
it represented to communities, and to seek support for the normal’s continued 
existence. We covered the entire state . . .  and since  there  were a lot of teachers 
[in the communities] who had studied at Reyes Mantecón or Tamazulapan 
[another rural normal in Oaxaca], they took us in and supported us.”73 Student 
organ izing yielded protest letters from communities throughout the country 
who argued for the preservation of the twenty- nine rural normales as a  matter 
of revolutionary justice,  because they served the “ humble classes” and  because 
they are “all that is left of the Mexican Revolution for which Villa and Zapata 
fought.”74 Letters pointed to the restructuring as hypocritical, noting that 
what education  really needed was more resources and that it made  little sense 
for a government purportedly committed to eliminating ignorance and pro-
moting pro gress to close teacher- training schools. “ Don’t make us think we 
continue to live in the era of Porfirismo,” stated a letter signed by twenty- 
eight campesinos from San Luis Potosí, “a time when only the  children of 
the bourgeoisie received an education.”75 Pointedly,  others declared, “Why 
do we want agricultural technicians? What we need is land.”76
“Of course they ignored us,” stated Aquino. “The decision had already 
been made.”77 While ultimately unsuccessful in stopping the mea sure, nor-
malista efforts mobilized significant re sis tance in several locales. In Palmira, 
Morelos, students had done such extensive canvassing, noted intelligence 
agents, that school officials managed to enroll only three pupils for what 
was now a technical agricultural school, and teachers thus had to cancel 
classes. In Tiripetío, Michoacán, students opposing the change soon took 
over the school, preventing all but eleven students from enrolling. In many 
normales, students occupied the campuses during the summer, a pro cess the 
sep fought by ending food ser vices and cutting off the  water and electric-
ity.78 In many schools the parents association protested in support of the stu-
dents.79 In some cases, they did so  because their kids would be sent to schools 
farther away, making it harder for parents to visit them. This situation was 
aggravated for female students, whose families  were already reluctant to have 
them live away from home. In many cases, teachers and staff also opposed the 
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change and supported students by speaking at their demonstrations, find-
ing them lodging, or holding meetings at their homes.80 Students also found 
backing among surrounding communities. For example, in Perote, Veracruz, 
local businesses gave normalistas food and monetary donations; in Tamatán, 
Tamaulipas, school staff found places for students to stay when the authorities 
dislodged their school occupations.81 “We tried so many  things,” recalled a 
normalista from Tiripetío, Michoacán. “We’d canvass, we’d denounce, we’d 
invite communities, knowing [ there was  little hope]. But we’d do it, not 
every one of course, but some. Still, the official propaganda was too strong.”82
So  were the threats. The authorities notified the students that if they 
did not pre sent themselves at their newly assigned schools by September 6, 
they would lose their scholarships. Where students occupied normales, po-
lice forcibly removed them and threatened the complete closure of their 
schools.83 At some institutions the authorities displayed a massive show 
of force, as one student due to return to Salaices, now transformed into a 
technical agricultural school, recalled: “What we saw was astonishing. The 
road to the normal looked like an anthill—it was soldiers who did not allow 
us to come into the school. They told us our place was now in Aguilera, 
Durango.”84 Numerous students  were detained at military checkpoints or 
plucked off passenger buses, and the soldiers tormented and harassed them.85
The restructuring caused division within many rural normales themselves. 
While the government’s show of force bespeaks the mea sure’s general lack of 
popularity, not all students opposed the change.86 As long as their scholarships 
remained intact, many normalistas  were content to change schools. While 
some administrative and teaching personnel opposed their reassignment, their 
response was decidedly more mixed than that of the students. In Reyes Man-
tecón, for example, the staff predominantly originated from the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec region, and their transfer to Chiapas actually put them closer 
to home.87 In some communities surrounding rural normales, the govern-
ment’s campaign— waged through organ izations like the League of Agrar-
ian Communities and the National Campesino Confederation— effectively 
halted or overturned support for student protests.88 The hardships entailed 
in occupying a school with no  water, electricity, or food further dissuaded 
 others.
Still, the fecsm continued its re sis tance and on September 3, 1969, called 
for a system- wide strike.89 The minister of normal education, Ramón Bonfil, 
took it upon himself to visit individual schools to address this re sis tance. 
In Ayotzinapa, accompanied by representatives of the snte, the state- allied 
teachers’  union, local education officials, public- security members, and the 
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head of the state’s judicial police, Bonfil issued students a forceful warning: if 
they  were found agitating, their food would be suspended, and their teachers 
removed, and their  water and electricity would be cut off;  those who did not 
like the reform  were invited to leave. If they or ga nized, they would be expelled 
and blacklisted, preventing them from enrolling in other normales. Before 
leaving, the minister singled out ten student leaders, pulled them aside, and 
energetically reiterated the threats to them. He ended with a blanket warning 
against any type of mobilization, including complaints about food. When 
Bonfil departed, the uniformed police then guarding the school  were re-
moved, leaving in their place three undercover agents disguised as workers.90
But even such warnings failed to completely quell protest.  After the min-
ister visited Mactumactzá in Chiapas, the students changed their strike to 
rolling absences with thirty diff er ent students abstaining from class  every 
day.91 Teachers who supported student protests also received threats. In 
Atequiza, Jalisco, the education authorities reminded instructors that their 
salaries came from the government and, above all  else, their loyalty should 
lie  there. They  were to report any student organ izing and  were warned that 
the sep had a list of teachers and staff who had “fomented or encouraged 
the subversive activity of students.”92 The education minister soon dangled a 
carrot alongside this stick, promising teachers better benefits if they opposed 
student organ izing.93
The fecsm put on a brave fight, but by the end of September, it was clear 
that they could not stop the restructuring. Its leadership reaffirmed its com-
mitment to the rural normal system, declaring it would remain firm in its 
fight for educational access, and demanded that the government continue 
to recognize the federation as an autonomous organ ization representing 
rural normal students.94 But their strug gle became a defensive one, reduced 
now to securing enrollment for  those expelled for protesting the reform. 
Distress— the sense that a major  battle, and perhaps the war, had been lost— 
pervaded the fecsm leadership. To the extent that the 1960s marked the 
explosion of youth mobilization, this blow to rural normales was even more 
crushing. Saúl López de la Torre, from the rural normal of Mactumactzá in 
Chiapas, vividly evoked the leadership’s sentiment in the wake of the restruc-
turing: “During the first week of November, I attended what would be the 
last fecsm convention of that period. The meeting— more like a funeral 
than a national po liti cal assembly— took place in a small establishment in 
the historic center of Mexico City. No more than twenty of us from diff er ent 
parts of the country came to discuss the path we’d take in light of the new 
power relations.”95
210 Chapter Seven
What the fecsm lost with the system’s restructuring was not teacher train-
ing spots.  Those numbers would ostensibly remain the same, albeit confined to 
half as many schools. The true loss, as a fecsm leader explained, was the means 
to politicize and or ga nize students starting at the ju nior high school age. “As 
of 1970, when the reform went into effect, the fecsm had six thousand fewer 
members and a reserve of only two school years in which to po liti cally prepare 
students to sustain the national organ ization. This was without a doubt one of 
the most intelligent acts that the education authorities could have undertaken. 
In one fell swoop, they decimated the best- organized forces that the in de pen-
dent and demo cratic student movement preserved  after 1968.”96
the 1969 restructuring of rural normales stands as a watershed mo-
ment in normalista narratives, even for  those who did not experience it di-
rectly. Time and again, students cited the elimination of fourteen rural nor-
males as official retaliation against a network of schools that produced unruly 
subjects. Given the 1968 student protest in the capital, their logic goes, Pres-
ident Díaz Ordaz was proactive in stifling  those poised to take up its man-
tle. In their accounts, normalistas rarely, if ever, mention the accompanying 
academic mea sures. Even the additional year of study that postponed their 
receipt of a salary—in the moment a significant grievance— merits scant at-
tention de cades  later. Such an interpretation, and the outsized role that po-
liti cal action plays in normalista memories in general, reveals both objective 
and subjective realities. In the case of the former, it shows the extent to which 
leftist ideological formation constituted a part of school life— a parallel cur-
riculum, as one study termed it.97 The elimination of half of the country’s 
normales also served to confirm the oft- repeated message of student leaders: 
post- Cardenista administrations had no interest in preserving  these insti-
tutions; on the contrary, given the opportunity, they would be eliminated. 
More broadly, this understanding speaks to the 1960s as a de cade of youthful 
mobilization, which, despite scholars’ focus on Mexico City, encompassed 
the entire country, including rural areas.
With regard to subjective realities, emphasizing Díaz Ordaz’s po liti cal 
motivation allows for the possibility that the normalistas, too,  were his-
torical protagonists— even if defeated ones. Given the prominence that 
Tlatelolco has come to occupy in Mexico’s recent po liti cal narrative, it is not 
surprising that rural normalistas tie their own mobilizations and the state’s 
response to this event, especially since,  until the 2014 attack on Ayotzinapa, 
rural normalistas remained largely invisible in national histories of student 
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protest. At a personal level, moreover, highlighting their intrepid spirit of 
re sis tance helps reconcile a basic contradiction between the ideal and the 
real ity of their education and professional trajectory. While rural normales 
 were to gradu ate committed teachers whose missionary duty would have 
them return to the countryside, where they would teach and live among 
the most vulnerable population, gradu ates instead gravitated to urban areas 
where they had greater professional opportunities and a chance at a more 
comfortable life.  Whether or not they continued their po liti cal activism, and 
 whether or not they upheld leftist ideological princi ples, normalistas over-
whelmingly emphasize the noble ideal of the rural normal proj ect. No won-
der they condemn a mea sure that curtailed it.
Less evident in their oral histories but pervasive in the documents pro-
duced at the time are the fundamentally diff er ent assumptions  under which the 
fecsm and the education authorities operated. Both recognized deficiencies in 
rural normales and the extent to which  limited resources aggravated the prob-
lem. For students, this financial neglect was representative of the state’s larger 
disregard for campesinos. The prob lems  were structural and demanded radical 
action, mea sures that seemed pos si ble based on the Cardenista past and the rev-
olutionary pre sent. In a de cade marked by global student movements and anti-
colonial and anti- imperialist strug gles, in which the Cuban Revolution figured 
prominently as a socialist example, this is hardly surprising. In both universities 
and normal schools, Marxism, relayed an alarmist U.S. embassy report, was the 
dominant framework by which students understood their real ity.98
For the sep, the shortcomings at rural normales  were symptomatic 
of larger prob lems within the teacher- training system, to be resolved 
through updated pedagogical methods, professional efficiency, appeals to 
self- sacrifice, and better instilling of moral and civic values. While sep 
authorities dismissed student calls for structural transformation as based 
on youthful idealism, their own emphasis that normalistas  ought to demon-
strate a selfless spirit of ser vice was itself an idealistic appeal, compelling 
teachers to renounce basic material comforts in the name of patriotic duty. 
Accepting this condition was the best way to serve a poor nation like Mexico. 
From this perspective it is easy to see why normalistas’ po liti cal involvement 
constituted such an obstacle to professional efficiency. Not only did it give 
students the ideological tools with which the challenge the state, but it took 
them away from classes, disrupted the smooth  running of institutions, and 
produced constant obstacles to state dictums.  Whether po liti cally motivated 
or not, halving the rural normal system constituted a means to curtail this 
challenge.
 “when we arrived at the normal of Tamazulapan, the environment was 
very hostile,” recalled Elsa Guzmán, who began her studies  there in 1970. “I 
think [school] authorities took their task very seriously, and some of the staff 
thought they had all the power over us.” Guzmán spoke of verbal abuse, in-
sults, and general mistreatment— a painful environment that hurt students’ 
self- esteem. “We endured it for two years,  until it became intolerable. When 
I was in my third year, we started meeting in the bathrooms. At first it was 
just two of us, then three, four. That’s how we’d meet . . .  clandestinely, with 
the lights off.” When their secret meetings reached twenty  people, they de-
cided it was time to call a strike, to lead the rest of the student body in a 
walkout. “If  people joined us, then we’d made it; other wise, we knew we’d be 
expelled.”1 Much to their surprise, their peers followed. So began the pro cess 
of reconstituting the Mexican Federation of Socialist Campesino Students 
(fecsm).
The 1969 reform that converted fourteen of the twenty- nine rural nor-
males into technical agricultural schools and separated the secundaria from 
the professional training stands as a traumatic moment in normalista mem-
ories. The reform decimated the rural normal system by reducing the num-
ber of schools, constraining their geographic reach, and curtailing the years 
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students spent at the institutions (map 8.1). That the Ministry of Public 
Education (sep) implemented this transformation in the wake of the 1968 
Tlatelolco massacre rendered po liti cal a purportedly educational reform. 
The changes came with a tightened control over the student body—an iron 
fist, as one intelligence officer characterized it. School administrators pro-
hibited student associations, and officials refused to recognize the fecsm as 
a mediating body.2
This chapter examines the rural normales in the aftermath of the 1969 
reform amid the po liti cal fallout generated by the Tlatelolco massacre. It 
traces the pro cess by which the fecsm reconstituted itself and the nature of 
rural normalistas’ po liti cal involvement in the 1970s. This de cade saw impor-
tant transformations for the student body. Most significantly, the federation 
that reemerged was more militant but also more fractured. This quality 
was itself a product of the contradictory po liti cal environment in which it 
regrouped. President Luis Echeverría (1970–76),  eager to repair the belea-
guered image of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (pri), embarked on a 
series of reforms. Seeking to portray himself as an heir to Lázaro Cárdenas’s 
legacy, Echeverría declared education expansion and land re distribution 
two cornerstones of his administration. He also touted a demo cratic open-
ing, lowered the voting age, and freed po liti cal prisoners— many of whom 
had languished in jail since the  labor strug gles of the 1950s. Echeverría also 
sought to revive Mexico’s revolutionary credentials by providing asylum to 
 those fleeing Augusto Pinochet’s Chile and taking a leadership role in Third 
World politics. This context provided some breathing room for the fecsm 
and contributed to its ability to regroup and, eventually, regain sep recogni-
tion. Most remarkably, it enabled the construction of a new rural normal in 
Amilcingo, Morelos.
But the pri’s new face had its limits. Echeverría maintained the state’s 
repressive apparatus— and not only against radicals, a fact vividly demon-
strated with the 1971 police and paramilitary attack on student demonstra-
tors in Mexico City. The operation left two dozen dead and more than a 
hundred injured.3 In the sierra of Guerrero, the regime that sought to re-
vive Cárdenas’s legacy encountered guerrillas led by rural teachers, the very 
figureheads of 1930s Cardenista policy. Lucio Cabañas, a 1963 Ayotzinapa 
gradu ate and former fecsm general secretary, took up arms  after a series 
of government massacres blocked his effort at peaceful protest. In response, 
the state unleashed its full might, a dirty war that forcibly displaced, killed, 
tortured, or dis appeared hundreds of campesinos.4




4 Cañada Honda, Aguascalientes
5 Hecelchakán, Campeche
6 Mactumactzá, Chiapas
7 El Mexe, Hidalgo
8 Panotla, Tlaxcala
9 El Quinto, Sonora
10 San Marcos, Zacatecas
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13 Tenería, Mexico State
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15 Tiripetío, Michoacán
Source: “Escuelas Normales Rurales,” August 18, 1969, Archivo General de la Nación, Dirección 
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It is not surprising that Echeverría resorted to such brutal force. He had 
been,  after all, part of the inner circle that presided over the Tlatelolco mas-
sacre. Nor is it surprising that his populist attempts to reform the economy 
failed. In this latter effort, he was hampered not only by three de cades of eco-
nomic policy that favored industry, agribusiness, and the urban sector but by 
elites intent on preventing changes to a system from which they had bene-
fited so handily. As Echeverría came to be besieged by northern industrialists 
and right- wing ele ments of the  middle class, his administration increasingly 
tried to characterize normalistas’ protest as antirevolutionary.5  Under the 
logic that any protest against the president ultimately fortified reactionar-
ies, the sep painted leftist normalistas as “instruments of a fascist pro cess.”6 
 These allegations had  little staying power. But the official demonization of 
their schools persisted and, in fact, was cemented during the 1970s. Nor-
malistas’ new tactics— which included commandeering buses and setting 
up roadblocks— made them increasingly vis i ble to an urban public and fed 
the view of them as disruptive troublemakers whose last priority was to 
study. That their schools became recruiting grounds for clandestine groups 
branded rural normales as guerrilla seedbeds, a label that persists to the pre-
sent. As the 1970s wore on and new educational reforms created a byzantine 
teacher- training system in which private and state (as opposed to federal) 
normales increasingly crowded the institutional landscape, rural normales 
distinguished themselves ever more by the militancy of their students.
 “THE REACTION OF THE COMPAÑERAS WAS FIERCE”
The 1969/70 academic year was turbulent at rural normales. Unable to 
halt their schools’ restructuring, normalistas disrupted its implementa-
tion. It took some time for the education authorities to gain control of the 
situation; when they did, it was through draconian disciplinary mea sures, 
including the prohibition of student associations. “The crisis was terrible,” 
remembered Marcos José García, who in the fall of 1969 began his studies 
in Reyes Mantecón, a rural normal in Oaxaca, now turned into a technical 
agricultural school. The environment left him unsettled. “I got very scared 
and went home. . . .  When I came back a month  later, the situation was 
calmer.”7 Or so it seemed. Tensions bubbled up as collective rage. “When 
[sep] officials arrived,  there would be war in the cafeteria,” recalled Aristarco 
Aquino Solís, a student from Mactumactzá. “It started slowly, with pieces of 
bread. One visiting official ended up doused in coffee.”8 Elsa Guzmán spoke of 
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similar moments in Champusco, Puebla, where she was first transferred in 
the wake of the restructuring. When the general secretary of normal educa-
tion, Ramón Bonfil, visited the school, “the reaction of the compañeras was 
fierce. Plates started flying. The man left covered in food. . . .  The aggression 
was strong; they even threatened to close the school  because of that action.”9 
At San Marcos, Zacatecas, the outbursts at cafeterias went further, with stu-
dents hurling dishes, overturning  tables, and slamming furniture, a mess they 
 were all made to clean up.10
The sources of this pent-up resentment  were many. Not only did the 
tightened control elicit authoritarian practice, but it increased graft. With 
no student associations to oversee them, teachers, administrators, and staff 
could more easily extract food funds, resources, and boarding- school sup-
plies. Reconstituting the fecsm in this environment was no easy task. The 
intensity of the 1969 re sis tance and the normalistas’ inability to prevent 
the system’s restructuring exhausted their energies and dampened morale.11 
Some of the most active student leaders had been expelled or had joined 
guerrilla strug gles.  Those completing their last year of study  were especially 
hesitant to participate in strikes or to engage in other acts of re sis tance since 
 doing so jeopardized the timely receipt of their diplomas.12
But an undercurrent of discontent persisted. Organ izing efforts at indi-
vidual schools soon overlapped with  those of delegates who sought to re-
constitute the fecsm nationally. The pro cesses fed off one another. Only if 
students gathered sufficient organ izing capacity at individual schools could 
federation delegates force the sep to the negotiating  table. In Mexico City, 
students from vari ous rural normales had been meeting since the summer of 
1970.  Little came of it  until 1972, when they united rural normales  behind 
a set of demands consisting of freedom of association (including facilitating 
the conditions  under which fecsm delegates could travel to national meet-
ings); increased food rations, stipends, scholarships, and teachers; and the 
resignation of rural education director Lucio López Iriarte for his “despotic, 
arbitrary, and inept” policies.13
Normalista delegates presented this list of demands to the sep in July 1972, 
but not  until November, when all rural normales went on strike, did the au-
thorities respond, agreeing to raise food amounts and stipends but deferring 
the other  matters to a  later date.14 Still,  these two concessions stood as a vic-
tory. Rural normales had presented a united front and brought the sep to the 
bargaining  table. By meeting with fecsm delegates, the sep had again recog-
nized it as a legitimate representative body. The student group moved quickly 
to or ga nize a reconstituting congress in December. Seventy- five  representatives 
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from the fifteen rural normales attended this meeting at Tenería in Mexico 
State.15 The fecsm soon achieved another victory, the removal of López 
Iriarte, whom they accused of systematically rejecting any petition brought 
before him.16
 These nationally coordinated efforts overlapped with a series of mobili-
zations at individual normales. In Saucillo the normalistas pressured for the 
readmittance of two students expelled for protesting the 1969 reform; in San 
Marcos students ousted the director, whose authoritarianism had crossed 
a line when he struck a student; Mactumactzá and Tiripetío followed, the 
former  running off their director for fund mismanagement and the latter 
for negligence.17 Telling with regard to how students experienced the reasser-
tion of their power are the words of Elsa Guzmán, whose story opened this 
chapter: “We came together to fight for our freedom, our autonomy to again 
or ga nize ourselves and the normal. . . .  It then fell to me to tell the assistant 
principal who mistreated us and the teacher who groped students that they 
had twenty- four hours to abandon the school.”18
The fecsm made headway on both material and po liti cal demands. The 
latter involved a lenient absence policy for delegates, whose duties meant fre-
quent travel and who would other wise lose their right to take final exams.19 
Normalistas also achieved impor tant concessions in agrarian disputes in-
volving their schools. Significantly, such victories benefited neighboring 
campesino communities as much as the normales themselves. In 1974, for ex-
ample, students from Tenería secured the restitution of sixty- three hectares 
of land that they proposed be cultivated by landless campesinos, alongside 
whom the students would work to fulfill their agricultural training require-
ment. The campesinos, in turn, would keep the harvested crops.20 Likewise, 
in 1975, in the rural normal of El Mexe, where teachers had appropriated 
land meant for agricultural training, students mobilized to turn it over to 
the neighboring campesinos.21 In other instances, normalistas secured sup-
port from rural dwellers to preserve or expand their schools. For example, 
in Sonora, when the sep sought to transfer the rural normal of El Quinto 
to Guesave, Sinaloa,  because it did not have enough land, students opposed 
to the move convinced campesinos in the surrounding area to donate the 
required acreage in return for compensation by agrarian authorities.22
More broadly, the fecsm assessed the national context to formulate a 
path of strug gle beyond school walls. In their 1974 conference in Mactumac-
tzá, 250 normalistas debated strategies for broader popu lar engagement and 
named commissions charged with approaching workers, campesinos, and 
the poor in order to better understand their prob lems and support their 
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strug gles.23 At individual schools students had already made concerted efforts 
to participate in popu lar mobilizations. The list was long. In January 1973 the 
federation convened a meeting in Tiripetío to determine how best to aid 
striking sugarcane laborers in Veracruz; the following year, students from El 
Mexe sent sugar, beans, and coffee to striking cement workers in Tula, Hi-
dalgo, and  later joined the workers as they attempted a factory takeover; in 
northern Mexico, students from Aguilera and Saucillo supported and par-
ticipated in campesino land takeovers.24 Mactumactzá students aided mill 
workers at Maderas de Comitán as they formed an in de pen dent  union, and 
 those from Tenería supported the workers at the Radio Majestic factory in 
the nearby state of Tlaxcala when they sought higher wages; in Hecelchakán, 
Campeche, normalistas mobilized against the hike in bus fares.25 Telling of 
such support for workers, one intelligence report— after listing the vari-
ous agrarian, worker, and civil servants (burócratas) strug gles in Chiapas— 
commented, “Of course, all of  these movements are spearheaded by students 
of the state’s rural normal.”26  These actions represented a continuation of 
rural normalistas’ engagement with popu lar strug gles and, while sporadic, 
added ele ments of praxis to the revolutionary theory they read and discussed 
in their po liti cal study groups.
Internally, the fecsm attempted to make some changes in its orga-
nizational structure, though the degree to which it underwent substantive 
change is unclear. At their 1974 conference in Mactumactzá, Chiapas, del-
egates discussed proposals for a less hierarchical organ ization, one in which 
the national council became a coordinating body and the secretary general 
a mediator rather than a figurehead charged with decision- making. The po-
sition, moreover, would be subject to more frequent rotation. Conference 
proceedings also indicated the need for more deliberate and systematic 
study of Marxism- Leninism to best “direct the strug gle of the working and 
lower classes” when conditions  were ripe. Fi nally, during this conference the 
delegates voted to assume the repre sen ta tion of the technical agricultural 
schools, the rural normales that had become ju nior high schools with the 
1969 reform.27 The arrangement was short- lived, partly  because of the strong 
retaliation of the education authorities, who tracked normalista organizers 
and,  after their first joint national strike, expelled close to nine hundred se-
cundaria students.28 In a volatile environment also characterized by fissures 
within the fecsm itself, repre sen ta tion of the secundarias proved untenable.
By some mea sures the fecsm that came together in the early 1970s was 
more militant but its divisions more salient. Still, if 1969 stands as a moment 
of defeat, the protest actions of the early 1970s evoke a sense of renewed student 
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power, whose manifestations went from outbursts of rage, to strikes, to sol-
idarity campaigns with workers and campesinos, to direct action in which 
students commandeered buses or mounted roadblocks. The most radical 
joined armed movements. In this context, divisions over strategy, ideological 
debates, and orga nizational allegiances became more accentuated and drove 
wedges between militant groups and the general student body. Four  factors 
contributed to this tendency. First, the restructuring of rural normales from 
six- year institutions that included both secundaria and professional train-
ing to four- year teacher- training schools reduced the age span of the student 
body and shortened the amount of time students spent  there. This effectively 
diminished the fecsm’s time frame for recruitment, ideological continuity, 
and orga nizational training. Second, for individuals anxious for change, ac-
tions such as commandeering buses or collaborating with guerrillas provided 
an outlet that came at the cost of the slower, piecemeal work involved in con-
sciousness raising and collective organ izing. Such activity, in turn, gave the 
government and media outlets more ammunition with which to demonize 
the rural normalistas, who  were often presented as marauding youth gangs. 
During the fecsm’s 1974 conference in Chiapas, for example, a San Cris-
tóbal de las Casas radio announcer took to the airwaves to warn parents that 
students from rural normales and a group of indigenous  people— whose mo-
bilization in the neighboring town normalistas had supported— planned to 
attack kindergartens and elementary schools with stones and Molotov cock-
tails. In response, principals closed the schools as anxious parents picked up 
their kids. “The report was false,” wrote an intelligence officer  later. “No stu-
dents from the rural normales  were in the vicinity of the elementary schools, 
nor  were  there any incidents  there.”29
Third, the government stepped up its efforts to co- opt students. The So-
cialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, pst), which 
one 1970s normalista characterized as “neither a party, nor socialist, nor of 
workers,” was one vehicle for recruitment into state circles. “They  were of a 
filiation very close to the pri,” explained Marcos José García from Tiripetío, 
where the pst’s efforts  were especially strong. “They  were practically the left 
wing of the pri. They would go to normales to co- opt . . .  [and] conjure up 
conflicts, divisions.”30 In 1975 the fecsm itself denounced government and 
education authorities for using the party to undermine the federation’s long 
history of strug gle.31 The pst began recruiting members at rural normales 
and gained strength through its ability to curry  favor with high- level sep 
officials.32 In schools like Tiripetío, El Mexe, Hecelchakán, and Mactumac-
tzá, its affiliates soon claimed to have ousted the fecsm as a representative 
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body.33 In 1976 the pst planned a national constituting conference in El 
Mexe to wrest control away from the fecsm.34 While ultimately unsuccess-
ful in supplanting the fecsm at the national level, the pst’s actions led to 
considerable division among the student body.
Fi nally, despite initial sep concessions that allowed the fecsm to regroup, 
the education authorities soon moved forward with stricter regulations on 
collective action. Any strikes of five continuous days or ten aggregated ones 
would result in the suspension of classes, declared a 1976 sep regulation. 
Students would thus lose credit for the entire semester. Modifications to the 
school calendar made in previous de cades to account for days lost to strikes 
would now be disallowed, preventing students from making up the time.35 
The only option would be to repeat the year. “Young students, you should 
stop and think!” declared the head of teacher- training education, “the schools 
and universities that the sons and  daughters of the rich attend do not miss any 
days. It is noteworthy that the more the academic indicators in our own schools 
descend, the better they remain in universities and institutions of higher culture.” 
Tinged with class contempt, the statement further asserted that student mo-
bilizations elicited hostility among surrounding populations, undermined 
institutions emanating from the revolution, and led earnest students to drop 
out and militant ones to be expelled, thus undermining the teaching profes-
sion more generally.36
In this way, while the fecsm was able to regroup, sep authorities also 
stepped up their efforts to foment a black legend about rural normales. The 
proliferation of guerrilla groups throughout the country and their connec-
tion to rural normales (discussed  later in this chapter) further facilitated the 
criminalization of  these students and their schools. That Echeverría provided 
vis i ble concessions to campesinos and students— such as the recognition of 
the new rural normal in Amilcingo— reinforced the impression that mili-
tant normalistas  were being unreasonable.
 “AN ACT OF JUSTICE TO MEXICO’S AGRARIAN MOVEMENT”
Remarkably, given the 1969 closing of half of the rural normales, the com-
munity of Amilcingo, Morelos, pushed through the creation of a new one 
in 1974.37 The population of Amilcingo, located on the state’s eastern border 
with Puebla, consisted mainly of subsistence farmers and seasonal agricul-
tural workers. Spearheaded by Eva Rivera, a local elementary schoolteacher 
and a 1957 gradu ate of the rural normal of Palmira, and Vinh Flores, a mem-
ber of the Youth Communist Party, the initiative brought together actors of 
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vari ous po liti cal stripes. Rivera belonged to the local evangelical church and 
recruited support among its members, including Benedicto Rosales Olivar, 
the president of the ejido association, and Justo Rivera, a local town council 
assistant. Other municipal authorities associated with the pri, like Nabor 
Barrera, also joined the effort.38 This small, unlikely group of evangelicals, 
communists, and priístas (official party members) put together a makeshift 
teacher- training school whose classes began in Amilcingo’s municipal build-
ing, where teachers from Rivera’s school volunteered their time imparting 
eve ning classes. Flores recruited students from nearby communities, many 
of whom  were initially  housed by campesinos and, in exchange, helped with 
farming tasks. Twenty- six students passed through Rivera’s home alone. As 
enrollment increased, the school moved to the town’s evangelical  temple. 
Soon the initiative came to the attention of students at other rural normales. 
Pedagogical material arrived from Tamazulapan, Oaxaca; mattresses from 
Tenería, Mexico State; and fecsm delegates from El Quinto, Sonora. Call-
ing itself a normal rural popu lar, in its first few months, the school had a 
constant, if unstable, flow of students.39
In the first few months of operation, the school’s main challenges  were lo-
gistical: providing room and board for students, finding adequate classrooms, 
managing the informal personnel, and retaining a stable student body. Only 
official sep recognition would bring the necessary resources to address  these 
 matters, not to mention legitimize the gradu ates’ diplomas. The school’s fed-
eralization thus became the next goal, a  battle that the fecsm joined. The 
federation’s involvement strengthened the movement as rural normalistas 
from across the country traveled to Amilcingo, or ga nized community bri-
gades, and incorporated the school’s recognition into the demand list they 
issued to the sep.40 As the mobilizations in  favor of the school picked up 
pace, so did official opposition. On March 21, 1974, for example, normalistas 
and community members held a joint demonstration in Cuautla, where Eva 
Rivera figured visibly as a speaker and or ga nizer. In the following days, the 
local school inspector ordered her transfer from Amilcingo to a remote com-
munity in the southern part of the state.41
Rivera’s removal triggered the first of several fissures in the movement. 
Some ejidatarios blamed the normalistas for the government’s retaliation. 
Since the students’ arrival, the town had begun to see graffiti reading “Long 
live Lucio Cabañas” and “The guerrillas are the  people.” Indeed, at a Cuautla 
demonstration, the normalistas had shouted antigovernment proclamations 
and handed out leaflets in support of Lucio Cabañas’s guerrilla group.42 Such 
proclamations made many locals ner vous. Undeterred, the fecsm pressed 
222 Chapter Eight
forward, calling a strike of rural normalistas in support of the normal’s rec-
ognition and the restitution of Flores to her original post.43 Despite tensions, 
they planned a joint community- student march from Amilcingo to the sep’s 
offices in Mexico City on May  5, 1974. Their cause drew support from stu-
dents at the Autonomous Universities of Guerrero, Zacatecas, Yucatán, and 
Puebla, as well as the agricultural schools of Chapingo, Delicias, Iguala, and 
Venecia.44 In de pen dent campesino organ izations also responded to the call for 
support. When the marchers reached the city of Cuautla, they encountered a 
commission that included Morelos governor Felipe Rivera Crespo and nor-
mal education secretary Víctor Hugo Bolaños. Backed by an army dispatch, 
the state officials convinced the participants to call off the march and enter 
into negotiations.45 By the end of May, the authorities agreed to support the 
construction of a  women’s normal—to be named Emiliano Zapata— “an act 
of justice to Mexico’s agrarian movement and its principal proponent.”46 A 
committee made up of sep members, students, and campesinos was tasked 
with obtaining the required fifty hectares on which to build the school. 
Within less than a month, the ejidatarios had agreed to provide just shy of 
that amount (49.83 hectares).47 Campesinos and rural normalistas from vari-
ous schools cleared and prepared the land for construction, with students 
forming brigades to procure food donations to sustain the volunteers.48
The pro cess was anything but smooth. Not all members of the ejido asso-
ciation had supported their land’s expropriation. While the initial disagree-
ments  were resolved within the ejidatario council, conflict bubbled up again 
during the compensation pro cess.49 Objections  were practical as well as po-
liti cal. The land that the agrarian authorities offered in exchange was farther 
away, and the distance represented a hardship for farmers. Po liti cally, opposi-
tion came from  those who sympathized with the Popu lar Socialist Party, op-
posed as it was to an initiative spearheaded by communists on the one hand 
(such as Vinh Flores) and priístas (municipal and ejido authorities) on the 
other. Such conflicts soon turned violent and before the de cade’s end left all 
but one of the leaders dead. Benedicto Rosales Olivar, the head of the ejido 
association and a strong proponent of the school, was the first victim, shot 
in the back just outside his home on November 12, 1975. A year  later, Vinh 
Flores, the young communist and key protagonist of the initiative, was found 
dead, killed alongside his  uncle in the neighboring region of Puebla.50 Ru-
mors placed the blame for  these murders on local gunmen protected by state 
authorities.51 Given official disinterest in pursuing an investigation, three 
campesinos who had fought alongside Flores took justice into their own 
hands, killing his alleged murderers. This crime the authorities did pursue, 
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apprehending and torturing  those responsible.52 Two years  later, the murders 
continued with the killing of Nabor Barrera, the president of the newly cre-
ated municipality of Temoac and an early supporter of the Amilcingo nor-
mal initiative.53 The presumed intellectual and material authors responsible 
for slaying the school proponents  were themselves killed in 1979.54
 There  were other troubling dynamics. Conflicts within the student body 
developed during its first federally operated school year. Some of the stu-
dents sought to maintain a close relationship with Amilcingo’s community 
members, while a rival group wanted decisions made  under the rubric of 
institutional autonomy. This conflict stifled  future grassroots collaboration 
between the community and the school, the very solidarity that first gave 
the initiative strength. As it evolved, the school- community relationship 
became more functionalist. The normal provided educational opportuni-
ties for the  daughters of the local population—70   percent of its student 
body came from Morelos, with the rest hailing from Guerrero, Puebla, and 
Oaxaca.55 Moreover, the staffing and administrative positions went to the 
Amilcingo population, providing a much- needed source of employment. In 
addition, the normalistas undertook their student teaching in the local ele-
mentary schools and or ga nized festivities surrounding civic holidays.56
As with other rural normales, Amilcingo developed a strong activist tradi-
tion. National fecsm delegates immediately or ga nized a student committee 
 there. Ever determined to ensure a presence in all normales, the fecsm ap-
pealed to students by invoking education both as an opportunity for material 
security and as a popu lar vindication. Xóchitl García, who began her studies 
in Amilcingo a year  after its founding and was active in the student associa-
tion, remembered, “Our compañeros helped and at the same time pushed us 
to learn. They said that it  wasn’t just about arriving once the  table was set, or 
about just becoming teachers. It was about participating [in the strug gle] so 
that it could be stronger, so that more students could arrive and continue to 
have professional opportunities, to change the country, to feed their families, 
and to help the  people.”57
In the Morelos countryside, such messages found fertile ground, and even 
if the Amilcingo community did not participate in the decision- making 
structure of the new school, the students who studied  there engaged— 
indeed, often had ties to— local histories of strug gle. Xóchitl García is a case 
in point. The  daughter of a prominent Jaramillista— a campesino movement 
that in preceding de cades had fought for agrarian rights through  legal and 
armed strug gle— García was no stranger to the state’s repressive apparatus. 
Not only had Rubén Jaramillo, the movement’s leader, been massacred by 
224 Chapter Eight
the army alongside his wife and three sons a de cade  earlier, but García’s own 
 father had been the victim of a brutal attack by hired gunmen.58 To García 
and the politicized student body of the normal, the fate of activists like Vinh 
Flores confirmed the repressive nature of the state, not to mention the pre-
cious quality of social gains, which more often than not came at the cost of 
 human life. With no formal accountability for the murders of local activists, 
their fate came to be understood within the pattern of vio lence meted out 
to community leaders. As García stated about Flores, “He was a brave man 
of the countryside who did not get to see the culmination of the normal 
 because he was assassinated. We found out  later— because the truth was hid-
den for a long time— that it was the state government that had him killed. . . . 
They ambushed him alongside the person he was with. . . .  They massacred 
them out in the fields and left them  there like animals.”59 Amilcingo’s student 
committee would take its name from the slain leader, and  today a large mural 
in the school’s cafeteria honors him along with Nabor Barrera and Benedicto 
Rosales Olivar, the two other local leaders who fought for the school’s cre-
ation and  were killed in the ensuing years.60
In both its victory and the lives lost to secure it, the rural normal of Amilc-
ingo pre sents a vivid example of the achievements and sacrifices of re sis tance 
movements. The timing of its creation symbolized Echeverría’s proclaimed 
commitment to education and to the countryside. Seen in a long- term con-
text, it displayed the pri’s tried- and- true carrot- and- stick strategy. But Ech-
everría’s populist mea sures and po liti cal reforms could not erase his close as-
sociation with the Tlatelolco massacre. And if to many 1968 symbolized the 
point of no return in the move from reformist to armed tactics, the 1969 deci-
mation of the rural normales further reinforced the logic of guerrilla strug gle 
since it signaled a large- scale strategy of containment against student move-
ments. Faced with the opportunity to join or aid clandestine groups, many 
rural normalistas took it. Some viewed their choice as a moral imperative, 
 others as a logical action since they had been expelled, and yet  others as the 
most effective way to create change. Regardless of the motivation, the rural 
normales’ history, militant tradition, and presence throughout the country 
would make them both recruiting grounds and hubs of guerrilla support.
 “TO CHANGE THE WORLD”
If the 1965 guerrilla attack on the military barracks of Madera, Chihuahua, 
had already revealed the symbolic and material link between armed strug gle 
and rural normales, the vari ous guerrilla groups that emerged throughout 
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the country in the wake of 1968 solidified this connection. The Revolution-
ary Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria, mar), the 
23rd of September Communist League (Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre), 
the National Revolutionary Civic Association, and the Party of the Poor— 
itself led by a gradu ate of the rural normal of Ayotzinapa— all included rural 
normalistas as  either participants or support networks. The proliferation of 
guerrilla groups in Mexico was another symptom of the pri’s legitimacy cri-
sis. Even before the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, state repression had led popu-
lar leaders to take up arms. Rubén Jaramillo in Morelos, Arturo Gámiz and 
Pablo Gómez in Chihuahua, and Genaro Vázquez and Lucio Cabañas in 
Guerrero had all resorted to armed strug gle when the state’s targeted perse-
cution and campesino massacres closed other ave nues of protest. October 2 
uncovered this real ity for the urban, middle- class public, leading many uni-
versity students to pursue a similar route.
For many student insurgents, the international context was equally 
significant. Since 1959 the Cuban Revolution had inspired hope about the 
possibilities of socialist revolution. Anticolonial strug gles in Asia and Africa 
vividly showcased Third World actors as protagonists of liberation, while the 
war in Vietnam laid bare the brutal nature of U.S. imperialism. In Eu rope, 
Japan, and the United States, internal protest showed that the First World 
was hardly the model modernization theorists had long maintained. And in 
both life and death, Ernesto “Che” Guevara stubbornly stoked the youthful 
imagination.
During the 1970s  there  were twenty- nine guerrilla organ izations in Mexico, 
together involving 1,860 participants.61 The mar, the 23rd  of September 
Communist League, and the groups led by Vázquez and Cabañas in Guer-
rero most intersected with the rural normales. Initiated by about a dozen 
students, most of whom belonged to the Communist Youth Cadre, the mar 
dated back to the mid-1960s, spurred in no small mea sure by the repression 
at schools outside the capital. In Michoacán many had congregated in the 
Nicolaita Student House, living quarters for out- of- town university students 
and the place where rural normalistas from La Huerta and Tiripetío took 
refuge during their re sis tance to the 1969 normal restructuring.62 Some of 
the mar’s initial participants had studied in the Soviet Union’s Patricio Lu-
mumba University and would  later receive training in North  Korea, which 
during the 1960s and 1970s supported liberation strug gles throughout Asia, 
Africa, and Latin Amer i ca. The mar conceived of itself as the vanguard 
group that would eventually lead Mexico’s socialist revolution.63 It first 
sought training in Cuba, but the island’s close diplomatic relationship with 
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Mexico kept it from lending support. North  Korea, which then sought to 
foster a policy of guerrilla internationalism, eagerly took them in and from 
1969 to 1970 lent military training to fifty- three mar members.64 Upon 
their return, in conjunction with other armed groups, the mar saw its task 
as accelerating the conditions for a popu lar uprising. By the early 1970s, with 
almost a hundred members, it had a presence in at least ten states and the 
Federal District.65
From Chihuahua, rural normalistas like Alma Gómez Caballero and Her-
minia Gómez Carrasco, students from Saucillo and  daughters of the activist 
teachers Pablo Gómez and Raúl Gómez respectively, joined the mar. 
Gómez Carrasco’s involvement with the mar began while she was studying 
at Saucillo. Long active in campesino mobilizations, whose land takeovers 
she participated in, she was expelled in October  1969 for taking part in a 
commemoration of the 1968 student massacre. “By then, a compañero from 
Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, . . .  had already recruited us to be part of the Revolu-
tionary Action Movement,” she recalled. “We  were  going to join once we fin-
ished at the normal; we  weren’t  going to just grab a gun and leave. But since 
they expelled me . . .  I went to Mexico City and from  there to North  Korea, 
where we received military training as part of the mar. We  were  there a year 
and then returned as an armed group—to change the world!”66
Individual normalistas’ reasons for joining or supporting armed move-
ments varied. Gómez Carrasco’s last phrase, a reflection said half in jest, is a 
common frame. Ushering in a better world seemed within arm’s reach, and 
the normalistas— involved in po liti cal action from a young age— wanted to 
be part of that effort. Such impulses reflect a commonsense devotion to po-
liti cal strug gle amplified by radical strains in normalista culture and accen-
tuated by the de cade’s zeitgeist.67 Many specifically cite the 1968 Tlatelolco 
massacre as an event that signaled the close of  legal channels. “ You’re ex-
pressing your right to  free speech,  you’re fighting for your constitutional 
rights, and  you’re defending  simple  things like university autonomy, and the 
government responds with bullets! What message is it sending?!” reflected 
Alma Gómez Caballero, who joined the mar.68 For  those moved but not 
convinced by 1968, the 1969 closure and clampdown at rural normales acted 
as the final push.  Today some think of the decision as naive, while  others 
marvel at the courage it took— a product of youthful temerity, a bravery pos-
si ble since they  were not weighed down by  family responsibilities.
To the extent that  there is a relationship between youth and audacious 
acts, it was the 23rd of September Communist League that most capitalized 
on this propensity. The league, an urban guerrilla group taking its name from 
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the date of the 1965 attack on Chihuahua’s military barracks in Madera, also 
had significant reach in rural normales. Founded in 1973 in Guadalajara, the 
league was the most radical and largest of the guerrilla groups in Cold War 
Mexico, made up of a co ali tion of seven in de pen dent guerrilla groups to-
gether numbering about 450. Its membership was primarily student based.69 
Ideologically, the league saw universities as institutions integral to the pro-
cess of cap i tal ist accumulation. By extension, students  were proletarians. 
The group relied on revolutionary expropriations (bank heists) and kid-
napping of prominent figures— Eugenio Garza Sada, the power ful Mon-
terrey industrialist; José Guadalupe Zuno, the president’s father- in- law; and 
Terrence  G. Leonhardt, the U.S. consul general,  were three of their most 
high- profile abductions. Tactically, the league prioritized po liti cal vio lence 
over grassroots organ izing, and members often found themselves in open 
confrontation with the police. Despite its urban focus, the group did recruit 
and gain adherents in rural normales.70 Elsa Guzmán from Tamazulapan, 
Oaxaca, remembered her collaboration with this group. “As a security mea-
sure, we never asked their names. But  there was this one  woman whom we 
called la maestra, and she was pregnant. She seemed about to give birth, and 
she still trained us in how to use a gun.” Guzmán characterized that training 
as a self- defense mea sure for when she took supplies to guerrillas. At other 
points, Guzmán remembered bringing league members to the normal to eat 
at the cafeteria. “ They’re my aunt and  uncle,” she would respond to anyone 
who asked.71
But it was Lucio Cabañas’s Party of the Poor, a campesino guerrilla group 
based in Guerrero, that became most associated with the rural normales. Not 
only was Cabañas an Ayotzinapa gradu ate, but he had been the head of the 
fecsm in the early 1960s; his fame resounded throughout the rural nor-
mal system, and he himself relied on normalista networks while operating 
clandestinely.72 The character of Cabañas’s guerrilla group, moreover, was 
in some ways closer to rural normalista culture than  either the mar or the 
23rd of September Communist League. A campesino group based in Guer-
rero’s sierra, Cabañas’s Party of the Poor had long defended rural dwellers 
against cacique vio lence, and as a teacher in the Atoyac sierra, Cabañas had 
mobilized for basic reforms for the local population. Cabañas himself traced 
his early po liti cal consciousness to his years at the rural normal. “ Those of us 
from Ayotzinapa, from the rural normal school, would go into all the  little 
towns and everywhere or ga nize demonstrations, bringing the campesinos 
along. Even when we  were leaders in Ayotzinapa, we’d give clothes to the 
poor campesinos who did not have anything to wear and would approach us 
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at Ayotzinapa.” It was at the normal, he  later declared, that their conscious-
ness was born.73
Genaro Vázquez, another Guerrerense schoolteacher (trained at the Na-
tional Teachers School), or ga nized a diff er ent armed group, the National 
Revolutionary Civic Association. A longtime defender of Guerrero’s cam-
pesinos, Vázquez was an early advocate for coffee, coconut, and sesame seed 
growers; spearheaded land invasions; coordinated strug gles for municipal 
democ ratization; participated in Mexico City’s 1950s Revolutionary Teach-
ers Movement; and mobilized against the repressive Guerrero governor Raúl 
Caballero Aburto in 1960. His po liti cal  career shared many characteristics 
with  those of Pablo Gómez and Arturo Gámiz; like them, Vázquez did not 
study at a rural normal, although Ayotzinapa students claim his legacy, viv-
idly showcasing him along with Cabañas in their murals. Specifically citing 
the government’s decimation of the rural normal system, the flyers of the 
National Revolutionary Civic Association beckoned normalistas to “par-
ticipate in the  people’s strug gle and avoid the next blow the government is 
planning against rural normales.”74
That rural teachers like Vázquez and Cabañas commanded armed camp-
esinos in Guerrero, inflicted army losses, and, for several years, defied federal 
operations to capture and subdue them inspired rural normalistas in no small 
mea sure  because they offered a concrete example of retributive justice, di-
rect action, and a revolutionary path to socialism.  These teachers  were living 
incarnations of education as consciousness, of the disquieting attitude that 
 there was more to be done. Still, while many rural normalistas joined guer-
rilla groups, more commonly students aided them with supplies, provided 
cover, or facilitated transportation. Such students often acted of their own 
accord, hiding their deeds not only from school administrators but from the 
student governing council. Elsa Guzmán, a student from the rural normal of 
Tamazulapan, for example, recounted how she and another student aided 
the guerrillas:
We  were in touch with the community of Jamiltepec, the  people who 
had direct contact with Lucio Cabañas. But that was just two of us, and 
it had to be kept a secret. We filled a truckload with blankets and other 
stuff, claiming it was for the campesinos of Jamiltepec. We knew their 
true destination. . . .  We  later received a strong scolding from the student 
council when they found out the length to which we had gone, the extent 
to which we had exposed ourselves,  because we had gone to meetings in 
Jamiltepec and had received a lot of death threats.75
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Intelligence agents also noted that collaboration was more the purview 
of individuals or small groups than a school- wide initiative.76 In fact, while 
normalistas made constant proclamations in support of the guerrilla cause in 
Guerrero, they rejected accusations of outright participation. For example, stu-
dents at the rural normal of Tenería declared, “We may have the same goals 
and ideals, but our type of strug gle is completely diff er ent. Prof. Cabañas 
has chosen an armed movement, and we fight with ideas. In no moment— 
and this should be clear— have we tried to imitate him. So in our institution 
and in the rest in our country,  there  isn’t, as some of the regime’s authori-
ties would have you believe, armament the guerrillas give us.”77 In a public 
demonstration in Chiapas, normalistas from Mactumactzá explic itly decried 
the government branding them guerrillas and rabble- rousers, responding 
that they  were simply students seeking justice for the  people.78 While much 
of the student connection was indeed at the level of ideals, as the normalistas 
claimed, it also behooved  those linked to clandestine groups to deny any 
concrete collaboration since it not only elicited repression but bolstered the 
authorities’ portrayals of rural normales as guerrilla seedbeds.
Flyers from the urban guerrilla group the 23rd  of September Commu-
nist League turned up in the hands of rural normalistas, and on at least two 
occasions the authorities detained individual normalistas for possession of 
modest caches of arms.79 According to a May 1974 intelligence report, Ten-
ería had many participants in the league.80 But the relationship with this 
group was at best fraught. At the rural normal of Tiripetío, Michoacán, for 
example, the student assembly sought to avoid what they characterized as 
the league’s infiltration.81 No  matter the degree of normalista engagement 
with armed strug gle, the government constantly showcased connections and 
thus dismissed normalista protests as  simple cover for violent subversives. 
The students charged that, in fact, the government sponsored infiltrators to 
sow chaos by distributing drugs and holding rowdy social gatherings. Aside 
from painting rural normales in a bad light, such actions, they denounced, 
disrupted fecsm efforts to cultivate po liti cal consciousness.82 In some cases, 
the students themselves identified  these government agents and sought their 
expulsion.83
For the broad student body, it was the guerrilla symbolism they most en-
gaged with. The heroism of armed strug gle provided a significant rallying 
cry, one normalistas evoked within a framework of heroic masculinity. At 
one demonstration, for example, students carried a banner reading, “Did my 
 mother breed a man or a castrated being? Let’s open new guerrilla fronts.”84 
 Women normalistas, too, called on their compañeras to adhere to this model 
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of bravery. In a demonstration in San Juan Chamula, Chiapas, held in con-
cert with the fecsm’s annual convention, one female orator specifically ap-
pealed to  women to incorporate themselves into the revolutionary pro cess 
and join the guerrilla movement in Guerrero.85
The mystique  behind the guerrilla strug gle was compelling. But, over-
all, the relationship between rural normales and armed movements was 
unstable. On the one hand, armed groups found in  these institutions fer-
tile recruiting grounds as well as spaces of refuge and support. On the 
other, the fact that groups like the mar, the 23rd of September Commu-
nist League, and other clandestine organ izations lacked a substantive popu-
lar base,  were highly persecuted, and advocated risky, often- sensationalist 
actions made for a hotly contested and highly contentious relationship be-
tween the student body and insurgent members. Even guerrilla leaders like 
Cabañas cautioned students about the delicate nature of the path of armed 
strug gle.86 That the authorities used students’ relationship to guerrillas as 
a justification for the military takeover of rural normales showed just how 
high the stakes ran. In 1976, for example, the army and police forces ended a 
strike at the rural normal of Atequiza, Jalisco, with a massive show of force. 
The justification was the school’s supposed ties to subversives since one of its 
gradu ates had participated in the 1974 kidnapping of the first lady’s  father.87 
The rural normal of Aguilera, Durango, experienced a similar show of force 
when, on February 27, 1975, the military surrounded the school while the 
judicial police forced students out of the dorms— beating one who resisted. 
In this operation, security forces retrieved the fourteen buses the students 
had sequestered “but found no armament,” reported the intelligence officers, 
“only leftist propaganda.”88 Throughout the country the authorities circu-
lated lists of the “leaders and negative activists,” tracking normalistas so 
closely they listed their seat numbers on buses they took to attend a fecsm 
conference.89 In other instances, the sep attempted to stymie rural normalis-
tas’ contact with “campesinos and the  people more generally” by ordering 
directors to disable schools’ agricultural vehicles so students could not use 
them for transportation. When this action failed, the ministry appealed 
to transit police to detain all rural normal vehicles and prevent their cir-
culation.90 In Guerrero the sep singled out Ayotzinapa normalistas attempt-
ing to or ga nize the ju nior high school students in the neighboring commu-
nity of Tixtla.91 The authorities did not stop at surveillance, and throughout 
the country students denounced the state’s repression, including instances 
of kidnapping, beating, torture, and, in some cases, killing of normalistas.92
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In Guerrero, governor Rubén Figueroa unleashed an undeclared war 
against the rural normal of Ayotzinapa, threatening to turn the institution 
into a tourism school. “ Those rabble- rousing teachers and students  will pack 
their bags and get the hell out of Guerrero,” he declared.93 Official disdain 
for Ayotzinapa continued in the years  after Cabañas’s death, with Figueroa 
and the school principal jointly squashing student organ izing. Even mod-
est acts of student engagement with the local population ran up against the 
state’s wrath. During the summer of 1978, for example, a group of students 
sought to undertake a socioeconomic study of the region to better engage 
with community needs. The school director moved to prevent  these efforts 
by notifying parents to come for their sons, who would other wise be ex-
pelled. If they refused to leave, they would be forcibly removed, and their 
physical integrity could not be guaranteed. The principal also targeted any 
organ izing links among students, teachers, and staff and decreed that if stu-
dents missed more than two classes, they would lose the right to take their 
exams. For students, such mea sures revealed him to be a mere lackey of the 
governor. It was Figueroa who ultimately determined students’ fate, charged 
normalistas, a power the governor made clear by constantly sending the army 
to Ayotzinapa.94
Without concrete figures about the number of normalistas who joined 
the guerrillas compared to students from other educational institutions, it 
is difficult to know for certain if they joined in greater proportion. No guer-
rilla group was made up exclusively of rural normalistas, and the mar and 
the 23rd of September Communist League counted on numerous university 
students. However, some characteristics of rural normales, such as their na-
tionwide web and the autonomy students enjoyed by living far from home, 
rendered them appealing sites for clandestine groups to both recruit and 
seek refuge. Their radical tradition, moreover, made many of their students 
receptive to guerrillas’ message. Significantly, unlike for other schools, the 
narrative that links rural normales with guerrillas persisted. The association 
between  these schools and armed strug gle was heightened by the fact that 
they continue to be hubs of protest, are located outside or on the periphery 
of urban centers, and have a predominantly poor student body that proudly 
claims the legacy of martyred rural teachers like Pablo Gómez, Arturo 
Gámiz, Genaro Vázquez, and Lucio Cabañas. While, of them, only Cabañas 
and Gómez had institutional ties to  these schools, both students and the 
state invoke a connection, albeit in fundamentally diff er ent ways. For stu-
dents, the links to guerrillas stand as a genealogy of re sis tance: from Pancho 
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Villa and Emiliano Zapata, whose revolutionary strug gle brought land and 
education to the poor; to Lázaro Cárdenas’s socialist teachers, who trav-
eled to remote communities with a book in one arm and a  rifle on the other; 
to the daring 1965 assault on the military barracks in Madera, Chihuahua; to 
the 1970s armed movement in Guerrero, rural normales represent centers of 
critical consciousness, the bulwarks of revolution whose restless students are 
the consequence of a besieged countryside (figure 8.1).
From the perspective of the state, rural normales  were once heroic in-
stitutions that produced committed educators whose willingness to forgo 
their own well- being ushered in admirable national achievements. With 
time, however, they developed a sense of privilege that turned the schools 
into agitation hubs with students always demanding more than what a poor 
nation could possibly provide. In the pro cess, normalistas squandered their 
educational opportunity with disruptive acts of protest, uselessly offered 
figure 8.1 Mural at the rural normal of Ayotzinapa, Guerrero. The image of the 
rural teacher with a  rifle over one arm and a book in the other is a common allusion to 
the generation of teachers of the 1920s and 1930s who had to contend with Cristero 
vio lence. Photo graph by author.
 “Clandestinely with the Lights Off” 233
their energies to workers and campesinos, and collaborated dangerously 
with subversives. For President Echeverría, who faced business- class ire for 
his attempts to revive policies of agrarian distribution and social spending, 
the militancy of  these institutions deprived him of support that might 
shore up his credentials as a leftist reformer. The sep thus continuously dis-
missed normalista demands, claiming they served the right’s cause against 
the revolution.
 “IT IS IN YOUR HANDS TO SAVE OR  
DESTROY THE RURAL NORMALES”
As the 1970s wore on, the sep increasingly sought to wrest from the fecsm 
the revolutionary mantle with which the student federation had long de-
fended the rural normales. If the fecsm’s ability to regroup and the sep’s 
recognition of a new rural normal in Amilcingo represented a change from 
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz’s clampdown, over the course of Echeverría’s adminis-
tration, policy  toward rural normalistas would harden. Initial concessions 
had not succeeded in taming the fecsm. On the contrary, within its ranks 
and within the rural normales more generally, guerrilla groups found support 
as well as fertile recruiting ground.  These tendencies the sep addressed by pre-
senting itself as the agency willing to implement the revolution’s mandate of 
popu lar education against a student organ ization that harbored privileged, 
reckless activists who ultimately, went its logic, served a fascist cause.
The sep’s negotiations with the fecsm show an effort to isolate and 
portray it as an entity controlled by outside interests, ones intent on cor-
rupting the consciousness of  future teachers and endangering the rural nor-
males’ very existence.95 In a March 27, 1976, letter to rural normalistas, their 
parents, and all education workers, the secretary and undersecretary of rural 
normal education, together with the principals of sixteen rural normales, at-
tempted to walk back  earlier concessions. The declaration honed in on the 
federation’s demand for a flexible absence policy for its national delegates, 
characterizing it as “exaggerated” and “bourgeois.”  These types of privileges, 
stated the letter, would lead students “to forget their class origin and com-
mitment to the  people.” Pitting the students against the poor communities 
from which they came, it further asserted that such arrangements took “re-
sources away from campesinos” since low- quality teachers represented a “ne-
gation of educational ser vices to the  children of indigenous and campesino 
communities.”96 In the months to come, sep language acquired a particularly 
scathing tone. For example, when responding to a fecsm letter demanding 
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compliance with  earlier agreements, officials caricatured their petition, de-
claring, “How is it pos si ble that students from rural normales, real students, 
are okay with a demand list that includes the privilege of leaders not to study 
and yet receive credit almost as a mere formality? This, when  others must 
comply with all their obligations.”97 It was student organ izing, argued school 
officials over and over, that most threatened and corrupted the existence of 
rural normales, and neither they nor teachers had “the right to endanger the 
institutions that are the patrimony of generations of campesino  children.”98
In a specific attack on normalistas’ propensity to join popu lar strug gles, 
the sep declared that the duty of student revolutionaries was to study. How 
could they possibly privilege “daily contact with culturally marginalized 
groups” over book and classroom- based learning? Would such contact en-
able “a command over mathe matics, the fundamental tool of thought and 
discovery, and the confirmation of nature’s laws?” Rather than participate 
in demonstrations or give speeches that show “a superficial and dogmatic 
view of revolutionary theory,” students should “learn the princi ples and laws 
of physics, chemistry, and the natu ral sciences that  will permit a clear vision 
of the universe, of man, and of how phenomena unfold.”99 What could nor-
malistas possibly learn from the  people, chastised another sep declaration, 
when it was their job as  future teachers to elevate that population’s general 
cultural level?100
Education authorities thus expressed their concern for the peasantry, a 
sector that deserved good teachers, whose commitment to academics would 
keep them in the classroom and away from disorderly popu lar mobilizations. 
For a regime claiming the legacy of Cárdenas, who had vindicated teachers 
as community leaders, this position was, to say the least, ironic. But officials 
went even further in their appropriation of the revolutionary mantle. The 
sep lumped normalistas with the regime’s right- wing foes, accusing them 
of aiding fascism. Echeverría’s attempted international leadership of Third 
World nations further gave the sep license to tout its revolutionary cre-
dentials as it implored students to adopt “the system of work and study that 
existed in nations that stand at the revolution’s vanguard.”101 This position 
the minister of normal education contrasted with rural normalistas’ “igno-
rance, irresponsibility, and childlike be hav ior,” which would ultimately hurt 
their schools and was blind to the ways in which fascism had been imposed 
in many parts of Latin Amer i ca.102 “It is in your hands to save or destroy the 
rural normales,” the minister  later warned the fecsm. “Choose one road or the 
other, but if you select the wrong one and our institutions are abolished,  don’t 
blame  others; you  will be the only ones responsible.”103 Despite the new twist, 
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the sep’s narrative was familiar. The deficiencies in rural education  were of 
the normalistas’ own making. Their actions generated chaos and anarchy and 
stymied teacher quality, ignored a ser vice they owed the nation, and demon-
strated a disregard of their own privilege given the massively coveted spaces 
at rural normales.
But the real threat to rural normales was structural. By the 1970s teach-
ers’ demographic background— where they  were from, where they trained, 
and where they worked— was increasingly urban. The number of private and 
state- funded teacher- training institutions had grown since the 1960s, their 
presence confined almost exclusively to urban areas.  These new normales 
had proliferated in response to an increased demand for teachers as the sep 
expanded elementary and secondary education and offered greater opportu-
nities for professional advancement, making teaching a more attractive pro-
fession.104 In the 1970s, especially as the economic crisis unfolded,  there was 
a glut of teachers— everywhere except in the countryside.
 “CONSTANT REFORM”
Early on, Echeverría declared that Mexico’s revolution demanded “constant 
reform” and that within that pro cess education “holds a special place.”105 
President Díaz Ordaz had already identified education as in need of atten-
tion, but Echeverría’s approach differed. While Díaz Ordaz had sought to 
starve universities into submission, his successor courted them through fi-
nancial largess.106 Echeverría’s administration both increased funding for 
existing institutions, like the National Autonomous University of Mexico, 
and created new ones, such as the Autonomous Metropolitan University, 
a decentralized system with a campus in each of Mexico City’s cardinal 
points. The latter both provided university education for an expanding stu-
dent body and opened a slew of stable teaching and research positions for 
intellectuals and scholars.107 Echeverría also funded new high school– level 
institutions like the Acad emy of Sciences and Humanities— schools linked 
to the National Autonomous University of Mexico whose gradu ates gained 
automatic entrance to the university— and the high school academies meant 
to provide specialized degrees to  those entering the workforce rather than 
the university.
The sep also undertook changes at other educational levels, although 
 these  were less substantive. It rolled out a new elementary school textbook 
program that updated materials issued by President Adolfo López Mateos 
a de cade  earlier.  These new texts aligned the curriculum with the regime’s 
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demo cratic opening and emphasized critical thinking, student potential for 
creativity, and an active learning pro cess.108 To be meaningful, such changes 
would have required a concomitant transformation in the normal system 
that equipped teachers with the tools to appropriately implement the peda-
gogical shift. But at normales this change took place at best superficially since 
few instructors  there  were themselves qualified to teach the new methods.109 
 Needless to say, this pro cess reinforced a number of academic deficiencies.
Educational structures, methods, and the system itself, announced Ech-
everría in his first state- of- the- union address, would undergo a pro cess of 
permanent renovation.110 At teacher- training schools, this translated into a 
series of precipitous curricular changes that often worked at cross- purposes. 
In 1972, for example, the education authorities turned their attention to the 
status of a teaching degree, a long- standing question whose resolution had 
been kicked down the road for three de cades. Unlike professional training 
programs in law, medicine, or engineering that required a bachillerato (a 
high school diploma), students could enter a normal straight from ju nior high 
school.111 This difference in schooling partly accounted for teachers’ lower 
pay and status. The 1972 reform made it pos si ble for students to receive 
their bachillerato alongside their teaching degree. To meet such standards, 
normales increased the number of required subjects, a change that propor-
tionally decreased courses in pedagogy.112 With this reform, instructors at 
normales  were expected to possess expertise in a par tic u lar field or fields 
(since they often taught more than one discipline) as well as the pedagogical 
methods of that field. The dust had barely settled on this reform when, in 
1975, the sep implemented an additional change that reduced the number 
of requirements by consolidating subject areas.113 Whereas the 1972 legisla-
tion emphasized subject knowledge, the sep now brought the focus back to 
teaching methods.114
 These reforms, which, like  others, took place without the educators them-
selves being consulted, generated chaos, especially since they began a mere 
three years  after the 1969 restructuring. The Revolutionary Teachers Move-
ment, a longtime pri challenger, issued a proclamation that put it best:
Normal education is in the utmost state of confusion and contradictions: 
confusion  because teachers and students ignore the programmatic content 
of many of the subjects they are to learn and develop in the coming aca-
demic year . . .  [and]  because a good portion of the teaching body does not 
know with certainty which subject they  will impart, if it  will be in their 
area of specialization or a diff er ent one. But they  will be obliged to im-
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part it owing to the continuously touted duty to serve. It is contradictory 
 because two diff er ent study plans are being carried out on the same cam-
pus, the 1969 and the 1972 restructured one.115
This critique highlighted a longtime sep tendency in which each presi-
dential administration unveiled a new education policy, which, time and 
again, sep bureaucrats had elaborated with no input from teachers.116 
No won der  these reforms did not achieve their objectives, condemned a 
normalista from Tenería: “the  grand pedagogues get together . . .  and de-
cide every thing a priori— programs, texts, methods, systems.”117 More often 
than not, such policies addressed symptoms of larger structural prob lems, 
especially in the countryside. “It’s like treating cancer with an aspirin,” com-
mented an op-ed on the reforms, “the headache  will be gone, but the patient 
 will never be cured.”118 Without a profound transformation of the system 
itself, student teachers experienced the changes as a haphazard reshuffling of 
class time, one “that takes hours from one subject to give to another, squeez-
ing into three years what should be distributed into eight or nine.” From a 
 labor perspective, the reforms  were even more problematic since “electronic 
minds” put it on teachers to resolve the prob lems of education through “ap-
peals to the spirit of sacrifice and the apostolic nature of teaching.”119 In the 
meantime, “we are subject to the same market laws as any other worker who 
sells their  labor power,” continued the normalista from Tenería, “we sell our 
intellectual work. We  can’t be asked for extreme sacrifice for  grand endeavors 
that mask sad realities.”120
During the 1970s, the sep’s professionalization strategy added academic 
pedigree but did  little in terms of substance. In fact, the logic was often 
contradictory. One of the justifications for the 1969 separation between se-
cundaria and teacher training had been that, with no obvious relationship 
between each cycle, an abundance of students enrolled in rural normales not 
 because of a desire to teach but  because they sought a ju nior high school 
education. Once they completed the secundaria years, rather than continue 
at the normal,  these students transferred to other educational institutions. 
Rural normales, argued the architects of the 1969 reform, should be the 
sole domain of  those with an inner love for teaching— the much- touted vo-
cación or mística. And yet the 1972 reform that established the simultaneous 
normal- bachillerato track held as its logic that  those with a calling to teach 
could pursue other  careers requiring a high school degree. Aside from the 
dizzying curricular back- and- forth  these changes implied for normales’ 
curriculum, rather than increasing the prestige of a teaching degree, the 
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change reinforced its inferior status vis- à- vis other professions since it basi-
cally equated a teacher- training degree with a high school education. Not 
only did it not improve the academic quality of normal education, but it 
triggered a mad rush for títulos (degrees), a tendency that did much to raise 
individual pay but  little for teachers’ overall collective status and material 
security.121 With the bachillerato degree, gradu ates of normales could pursue 
a licenciatura— roughly equivalent to a college degree—in education or in 
other  careers.  Those opting for the latter could follow it with a master’s and 
a PhD, making them eligible for high- ranking positions at teacher- training 
schools or in the sep administration.
With this change, the number of normales increased, especially in urban 
areas, contributing to an ever- growing sector of educators who  were urban in 
both background and training. Many teachers already in ser vice pursued 
their advanced degrees at the National Teachers School or the Higher Nor-
mal School of Mexico, where 80  percent of the student body  were part- time 
students gaining their specialization during the summer months.122 With 
 these degrees, teachers could improve their pay and status, an upward mo-
bility that for rural educators meant moving to the cities. The countryside 
would thus continue to lack teachers.
And yet the rural normal model was increasingly abandoned. Instead, nine 
Regional Normal Teaching Centers  were built, as  were thirty Experimental 
Normal Schools, improvised teacher- training schools that required far fewer 
resources than formal institutions.123 Moreover, the agricultural component, 
one of the curricular aspects that most differentiated rural normalistas from 
urban ones, decreased amid the changing course requirements implemented 
by the 1972 and 1975 legislation. This occurred, first,  because the new re-
forms reduced the number of required hours for agricultural classes and 
made them electives within normalistas’ three broad areas of study; and, sec-
ond,  because,  after the 1969 restructuring, much of the focus on farming be-
came concentrated in the institutions that had been transformed from rural 
normales into technical agricultural schools.  These schools drew the bulk of 
agricultural teachers.124
The 1969 reform that in rural normales separated the secundaria and pro-
fessional training added an additional hurdle for students from the poorest, 
most marginal areas. Given the high demand, gaining a spot at  these schools 
had long been difficult. The 1969 reform raised the bar since applicants 
now had to finish both elementary and ju nior high school before apply-
ing. In a country where, in 1971, only 9  percent of the  children from rural 
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areas finished elementary school (compared to 54  percent in the cities), this 
was no small feat.125 The socioeconomic characteristics of the eligible appli-
cant pool likely went up since, for the nation’s poorest campesino youth, a 
ju nior high school education would remain elusive. Accentuating this trend 
was the sep’s 1974 cancellation of the pase automatico (automatic ac cep-
tance) for gradu ates of technical agricultural schools, one of the few conces-
sions made to the fecsm during the 1969 restructuring. Thus, the fourteen 
schools meant to provide a secundaria education for the country’s rural poor 
now curtailed the opportunity for upward mobility offered by a teaching 
 career. Moreover, despite previous fecsm efforts to change the nature of 
the entrance exam, the sep preserved a single entrance exam for rural and 
urban normales, a test that privileged abstract over practical or technical 
knowledge.
The Echeverría administration did adopt a patchwork of programs to 
address the shortage of teachers in the countryside. The sep created new 
incentives for  those who taught in the countryside, including salary bene-
fits, housing, farming plots, opportunities for professional development, and 
promotions for  those who devoted more years to rural communities.126 It 
also granted some teaching positions to the communities themselves so that 
the funding would stay with the locality rather than follow the teachers, so 
many of whom transferred  after only a few years in remote communities. In 
addition, the sep instituted the position of community promoter, by which 
youth with a secundaria education could receive intensive course training to 
then teach in areas too small to build a school. This policy was especially sig-
nificant for indigenous communities, whose owner ship of the position began 
an ever- slight reversal in the sep’s long- standing acculturation model.127
But education policy did  little to address the country’s grave social prob-
lems. The economic crisis of the 1970s accentuated the in equality that had 
characterized the Mexican miracle, and Echeverría’s increased spending im-
proved neither education’s quality nor access to it.128 The benefits continued 
to accrue to the urban upper and  middle class, a tendency reflected in the 
fact that higher education served only 4   percent of the school- age popu-
lation but absorbed 20  percent of school spending.129 President José López 
Portillo (1976–82) continued Echeverría’s policy; during his sexenio, enroll-
ment rates at universities increased 90.6  percent while  those at elementary 
schools grew only 34.4  percent.130 Between 1970 and 1976, the number of in-
stitutions of higher learning went from 400 to 646.131 By the early 1980s, the 
poorest rural and indigenous communities invested proportionately greater 
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amounts in their  children’s education.132 Overall, education became, as one 
study put it, “a relatively inexpensive means to compensate for the lack of 
opportunities of social mobility outside the school.”133
for many observers, the 1968 state vio lence at Tlatelolco marked the 
end of the revolutionary pro cess the pri had claimed to carry out over 
the course of four de cades. Some went as far as reevaluating the nature of the 
1910 revolution itself. Had it indeed marked the end of a dictatorship that 
ushered in a social justice proj ect? Or had it merely transformed Porfirio 
Díaz’s rule into a single- party dictatorship? As Echeverría sought desperately 
to convince the population of the former, guerrilla groups acted  under the 
logic of the latter.
Rural normales, which encapsulated the princi ples of redistributive justice, 
state consolidation, and upward mobility, complicated this dichotomy. Sys-
temically, they provided an outlet for a besieged rural population by offering 
campesino youth a chance to study and to eventually receive a stable, if mod-
est, income. That this was a generational improvement in their livelihood 
made rural normales a tangible revolutionary gain. For most gradu ates, this 
pro cess of upward mobility produced a life of po liti cal quiescence, and, iron-
ically, constituted a stepping- stone to urban life that fortified the pri itself. 
As Arturo Gámiz, the rural teacher- turned- guerrilla, lamented about nor-
malistas’ own education, “For  every one instructor who imparts revolution-
ary content, a hundred  will teach reactionary lessons.”134
Subjectively, however, rural normales’ uniquely radical genealogy made 
their pupils’ training as much po liti cal as academic. The revolutionary re-
gime’s original emphasis that teachers gradu ate as community leaders first 
had the effect of producing student leaders within the rural normales them-
selves. The boarding- school structure accentuated this tendency since it pro-
vided a context in which it was easier to or ga nize the student body than it 
would be to mobilize the population in rural communities. Given the con-
stant besieging of rural normales, individual advancement in fact depended 
on collective strug gle to defend the integrity of the institutions. This pro cess 
itself awakened a radical consciousness in a number significant enough to 
undermine the po liti cally palliative effects of the state’s education proj ect. In 
the long- term pro cess of state formation, consolidation, and legitimacy, this 
was an unintended lesson of revolution.
created in 1922, Mexico’s Ministry of Public Education (sep) consti-
tuted one of the revolutionary government’s most impor tant institutions 
of state consolidation. By building schools, publishing textbooks, and dis-
patching teachers throughout the country, it helped forge a national identity 
and established a strong, centralized state. Half a  century  later, the sep had 
grown to such an extent that the government found its bureaucratic morass 
an obstacle to enacting policy. Moreover, the National Union of Education 
Workers (snte), allied with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (pri) 
and including the entirety of workers associated with federal education— 
from teachers, to museum staff, to janitors, to members of the sep’s own 
bureaucracy— had become the largest  union not only in Mexico but in Latin 
Amer i ca. Its power had grown to such an extent that presidents had to con-
tend with a leadership not always in line with their education proj ects.
In the 1970s President Luis Echeverría sought to temper the snte’s power 
through two strategies. He appointed university- trained professionals— 
economists,  lawyers, engineers— over  career educators to key sep positions, 
and he created new administrative units throughout the country for teachers 
to pro cess paperwork related to pay, se niority, and benefits.1 This new struc-






to the capital but also bypassed  union representatives, who  until then had 
been the primary vehicles to address such  matters. Termed desconcentración 
(deconcentration) by lawmakers, the pro cess grew teeth through the latter 
part of the de cade as President José López Portillo increased the number 
of technocratic appointees to the sep and framed educational reforms as a 
 matter of school quality. Tensions with the pri’s longtime  union ally  were 
not long in emerging. Previous education policy based on the growth of the 
school systems had been mutually beneficial—to the government  because it 
could boast of the number of classrooms and schools built and to the snte 
 because such expansion grew its membership.2 But foregrounding quality 
not only precluded such growth but also entailed establishing mechanisms 
by which the sep, not the  union, more closely supervised and evaluated 
teachers.
As Mexico faced a crippling debt crisis in the 1980s, an increasingly tech-
nocratic governing class cut social spending, auctioned off state- owned in-
dustry, reduced tariffs, and weakened entities— such as unions— that might 
interfere with market dictums. Transnational corporations would steadily 
establish their dominance. This de cade thus marked the transition of the pri 
from a populist state party to a neoliberal one. The shift was dramatic for a 
party that had historically relied on a corporatist spending structure to exert 
dominance and mitigate capitalism’s most devastating effects. Just as signifi-
cantly, the shift to neoliberalism marked an affront to the 1917 Constitution, 
which had established a strong, socially conscious, nationalist state.
 Under the framework of efficiency, neoliberal mea sures began restructur-
ing most state entities. Transforming the education system to conform to this 
model would take time, but neoliberal doctrine reinforced previous efforts 
to “deconcentrate” the federal government’s hold on schooling.  Under the 
logic of decentralization, President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88) sought to 
hand over control of elementary schools and normales to state governments. 
Such a change threatened the snte’s very structure for it implied its frac-
ture into state syndicates, a transformation its leadership would not willingly 
accept. Nor  were state governments  eager to undertake the po liti cal,  labor, 
administrative, and economic responsibilities involved in decentralization.3 
This combined dynamic, together with the demo cratic teachers’ movement 
that since 1979 had been mobilizing in the country’s southern states, stalled 
de la Madrid’s initiative.
But his administration could boast of a diff er ent accomplishment, fi nally 
making a high school diploma (bachillerato) an entrance requirement for 
normales. In 1984 rural normales thus became colleges, a condition that, 
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theoretically, gave teachers the same professional status as doctors,  lawyers, 
and engineers. According to its proponents, this would improve education. Its 
detractors, who cited student- teacher ratios of forty- seven to one and a school 
system in which 56  percent of the nation’s elementary schools  were single- 
classroom, multigrade institutions, saw it as a counterproductive mea sure 
in a country still in need of rural teachers.4 The bachillerato requirement 
meant it would now take longer and be more expensive to become a teacher, 
reducing the profession’s accessibility to the poor. The results, according to 
one assessment,  were disastrous, first  because new courses, subjects, and ma-
jors  were simply added without the corresponding personnel or instructor 
training; and, second,  because  those who could opted to invest the extra four 
years of study in  careers that paid better.5
Significantly, though, much of the debate over the bachillerato require-
ment was subsumed by a larger  battle for the snte’s democ ratization. During 
the late 1970s and into the 1980s, rank- and- file teachers from Oaxaca, Chi-
apas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos, and Mexico State waged a power ful move-
ment that challenged both the government and the official  union. From the 
former, dissident teachers demanded better pay and benefits; from the latter, 
they sought the right to freely elect their own representatives. The teach-
ers’ revolt slowed down education’s decentralization. At a time of economic 
crisis and presidential transition, the pri could not afford to systematically 
antagonize the leadership of its most power ful corporatist organ ization. 
Not  until the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) would the 
sep’s administrative and bud getary decentralization be accomplished.
Gradu ates of rural normales came to occupy an impor tant role in the 
demo cratic teachers’ movement. In Chiapas, which along with Oaxaca con-
stituted the bulwark of demo cratic  unionism, the rural normal of Mactu-
mactzá produced a vocal leadership contingent. In central Mexico, Misael 
Núñez Acosta, a gradu ate of the rural normal of Tenería, Mexico State, and 
a longtime or ga nizer of laborers and colonos (newly arrived urban dwellers) 
became one of the movement’s most prominent figures. A member of the 
demo cratic executive committee in Mexico State, he was assassinated in 
1981 as he exited a community meeting. The gunmen killed a parent and 
wounded a teacher who accompanied him.  Later detained, the perpetrators 
reported that they  were hired by a snte adviser. This attack was not excep-
tional. Núñez Acosta was merely the most prominent victim in a movement 
that officials dealt with through threats, torture, kidnapping, and violent 
confrontations.6 His image and  those of Lucio Cabañas and Genaro Vázquez 
are  today the insignia of the National Coordinator of Education Workers, 
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which, since its founding in 1979, has waged a  battle for  union democracy 
and fought neoliberal reforms to the education system.
In 1992 President Salinas implemented the National Accord for the 
Modernization of Basic and Normal Education, which formalized in law the 
system’s decentralization. Building on the initiatives of his pre de ces sors and 
ousting the longtime snte leader Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, who opposed 
the decentralization, Salinas negotiated the terms of the reform with Elba 
Esther Gordillo, his choice to succeed Jonguitud Barrios. The arrangement 
let the snte preserve its national repre sen ta tion of education workers, while 
transferring administrative control to the states. The federal government 
maintained the power to formulate educational plans, programs, and ma-
terials; to write and update textbooks; to establish evaluation criteria; and 
to design and carry out professional development programs. States thus ac-
quired the administrative functions, while the central government preserved 
the normative ones.7 Such a division ensured the continuation of a strong, 
centralized executive with the power to align the education system with its 
changing po liti cal and economic vision. Indeed, the Salinas administration 
would make this evident in an initiative to rewrite the nation’s elementary 
school textbooks.
By 1992 the narrative of Mexico’s history textbooks found itself at odds 
with a de cade of structural reforms that had altered the economy in  favor of 
foreign investment, privatization of state industry, and reduction in public 
spending. Salinas’s neoliberal rhe toric and policies mirrored  those of Por-
firio Díaz, the dictator whose authoritarianism and liberal economic model 
had caused the revolution. Salinas’s solution was to rewrite history. Along 
with Ernesto Zedillo, then minister of education (and president from 1994 
to 2000), Salinas was closely involved in the writing and production of a new 
set of books that offered a revised vision of the Porfiriato, Emiliano Zapata, 
U.S. intervention, Lázaro Cárdenas’s presidency, and the Catholic Church. 
In their texts, Díaz was a modernizer rather than a dictator; Zapata was a mil-
itary hero rather than an agrarian one; U.S. designs— rather than imperial— 
were inextricably linked to both nations’ pro gress; Cárdenas’s oil nationaliza-
tion was a necessity of World War I that was met by an understanding U.S. 
government; and the Catholic Church was treated in an uncharacteristically 
dispassionate manner.8 It is not, as one scholar wrote, that previous gener-
ations of textbooks “ were based on class analy sis, economic nationalism or 
‘Yankee- phobia.’ Their cele bration of Zapata’s revolt and Cárdenas’s presidency 
 were mostly lip ser vice from a regime  little concerned with their ideals. But the 
interpretive shift evident in the new texts is sufficient to suggest the influence 
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of a power ful new orthodoxy. Even lip ser vice to the old ideals had become 
intolerable.” Tellingly the church, the private sector, and the National Action 
Party, groups that had harshly critiqued the López Mateos and Echeverría 
administrations’ texts, not only praised the new books but directed their ire 
against the leftists who criticized them.9 Still, the general outcry was so  great 
that Salinas and Zedillo ultimately pulled the texts, demonstrating that the 
consolidating ele ments of revolutionary state formation could not easily be 
written away.
EDUCATION REFORM AND NORMALISTA RE SIS TANCE
Vicente Fox’s 2000 presidential victory unseated the pri from a position it 
had held for seventy- one years.  Under the historically right- wing National 
Action Party, President Fox and his successor, Felipe Calderón (2006–12), 
continued the pri’s neoliberal policies and used the pri’s previous allies to 
do so. When Calderón implemented an education reform bill mandating 
universal testing for students and teachers, he did so with the support of 
the snte and its by then notoriously corrupt leader, Elba Esther Gordillo.10 
 These new standardized tests would be a principal mechanism for hiring 
and promotion, thus undermining se niority rights and long- established job 
guarantees. Gordillo expressed her own contempt for rural normales when 
in 2010 she declared that they constituted guerrilla seedbeds and that it was 
necessary to close at least some of them. She had previously suggested they 
be turned into centers to train workers for the tourist industry.11 If for most 
of the twentieth  century rural normalistas had been villainized as communists, 
agitators, and subversives, more recent epithets labeled them vandals, pseudos-
tudents, and troublemakers. In the neoliberal era, normalista fights became in-
creasingly defensive, responding to ever- creeping cuts to resources and schol-
arships and charges that they had no place in a predominantly urban nation.
Salinas’s decentralization shifted the target of normalista grievances from 
federal authorities to state ones. For the most part out of the public eye, rural 
normales drew attention when the authorities violently quelled their pro-
tests. During  these moments the press issued a consistent script: normalistas 
 were more interested in wreaking havoc than in studying. Students’ poor and 
often indigenous background, moreover, evoked racialized dismay that they 
could not merely be grateful for the opportunity to study. Given that bud-
gets  were now in the hands of governors, normalistas increasingly had to pe-
tition local authorities for the resources due to them. This further fractured 
the Mexican Federation of Socialist Campesino Students (fecsm), which 
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during the 1970s and 1980s had already been seriously weakened. While students 
from  sister normales traveled to each other’s schools to lend solidarity, the pre-
vious dynamic in which the fecsm leadership negotiated with the federal sep 
authorities in the name of the entire system was rendered untenable.
Radical in their history and fierce in their protests, normalistas continued 
to act in ways that led to dramatic episodes (see figure E.1).12 One of  these, 
at the rural normal of El Mexe, Hidalgo, took place in February 2000, in 
response to the authorities’ takeover of their campus. El Mexe’s students had 
or ga nized a strike protesting the governor’s latest round of enrollment cuts, 
a creeping trend throughout the 1990s. Their protest had already resulted in 
so many student detentions that teachers and parents set up camp in the state 
capital demanding their release. When the governor sent a riot squad to dis-
mantle the encampment and retake the normal, the repression meted out by 
the police elicited the ire of surrounding communities. Before long, residents 
had surrounded the school and detained about seventy policemen. Stripped 
of all but their trousers, the policemen  were lined up, tied, and laid facedown 
on the public square.  There the community members submitted them to a 
public judgment. So incensed was the crowd that the police risked a collective 
lynching. But cooler heads prevailed, and they  were eventually exchanged for 
the detained normalistas. It was a pyrrhic victory. Three years  later, the gover-
nor closed the school dorms, and shortly thereafter his successor turned the 
normal into a polytechnic university.
In the southern state of Chiapas, equally dramatic events unfolded in the 
rural normal of Mactumactzá in August 2003.  There students, faculty, and 
parents or ga nized numerous protests against Governor Pablo Salazar Men-
diguchía’s plan to implement competitive standardized tests to determine 
which gradu ates would be hired as teachers. Reportedly recommended by 
the World Bank, this mea sure replaced a key feature of the rural normal sys-
tem: the guarantee of a job for their gradu ates.13 Students or ga nized marches, 
protests, and roadblocks and commandeered numerous public and private 
transport vehicles, which they held at their school. To recover the vehicles, 
the governor launched a police incursion into the normal, which  housed not 
only students but faculty, staff, and their families. Captured video footage 
shows merciless police beatings, bloodied staff, and  children wailing from 
the effects of tear gas.14 One school- bus driver was killed. That fall, the gover-
nor cut enrollments by half and closed the school dorms and cafeteria.
In 2012 normalistas in the state of Michoacán waged an especially strong 
 battle against the implementation of President Calderón’s education reform 
bill. Student demand for spots in rural normales— valued as much for the 
figure E.1 Under the police boot is a student from the rural normal of Ayotzinapa 
who, together with his peers, had taken over tollbooths on the Mexico City– Acapulco 
highway demanding teaching jobs upon graduation. La Jornada, December 1, 2007. 
Photo graph by Pedro Pardo.
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 free education they provided as for the guarantee of a job  after graduation— 
began to falter, providing officials a justification to further cut their funding. 
Staunchly supported by business groups such as Mexicans First, the education 
reform bill included a change in the curriculum at normales placing a strong 
emphasis on English- language and computer skills. Dissident teachers and 
normalistas opposed an education curriculum that privileged En glish over 
indigenous languages and emphasized computer- based pedagogy when so 
many teachers  were assigned to communities with no electricity. Such critiques, 
responded supporters of the reform, reflected an unwillingness to adopt the 
princi ples of pro gress and modernity.
The demo cratic teachers’  union, the National Coordinator of Education 
Workers, protested the lack of teacher participation in the new curricular 
design and its universal quality, which meant that students in the indigenous 
sierra of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, and Michoacán would be taught and 
tested on the same material as  those in the cities of Guadalajara, Monterrey, 
and the country’s capital. In an attempt to halt its implementation, repre-
sentatives from Michoacán’s eight normales demanded talks with the state 
governor, Fausto Vallejo. Especially militant  were the students from the rural 
normal of Tiripetío, the indigenous normal of Cherán, and the regional ed-
ucation center of Arteaga. When the governor refused to engage in any sort 
of negotiations, students sequestered forty passenger and cargo vehicles. To 
recover them, Governor Vallejo raided their schools, leading to confronta-
tions that left numerous students injured and 176 arrested; dramatic photos 
show transport vehicles in flames. But the show of force succeeded only in 
galvanizing more student and teacher mobilizations. At the risk of facing a 
repeat of the 2006 Oaxaca rebellion in the context of Enrique Peña Nieto’s 
presidential inauguration, Governor Vallejo freed the detained students and 
postponed the implementation of the reform in Michoacán.15
The  battles between teachers and the government would intensify during 
the next sexenio as the Peña Nieto administration implemented a new round 
of education reforms, most of which deepened the provisions of the previous 
initiative and enacted constitutional changes undermining teachers’  labor 
rights. Testing would be increased and now had punitive consequences for 
teachers’ tenure; an education at a normal would no longer be required to 
become a teacher; and collective bargaining rights  were curtailed. At rural 
normales, gradu ates would no longer be guaranteed a job  after graduation, a 
mea sure that  today stands as the greatest threat to  these schools (map E.1). 
Without the promise of  labor security, applications to the schools have 
gone down dramatically, a tendency state governors have used to reduce their 
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5 Cañada Honda, Aguascalientes
6 Hecelchakán, Campeche
7 Mactumactzá, Chiapas
8 El Mexe, Hidalgo
9 Panotla, Tlaxcala
 Schools
10 El Quinto, Sonora
11 San José, Tamaulipas
12 San Marcos, Zacatecas
13 Saucillo, Chihuahua
14 Tamazulapan, Oaxaca
15 Tenería, Mexico State
16 Teteles, Puebla
17 Tiripetío, Michoacán
Source: Compiled by author based on vari ous sources, including sep documents, news reports, and 
personal visits to schools.
Note: This map should be taken with a degree of caution since most sources contain errors and 
inconsistencies.
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funding. Overall, Peña Nieto’s reform paved the way for increasing school 
privatization by facilitating corporate sponsorship.16 The education bill was 
part of a broader set of reforms known as the Pact for Mexico that privatized 
oil and eased restrictions on the extraction of natu ral resources. So drastic 
 were  these new mea sures that they required changes to the constitution, 
which  were supported by all three major po liti cal parties, despite their gen-
eral lack of popularity.
Few groups  were as militant in their re sis tance to the Pact for Mexico 
as teachers. To  counter their mobilizations, the state wielded massive force 
and implemented a media campaign so extensive that its costs exceeded the 
2017 public relations allotment by 2700  percent. In fact, the spending sur-
passed funding amounts for the normales themselves.17 Teachers, moreover, 
boycotted and protested the mandated tests, so much so that some testing 
sites counted a greater number of police than test takers, with evaluations 
administered  under a virtual state of siege.18  There was also bloodshed, such 
as the June 2016 killing of 8  people and the wounding of 150  others in the 
Mixtec community of Nochixtlán, Oaxaca, as armed police moved to dis-
mantle roadblocks set up by teachers and their supporters.
So unpop u lar was the education reform that many analysts believe it cost 
Education Minister Aurelio Nuño the pri’s nomination for the presidency. 
More generally, the corruption scandals that plagued Peña Nieto’s adminis-
tration; the state’s involvement in massacres such as  those in Tlatlaya, San 
Fernando, Ayotzinapa, and Nochixtlán; the Pact for Mexico in general; and 
the education reform in par tic u lar help explain the landslide victory of the 
left- leaning candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2018. Among other 
promises, López Obrador vowed to overturn the education reform. To nor-
malistas he pledged the reopening of the rural normal of El Mexe, a promise 
half borne out when in 2019 he reinaugurated it as a normal but without its 
boarding school.
A NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY
At the dawn of the twenty- first  century, as the populations of most Latin 
American countries rebelled against neoliberalism by electing progressive and 
even socialist governments, Mexico’s presidential administrations proceeded 
to deepen the structural reforms begun in the 1980s. It is not that Mexicans 
did not protest. On the contrary, the Chiapas indigenous rebels who on Jan-
uary 1, 1994, launched an armed revolt against the government inaugurated 
a global re sis tance to neoliberalism. But Mexico’s technocratic elites weath-
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ered the storm, moving in fact more to the right, first with the election of 
the National Action Party in 2000, whose candidate, Vicente Fox, touted 
his business expertise (he had been head of Coca- Cola in Mexico) as a chief 
qualification for  running the country, and then with Felipe Calderón, who 
declared a war on drugs and brought the army into the streets to wage it. 
When,  under a new and modern guise, the pri returned to the presidency in 
2012, Peña Nieto quickly revealed far more continuities than changes.  These 
came in his administration’s massive corruption scandals, the dismantling of 
what revolutionary gains remained, and the ignoring and then stonewalling 
of the investigation into the Ayotzinapa events, the largest attack on students 
since Tlatelolco.19
For close to a  century, right- wing groups have persecuted, demonized, 
and attacked rural normales and their gradu ates. Starting with the Catholic 
Church and hacendados during the 1920s and 1930s, moving through mid-
century elites, intensifying during the late 1960s and early 1970s period of 
faltering pri legitimacy and economic crisis, and accelerating with the tech-
nocratic reforms of the 1980s through the 2010s, rural normales have incurred 
the ire of  those intent on overturning the poor’s revolutionary gains. But rural 
normalistas have shown that burying justice is no easy pro cess. Perhaps 
 because of this, when President Calderón’s transition team prepared to hand 
over power to Peña Nieto in 2012, they listed the rural normal of Ayotzinapa 
as a “national security priority.” Their classified seventeen- page report stated 
that the “activism of the Ayotzinapa normalistas” presented a major “govern-
ability” concern.20
Mexico’s neoliberal de cades intensified the threats to rural normales (fig-
ure E.2). Indeed, the schools’ very logic  violated  every princi ple of a doctrine 
based on the primacy of the individual, the privatization of public goods, 
and the vulnerability of  labor. Presented by its proponents as a system based 
on market efficiency that was inextricably demo cratic and required minimal 
government involvement, in practice neoliberal reforms bred corruption, 
 were implemented through autocratic mea sures, and  were accompanied by 
exorbitant state spending for military and police forces. As free- trade agree-
ments created an environment that helped expand the drug economy—by 
devastating subsistence farming and massively increasing border traffic, to 
name but two examples— the war on drugs accelerated the pro cess of accu-
mulation by dispossession. Mining, logging, petroleum, fracking, and other 
extractive industries have benefited from the drug war as governments enact 
policies that displace populations, create industrial security zones, and finance 
elite guards to protect multinational corporations. The irony, of course, is 
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that the very forces charged with battling or ga nized crime are themselves 
intimately involved in the drug trade. In Mexico, where drug organ izations 
 were born and evolved from within the state, it is fitting that on the night 
of September 26, 2014, the authorities came to a drug lord’s aid to, as one 
investigative line shows, recover the precious heroin cargo contained, unbe-
knownst to the normalistas, in one of their commandeered buses.21
“If the 1994 guerrilla uprising in Chiapas helped crack open a longer 
history of armed strug gle and re sis tance against the pri,” writes Alexander 
Aviña, “then perhaps the recent 2014 forced disappearance of forty- three Ayo-
tzinapa normalista students in the northern region of Guerrero could aid in 
the uncovering of a longer history of state- sponsored (or at the very least, 
state- enabled) terror in southwestern Mexico.”22  There is a third layer that 
figure E.2 Mural on a dorm wall of the rural normal of San Marcos, Zacatecas. The 
mural lists the sixteen rural normales that existed in 2015. It also lists the normales of 
Cedral and Cherán, which, while not rural normales, were affiliated with the fecsm. 
It does not list the rural normal of San José, Tamaulipas, since its students are not 
affiliated with the federation. Photo graph by author.
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both events lay bare, the per sis tent legacy of the revolution, especially in the 
right to land and education it bequeathed to the country’s most marginal-
ized. When the Chiapas rebels  rose up against the government, they cited 
Salinas’s reform of Article 27 as the final straw in its decision to take up arms 
against the government. The president’s 1992 changes to the constitution— a 
prerequisite for the North American  Free Trade Agreement— privatized the 
ejido and declared all pending land petitions null and void. In their outcry 
from the southern corner of Mexican territory and  under the banner of the 
revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata, Mayan rebels elicited massive national 
and international support.
In a parallel if distinctive manner, the attacks against the normalistas in 
Guerrero ignited the fury of the Mexican citizenry and brought public at-
tention to the rural normales, institutions that heretofore had receded into 
the margins of recent history. Normalistas’ uncanny evocation of Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg, not to mention the 
ever- ubiquitous hammer and sickle that adorns their school walls, raised 
the eyebrows of more than a few— especially foreign— media correspon-
dents. That such old- left insignia  were a central trope of the de cades of rev-
olutionary consolidation seemed largely forgotten, despite the national and 
international popularity of Mexican muralists who celebrated communist 
utopias. Ephemeral in its implementation, socialist education was expansive 
in its legacy, and the Marxists who once abounded in the sep bequeathed 
a framework that, from below, the fecsm perpetuated. While historically 
modest in their goals— the preservation and improvement of their schools— 
rural normalistas have been radical in their ideology and daring in their ac-
tions, demonstrating the ambitious implication of the poor’s right to an ed-
ucation. The state’s 2014 response to Ayotzinapa students illustrated that if 
 there was anything new in the twenty- first- century pri, it was the extent to 
which it was infused by or ga nized crime. The normalista youth who unin-
tentionally laid this bare to the world did so  because of their long- standing 
radical tradition.
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Appendix: 
Sample Rural Normal Class Schedules
Sample schedules  were compiled from report cards and course listings from 
three individual normales. They likely varied from school to school depend-
ing on instructor, workshop, and land availability.
TABLE A.1  Rural Normal Class Schedules, 1937–1939
Grade Class













 Table A.1,  continued
Agricultural and industrial, 1st year Anatomy, Physiology, and Hygiene
Arithmetic and Geometry
Basic Agriculture
Drawing and Popu lar Arts
Home Economics
Language Arts























Use of Natu ral Resources
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 Table A.1,  continued
Professional Advanced Language Arts
Basic Agriculture
Drawing and Popu lar Arts
Educational Psy chol ogy
Home Economics
Modern Teaching Methods
 Music and Choir
Natu ral Sciences
Organ ization and Administration of 
Rural Schools
Physical Education




Rural Life: Structure and Betterment
Rural Trades
Science of Child Rearing
Social Guidance and Worker and  
Campesino Legislation
Source: Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Dirección General de 
Enseñanza Normal, Completion Certificate, c34232, Exp.15-27-6-11.
Note: Hours per week not available.
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 TABLE A.2  Rural Normal Class Schedules, 1943–1948
Grade Class Hours
















Geography of Mexico 3
History of Mexico 3








 Table A.2,  continued
Ju nior high, 3rd year Agriculture, Husbandry,  





Drawing and Modeling 2
En glish 3
Geography 3
History of Mexico 4
Hygiene 3




Professional, 1st year Biology 4







Po liti cal Economy 3
Psy chol ogy 4
Teaching Methods 6





Professional, 2nd year Child Development 4
Cosmography 3
Drawing and Plastic Arts 2
Ethics 4







Professional, 3rd year Art History and Aesthetics 3
Drawing and Plastic Arts 2








Theater and Dance 2




Source: Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Direc-
ción General de Enseñanza Normal, “Documentos relativos que amparan 
las asignaturas y calificaciones,” c34247, Exp.15-27-24-63.
* Document lists three hours daily, which is much higher than other years 
and should thus be taken with caution.
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 TABLE A.3  Rural Normal Class Schedules, 1954–1955
Grade Class Hours



















History of Mexico 2
















History of Mexico 3






Professional, 1st year Agricultural Activity 4
Directed Reading 5
Drawing 2









Psy chol ogy 3
Teaching Methods 6
Workshops 2

















Professional, 3rd year Art History and Aesthetics *
Drawing and Plastic Arts *
Elective *












Theater and Dance *
Workshops *
Source: Archivo Histórico de la Escuela Normal Rural de San Marcos, 
Zacatecas, “Horario,” c1955; and Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de 
Educación Pública, Dirección General de Enseñanza Normal, “Certifi-
cato de Estudios,” c34180, Exp.15-27-21-53.
* Hours not available.
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 TABLE A.4  Rural Normal Class Schedules, 1962–1963
Grade Class Hours





















History of Mexico 3
Home Economics 2









Ju nior high, 3rd year Agricultural Activity 6
Biology 3






History of Mexico 3
Home Economics 4
Language and Lit er a ture 3
Mathe matics 3
Mathe matics (option) 3
 Music 2
Physical Education 2
Professional, 1st year Agricultural Activity 4
Choir 5
Drawing 2








Psy chol ogy 3
Sports 5
Teaching Methods 6































Psy chol ogy of Teaching 
Methods
3
School Organ ization 3
Sports 5
Teaching Methods 6
Theater and Dance 2
Source: Archivo Histórico de la Escuela Normal Rural de Cañada Honda, 
Aguascalientes, “Horario de clases,” c30.
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 TABLE A.5  Rural Normal Class Schedules, 1971–1972
Grade Class Hours
Professional, 1st year Agricultural Activity 6
Anthropology 2
Child Psy chol ogy 4
Electives 2
History of Culture 4









Professional, 2nd year Agricultural Activity 6
Arithmetic and Geometry 3
Didactics 6
Electives 2
Ethics and Aesthetics 6
 Music 2
Physical Education 2








Professional, 3rd year Agricultural Activity 6
Dance 2
Electives 1
Geography and Cosmography 3
History of Education in 
Mexico
6






Source: Archivo Histórico de la Escuela Normal Rural de Cañada Honda, 
Aguascalientes, “Horario de labores docentes,” c38.
Note: Ju nior high no longer offered at normales.
Notes
Abbreviations
agn Archivo General de la Nación
ahenr/ch Archivo Histórico de la Escuela Normal Rural de Cañada Honda, 
Aguascalientes
ahenr/sm Archivo Histórico de la Escuela Normal Rural de San Marcos, 
Zacatecas
ahenr/t Archivo Histórico de la Escuela Normal Rural de Tamazulapan, 
Oaxaca
ahsep Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Educación Pública
c  Caja [Box]
Conalte Consejo Nacional Técnico de la Educación
deanr Departamento de Enseñanza Agrícola y Normal Rural
dfs Dirección Federal de Seguridad
dgen Dirección General de Enseñanza Normal
dgips Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales
Exp.  Expediente [Rec ord]
h Hoja [Page]
Leg. Legajo [File]
nara National Archives and Rec ords Administration
p- mac Presidentes, Manuel Ávila Camacho
sep Secretaría de Educación Pública
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Introduction
1. Three other  people  were also killed, and twenty- four suffered gunshot 
wounds, including seven normalistas. On the army’s tracking of the students, see 
Anabel Hernández and Steve Fisher, “La historia no official,” Proceso, Decem-
ber 13, 2014. For a blow- by- blow account of the attack on the normalistas and the 
state’s cover-up, see Hernández, Verdadera noche.
2.  Human Rights Watch, “Vanished.”
3. For example, just two and a half months  earlier, the military had killed 
twenty- two  people in Tlatlaya, Mexico State, claiming the casualties resulted 
from a confrontation with drug traffickers. Investigations soon revealed the mil-
itary had executed at least twelve of the individuals who  were unarmed or trying 
to surrender and altered the scene to look like a confrontation had taken place. 
A much larger massacre, of 193  people, mostly Central American mi grants, took 
place in 2011 in San Fernando, Tamaulipas. It was perpetrated by the Zetas cartel, 
but investigations also revealed the participation of Mexican police. On Tlatlaya, 
see  Human Rights Watch, “Mexico.” On San Fernando, see “Mexican Police 
Helped Cartel Massacre 193 Mi grants Documents Show,” npr, December 22, 
2014, https:// www . npr . org / 2014 / 12 / 22 / 372579429 / mexican - police - helped - cartel 
- massacre - 193 - migrants - documents - show.
4. While much of this vio lence took place  under the presidential administra-
tions of Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006–12), both from 
the National Action Party, the vio lence itself resulted from the pri’s decreased 
hegemony and the ensuing turf  battles. With the ascendance of opposition parties 
since the 1990s, the pri no longer held a mono poly over regional drug- trafficking 
power arrangements.
5. During the summer and fall of 1968, students from campuses across Mexico 
City or ga nized a series of protests. Initially sparked by the government’s excessive 
use of force against a skirmish between two rival high schools, the movement that 
developed soon issued a demand list that, among other  things, included freedom 
for po liti cal prisoners, the abolishment of Mexico City’s riot squad, and re spect 
for university autonomy. More generally, participants denounced the enormous 
amount of resources devoted to the Olympic Games Mexico was preparing to 
host that fall. On October 2, as students held a massive rally in Tlatelolco’s plaza, 
the army surrounded them and fired into the crowd, leaving an estimated two 
hundred to five hundred dead. Although it was known primarily as a student 
massacre, the mobilizations included many other sectors of the population who 
 were also victims of repression.
6. In the 1930s the rural normales became explic itly for the sons and  daughters 
of campesinos as well as the  children of rural teachers. The term campesino is itself 
expansive and generally refers to  those from the countryside who are poor.
7. For a sample of  these thinkers’ writing, see Loyo Bravo, Casa del pueblo.
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8. Paul Gillingham has studied this dynamic in Guerrero for the 1930s and 
1940s, but  there is  little other work for subsequent de cades or other regions. See 
“Ambiguous Missionaries.”
9. Grandin, Last Colonial Massacre, xvi.
10. On critical pedagogy see Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Paulo Freire 
emphasized that the means of transmitting knowledge  matter as much as the 
content. At rural normales the education pro cess rarely followed the dialogic 
approach envisioned by Freire.
11. For an overview of theories of consciousness, see Carpenter and Mojab, 
“Adult Education.”
12. See Thompson, Making of the En glish Working Class.
13. For a Latin American case study that looks at the diverse origins of con-
sciousness among Chilean workers, see Winn, Weavers of Revolution.
14. See, for example, Choudray, Learning Activism; and Kelley, Freedom 
Dreams.
15. Organ izations like the Black Panthers or the Young Lords, for example, de-
voted much time and energy to breakfast programs for Black and Brown  children, 
community health care, or campaigns to bring attention to toxic or dilapidated 
inner- city housing.
16. See, for example, Gould, To Lead as Equals.
17. For two works that detail this pro cess for dramatically diff er ent times and 
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